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Can foreign aid re-build a collapsed state? This dissertation addresses the paradox of 
lackluster reform in recipients of massive state-building assistance and questions whether current 
aid doctrine, organized around the principles of local ownership and donor coordination, can 
generate the incentives necessary to curb persistent state capture.
The backbone of the modern state is a Weberian bureaucracy that keeps itself honest by 
restraining public actors. The effectiveness of aid in pursuing this ideal depends crucially on the 
anatomy of state-building assistance:  the administrative politics  of  state  organizations  tasked 
with enforcing institutional change, the nature of the aid relationship that binds them to foreign 
donors, and the strategic dilemmas that donors face in their interactions among themselves and 
with recipient organizations. Theoretically,  state-building assistance is defined by a principal-
agent dynamic subject to the moral hazard problem, which can only be solved by deploying 
strong conditionality in favor of administrative enforcement; and by a donor collective action 
dynamic subject to the free rider problem, which can be solved more effectively by relying on a  
leading donor instead of an aid coordination mechanism.
I explore this analytical framework through a case comparison of the effects of foreign 
aid on the rationalization of the civil service, the fight against public corruption, and the civilian 
control of the security sector in post-conflict Sierra Leone (2000-2011) and Liberia (2003-2011). 
These two sub-Saharan African countries represent an ideal setting for comparative analysis, 
equivalent in terms of state collapse and aid dependence but exhibiting cross-country and within-
country variation in state-building assistance. The six case narratives, built around interviews 
with participating officials and primary documentation, confirm the theoretical expectations of 
the anatomy of state-building assistance: leading-donor conditionality is a more effective source 
of incentives for institutional change.
The  findings  of  this  dissertation  serve  as  a  springboard  for  a  new  set  of  analytical 
principles  for  state-building  assistance.  Faced  with  the  powerful  political  implications  of 
administrative reform, donors face a clear choice: Will they enable the continued capture of the 
state by corrupt elites? Or will they challenge them in order to induce meaningful and sustainable 
state-building?
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Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who will guard the guards themselves?)
Juvenal, Satire VI (1st-2nd century AD) 
And one should bear in mind that there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of  
success, nor more dangerous to administer than to introduce a new order to things; for he who 
introduces it has all those who profit from the old order as his enemies; and he has only lukewarm 
allies in all those who might profit from the new.
Nicolo Macchiavelli, The Prince (1513)
DFID’s support was based on a technocratic approach, carrying out analysis and then developing 
proposals on what should be reformed. This approach assumed three conditions were in place. 
First, that there was sufficient political will and interest in place. Second, that the donors and  
government shared a common vision of what type of civil service should emerge from the reform 
process. Third, that there was sufficient technical and management capacity in place in ministries 
and government to actually implement proposals. None of these conditions held...
United Kingdom Department for International Development (2008)
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1.  The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance
On January 16th, 2006, the grounds before the Capitol building in Monrovia swelled with 
an optimism unusual for a country ravaged by a 14-year long civil war. A new Liberian President 
had been democratically elected, the first African female head of state. As she prepared to give 
her inaugural address, expectations were high that the Harvard-trained Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a 
former World Bank official, would be able to galvanize the widespread thirst for change into an 
audacious program of national recovery. Beyond an entrepreneurial spirit and a not insignificant 
amount of luck, the daunting task would require “political will and a civil service that is efficient, 
effective and honest. . . . the creation of a meritocracy that places a premium on qualification, 
professionalism, and performance” (Government of Liberia 2006c). A tall order for any country, 
but  especially for  one  destroyed by decades  of  abuse of  public  office.  To that  end the  new 
President pledged to make corruption “the major public enemy,” and she called on her own 
ministers to lead by example. “Any member of my administration who sees this affirmation as 
mere posturing or yet another attempt by another Liberian leader to play to the gallery on this 
grave issue should think twice.” With this  thinly veiled threat ringing in the ears of all  key 
players  in  attendance  -political  leaders,  appointed  officials,  career  civil  servants,  and 
international partners- the stage was set for a state-building effort aiming to raise Liberia’s public 
institutions and organizations from the ashes of capture and collapse. 
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Barely one hundred miles across the Mano river in Liberia’s Western border, a similar 
scene would soon take place as a newly elected President inaugurated in Freetown the incoming 
Sierra Leonean legislature. On October 5th, 2007, the man stepping up to address the assembled 
Members of Parliament, high-ranking public servants, and members of the diplomatic corps was 
former insurance businessman Ernest Bai Koroma. Although hailing from a different background 
from  his  Liberian  counterpart,  this  newly-minted  President  formulated  in  his  speech  a 
remarkably  similar  diagnosis  of  the  ills  afflicting  Sierra  Leone:  he  specifically  decried  the 
“spates of indiscipline, both in the private and public sectors,” which had undermined economic 
development, and committed himself to instill a new culture of government. “In my government, 
effective management and discipline will be the standard ways of doing business, underpinned 
by an appetite for enforcing laws, rules and regulations” (Government of Sierra Leone 2007c). 
The days of opaque and unaccountable administration where over: “every Cabinet Minister will 
be productive, every civil servant will accomplish his or her duty with performance targets . . .  
Good governance will also require public accountability in every sector. In the classroom, the 
hospital,  government offices and everywhere public service is rendered.” Echoing the claims 
made by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Ernest Bai Koroma assumed office with a commitment of “Zero 
Tolerance” on corruption that he reiterated in his address before legislators, public servants, and 
representatives of foreign donors. His words left  no room for interpretation: “The culture of 
impunity that has taken root in Sierra Leone will be eliminated.”
These were both remarkable speeches, made by two presidents committed to rebuilding 
the  weakened  and  collapsed  state  institutions  of  their  respective  countries.  A difficult  task, 
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certainly, but one that they would not face alone, as the governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia  
would became the recipients of generous foreign aid from international partners. Together, local 
leaders and donors would draft comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and 
sectoral reforms, all of them designed according to the latest thinking on state-building theory 
and practice. The scale of foreign support fueling these programs was truly gargantuan: between 
2001  and  2010  Sierra  Leone  received  almost  $4  billion  in  official  development  assistance, 
amounting to a yearly average of 30% of the country’s gross domestic product; across the border, 
in the same ten years Liberia received $4.7 billion in foreign aid, on average equal to 29% of 
yearly GDP. These funds were disbursed by a small group of donors comprising former colonial 
powers, international financial organizations, and regional organizations, all of them willing to 
use Sierra Leone and Liberia as veritable laboratories for new models of assistance. With such 
massive inflows of foreign aid, and with such ostensible commitment to reform on the part of 
local  leaders  and international  partners,  any reasonable  observer  would  have  expected  post-
conflict state-building in these two small West African countries to be a resounding success. It 
was  not.  In  this  dissertation  I  generate  and  test  an  explanation  for  this  seeming  paradox, 
demonstrating how easily aid promises fall prey to donor politics, especially in contexts of state 
failure and collapse. Even best-case intentions can fail in the face of worst-case incentives. 
My  analytical  focus  is  the  anatomy  of  state-building  assistance:  the  administrative 
politics of state organizations tasked with enforcing institutional change, the nature of the aid 
relationship that binds them to foreign donors, and the strategic dilemmas that donors face in 
their  interactions  among themselves  and with  recipient  organizations.  I  explore  this  variable 
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anatomy through a comparison of six processes of assisted institutional change: civil  service 
reform, anti-corruption reform, and security sector reform in post-conflict Sierra Leone (2000-
2011)  and  Liberia  (2003-2011).  The  cases  strongly confirm the  central  logic  animating  this 
dissertation, namely that the effectiveness of state-building assistance depends crucially on the 
outcome  of  two  strategic  dilemmas:  an  agency  relationship  between  donors  and  recipients 
subject to the moral hazard problem, and a collective action relationship between donors subject 
to  the  free  rider  problem.  These  two  dilemmas  have  long  plagued  the  uneasy sleep  of  the 
international development community, but current doctrine and theory have neglected the central 
role of administrative politics in perpetuating them. By highlighting this forgotten side of state-
building politics, I also provide an alternative to the usual prescriptions: in order to overcome 
entrenched patterns of state capture and corruption, donors have to rethink the myth of local 
ownership  and  the  panacea  of  aid  coordination,  and  instead  they  have  to  confront  a 
fundamentally  political  challenge  through  a  fundamentally  political  approach,  one  which 
empowers local reformers by using conditional aid to alter the structure of incentives for change.
1.1  The Administrative Politics of State-Building and the 
Strategic Dilemmas of Assistance
State-building  in  post-conflict  countries  lacks  the  grandiosity  of  modern  European 
history:  no  warring  dynasties,  no  massive  armies  lined  up  on  the  battlefield,  no  powerful 
bureaucracies  gradually  emerging  over  centuries,  and  no  entrenched  conflicts  between 
socioeconomic classes. The outputs of such macro-historical struggles are simply taken as given: 
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on paper, countries are born (and reborn) with elaborate constitutions, legislative frameworks, 
standing armies,  and bureaucracies.  With all  the formal  trappings  of the state  in  place from 
inception,  post-conflict state-building reveals itself  as a much finer-grained -although no less 
political- process; it is almost personal, to the extent that the potential for state strengthening 
often lies in the hands of public servants who on a daily basis face the choice between upholding 
public  rules  or  using  their  office  for  private  gain.  The  aggregation  of  thousands  of  such 
individual  decisions,  across  the  panoply  of  ministries  and  agencies,  results  in  the  macro-
phenomena  that  state-building  scholarship  is  so  familiar  with,  the  stuff  that  cross-national 
governance indicators are made of: regulatory strength, control of corruption, and the rule of law. 
At the end of the day, however, it all begins with a basic, very personal question that a civil  
servant must answer: Do I follow the rules?
I  begin  this  dissertation  with  the  conceptual  claim that  state-building  is  not  just  the 
process of establishing new public organizations: it is the process of ensuring that the public 
actors inhabiting those organizations behave according to the standards of modern bureaucracy. 
While  the  former  is  a  question  of  institutional  design,  the  latter  is  a  matter  of  institutional 
enforcement, and more specifically, of administrative enforcement. Administrative rules are the 
lynchpin of the modern bureaucratic state, as conceptualized by German sociologist Max Weber 
a century ago and as pursued by aid agencies and reformist governments nowadays. Formalism, 
impersonality,  and written record in the exercise of public office are the fundamental norms 
governing state actors. They represent an ideal type, an analytical construct that cannot be found 
in the empirical world but that nonetheless serves as the standard by which real bureaucracies are 
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measured. Administrative institutions are also the source of enormous political tension, and their 
enforcement or violation crucially determines state strength and weakness on a fractal  level: 
every  morning  individual  public  officials  have  to  decide  whether  they  will  abide  by 
administrative rules and procedures,  and their  personal  choices  aggregate into organizational 
practices, inter-agency relations, and ultimately the dynamics of state-building and state failure. 
By shifting  the  focus  of  analysis  from institutional  design  to  institutional  enforcement,  this 
conceptualization also has momentous implications for the analysis of state-building assistance.
State-building  in  post-conflict  countries  lacks,  not  just  the  grandiosity,  but  also  the 
intimacy of European political  development:  few leaders have the opportunity to experiment 
with home-grown institutional templates without well-intentioned foreigners telling them what to 
do and how to do it. Though a bit lost between the conventional policy areas of humanitarian 
relief,  economic  development,  and  democracy  promotion,  state-building  as  an  international 
agenda  is  equally  shaped  by  the  ideas  and  resources  of  external  actors—a  community  of 
“donors”  encompassing  organizations  as  diverse  as  United  Nations  peacekeeping  missions, 
specialized   agencies  like  the  United  Nations  Development  Program,  international  financial 
institutions like the World Bank or the regional development banks, bilateral aid agencies from 
OECD  and  non-OECD  countries  alike,  and  their  omnipresent  sidekicks,  international  non-
governmental organizations. All these actors ostensibly deploy their expertise and resources in 
support of a local governance agenda, but in practice recipient governments in collapsed states 
seldom have the capacity to design strategies, let alone implement them. International “partners” 
provide them with technical assistance at  all  levels,  sometimes supplying their  own staff  for 
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training and project implementation units, in order to make sure that the massive inflows of 
foreign aid are put to their intended use and ultimately contribute to some kind of public good. In 
the  case  of  state-building,  the  public  good  is  institutional:  new  rules  at  all  levels  -from 
constitution to intra-departmental units- which ensure that the country is governed properly (and, 
indirectly,  that foreign aid is used effectively). Whether such aims can be achieved depends, 
fundamentally, on the interaction between two distinct sets of actors and organizations.
The protagonists of post-conflict state-building generally come in one of two categories. 
First there are foreign experts who have been hired to promote the establishment of modern 
public  sector  management  practices  in  an  utterly  incapable  ministry  or  agency,  and  whose 
counterparts  are  likely  to  be  bureaucrats  with  no  more  than  a  high  school  education  and 
politicians who in the morning will demand more money, only to publicly chastise foreigners in 
the afternoon for imposing alien ideas on their country. This is the sorry -if well-paid- task that  
confronts  the  international  bureaucrats,  development  experts,  seconded  civil  servants,  and 
military  advisers  who  are  building  states  around  the  world.  As  members  of  a  bilateral  or 
multilateral  aid  agency their  first  allegiance  is  to  their  employers,  and they rarely desire  to 
undermine them—regardless of actual impact,  evaluations sent home are likely to claim that 
progress is being made and that more funds are necessary to attain the stated objectives. That 
said, personnel in field offices are also prone to feeling that they are accountable to the recipient 
government or, more specifically,  to the recipient population—they have supposedly come to 
help them, after all, and their needs should be the overriding concern. The second category of 
post-conflict state-building actors includes local public officials, natural-born survivors who have 
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endured years of violence and uncertainty to emerge as providers of an extended family or an 
entire community (a village, a tribe, even a region), only to face a bevy of international partners 
who are all too willing to help them rebuild their country as long as they dismantle the very 
informal welfare structures that sustain their dependents. As representatives and “big men” of 
large networks of clients, these public officials owe their followers patronage dues for both very 
practical and very moral reasons—mouths need feeding, traditions need upholding. And yet as 
recipients  of  foreign  assistance  they are  forced  to  at  least  display a  semblance  of  reformist 
attitude according to international standards and best practices. Take now these two types of 
actors and have them work together toward a supposedly common aim. The resulting mix will 
contain cognitive dissonance in no small measure.
The process of assisting the development of effective state bureaucracies after collapse is 
shaped  by  one  conceptual  premise  and  two  strategic  dilemmas.  In  essence,  state-building 
requires public actors to substitute long-term and diffuse public institutions for short-term and 
tangible informal incentives. This is an especially demanding task in failed and collapsed states, 
in which state capture has become path dependent and thus the prospects of autonomous state-
building are minimal. The conceptual premise of state-building assistance is therefore a modicum 
of  resistance  to  meaningful  reform -that  is,  to  administrative  enforcement-  by  local  public 
officials.  The first  strategic  dilemma stems from the introduction of external actors into this 
institutional  dynamic: foreign donors aspiring to support state-building have to rely on local 
public  actors  for  implementation  of  their  assistance.  The  fact  that  donor  as  principals  and 
recipients  as  agents  may have  incompatible  objectives  is  likely  to  generate  a  moral  hazard 
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problem in which local actors take the foreign aid but do not carry out substantive reform. Even 
if aid dependence imbues donors with the ability to use their resources as a potential inducement 
against such moral hazard, the eventual dynamic of reform will depend on the nature of their 
interests:  specifically,  I  distinguish  between  committed  donors  focused  on  administrative 
enforcement, and uncommitted donors focused on administrative design. The second strategic 
dilemma arises from the proliferation of state-building donors, and is rooted in the fact that the 
effective use of foreign aid as an inducement for administrative enforcement is a public good for 
all aid actors, and as such it is subject to collective action dynamics. The potential free rider  
problem can only be solved by relying on an aid-coordination scheme, a strategy which itself 
generates a second-order problem, or on a disproportionately committed donor, a strategy which 
hinges crucially on that donor’s commitment to reform.
In combination, this conceptual premise and these two strategic dilemmas generate clear 
theoretical expectations for the success of state-building assistance, which I explore through a 
explanatory typology (Elman 2005) summarized in table 1.1 below and detailed in chapter 2.
Table 1.1: Explanatory Typology of State-Building Assistance
Single or leading donor Multiple donors
Administrative enforcement
(committed)
Tension
Political inducement
Conditionality solves agency
Subversion
Political inducement
“Weakest-link” conditionality
Administrative design
(uncommitted)
Concession
Technical inducement
Moral hazard problem
Diversion
Contradictory inducement
Common agency problem
Taken at the most abstract level of generality, this argument need not be restricted to 
state-building:  all  processes  of  assisted  change  can  in  principle  face  the  same  challenges. 
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However,  empirically all  processes  of  reform that  involve  public  actors  in  any way will  be 
affected by the strength of administrative institutions. When civil servants are not constrained by 
the principles of Weberian bureaucracy,  every policy decision becomes a potential  source of 
rents,  a  potential  target  for  state  capture.  Insofar  as  administrative  institutions  provide  the 
behavioral infrastructure for all forms of state action, state-building assistance can fundamentally 
improve the effectiveness of all aid channeled through -or working with- public organizations. 
Therefore, while in the abstract the strategic dilemmas of principal-agent assistance and donor 
collective action may be applicable to many policy areas, in practice they are likely to have the  
greatest impact on aid effectiveness when they unfold in administrative state-building.
I explore this theoretical framework through an empirical analysis of three broad areas of 
institutional change: the rationalization of the civil service, the fight against public corruption, 
and the civilian control of the security sector. These areas are also three of the most fundamental 
dimensions  of  the  modern  state,  and  I  discuss  their  practical  and conceptual  dimensions  in 
greater length in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
The first  task of post-conflict  state-building is establishing an effective,  efficient,  and 
accountable civil service capable of delivering public services to citizens. The administrative 
institutions of bureaucracy are imbued with a certain subversive quality, to the extent that they 
require the severance of informal obligations between state officials acting on an public capacity 
and their private social environment. Bureaucratization is thus the first line of defense against 
state capture. The second task of post-conflict state-building is ensuring that, once public actors 
are formally and rationally organized, their performance is constantly measured against standards 
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of public integrity and transparency. Anti-corruption administrative institutions protect the state 
against the abuse of public office for private gains; they are true reform multipliers, representing 
the core of the modern state’s immune system. The third task of state-building -even if it  is  
usually the first one on everyone’s mind- is developing the ability of the state to protect itself  
from  external  and  internal  threats  without  becoming  a  praetorian  organization.  The  twin 
“problematiques” of civilian control and democratic governance represent attempts to enforce 
administrative  institutions  on  coercive  actors  jealous  of  their  organizational  autonomy  and 
symbolic prominence in national politics.
These three programs of reform are central components of the institutional agenda that 
foreign donors and local leaders officially seek to promote in post-conflict settings. In that sense 
they represent  an intersection of policy challenge and conceptual formulation,  and while  the 
former is often confined to the specific conditions of each case, the latter can help us develop a 
better  understanding of state-building assistance as a political  process defined by conditional 
institutional enforcement.
1.2  The Limitations of Current Aid Doctrine and Conventional 
Reform Theory
One  might  wonder,  at  this  point,  what  an  entire  dissertation  devoted  to  obscure 
administrative  processes  in  remote  and  unimportant  African  countries  can  contribute  to  an 
already large body of aid and state-building research. My answer is simple, yet ambitious: better 
concepts  for  better  policy.  Specifically,  I  aspire  to  make  two  main  contributions  with  this 
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dissertation.  First,  I  argue  that  administrative  politics  call  for  a  theory  of  change  that 
problematizes  institutional  enforcement,  not  just  institutional  design.  This  entails  a  shift  of 
analytical focus from political regimes toward state bureaucracies, and from the limitations of aid 
toward the strategic interactions that it  generates. Second, I  argue that this theory of change 
justifies a revision of the principle of ownership in current aid doctrine, as well as an explicit 
reassessment  of  conditionality  as  a  political  instrument  for  post-conflict  state-building.  By 
deploying  fundamental  concepts  and  analytical  tools  in  combination  with  detailed  cases  of 
assisted reform I aspire to challenge the conventional wisdom that has emerged in practitioner 
and academic circles over the last two decades.
State-building became a development priority in the 1990s. After more than a decade of 
structural  adjustment  programs  focused  on  deregulation  and  privatization  as  a  solution  to 
government insolvency, practitioners and researchers alike reached the conclusion that one of the 
main problems of developing economies (especially in Africa) was not so much the excess of 
state  as  its  deficit  (Goldsmith  1999,  2000). Marketing  boards,  parastatals,  and  other  state 
organizations did not actually embody a desire to over-regulate the economy and society, but the 
incentive to derive rents from the only consistently liquid segment of an impoverished economy 
(Krueger 1974; van de Walle 2001). Development policy thus turned away from deregulation and 
toward  the  promotion  of  an  institutional  environment  conducive  to  economic  growth.  The 
realization that the state should be rethought as an instrument of development, not an obstacle to 
it, attained its most popular expression in the 1997 World Development Report published by the 
World Bank, with the title “The State in a Changing World” (World Bank 1997). Drafted with 
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advice from some prominent scholars of institutional economics, the Report brought institutions 
(“the rules of the game”) into the spotlight, and it highlighted the politics that arise around the 
costs and benefits that they generate for actors, that is, their incentive structure. In many ways 
the  Report’s  prescriptions  for  the  public  service  encapsulated  the  ideal-typical  features  of 
Weberian bureaucracy: formalism, impersonality, and organizational rationality.
Just as the development community formulated a new set of institutional objectives for 
the promotion of state effectiveness, however, it  came to simultaneously deprive itself of the 
means to  confront  the institutional  politics inherent  to  state-building.  The years of structural 
adjustment  had  also  brought  the  realization  that  conditionality,  the  use  of  foreign  aid  as  an 
incentive to pursue difficult reforms, for the most part did not actually work as intended (Nelson 
1990; Rodrik 1990; Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993; Killick 1997; World Bank 1998; Dreher 2009; 
Wright and Winters 2010). Instead, many assistance processes devolved into what Tom Callaghy 
called the “ritual dances of reform,” an iterated dynamic of negotiation and disappointment in 
which recipient governments promised to reform in exchange for aid and international donors 
promised  to  believe  them  (Callaghy  and  Ravenhill  1993).  A pattern  of  “permanent  crisis” 
emerged throughout Africa, in which political leaders failed to pursue any policy or institutional 
reform which threatened the rents from public office captured by their patrimonial constituents 
(Herbst  1990;  Dollar  and  Svensson  2000;  van  de  Walle  2001;  Wright  2010).  The  logical 
conclusion of a decade of failed reforms was to rethink the value of conditionality as a policy 
instrument, and to gradually shift toward selectivity, a system of aid-for-policies in which good 
performers would be rewarded (Nelson 1996). By the end of the 2000s, the development world 
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had  ostensibly  abandoned  conditionality  and  substituted  it  with  a  new  operating  principle, 
“ownership,” according to which assistance should always be designed on local strategies and 
priorities  (Chesterman  2007;  OECD  2005;  World  Bank  2005).  I  will  discuss  the  analytical 
limitations of ownership as a guiding principle in chapter 7. Suffice it to say for now that through 
this new paradigm the community of aid donors were responding to the political challenges of 
structural  adjustment  with  a  doctrinal  retreat  from  any  political  entanglement,  jettisoning 
whatever leverage for reform their resources may have given them.
In academic circles, too, the failure of institutional conditionality was met with an odd 
shift in attention from the characteristics of recipients to the characteristics of donors. A new 
intellectual and political climate emerged within donor countries in which aid was claimed to be 
“dead,” or at the very least in need of major reinvention (Easterly 2006, 2008; Banerjee 2007; 
Riddell 2007; Barder 2009). A not inconsiderable amount of time and effort were devoted to 
critiquing aid  itself  as  a  cause  for  institutional  weakness  in  aid-dependent  states:  instead  of 
promoting a strong system of rules for economic growth, the new conventional wisdom held, 
donors  were  culpable  of  major  distortions  in  recipient  state  organizations,  diverting  local 
officials’ attention  from  actual  problems,  “poaching”  human  capital  away  from  indigenous 
organizations, and weakening accountability by privileging the executive branch to the detriment 
of the legislature  (Moore 1998; Bräutigam 2000; Svensson 2000; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; 
Remmer 2004; Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle 2006; Knack and Rahman 2007; Morrison 
2009;  Wright  and Winters  2010;  see  Goldsmith  2001 for  a  rebuttal  of  this  approach).  This 
concern with the legitimacy and limitations of donors accounts for much of the content of the 
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Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which largely blames them for the ineffectiveness of 
development assistance across the board  (OECD 2005). Instead of directly addressing reform 
politics and the challenges of conditionality, through the emphasis on ownership and selectivity 
foreign aid had come to rely, as it were, on the kindness of strangers.
An  unintended  consequence  of  soul-searching  and  self-examination  was  that  the 
development community neglected its theory of change, especially as it concerns state-building. 
What if local leaders are unable to overcome political resistance to reform? And most crucially 
for the cases in this dissertation and for current processes of post-conflict state-building around 
the world: What  if  leaders adopt  institutional  changes but  state bureaucracies fail  to enforce 
them? Within political science, the original effort to “bring the state back in” opened up the 
possibility of discussing policy reform both in terms of state-society relations and of bureaucratic 
politics  (Skocpol 1979; Krasner 1984;  Evans,  Rueschemeyer,  and Skocpol  1985; Tilly 1990; 
Barkey and Parikh 1991). However, recent research on the political economy of development has 
overwhelmingly  followed  the  first  path,  focusing  on  the  state  as  an  arena  for  competition 
between  different  social  interests.  Scholars  working  within  this  approach  have  devoted 
themselves to investigate why political leaders adopt certain policies and not others, or why they 
provide certain public goods and not others, and in so doing they have exhibited a seemingly 
limitless fascination with democracy and autocracy, veto points, interest groups, and economic 
classes (Bates 1981; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Haggard and Webb 1993; Geddes 1994; Boix 
2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Keefer 2007; Gandhi 2008; Haggard, MacIntyre, and Tiede 
2008; Pepinsky 2009; Slater 2010). But the fact is that this line of research is often concerned 
15
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 1
with institutional design, not institutional enforcement (Levitsky and Murillo 2009), and whereas 
the former is intrinsic to political regimes (that is, to systems for the design of rules), it is to the 
latter  that  we  must  turn  to  if  we  are  to  fully  understand  state-building  politics.  Even  the 
burgeoning research  agenda on fiscal  state-building,  which  should  in  principle  focus  on  the 
administrative politics of taxation, can sometimes fall prey to this regime bias by emphasizing 
the centrality of the fiscal contract between governments and citizens (Moore 1998; Bräutigam, 
Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008).  This tendency within modern political economy of development 
severely limits our ability to understand administrative state-building, a politics of reform which 
takes place not at the level of the regime, but at the level of the bureaucracy.
The twin focus on donor organizations and political regimes to the detriment of actual 
state organizations is also evident in the nascent field of state-building and intervention studies 
(e.g. Zisk Marten 2004; Brinkerhoff 2007; Call and Wyeth 2008; Kaplan 2008; Paris and Sisk 
2009). Clare Lockhart and Ashraf Ghani are the authors of one of the most prominent policy 
books  on  state-building  assistance,  distilling  their  experiences  in  post-2001  Afghanistan  (as 
foreign adviser and Minister of Finance, respectively) into a central prescription for successful 
state-building: a new social compact between leaders and citizens, that is, a refoundation of the 
political regime (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). Roland Paris, a prominent analyst of post-conflict 
peace-building, also focuses on regime institutions in his analysis of unstable democratization 
before comprehensive institutionalization  (Paris  2004). And even Simon Chesterman, who is 
otherwise an ardent critique of the ownership norm, focuses on the contradictions of using an 
intrinsically authoritarian means such as international transitional administration to establish a 
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liberal democratic state  (Chesterman 2004). It has been Francis Fukuyama, of all people, who 
after reneging on his earlier claim about the “end of history” has come to recognize the truly 
central role of  Weberian public administration in the process of state-building (Fukuyama 2004, 
2011).
 In this dissertation I seek to add to these debates in two ways. First, I want to reclaim a 
conceptual  space  for  state-building  that  is  not  subordinated  to  regime  politics,  one  that  is 
grounded  in  the  anatomy of  institutional  change  at  a  bureaucratic,  administrative  level.  By 
problematizing implementation and enforcement, as well as the rules and regulations that govern 
public  actors,  I  seek  to  shift  the  analytical  spotlight  onto  a  different  layer  of  state-society 
relations which is not necessarily tied to levels of democracy or interest groups. Second, I want  
to use this conceptual space as the springboard for a theory of change that can explicitly connect 
donor politics with recipient politics. By articulating such theory with some of the most basic 
analytical  tools  of  modern  political  economy (agency and  collective  action)  I  seek  to  bring 
conditionality back into the aid conversation, and to demonstrate that state-building assistance 
can work when it fully takes into consideration the administrative politics of enforcement. Only 
then can it aspire to effectively promote the establishment of public organizations according to 
the Weberian ideal.
1.3  Two Countries and Six Cases of State-Building Assistance
Of all the instances of assisted post-conflict reconstruction at the turn of the 21st century, I 
focus on Sierra Leone and Liberia, two sub-Saharan African countries which offer an almost 
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ideal testing ground for my typology on the anatomy of state-building assistance in that they 
exhibit remarkably similar initial conditions but have received very different types of support.
In  terms  of  similarities,  they  share  an  identical  termination  of  protracted  hostilities, 
mediated with the help of regional diplomacy, a military backer, and UN peace-keeping; they 
have held peaceful, free and fair elections (2002 and 2007 in Sierra Leone, 2005 and 2011 in 
Liberia); they have similar legacies of undemocratic rule and private capture of state institutions; 
they have undergone an almost complete merging of politics and coercion; and neither of them is 
strategically significant (e.g. in terms of natural resources) for external actors. Table 1.2 presents 
a comparison of basic political and economic indicators for both countries when hostilities ended 
(2001 in the case of Sierra Leone and 2003 in the case of Liberia): although Sierra Leoneans 
seemed to be slightly wealthier than their neighbors, both countries exhibited marked poverty 
and similarly low levels of democratization and governance indicators.
Table 1.2: Sierra Leone and Liberia, Basic Indicators After Civil War
Sierra Leone 2001 Liberia 2003
Population (millions) 4.30 3.04
GDP (current US$ millions) 805.66 410.20
Per capita GDP (PPP, current US$) 437 308.69
Polity2 2 1
WGI Government Effectiveness -1.51 (2002 data) -1.50
WGI Regulatory Quality -1.27 (2002 data) -1.69
WGI Rule of Law -1.33 (2002 data) -1.68
WGI Control of Corruption -0.75 (2002 data) -1.22
Sources: World Development Indicators, Polity IV Data Series Version 2010 (indicator ranging from -10 to +10),  
Worldwide Governance Indicators (ranging from -2.5 to +2.5).
Above all, the legacies of state capture and collapse were equally pronounced on both 
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sides of the border. Though coming from drastically different colonial origins, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia converged over time on a institutional path of failure under the respective patrimonial 
regimes of Siaka Stevens (1967-1985) and Samuel Doe (1980-1990). These parallel dynamics 
became violently entwined during the Mano River conflicts of the long 1990s (1989-2003), in 
which the Sierra Leonean and Liberian states virtually collapsed under the weight of insurgents 
and rapacious public actors. After conflict, local elites in both countries were faced with the same 
challenges:  ensuring  domestic  peace  through  electoral  democracy,  and stimulating  economic 
recovery  through  foreign  aid.  Sierra  Leone’s  post-conflict  politics  were  shaped  by  the 
administrations  of  Ahmad  Tejan  Kabbah  (1996-2007)  and  Ernest  Bai  Koroma  (2007-2012), 
protagonists of the central political rivalry between the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party and the All 
Peoples’ Congress.  In Liberia  an interim National  Transitional Government  (2003-2005) was 
succeeded  by  the  democratic  presidency  of  Ellen  Johnson  Sirleaf  (2006-2012),  whose 
administration was defined by the minority status of her Unity Party in the Liberian legislature. I 
review these political and institutional dynamics in greater detail in chapter 3.
There are some differences, of course, which can be invoked as alternative hypotheses for 
the  variable  success  of  state-building  assistance  in  these  countries.  Colonial  legacies,  for 
instance, could conceivably have significant effects. Freetown became a British Crown colony in 
1806, with the rest of Sierra Leone following as a protectorate in 1896. Liberia, in turn, was 
founded and colonized in 1821-22 by freed American slaves, who in 1847 founded a republic 
modeled on the government of the United States. Another competing explanation could be the 
fragmentation of the party system, which can make the political  compromises necessary for 
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institutional reform difficult or even impossible. The greater the number of parties in the Liberian 
legislature compared to  Sierra  Leone (eleven and three,  respectively)  could  mean that  more 
interests had to be incorporated into a ruling coalition, and therefore that policy agendas were 
more prone to  hijacking by particularistic  interests.  However,  these country-  or regime-level 
factors  can  seldom  account  for  the  kind  of  within-country  variation  that  I  explore  in  this 
dissertation. Bureaucratic capacity could be invoked in that case as a plausible cause for variable 
organizational  effectiveness.  However,  the  capacity  scapegoat  simply  cannot  explain  why 
similarly endowed organizations -or even the same organization,  at  different times- enforced 
administrative institutions to different degrees.
I focus on a different causal mechanism: the specific patterns of donor assistance for each 
state-building process. In particular, I am interested in the different identities and agendas of aid 
actors and how these inform their interactions with local actors and other donors. The United 
Kingdom was Sierra Leone’s leading international partner, as was the United States in Liberia. 
The specific identities and aid strategies of these bilateral donors, together with their changing 
interactions  with  other  key donors  like  the  World  Bank,  European Commission,  and United 
Nations Development Program, have shaped the post-conflict process of state-building in these 
two African countries. Each of the six cases represents a different instance of the core analytical 
logic of this dissertation: due to the entrenched structure of incentives for state capture, it  is 
variation in the identity and interests of donors that results in divergent expressions of the two 
strategic dilemmas, as shown in table 1.3 below.
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Table 1.3: Case Comparison of State-Building Assistance
Sierra Leone Liberia
Civil Service Reform
First period of Concession: UK as 
leading donor focused on 
administrative design. Second period 
of Diversion: UK conditionality 
undermined by EU, UNDP, and WB 
focus on design.
Diversion: Multiple donors with 
disparate interests mostly centered 
on administrative design.
Anti-Corruption Reform
Tension: UK as leading donor 
focused on administrative 
enforcement; its conditionality 
prompts institutional change.
Subversion: Coordinated 
Governance and Economic 
Management Assistance Program 
(GEMAP) fails to apply 
conditionality.
Security Sector Reform
Concession: Strategic concerns of 
UK as leading donor result in a focus 
on administrative design.
Diversion: Multiple donors with 
disparate interests mostly centered 
on administrative design.
I analyze the dynamics of foreign assistance to civil service reform (CSR) in chapter 4. In 
Sierra  Leone,  CSR  unfolded  in  two  distinct  periods:  a  first  one  under  President  Kabbah 
dominated by British assistance and a focus on organizational restructuring, and a second one 
under President Koroma devoted to personnel reform with assistance from multiple donors. Due 
to a lack of commitment to enforce truly substantive changes on the part of both the United 
Kingdom and its erstwhile partners, a decade of assistance resulted in a bevy of reviews and 
strategies with little implementation and inconsistent sanctioning by donors. In Liberia,  CSR 
under both the transitional and Johnson Sirleaf governments was supported by a multiplicity of 
donors  often  animated  by  technical  rather  than  institutional  concerns,  and  this  resulted  in 
uncoordinated  expectations  and  monitoring  of  reform,  leaving  the  government  free  to  stall 
politically sensitive changes without  fear of donor conditionality.  The contrast  between CSR 
efforts  in  these two countries  perfectly illustrates the most  basic  incentives at  play of  state-
building,  as well  as the ways in which lack of commitment and coordination by donors can 
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ultimately  hinder  their  reform  agendas.  Moreover,  they  highlight  the  importance  of  strong 
administrative  reporting  and sanctioning which  can  begin  to  induce  public  actors  to  behave 
according to the law.
In chapter 5 I turn to the dynamics of foreign assistance to anti-corruption reform (ACR), 
which began in both Sierra Leone and Liberia as a response to donor concern for the effective 
and transparent use of foreign aid. While it was the Kabbah government that originally proposed 
an Anti-Corruption Commission for Sierra Leone, over the next six years the United Kingdom 
would become the  principal  political  and financial  backer  of  the national  auditing and anti-
corruption system. When political interference and stalling became glaring towards the end of 
Kabbah’s  second  term,  Britain  decided  to  suspend  its  assistance.  In  the  ensuing  climate  of 
controversy and public outcry the incoming Koroma administration was forced to deliver on its 
promise to turn the Anti-Corruption Commission into an independent and effective organization. 
Liberian ACR, in contrast, did not arise out of local political commitment. In fact, it was the 
evident corruption of the National Transitional Government that led international actors to design 
a  scheme  of  coordinated  aid  conditionality,  the  Governance  and  Economic  Management 
Assistance Program (GEMAP). However, even under the ostensibly committed administration of 
President Johnson Sirleaf, GEMAP’s main backers -United States, European Commission, and 
World  Bank-  did  not  manage  to  induce  sustainable  administrative  enforcement  due  to  their 
failure to agree on shared programs, expectations, benchmarks, and monitoring. The failure of 
GEMAP,  a  much-touted  “success”  of  aid  coordination,  exemplifies  the  collective  action 
problems  facing  even  those  donors  who  are  avowedly  invested  in  reform,  especially  when 
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measured against the decisive political action that the United Kingdom was able to achieve in 
Sierra Leone.
Lastly, in chapter 6 I analyze the dynamics of foreign assistance to security sector reform 
(SSR). After the historical protagonism of ungoverned security actors in the collapse of both the 
Sierra Leonean and Liberian states, the very basis for the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
coercion was in question in the two countries. However, donors supplying SSR assistance were 
forced to reconcile their competing interests in administrative reform and post-conflict stability, 
and for the most part they decided that the uncertain institutional benefits to come were not 
worth risking political  unrest  within the security apparatus.  That  said,  despite  this  lukewarm 
commitment to SSR state-building the two processes of reform unfolded according to vastly 
different  dynamics  due  to  the  variation  in  external  support:  whereas  Sierra  Leone SSR was 
assisted from the start by a more or less holistic intervention from the United Kingdom, Liberian 
SSR was by design split between two large actors, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (police) 
and the United States (military), around which a coterie of minor donors congealed over time. 
While perhaps unsuccessful in terms of uprooting state capture in everyday management, the 
British effort in Sierra Leone succeeded in consolidating the subordination of the entire security 
sector under a clear civilian hierarchy. In Liberia, however, eight years after the end of the war 
the military was not operational, the police was incapable and corrupt, and there was no overall 
strategic or operational coordination of the sector. Assistance from multiple donors had again 
proved to have a confounding effect on Liberian state-building.
The crafting of such detailed narratives of institutional continuity and change is always a 
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challenging task in terms of data availability and validity, but more so when the cases in question 
involve post-conflict countries. In the process of collecting data for this dissertation I have come 
to realize that perhaps I would have been better off studying institutional change in early modern 
Spanish colonies, if only because of the existence of vast archival materials which have already 
been identified and cataloged. Centuries later, the quest for data in post-conflict Sierra Leone and 
Liberia  is  a much more daunting proposition: many official  records have disappeared in the 
burning and looting that accompanies civil  war, and even when they have survived they are 
seldom organized or cataloged in a manner that suits the needs of the Ph.D. researcher. Post-
conflict bureaucracies are often not very good at keeping what little paper trail they produce. 
Document collection in these organizations thus resembles less archival work than archeology, 
relying on unexpected finds scattered between layers and layers of emptiness. Luckily for me, 
international donors are much better at recording everything they do and say. Many of them have 
a mandate or habit of making such information public, and among those who do not, there are 
some officials out there who are still friendly towards plucky researchers. By sheer happenstance 
some of this documentation consists of government policies and reports, and so at times donors 
have been a better source of information about local policy than governments themselves.
All told, the case narratives in this dissertation are based on some 150 official documents, 
supplemented  with insights  and evaluations  from about  70 middle-  and high-level  local  and 
international  public  officials  directly involved in  the  reform processes.  In  combination these 
primary sources form the skeletal core of each case, which I have fleshed out with secondary 
sources: peer-reviewed academic publications, whenever possible, as well as reports from expert 
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organizations  and articles  from the  specialized  or  local  press.  It  would  not  be  surprising  if 
participants in the events that I describe objected to some of my data and interpretations. The 
resulting case studies are not perfect; they simply can’t be. But they are, given the available 
evidence and to the best of my ability, faithful narratives, and thanks to the analytical logic that 
guides them they are also internally coherent. Despite an endless fascination with the specifics of 
each case, I try not to indulge in thick description for the sake of thickness, and the cases are  
detailed only in so far as the argument requires it.
1.4  An Analytical Challenge to Current Aid Policy
The foreign aid system exists in a constant state of crisis and self-examination. To some 
degree this stems from the tendency among development scholars and practitioners, as with any 
other  community,  to  consider  theirs  is  the  most  interesting  job  there  is.  But  this  lack  of 
complacency  has  an  undeniable  empirical  basis:  development  assistance  has  flowed  out  of 
-mostly-  Western liberal  capitalist  states  for  about  half  a  century now, and yet  its  recipients 
continue to be -largely- dependent on aid inflows for the most basic tasks of governing and 
providing services to their populations. Aid recipients have seldom graduated, and when they 
have it is not clear that they have done so because of aid; Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, 
remains a open wound in the conscience of the development community.
The main lesson of this dissertation, however critical it is of current doctrine and practice, 
is nonetheless optimistic when compared to conventional wisdom: state-building aid can actually 
be effective as long as it is designed to address the administrative politics that it is bound to 
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generate. The rumors of the death of aid have been greatly exaggerated, probably as a result of 
misplaced anger at the mixed record of reform in weak states. But these states are weak for a  
reason, and the same informal politics of clientelism and corruption that perpetuate state failure 
are likely to hamper the effectiveness of foreign interventions. Aid is not dead, just vulnerable to 
some powerful incentives that are stacked against its success, not least of which is the militant 
timidity with which development agencies sometimes approach political problems. Ownership is 
a truly noble aspiration, both philosophically and ethically, but it simply does not make sense 
analytically,  and moreover it is easily refuted empirically. States fail and collapse not due to 
cosmic or metaphysical  factors,  but due to  the actions of  people,  and especially of  political 
leaders. Once we acknowledge this fact, it is simply unreasonable to expect those same leaders 
and their  clients  and constituents to jettison the rents of state capture for some ideal-typical 
reform. Even those public officials who are reform-oriented may be unable to become agents of 
change, due to pressures and expectations from their families and communities as well as the 
countervailing efforts of reform spoilers. In such contexts of persistent state capture, it falls on 
donors to become agents of transformation by using their aid to generate incentives for state-
building, and thereby to empower local reformers.
I conclude this dissertation with a series of eight analytical principles for state-building 
assistance, which I enumerate in box 1.1 below. Each of this principles is further elaborated with 
illustrations from my case studies in chapter 7. The common analytical thread guiding all of them 
should  be  evident,  as  it  is  rooted  in  the  basic  claim  that  I  have  repeatedly  made  in  this 
introduction: state-building is a political process, and therefore so is state-building assistance. To 
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assume that foreign aid can promote new administrative institutions in an apolitical fashion is to 
invite disaster.
Box 1.1: Analytical Prescriptions for State-Building Assistance
(1) Focus on administrative organizations as state-building multipliers
(2) Promote administrative enforcement before regulatory reform
(3) Commit to longer and open-ended programs of assistance
(4) Design an incremental and flexible schedule of priorities and disbursements
(5) Attach clear, credible, and substantial aid conditionality to disbursement phases
(6) Share monitoring and evaluation information with citizens
(7) Pursue donor harmonization before engagement with the recipient government
(8) Disburse funds through a donor leader capable of political confrontation
Donors aiming to support state-building are faced with a clear choice: Will they support 
the political survival of corrupt elites? Or will they challenge them politically in order to induce 
meaningful and sustainable institutional change? In post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia it is 
evident  that  donors  could  have  done more,  that  they could  have  helped empower  the  often 
scattered and embattled reformers. Granted, such a line of action would have entailed a lot of 
political bickering, even political confrontation. But aid agencies have to come to terms with the 
tragedy of post-conflict state-building: sometimes real institutional change depends crucially on 
the presence of committed and determined external actors. And they also have to internalize the 
inherent  tension  of  state-building  assistance:  even  the  most  generous  and  altruistic  of  aid 
promises will be of little worth when they fail to recognize the strategic nature of donor politics.
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2.  Donors, Incentives, and Institutional Change
Interactions with a weak state are sometimes the source of as much absurdity as they are 
of uncertainty. That was my experience in Liberia, at least, when I was faced with the challenge 
of renewing my visa. Like most countries, Liberia requires foreign visitors to carry some form of 
visa which has to be procured in advance for a hefty fee. In my case I had to request it from the 
Honorary Consul of Liberia in Madrid, a charming Spaniard who assured me that my 100 euros 
entitled me to a 90-day stay in the country. Once I landed at Roberts International Airport outside 
of Monrovia, the queue for passport control was predictably long and slow. It was nighttime 
already, and like all visitors I was slightly taken aback at the lack of information that customs 
officials were giving us as they handled our passports. I seem to recall a female officer letting me 
through with some quick words about a visit to a police precinct thirty days later, but I was 
drowsy and distracted by more pressing concerns -such as not having transportation arranged for 
the 80-mile trip to Monrovia- so I did not pay much attention. Towards the end of my first month 
in Liberia I checked my passport again, just in case, and there it was: a 30-day temporary stamp. 
Determined to figure out what this meant but unsure of where to actually go, I decided to head 
into the belly of the beast, the central office of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.
I was welcomed by a dour-looking security guard, who after hearing the reasons for my 
visit kindly led me up a flight of stairs and into an unmarked office. There an unidentified man 
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told me that I had to pay $20 to renew my temporary entry visa. Temporary entry visa? Whatever 
happened to my 90-day stay, for which I had paid 100 euros already? Determined to pursue some 
impromptu state-building participant observation, I asked him to show me the regulations that 
mandated this fee. He handed me a faded sheet of paper with some granulated text. “This is not a 
regulation,” I said. “This is a photocopied brochure.” He stared at me with that enigmatic smile 
that I had come to expect from some post-conflict public officials, and told me that I could either 
pay $20  or  he  could  “take  me  to  see  the  boss.”  Not  knowing  who he  actually  meant,  but 
determined not to pay just to get out of that situation, I did ask him to take me to his boss. We 
walked up another flight of stairs and into yet another unmarked office, populated by the usual 
coterie of errand boys, bored secretaries, and idle maybe-civil-servants that I had grown used to 
seeing back in Freetown and elsewhere in Monrovia.  After a short  wait  I was shown to the 
adjacent office, where an older man with slightly better clothes sat behind a chair. I explained my 
situation.  He impatiently told me that I  had to  pay.  An argument ensued. In the heat  of the 
moment I told him that if the Bureau could not coordinate with Liberian consulates abroad that 
was their problem, not mine, and that I had already paid one hundred euros, which was a lot of 
money for a student like myself. Eventually, seeing that I would not budge, he gruffly dismissed 
me by telling me to bring a signed letter of request for the extension of my visa. “No money?” I 
asked. No money.
That was a Friday. The following Monday I brought an official-looking letter and my 
passport was promptly stamped. As I waited in the office, the older man walked out with a small 
retinue of  assistants.  It  was  then that  I  realized  that  the “boss” may have actually been the 
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Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization, and that I may have actually talked my way 
out  of  a  $20 fee through sheer  foolhardiness.  The whole episode  made me wonder  if  other 
foreigners -NGO workers, traveling investors- would have found it easier to pay the fee and get 
it over with. They probably did. The fact that I did not was a testament to a dysfunctional public 
organization, in which a well-dressed expatriate can waltz into unmarked office to speak with 
unnamed  officials  and,  if  he  is  stubborn  enough,  circumvent  whatever  norms  are  in  place, 
whether they are formal regulations or not. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization as a 
public bureaucracy did not make any sense: its procedures were not transparent to outsiders, its 
hierarchy could be circumvented, documentation was nowhere to be seen, and ultimately the 
enforcement of its organizational mandate could come to rely on personal interactions with the 
“boss.” Why didn’t  the Bureau work as it  was supposed to? Was there anyone in charge of 
assessing the performance of these public officials? Did any state-building donor care that this 
public organization evidently did not follow the rules?
2.1  Conceptual Premise: The Administrative Politics of State-
Building and State Failure
Before 1989, Sierra Leone and Liberia were internationally recognized states, enjoying 
the usual monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and extracting at least part of their revenue 
from a more or less compliant population. By the most commonly used definitions of the state in  
political  science,  they  were  doing  fine;  nowhere  near  Sweden  or  even  Mexico,  clearly,  but 
basically inhabiting the same conceptual space. Which means that those definitions are at best 
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incomplete, and at worst deeply misleading. For in a matter of months both countries succumbed 
to small military challenges that would unravel the canopy of state trappings and expose what 
truly lay underneath: civil war was not the cause of state collapse—it was the symptom. In this 
chapter I develop an analytical framework that relies on very much the same sources that inspire 
conventional  understandings,  but  that  emphasizes  a  fundamentally  political  problem  that  is 
central to the process of state failure and reconstruction: the enforcement of public institutions.
I  conceptualize  the  state  as  an  organization  tasked  with  enforcing  a  set  of  public 
institutions over a territory. This formulation builds directly on the conceptual foundations laid 
out  by  Max  Weber  in  the  densely-packed  first  chapter  of  Economy  and  Society.  While  the 
monopoly of violence, as a method of enforcement, is indeed intrinsic to the state as a political  
organization, it cannot convey in full the essence of the state as a social organization, with an 
administrative  staff  concerned  with  the  enforcement  of  an  order.  An  order  is  a  set  of 
“determinable  ‘maxims’”  toward  which  actors  orient  their  behavior,  a  set  of  rules  or 
prescriptions perceived by actors to be binding. It can be enacted either voluntarily or through 
imposition by the staff of the organization acting under claims of legitimacy (Weber 1978, 54). 
Without an order there would be nothing to orient the members’ behavior to, nothing to enforce. 
Therefore any concept of the state -at least of the Weberian state- requires mention of the order  
that justifies it in the first place. And yet the vague notion of order may not be very accessible to 
empirical study, which is why instead I prefer to use the much crisper term public institutions. I 
borrow the term institutions from neo-institutionalist economics and the expansive scholarship in 
political economy that it has spawned (e.g. North 1981; Levi 1988; North and Weingast 1989; 
31
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 2
North 1990; Greif 2006). Institutions in this sense are the “rules of the game” or, more formally, 
humanly  devised  constraints  on  action;  they  specify  what  one  can  (should)  and  cannot 
(shouldn’t)  do  in  a  given  setting,  and  conceptually  they  lend  themselves  to  a  more 
straightforward translation into empirics—they can be, for the most part, observed.
Public  institutions  are  impersonal,  written,  and  formal  institutions  governing  (Weber 
would  say  “dominating”)  social  action  within  a  given  jurisdiction.  All  three  attributes  are 
necessary. The distinction between personal and impersonal is a traditional one in institutionalist 
thought: a specific contract between two individuals may be a private institution, but the law that  
guarantees  such  contract  -any  contract-  is  a  public  institution.  Without  impersonality  there 
simply can be no state. “If the notion of state is to be at all meaningful, and not merely a ragbag  
synonym of government, it must be divorced from and even opposed to personal power—not in 
the legal but in the political sense” (Nettl 1968, 563 italics in the original). Therefore the state as 
an organization cannot be equated with the interests of those individuals occupying public office; 
if  it  can,  it  has  ceased  to  be  a  state  as  such.  Likewise  the  distinction  between  written  and 
unwritten institutions is key. Written rules are by definition knowable by anybody who can read, 
regardless of who the drafter is, and they reinforce impersonality by broadcasting power in an 
indiscriminate way. Insofar as they are recorded in a physical medium, they are more or less 
stable, and subsequent revision and derogation have to be registered too. Unwritten rules, in 
contrast, are knowable only by a a select group; informed outsiders notwithstanding, they govern 
only those insiders who are in the know: unwritten rules are, inherently, private rules. They are 
also subject to the vagaries of the personal relations that inform them, constantly updating as 
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external conditions change. Incipient public registry and documentation, in contrast, is the mark 
of the early state  (Gledhill, Bender, and Larsen 1988), and one of the central characteristics of 
the modern one (Scott 1998); it separates it from other forms of social organization not devoted 
to  the  enforcement  of  public  institutions.  Finally,  public  institutions  are  a  subset  of  formal 
institutions:  they  are  enforced  by  organizations  officially  vested  with  the  power  to  ensure 
institutional compliance, and not by social convention or mere habit. Together, impersonality, 
written  form,  and  formality  result  in  permanence  and  continuity  of  enforcement  within  a 
jurisdiction, and that is precisely what the bureaucratic state is supposed to ensure.
The  conceptual  opposite  of  Weberian  bureaucracy  is  the  set  of private institutions 
-personal, unwritten, informal- which have grown in the cracks and around the borders of public 
institutions: pervasive patterns of behavior and accountability which have come to be known as 
clientelism,  prebendalism,  nepotism,  or  corruption.  The  interaction  of  public  and  private 
institutions is crucial for processes of continuity and change: “Although a wholesale change in 
the formal rules may take place, at the same time there will be many informal constraints that  
have  great  survival  tenacity  because  they  still  resolve  basic  exchange  problems  among  the 
participants,  be  they  social,  political,  or  economic”  (North  1990,  91).  And  this  resilience, 
together with its attendant learning and adaptation effects, implies that private institutions are in 
no small part responsible for increasing returns and path dependence. Public institutional change 
depends on private institutional change, and vice versa  (Helmke and  Levitsky 2004). State-
building, from this perspective, is the process of superseding the private institutions which may 
govern a political community by enforcing the public institutions of bureaucracy. State weakness 
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or  failure,  in  contrast,  arises  from the  consolidation  of  private  institutions  which  hinder  or 
prevent such public enforcement. Therefore the politics of state-building cannot be construed 
merely  as  those  surrounding  the  design  of  new  state  institutions,  as  conventional  political 
economy  approaches  would  have  it.  Instead,  the  real  politics  of  state-building  involve  the 
category of actors whose job it is to make sure that public institutions trump private ones.
The Weberian state, just like any Weberian social organization, is defined by the presence 
of  an  administrative  staff  tasked  with  carrying  out  organizational  tasks.  Weber  identified 
bureaucracy as the most advanced form of administration, and associated it with the modern 
state,  capitalism,  and  even  democracy.  In  today’s  world  “staff”  is  a  rather  broad  term that 
includes  every  kind  of  public  official:  elected  representatives,  judges  and  magistrates,  civil 
servants  from  all  corners  of  the  executive  branch,  from  doctors  and  teachers  to  financial 
comptrollers and soldiers, and even private contractors working for the state. These are all public 
actors who are delegated the authority to enforce public institutions and supplied with the public 
resources to do so. They are a product of the state, deriving their livelihood and reputation from 
state resources and authority; they have therefore a powerful incentive to ensure the survival of 
the public order, or a façade thereof  (Englebert 2009). More importantly, public actors wield 
power over the allocation of state resources and the enforcement of state institutions, but in so 
doing  they  do  not  have  free  rein:  their  responsibilities  are  carefully  delineated,  and  their 
performance  is  expected  to  conform  to  certain  rules.  State  organizations  require  a  certain 
“common  purpose,”  which  is  alien  to  personal  aims  and  objectives:  “Individual  motive  is 
necessarily an internal, personal, subjective thing; common purpose is necessarily an external, 
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impersonal, objective thing even though the individual interpretation of it is subjective” (Barnard 
1938, 89). Another way to express this idea is to refer to the “public will,” but the central notion 
is the same: “the duties of the civil service are defined and limited by a formal expression of 
public will, i.e. a law, and the performance of those duties, whether non-feasance, malfeasance, 
or even ‘super’ feasance are judged by reference to the express terms of that law. Accountability 
is not personal, not a matter of inner conscience” (Finer 1950, 34 italics in the original). This is 
what makes the state a fascinating concept from an institutionalist perspective: not only does it 
enforce public institutions on its citizens and subjects, it enforces them on itself.
There is a subset of public institutions specifically tasked with ensuring that public actors 
do their job properly, and with sanctioning them whenever they do not. I call them administrative 
institutions after Weber’s notion of administrative order (Weber 1978, 51). These rules set limits 
to what public actors can and cannot do, as well as sanctions for those who venture beyond such 
limits. They represent the answer to the age-old question Quis custodiet ipsos custodes: Who will 
guard the guards themselves.  As Weber himself  put  it:  “A bureaucratic organization may be 
limited  and  indeed  must  be  by  agencies  which  act  on  their  own  authority  alongside  the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. This limitation is inherent in the fully developed legality type so that 
administrative action can be restricted to what is in conformity with rules” (Weber 1978, 271). 
Administrative  institutions are  public  institutions  governing  the  enforcement  of  public 
institutions, and as such they are different from those regulating state-society relations, which I 
call  regulative  public  institutions  after  Weber’s  notion  of  regulative  order.  “The  distinction 
between administrative and regulative order coincides in its broad lines, though not always in 
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detail, with the distinction between public and private law” (Weber 1978, 52). One could think of 
the analogy with civil or criminal law, on one hand, and administrative law on the other; in a 
more specific example, the prohibition of robbery would be a regulative institution, whereas the 
prohibition of police brutality would be an administrative one.
Administrative  institutions  are  ubiquitous  in  the  modern  state.  At  the  highest  level, 
constitutional design offers checks and balances between public organizations so that they do not 
overstep their mandates and there is always a watchful eye on their performance; in the study of 
democracy  this  type  of  counterweight  informs  what  is  usually  referred  to  as  horizontal 
accountability (O’Donnell 1998). The judiciary, for instance, may review the constitutionality of 
a  law enacted by the legislature;  legislative committees,  in  turn,  oversee and investigate  the 
performance of executive agencies; and independent watchdog bodies monitor the probity of all 
public actors, ensuring that they abide by their own internal regulations. But at the level of state 
agencies and organizations, too, administrative institutions govern how they are to carry out their 
dealings with the public, their hiring and promotion practices, or their financial accounting. They 
are often enforced by audit and oversight bodies which can receive complaints or launch probes 
of their  own, and whose findings and recommendations are supposed to be binding over all 
members of the agency. An internal affairs unit in a police department, an ethics committee in 
parliament, and an anti-corruption agency or bureau, are all administrative state organizations 
tasked with enforcing rules upon public actors.
 Administrative institutions are central to the concept of the state because they protect it 
from infiltration by private institutions,  the kind of parallel  rules that would motivate public 
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actors to take advantage of their position. In so doing they represent, in a way, the state’s immune 
system:  by ensuring that every rule is enforced in an impersonal, documented, and formalized 
manner,  they  are  protecting  the  state  from  the  kind  of  private  subversion,  sabotage,  or 
profiteering that could undermine it and ultimately destroy it. Since the state by definition cannot 
be personal, it has to have some means to hinder the personalistic temptations of public actors. 
Administrative enforcement is thus the first line of defense against “non-rational considerations, 
personal feelings and sympathies, clientelism, and corruption”  (Olsen 2008, 22).  Such checks 
may take the form of constitutional provisions on who gets what kind of power, ethics codes or 
administrative  law governing  the  conduct  of  civil  servants,  or  watchdog  bodies  tasked  with 
overseeing the executive bureaucracy from within. What all these mechanisms do is to hamper 
and prosecute the use of public resources for private use, and to promote the enforcement of 
regulative  public  institutions  -those  that  govern  state-society  interactions-  in  an  impersonal 
fashion. In short, they ensure that political leaders, judges, or bureaucrats cannot just take office 
and do as they please (Krasner 1984, 228).
When administrative enforcement diminishes or ceases altogether state failure ensues, 
and  social  relations  simply  re-orient  themselves  toward  non-public  orders  (Herbst  2000). 
Allegiance,  dispute  resolution,  and  redistribution  shift  downward  to  lower  levels  of  social 
aggregation, whether based on more or less ascriptive characteristics, such as ethnic or kinship 
groups, or on pseudo-voluntary association, such as rebel movements and warlord factions: as 
the state collapses, all politics becomes personal. This represents the triumph of the competing 
private institutions of patrimonialism: clientelistic politics structured around vertical networks 
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oiled by the distribution of patronage (in cash, services, licenses, offices, etc.)  (Médard 1982; 
Callaghy 1984; van de Walle 2001). The incentives for the private capture of public resources 
become so comparatively strong that the state eventually withers away to irrelevance. Without 
the strength to enforce compliance, with no public resources to distribute, and with no claim to 
legitimacy,  it  can  do  nothing  against  competing  private  institutions  run  amok.  Like  other 
informal  institutions,  patrimonialism displays  that  tenacious survival ability that  North wrote 
about. Hence the “institutional resilience in and of failed states” (Englebert and Tull 2008).
Afflicted by state failure or collapse, post-conflict countries find themselves at a critical 
juncture in terms of institutional design. There is a window of opportunity for the adoption of 
new legal and regulatory templates that are antithetical to the previous regime. Powerful local 
actors may indeed endorse a “window-dressing” reform agenda, but they have much to lose from 
impersonal and formalized government, as it will either check or entirely dispel reputations and 
resources accrued through the personal politics of failure and collapse. There is one weakness in 
such  a  distribution  of  power,  however,  a  true  Achilles  heel:  its  over-reliance  on  foreign 
assistance. Aid which pays salaries and buys equipment, builds infrastructure and equips offices, 
and ultimately generates opportunities for profit in an otherwise famished economy: without aid 
inflows the post-conflict power structures of clientelism and corruption would all but collapse. 
Because  of  this  dependence  state-building  donors  are  faced  with  a  fundamentally  political 
question: Are they willing to use their assistance as leverage to generate the kind of enforcement 
of administrative institutions that state-building requires? More importantly: Can they?
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2.2  First Strategic Dilemma: Donor Principals and Recipient 
Agents in State-Building Assistance
The first dilemma of state-building assistance in the 21st century, in the attempt to use 
foreign  aid  as  a  catalyst  for  institutional  change,  is  how  to  induce  the  recipient  actor  to 
implement reforms that may undermine his private interests. In other words, the effectiveness of 
aid ultimately depends on a working relationship between someone who wants  to  avoid the 
failure of aid at all costs and someone who wants to avoid the success of aid at all costs.
A common answer to  this  challenge  is  for  the aid “contract”  to  adopt  some kind of 
conditionality, whereby disbursement of future assistance is predicated on the achievement of 
specific institutional and organizational benchmarks.  Most conditionality stems from the idea 
that aid can be used as leverage to prod a reluctant government into implementing what the 
donors  consider  are  necessary  reforms  (Collier  et  al.  1997). But  how to  design  the  use  of 
inducements? There has been considerable debate as to the form that conditionality should take. 
Is it better to have ex-ante conditionality, so that aid is disbursed under the promise of reform, or 
to  have  ex-post conditionality  (also  called  selectivity)  that  rewards  good  performers  only? 
(Bräutigam 2000; Nelson 1996; H. White and Morrisey 1997) Should it be delivered in one lump 
sum,  or  split  in  tranches  so  that  intermediate  outputs  can  be  measured  as  indicators  of 
performance? (Adam and Gunning 2002; Adam et al. 2004; Collier et al. 1997) In any event, if 
there is even the slightest chance that the interests and incentives of donors and recipients are not 
perfectly aligned, conditionality inevitably generates a strategic interaction between them.
I  conceptualize  state-building  assistance  as  a  principal-agent  dynamic  subject  to  the 
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moral  hazard  problem  (Laffont  and Martimort  2002).  The  principal  (a  donor)  delegates  the 
production of  a  good (administrative  enforcement)  to  the agent  (a  recipient),  subject  to  two 
strategic complications. First, the agent’s effort is unobservable by the principal, only the final 
level of production is  (the donor cannot  be sure whether the recipient  is  fully committed to 
reform or simply lacks the required technical capacity). Second, principal and agent do not have 
the same interests, insofar as effort generates a utility for the principal and a disutility for the 
agent (administrative enforcement would increase aid effectiveness while limiting the chances of 
using public office for private profit). Since the outcome (administrative enforcement) is only 
partially due to the agent’s effort (commitment to reform), the agent has an incentive to put as 
little effort as possible into the execution of the task. This is the kind of problem that the idea of 
“moral hazard” captures. Luckily for the donor, the story does not stop there: in order to induce 
the  desired  level  of  effort,  the  principal  can  use  a  transfer  of  resources  (disbursement  of 
conditional  aid)  to  link  the  agent’s  utility  to  the  final  level  of  production.  In  conventional 
formulations the principal’s transfer has to fulfill the following requirements: it must be high 
enough to make the contract attractive for the agent (the “participation constraint”), and it has to 
induce the desired level of effort (the “incentive-compatibility constraint”). Post-conflict state-
building follows this basic model, with two key differences: first, elites are unlikely to reject any 
form of  financial  assistance,  no  matter  how many conditions  it  entails,  so  the  participation 
constraint is irrelevant; second, there is no third-party beyond the donor itself who can verify the 
recipient’s performance, and thus the donor must bear the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
conditionality. Besides such caveats, the incentive-compatibility constraint at the heart of a moral 
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hazard problem remains crucial: it  will determine to what extent the recipient of foreign aid 
actually enforces administrative institutions as required in the conditionality arrangement.
This abstract formulation can seem a priori  too reductionist,  considering the complex 
politics of state-building in post-conflict Africa, but there is in fact a solid tradition of thinking 
about aid conditionality as a principal-agent problem (Collier et al. 1997; Killick 1997; H. White 
and  Morrisey  1997;  Svensson  2000). At  a  very  practical  level,  the  enforcement  of  donor-
sponsored public institutions depends on the decision of individual politicians and civil servants 
who have  to  weigh  the  benefits  of  reform against  the  material  and ideational  incentives  of 
entrenched private institutions.  However abstract a basic principal-agent model may seem, it 
actually encapsulates the daily process of building the new state, one rule at a time. Whenever a 
civil servant considers taking a bribe or kick-back, whenever a politician refuses to investigate an 
administrative infraction in order to protect a client, whenever a prosecutor refuses to convict a 
corrupt official in exchange for political favor: in each case a principal-agent dynamic unfolds 
between the public actor and the international partners who back him. As the empirical chapters 
below demonstrate, public actors in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia were acutely aware of 
donor expectations and the prospect of conditional disbursement and withholding of funds. Thus 
moral hazard in state-building assistance is not an abstraction, but a empirical pattern.
Are donors creating the necessary incentives for compliance by recipient public actors? 
Agency  models  emphasize  the  ability  of  the  principal  to  credibly  commit  to  its  threat  of 
sanctioning non-compliance: without an expectation of punishment, the agent simply will not 
enact meaningful policy change. Empirically this logic maps onto some of the causes for the 
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recurrent “ritual dances of reform.” For instance, the World Bank rarely withholds its funds in 
light of obvious non-compliance, choosing to follow the interests of its dominant stakeholders 
instead of its own ostensible policy objectives (Dreher 2004). The same behavior is apparent in 
cases of political conditionality by bilateral donors. For instance, the inconsistent application of 
human rights conditionality, together with a weak correlation between violations and sanctions, 
undermines the credibility of a normative agenda introduced by donors themselves  (Crawford 
1997). This was especially the case during the Cold War, when geopolitical imperatives prevailed 
over democracy promotion (Dunning 2004).
In general, lack of donor credibility may just be a factor of an interest in aid disbursement 
which has little  to  do with state-building aims.  Domestic  political  consideration often shape 
bilateral foreign aid policy, as do security concerns, diplomatic support in the United Nations, or 
colonial attachment  (Drury, R. S. Olson, and Van Belle 2005; Travis 2010; Alesina and Dollar 
2000). The behavior of multilateral donors too is sometimes inconsistent with their professed 
goals: for instance, aid from regional banks and UN agencies is affected by economic need, but 
not so much by governance goals like political  freedom or control of corruption  (Neumayer 
2003). At the most basic level, like any other bureaucratic organization, bilateral and multilateral 
aid agencies have a powerful incentive to keep giving aid in order to maintain their budgetary 
presence  (van de Walle 2005). “Window-dressing” changes are not necessarily a bad thing for 
them: for an aid donor concerned with costs, for whom the task of monitoring compliance is too 
burdensome,  formal  reform provides  a visible  indicator of impact  even if  it  does not reflect 
meaningful change—legislation was passed, regulations adopted, organizations set up. Even on 
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those rare occasions when there is actual ideational commitment, the problem of material costs 
remains: enforcement requires monitoring of compliance through reliable indicators of progress, 
as well as a credible commitment to sanctioning the recipient in case of non-compliance, for 
instance by withholding further aid disbursement.
In principal-agent terms, by and large, donors are principals more interested in disbursing 
the reward to the agent than in ensuring task execution through monitoring and sanctioning of 
compliance. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to determine why some donors are more 
committed principals than others. Instead, in the case comparison of state-building assistance to 
various sectors in Sierra Leone and Liberia, I take donor interests as given, confident that -as the 
case  narratives  clearly  show-  there  is  no  reason  to  suspect  that  the  interests  of  donors  are 
endogenous to the expected difficulty of reforms. I operationalize these variable interests  by 
focusing on assistance strategies, not on stated goals or aspirations, in such a way as to split 
foreign actors into two categories: uncommitted donors, whose aid seeks to promote changes in 
administrative design, and who consequently are more tolerating of faulty implementation by the 
recipient;  and  committed  donors,  whose  aid  seeks  to  promote  changes  in  administrative 
enforcement, who are more prone to use their resources as an incentive for reform.
Donors are only one side of the strategic interaction, however. Absent incentives to the 
contrary, recipients of state-building assistance are likely to succumb to moral hazard—they will 
take aid funds, undermine reform implementation, and come back for more. Their interests, after 
all, are different from those of donors. The principal-agent dimension of conditionality is rooted 
in “a disjunction between politics as it happens in the minds of international administrators and 
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politics as it happens on the ground” (Chesterman 2004, 236). Such disjunction stems from the 
unwarranted  assumption  that  local  actors  share  the  donors’ understanding  of  collapse  and 
reconstruction. “Donors typically see such failure as a systemic breakdown and reconstruction as 
a  new  form  of  social  contracting,”  write  Pierre  Englebert  and  Denis  M.  Tull.  In  contrast, 
“African  elites  are  more  likely  to  view  both  as  an  opportunity  to  maximize  their  political 
fortunes. They may see reconstruction as the continuation of war and political competition for 
resources by new means” (Englebert and Tull 2008, 118). This evidently complicates the task of 
identifying  internal  stakeholders  for  the  reconstruction  process,  and  gives  rise  to  an 
uncomfortable question: Do local actors have any real incentive to support the return to a strong 
state?
State  failure and state  collapse are  the result  of  competing private  institutions whose 
incentives are more appealing to public actors than those of public ones. This usually happens in 
places where the state is the main source of steady employment and resources, and thus the 
ultimate prize  of  politics.  A public  official  who thinks  about  embezzling  money may do so 
because his salary is too low to satisfy his material needs, because his extended family expects 
that  he  will  provide  for  them  through  his  office,  or  because  embezzling  is  simply  what 
individuals in public office have always done. That same official would perhaps refrain from 
such behavior if the risk and penalties for getting caught were too high, if he believed in the 
intrinsic  value of the law, or if  nobody ever embezzled money.  In a failed state these latter 
considerations are feeble, and the weaker they are the greater the failure of the state.  When a 
critical juncture like civil war brings into question the survivability of institutions, the actors who 
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stand  to  lose  the  most  from change  are  those  who  reap  the  greatest  benefits  -material  and 
ideational- from the status quo. In any process of state-building these will be public actors at the 
very top, the political and bureaucratic elite.
Whenever donor-sponsored institutional reforms are expected to limit access to the rents 
that keep private institutions properly oiled (for instance by checking embezzlement of public 
funds or ensuring technocratic recruitment), there are powerful -and very rational!- incentives for 
local public officials to undermine the reform effort. When an elite as a whole is built atop the 
privatization of public resources for patronage, not a single member of them has an individual 
incentive to unilaterally promote reform  (Geddes 1994). One can easily imagine instances in 
which some local public actors do value administrative enforcement over the immediate rents of 
persistent failure; idealists occur frequently in weak states, after all, although rarely on the scale 
necessary to spur change by themselves. In order to simplify the basic analytical logic presented 
in this chapter, however, I assume that all local public actors in a failed state are individually 
rational and thus reluctant reformers. Reality is of course much more complicated, but that is a 
problem for chapters 4 through 6 to explore.
The implications of principal-agent theory are clear: as long as donors fail to establish an 
incentive  structure  that  overrides  moral  hazard  reluctant  public  actors  will  stall  whenever 
possible with complaints of limited capacity or foreign imposition, and when the need to secure 
international assistance becomes too pressing they will  simply adopt formal reforms that are 
never  meant to be enforced  (van de Walle  2001, 2005; Wright  2009, 2010).  For instance,  a 
government may reform its constitution to grant autonomous powers to a public audit service,  
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and then reserve appointment of its top officials for the president or make sure that it never has 
the budgetary allocations it needs to properly work. State-building will remain an exercise in 
delaying and window-dressing, constantly undermined by the competing informal institutions of 
particularism and patrimonialism. With other principal-agent problems this would be the end of 
the story. Not so with conditional aid and institutional change, however. State-building assistance 
is a labor of not one but many principals who, even when they share a common purpose, may not 
be able to agree on the best strategy for achieving it.
2.3  Second Strategic Dilemma: Donor Proliferation and the 
Collective Action Problem of Administrative Conditionality
The second dilemma of state-building assistance in the 21st century is the fact that the 
multiple donors involved in the business of institutional change may have conflicting agendas 
which undermine each other. Even on those rare occasions when they agree on aims, moreover, 
they may not necessarily agree on means. Such unintended consequences of donor proliferation 
have long plagued the uneasy sleep of the aid community: in principle, it is theoretically better to 
have as many contributions to development as possible; in practice, a “too-many-cooks” kind of 
problem  emerges  when  each  donor  has  an  independent  relationship  with  the  recipient 
government.  The  local  ills  of  aid  fragmentation  -overwhelmed  public  organizations,  civil 
servants serving donors and not citizens- are well-established in the “aid-institutions paradox” 
and  “aid  dependence”  scholarship  (Bräutigam  2000;  Bräutigam  and  Knack  2004;  Moss, 
Pettersson, and van de Walle 2006).  But there are also consequences for donors themselves: 
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confusion  of  messages  and  incentives  can  enable  rent-seeking  public  actors;  competing  or 
contradictory objectives may undermine reform agendas and encourage “donor shopping”; and a 
large number of donors may create collective action problems when dealing with the government 
(van de Walle 2005, 47; Knack and Rahman 2007, 177).
Conventional agency theory deals mostly with problems involving a single agent and a 
single principal. A situation with multiple principals who do not act in unison poses an additional 
layer of complexity, and it is referred to as a common agency problem (Bernheim and Whinston 
1986; Spiller 1990; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997; Siqueira and Sandler 2004). Consider 
the difficulty of overcoming the incentive-compatibility constraint of the basic agency problem, 
but compounded by the presence of conflicting incentives: it  becomes all  the harder to infer 
moral hazard from the agent’s unobservable performance when he is executing tasks for multiple 
principals.  In  a  multiple-donor aid relationship,  for  instance,  competing benchmarks  provide 
cover for officials unwilling to comply with specific conditions, and contradictory agendas may 
undermine each other and enable a sort of “donor shopping” whereby the recipient chooses to 
partner with the less demanding donor. The only way for aid actors to avoid the inefficiencies 
intrinsic to common agency would be to somehow “collude” around shared demands (Bernheim 
and Whinston 1986). But that is a tall order, even for like-minded donors.
The effective use of aid conditionality as an inducement for administrative reform is a 
public  good  for  aid  actors: insofar  as  stronger  public  institutions  are  likely  to  increase  the 
effectiveness of aid for all, enforcing them provides to the group of international partners as a 
whole with a non-excludable, non-rivalrous benefit. Non-excludability means that one actor or 
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set of actors cannot prevent others from enjoying the good; non-rivalry means that one actor’s 
enjoyment does not detract from others’ (Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1986; Sandler 
1992). Since all donors would benefit from better local institutions, the collective application of 
administrative conditionality is a socially optimal strategy which would dispel the nightmare of 
aid ineffectiveness. However, like all public goods, the effective use of aid conditionality suffers 
from the fact that its benefits are enjoyed collectively while its costs are borne individually. I 
have  already  discussed  the  credibility  problem  that  donors  face  when  they  have  multiple 
objectives  (some of  which  may be  even  contradictory)  as  well  as  the  bureaucratic  survival 
imperative  to  report  success  instead  of  failure.  Withholding  or  suspending  aid  is  a  risky 
proposition, not so much in terms of the relationship with the recipient government, but with the 
donor’s own principals. Upon receiving reports of aid under-performance, enterprising elected 
officials  back home may seize the perfect  opportunity to  score costless  political  points,  and 
domestic constituencies may come to question the whole notion of siphoning off part  of the 
national wealth for the enjoyment of ineffective leaders in a faraway land. The aid agency or its 
field missions may reach the conclusion that it would be so much easier if some other donor bore 
the  costs  of  enforcing  the  kind  of  administrative  reforms that  improve aid  effectiveness  for 
everyone. Hence the risk of donor free-riding that development scholars have identified.
Mancur Olson’s famous work, The Logic of Collective Action, was devoted in large part 
to discussing possible solutions to this free rider problem (M. Olson 1965). He came up with two 
logical ways of preventing or limiting collective good under-supply. The first one was the use of 
excludable  selective  incentives  that  reward  participants  or  punish  non-participants;  in  other 
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words, an institutional mechanism for facilitating collective action. If there was a way to bind 
actors’ interests closer together, he argued, the incentive to free-ride would be weakened. As a 
matter  of fact  the aid community has  come to a  remarkably similar  conclusion: the age-old 
prescription  for  the  ills  of  donor  proliferation  is  greater  aid  harmonization and  donor 
coordination, ranging from exchanging information or agreeing on policy and program priorities 
to coordinating operations  (Ross 1990). This miracle cure to donor proliferation has come to 
dominate much of the development  discourse,  and the zeitgeist  dictates that  “no reform can 
succeed without donor coordination” (van de Walle 2005). However, there are several powerful 
obstacles to coordination, such as different understandings of the role of the recipient in pooling 
mechanisms, divergent donor interests regarding the aims and modalities of aid, and bureaucratic 
resistance within donor agencies themselves, all of which hinder the development of deeper and 
more frequent coordination schemes. There is an easy explanation for this suboptimal outcome 
that does not require deviating from Olson’s thinking: coordination mechanisms are themselves 
second-order  problems  of  collective  action,  and  as  such  they  too  fall  prey  to  individual 
rationality despite their social optimality.
Much more promising is Olson’s second solution to the free rider problem. It is built 
around  the  notion  of  group  heterogeneity,  and  in  particular  the  asymmetry  of  preferences 
between actors: if at least one of them is more interested than the rest in supplying the collective  
good, then that single actor may be willing to shoulder the costs of provision even if the rest free-
ride. Since this type of actor has a disproportionate stake in the success of collective action,  
Olson dubbed his hypothesis the “exploitation of the great by the small”  (M. Olson 1965, 29). 
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Within the aid community,  too, those thinkers who have identified the potential  problems of 
collective action have come to prescribe, absent an effective mechanism for aid coordination, the 
notion of a dominant or leading donor who takes over external support for the reform of a single 
sector or even for a whole country (Bräutigam 2000; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; van de Walle 
2005). A leading donor would address some of the concerns associated with aid fragmentation: it 
would solve donor common agency and free-riding problems within its scope of action, clarify 
the terms and conditions of aid disbursement, and provide a single interlocutor for the recipient 
government.  More  importantly,  it  could  solve  the  principal-agent  problem.  In  that  regard 
heterogeneity of resources, and not just interests, is crucial: a donor with a disproportionate aid 
presence -and thus a disproportionate investment in aid effectiveness- would more readily bear 
the costs of compliance and sanctioning, and its disproportionate resources would make non-
compliance all the more costly for the recipient. Such powerful incentive to comply could easily 
trump the temptation of moral hazard.  But why would a donor behave this way? Because a 
leading donor disproportionally invested in the country’s agenda of sectoral change stands to lose 
the most from a failure to reform—the material and ideational costs of failure may be in fact 
greater than the material costs of monitoring and sanctioning. Even if every other donor free-
rides off its effort, the enforcement of conditionality by the leading donor would still be high 
enough to promote institutional change.
The question remains whether the leading-donor solution would elicit greater compliance 
in  the  recipient  than  the  ideal  donor-coordination  solution.  For  this  we  have  to  turn  to  a 
frequently overlooked aspect of collective action models: the  aggregation technology or social 
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production function.
Olson’s formal logic assumed that all participants’ contributions to the collective good 
aggregated in an additive fashion that made contributions interchangeable. Later collective action 
theory has revised this assumption, however, and in so doing it has come up with alternative 
aggregation technologies beyond straightforward summation (Hirshleifer 1983; Oliver, Marwell, 
and Teixeira 1985; Sandler 1992, 1998; Cornes 1993; Cornes and Hartley 2007). “Weakest link” 
and “best shot” technologies, in particular, represent two interesting ideal types in which the 
lowest or highest contribution, respectively, sets the level of the public good. An example of 
“weakest link” public good would be the containment of a transnational pandemic, where the 
least capable state determines the chances of a disease spreading.  A “best shot” example would 
be the research to develop a vaccine for a pandemic, which would be as good as the contribution 
of the best laboratory; this aggregation technology is similar to the “dragon-slaying” solution to 
collective action, in which the individual least tolerant of a dragon’s predation will be the first to 
attack it (Bliss and Nalebuff 1984).
These abstract ideas are in fact directly applicable to the dilemma of donor collective 
action. Enforcement by an aid coordination mechanism will  have its upper bound set by the 
donor partner least willing to enforce conditions on the recipient—a donor-coordination model 
aggregates contributions into a public good through the “weakest link” technology. Enforcement 
by a leading donor, in contrast, will have the upper bound set by the donor with the greatest stake 
in the success of conditionality—a leading-donor model aggregates contributions into a public 
good through the “best  shot” technology.  If  we allow for different  aggregation technologies, 
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therefore, collective action theory generates clear expectations for the effects of aid on post-
conflict  state-building:  leading-donor  conditionality  is  more  likely  than  donor-coordination 
conditionality to alter the incentive structure for public actors to enforce public administrative 
institutions.
2.4  An Explanatory Typology of State-Building Assistance
The analytical  framework of  this  dissertation  is  built  atop  the  premise  that  the  local 
enforcement  of  new  administrative  institutions  -the  essence  of  state-building-  is  a  difficult 
proposition, one which gives rise to a principal-agent strategic dilemma between recipient public 
actors and donor agencies who may not have identical interests, and which is further complicated 
by the presence of multiple donors whose collective action is undermined by the public-good 
nature of administrative reform. All three analytical claims have strong hypothetical implications 
in isolation. In combination, however, they can articulate an explanatory typology (Elman 2005) 
of state-building assistance which illuminates the variable causal logic of different cases.
Given the recipient moral hazard and donor free riding, the anatomy of state-building 
assistance can be categorized into four ideal types (table 2.1): tension, subversion, concession, 
and diversion.
Table 2.1: Types of State-Building Assistance
Single or leading donor Multiple donors
Administrative enforcement
(committed)
Tension
Political inducement
Conditionality solves agency
Subversion
Political inducement
“Weakest-link” conditionality
Administrative design
(uncommitted)
Concession
Technical inducement
Moral hazard problem
Diversion
Contradictory inducement
Common agency problem
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When a single or leading donor is the major aid interlocutor of the recipient, the second 
dilemma  that  I  have  presented  above  basically  disappears,  as  it  all  comes  to  rest  on  the 
commitment of the donor in question to induce institutional enforcement, and not just changes in 
institutional design. A committed donor is guided by a strategic understanding of the politics 
inherent in state-building and a willingness to overcome the competing private institutions of 
state capture. Such an actor is thus likely to focus on the establishment and consolidation of 
administrative institutions, and on their unhindered enforcement throughout state bureaucracies. 
Given the likelihood that recipient officials will attempt to undermine such reform in order to 
protect rent-seeking, a committed donor imbues its foreign aid with clear and strict conditions, 
which  it  is  ready  and  able  to  deploy  in  light  of  evident  political  interference.  Given  the 
confrontational nature of this aid relationship, I call this first type of state-building assistance 
“tension.”
Not all leading donors have the same interest in administrative reform, however, whether 
because of organizational constraints on its mandate or the presence of extraneous motivations 
for disbursing state-building assistance. An uncommitted donor is likely to use foreign aid as a 
means for promoting changes in institutional design, without attaching clear conditions to their 
eventual enforcement by public actors. State-building assistance under this type of relationship is 
likely to involve mostly technical assistance, with little political dialogue. Most crucially, lack of 
compliance with assistance programs and strategies is seen by the uncommitted donor largely as 
a  problem  of  limited  capacity  or  limited  resources.  Any  progress  -however  limited-  is 
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satisfactory,  and failure  becomes an opportunity for  rethinking benchmarks  and time frames 
without undermining the partnership. This creates an opportunity for recipient public actors to 
take  foreign  aid  and  maintain  the  appearance  of  reform  without  actually  threatening  the 
prevalence of private institutions. The leading donor’s lack of commitment actually enables local 
leaders to perpetuate private institutions, and that is why I call this second type of state-building 
assistance “concession.”
Donor proliferation can give rise to two potential scenarios, depending on whether aid 
actors are mainly interested in institutional enforcement or design. If multiple committed state-
building  donors  manage  to  solve  their  collective  action  problem through  some  sort  of  aid 
coordination mechanism, in principle the nature of their interaction with recipient public officials 
should not be at all different from that of a single or leading committed donor, and thus it should 
unfold according to the dynamics of “tension.” However, collective action solutions live and die 
by the aggregation technology that governs public good production, and due to a weakest-link 
technology coordinated  conditionality  can  only  be  as  strong  as  that  of  the  least  committed 
member of the group. As compared to a leading committed donor, even coordinated commitment 
with clear  and observable benchmarks  is  likely to  result  in a  higher  degree of tolerance for 
noncompliance  in  the  process  of  translating  monitoring  into  inducement.  Given  that  the 
aspirations  of  the  most  vocal  donors  will  always  be  tempered  by the  timidity  of  the  least 
confrontational one, I term this third type of state-building assistance “subversion.”
Finally, if proliferation results in a wider spectrum of motives, aid actors are unlikely to 
achieve coordination in support of any kind of institutional enforcement. Even if one or more of 
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the  donors  within  the  group  of  international  partners  are  truly  committed  to  administrative 
reform, the potential effect of their conditionality will be dampened by the relative size of other 
donors’ unconditional aid flows. The coexistence of disparate programs and standards of success 
and  failure  creates  contradictory  inducements,  neglects  the  moral  hazard  problem,  and  thus 
creates the perfect aid environment for persistent state capture. Given the likelihood that local 
public actors will turn donors on each other in an attempt to protect private institutions, I call this 
fourth type of state-building assistance “diversion.”
The four ideal types generate clear implications for the empirical study of the anatomy of 
state-building assistance to the extent that each of them expects donor-recipient interactions to 
unfold  according  to  different,  observable  dynamics.  I  explore  the  causal  logic  behind  this 
explanatory typology in sector-level narratives of state-building assistance in post-conflict Sierra 
Leone and Liberia: chapter 4 focuses on civil service reform, chapter 5 studies anti-corruption 
reform, and chapter 6 analyzes security sector reform. Instead of simply presenting case studies, 
those three chapters are organized theoretically as part of an attempt to demonstrate that each of 
these areas of state-building can be construed as a problem of administrative enforcement, and 
therefore that foreign aid to such diverse aims as pay reform, auditing, and military budgeting is 
subject to the same strategic dilemmas as I have presented in this chapter. Before delving into the 
narratives  that  substantiate  the  explanatory  typology,  however,  in  chapter  3  I  introduce  the 
trajectories of state capture and failure for Sierra Leone and Liberia,  as well  as the specific 
contours of their post-conflict aid-dependence.
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3.  Local Imperatives and Global Agendas in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia
The streets of Freetown and Monrovia are an incongruous mix of occasional scenes of 
wealth interspersed with a general landscape of poverty. For the pedestrian as for the passenger 
of hot and overstuffed public taxis and minibuses, the ubiquitous air-conditioned SUVs occupied 
by a single passenger and a driver can only inspire an unhealthy dose of envy. Either white and 
emblazoned with black “UN” letters or with the emblem of this or that aid agency or NGO, or 
shiny dark and with no mark of identification besides obvious socioeconomic power, these SUVs 
ferry  the  two  classes  of  the  post-conflict  elite  between  air-conditioned  offices,  guarded 
compounds, and overpriced luxury hotels. On the one hand, the senior elected and appointed 
officials who hold in their hands the public resources of their country, the jobs and contracts and 
business opportunities, often old and rotund, with a lord-like attitude towards local subordinates, 
grizzled veterans of the uncertain game of political survival in weak states. On the other hand, 
the  expatriates,  split  in  two  distinct  groups.  The  younger  ones  are  usually  Europeans  and 
Americans who manage aid agency missions and international NGOs, misfits or missionaries 
fascinated by a world too different from their own, bent on making a difference in a small corner 
of Africa and enjoying responsibilities far superior to what they could have attained in their 
home countries. The older ones are sometimes diplomats serving their time in a high-pay, low-
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cost post, and more often the transnational mercenaries and bureaucrats who staff the middle 
ranks of UN missions and international organizations. Away from the capitals, the government 
officials and expatriates who form the post-conflict elite may be a distant thing, a rare sight 
except  on  the  occasion  of  project  inaugurations  and  similar  events.  But  in  Freetown  and 
Monrovia they are at the top of a very clearly delineated socioeconomic and political hierarchy, 
and with good reason, insofar as they control the fate of Sierra Leone and Liberia.
This chapter presents the political trajectories of the two countries that this dissertation 
focuses  on:  their  regime dynamics  since the mid-20th century,  the key individual  names and 
collective  labels,  as  well  as  the  gradual  erosion  of  the  state  at  the  hands  of  exploitative 
governments  and  clientelistic  networks.  These  brief  narratives  provide  the  background 
information necessary to  fully comprehend the empirical  narratives  of  chapters 4 through 6. 
Absent a consolidated historiographical opus on Sierra Leone and Liberia, these histories are by 
necessity cursory and fragmentary, based on a variety of academic and lay sources documenting 
observation as well  as expertise.  The central narrative is analytically focused on the use and 
abuse of public office, the legacies that precipitated civil war and collapse as well as the post-
conflict structure of incentives that Kabbah, Bryant, Johnson Sirleaf, and Koroma were forced to 
contend with. The last part of the chapter turns to international actors, detailing the aid profiles 
for Sierra Leone and Liberia:  who were the most important donors in total aid and in state-
building, what their strategies looked like, and how they interacted with one another and with the 
government. Taking together, these discussions of local and global actors create the tapestry of 
relations, the dramatis personae, against which the empirical part of this dissertation will unfold.
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3.1  The Path to State Collapse in Sierra Leone
The recent political history of Sierra Leone, much like that of Liberia, could be glibly 
summarized as a succession of corrupt big men seizing power for the ostensible  purpose of 
uprooting corruption once and for all. Such a cynical perspective, however, is not tremendously 
informative, as it could be applied to most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa at one point or 
another  since  independence.  The  story  is  in  fact  more  interesting  once  the  details  become 
exposed, in particular the emergence and crystallization of ethnopatronage cleavages which have 
empowered  and  constrained  political  leaders  since  the  mid-1960s.  It  is  in  this  historical 
perspective  that  the  figures  of  Ahmad  Tejan  Kabbah  and  Ernest  Bai  Kororma can  be  fully 
comprehended as leaders. Whatever virtues and vices they had as moral and political individuals, 
they  both  had  to  juggle  the  responsibility  to  nurture  clientelistic  party  networks  with  the 
aspiration to establish a strong depoliticized state. Their failures and successes in civil service 
reform,  anti-corruption  reform,  and  security  sector  reform  become  meaningful  only  when 
contextualized in this manner.
Post-Independence Politics and the Emergence of State Capture
The specific contours of modern Sierra Leone resulted from the fusion of two separate 
geographical,  cultural,  and  political  entities  belonging  to  the  British  empire:  a  small  urban 
“colony” of freed slaves settled in the Freetown peninsula and given official status in 1808; and a 
large inland “protectorate” of indigenous peoples formally demarcated in 1896 as part of Franco-
British  competition  in  West  Africa.  The basic  cleavage that  this  haphazard  colonial  process 
generated  defined Sierra  Leone’s  colonial  politics,  pitting  a  Western-educated  elite  from the 
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colony (the creoles or “Krio”) against traditional agrarian chiefdoms in the protectorate (Kandeh 
1992). State-building has historically grafted onto this original divide: just as the British colonial 
state was once limited to the colony and a few protectorate outposts,  the 21st-century Sierra 
Leonean state is a meaningful concept only in Freetown and the major provincial capitals of Bo, 
Makeni, and Kenema. But even as the tension between the peninsula and the interior persists to 
the present, the major political split and principal source of private allegiances in Sierra Leone is 
broadly ethno-regional: the Mende peoples in the south and east, on the one hand, and the Temne 
and Limba peoples in the north and west, on the other. Two ascriptive and patrimonial coalitions 
which coalesced around the politics of negotiated independence.
The Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) was born in 1951 as the then colony’s first truly 
representative party,  bringing together part  of the Krio elite from Freetown with two crucial 
segments  of  the  protectorate  elites:  Western-educated  professionals  and  paramount  chiefs. 
Collectively, this alliance assumed a central role in the devolution and independence process and 
propelled  the  SLPP to  victory  in  the  elections  that  followed  the  enactment  of  an  interim 
constitution by the British in 1951. The Party was able to establish a government led by Milton 
Margai,  who  in  1954  became  “chief  minister”  of  the  colony.  Other  parties  emerged  in  the 
following elections, in 1957, but by the time of independence on April 27th, 1961 the SLPP had 
become the dominant political force of Sierra Leone, shaped by the personality and philosophy 
of its leader.
Milton Margai had been the first protectorate Sierra Leonean to graduate from Fourah 
Bay College, and was a member of the Colonial Medical Service until his decision in 1950 to 
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pursue private practice in order to reconcile his professional and political activities. He was a 
prominent member of the association of Westernized protectorate elites that eventually merged 
onto the SLPP, and later became the party’s first national chairman  (Fyle 2006, 122–123). A 
conservative man respectful of traditional values, Milton had a knack for reconciling what would 
have  otherwise  been  competing  sociopolitical  groups,  slowing  down  the  process  of 
“Africanization” of government in order to allay Krio fears while ensuring that paramount chiefs 
became the preeminent authority in the provinces  (Cartwright 1978, 186). As a result of this 
strategy of flexible accommodation the SLPP remained a loose organization of local notables and 
chiefs. When smaller parties challenged this status quo in the 1959 district elections, Milton’s 
answer was to “decapitate” the opposition by inviting them into a United Front for the final stage 
of independence negotiations with Britain (Cartwright 1970, 115–117).
Among  the  opposition  politicians  co-opted  into  the  United  Front  was  Milton’s  own 
brother, Albert Margai. A lawyer by training, Albert had also been politically active as a member 
of the educated protectorate elite, and had served as Minister for Health in the colony’s first 
cabinet in 1952 (Fyle 2006, 121–122). Fifteen years younger than Milton, Albert did not share 
the cautious and traditionalist political approach of his brother, and he became one of the leaders 
of a “modernizing” wing of younger backbenchers within the SLPP which resonated with Krio 
professionals and those dissatisfied with the prominence of paramount chiefs. After the 1957 
elections he successfully challenged Milton for the leadership of the party, but was eventually 
persuaded to stand down in favor of his brother. In 1958 he resigned from the SLPP, and together 
with  three  other  dissident  MPs he  founded the  more  radical  Peoples  National  Party (PNP). 
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However, in 1959 he returned to the SLPP fold under the umbrella of the United Front, and in the 
first  post-independence  cabinet  he  assumed  the  portfolio  of  Minister  for  Natural  Resources 
(Cartwright 1970, 98–100, 110–115).
Albert’s swings in and out of the SLPP had momentous consequences for Sierra Leone’s 
ethnic politics. Before the younger Margai’s defection, the SLPP had managed to encompass 
protectorate elites and paramount chiefs both from the south and east (Mendes like the Margais) 
and from the north and west. When the PNP split from the SLPP, Albert took a collection of the 
more radical Mende and Temne politicians with him, leaving the SLPP at the mercy of traditional 
leaders. But when he rejoined his brother in 1959 many Temnes and Limbas from the north 
refused to follow him, and the Mende leaders who accompanied him in fact displaced some 
prominent SLPP Temnes within the United Front (Cartwright 1970, 125). As a result the SLPP 
came to be seen as an increasingly Mende party, especially once Albert outmaneuvered Milton’s 
logical  successor,  a  Temne,  and  became  Prime  Minister  upon  his  brothers’ death  in  1964 
(Kandeh 1992, 92). Meanwhile, northern Temne and Limba politicians managed to organize their 
own party in 1960, the All Peoples’ Congress (APC).
Once he  assumed  power,  Albert  Margai  had  to  face  two political  challenges  that  he 
himself had helped create: first, the coalescence of radical opposition to paramount chiefs around 
the APC party; and second, the deepening of ethnopolitical cleavages along Mende-Temne or 
southern-northern lines, which worked to empower the opposition. The paradox for Albert was 
that the only way to make the SLPP more inclusive in the north would be to limit the power of  
chiefs, who were the only actors with enough capacity to block the ascendance of the APC at the  
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local level. Replacing an alliance of local notables with a modern party organization would prove 
impossible, especially given the resentment that the “old guard” harbored towards Albert Margai 
for his PNP defection. Unable to alter the distribution of power within the SLPP, the new Prime 
Minister turned to the civil service, where former PNP colleagues held prominent positions, and 
where young professionals were much more sympathetic to his modernizing and developmental 
agenda. Gradually Albert began to replace “neutral” public actors with compliant ones. Mende 
identity became in such cases a useful screening device: “If the civil servants were to be pressed 
into service for the leader of the SLPP, there was clearly no place for individuals who were 
suspected of favouring the opposition” (Cartwright 1970, 195). Albert sought to bind all kinds of 
elites into his party-state experiment. New legislation was adopted that forced chiefs to become 
involved  in  parliamentary  politics.  And  the  loyalty  of  the  armed  forces  was  secured  by 
incorporating force commander Brigadier David Lansana and other high-ranking officials into 
the inner political  circle of SLPP politics through marriages and patronage relations,  and by 
privileging the recruitment and promotion of Mendes into the military (Cox 1976, 65–76). Albert 
Margai  sat  at  the  top  of  this  expansive  network  of  vertical  allegiance  and  redistribution, 
tolerating the inevitable corruption that it generated and happily extracting substantive personal 
benefits himself (Cartwright 1970, 206–208). His vision of centralized political control of Sierra 
Leone culminated in 1965-66 with a series of proposals for the introduction of a single-party 
system, an overly ambitious idea which precipitated his demise.
Back in 1959 there had been one young politician within the Peoples National Party who 
denounced Milton Margai for his attempt to suppress any opposition under the United Front. 
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Siaka Probyn Stevens had been a trade unionist  and workers representative until  he became 
Minister for Mines, Lands, and Labor in 1951. He was re-elected as MP for the SLPP in 1957, 
but chose to leave the party and ended up founding the PNP with Albert Margai (Fyle 2006, 197–
198). Stevens was opposed to the idea that the United Front should be the political force leading 
the  country  to  independence.  In  1960  he  spearheaded  the  Elections  Before  Independence 
Movement, which shortly thereafter morphed into a new political party feeding on the growing 
dissatisfaction of northerners with the SLPP as well as on popular resentment against paramount 
chiefs.  The  leaders  of  the  nascent  All  Peoples’ Congress  were  predominantly  Limbas  -like 
Stevens  himself-  or  Temnes,  younger,  and  from a  lower  social  extraction  than  their  SLPP 
counterparts (Cartwright 1970, 130–132). The APC became the second most voted political party 
in the 1962 elections, catapulting Stevens to leader of the opposition in parliament.
Five years later, espousing populist rhetoric and a vociferous rejection of the traditional 
power of local chiefs, and cruising on the wave of popular discontent with Margai’s single-party 
aspirations, the APC defeated the SLPP at the polls on March 18 th, 1967. As the results that 
flowed  in  heralded  the  demise  of  Albert  Margai  and his  regime,  panicked SLPP politicians 
flocked to Brigadier Lansana at his military headquarters for protection and counsel. On March 
21st Siaka Stevens was sworn in as Prime Minister by the Governor-General of Sierra Leone. 
That same afternoon Lansana took matters into his own hands, placing the Prime Minister-elect 
under house arrest,  and declaring himself “custodian of state security”  (Cox 1976, 126). His 
protagonism would be short-lived, however, as in March 23rd he was deposed by disgruntled 
soldiers. The resulting military junta, the National Reformation Council,  lasted barely a year, 
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replaced by an Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement and then National  Interim Council 
after a coup by non-commissioned officers. On April 26th, 1968, Siaka Stevens was sworn in as 
Prime Minister for the second time in thirteen months.
The  government  of  the  All  Peoples’ Congress  under  Stevens  was  not  substantially 
different from the SLPP in terms of state capture: the only difference was that Mendes were 
displaced from public office and the civil service by the same Limba and Temne elites that Albert 
Margai had marginalized (Kandeh 1992, 92). The tables were turned, even if the dynamics were 
the  same.  As  Sierra  Leoneans  like  to  say:  same  car,  different  driver.  If  anything,  Stevens 
perfected the patronage system that the younger Margai had attempted to build. He purged the 
military of Mende officials, promoting Limbas instead. However, Stevens had learned the lesson 
of 1967-1968, and in order to prevent further political interference he indulged the armed forces 
while keeping them ineffective: he supplied them with generous quotas of subsidized rice but 
starved them of weapons and ammunition. Instead, for his own security he relied on a well-paid, 
well-armed, and loyal new paramilitary unit, the Internal Security Unit (Ero 2000, 18). The civil 
service became equally politicized and even more corrupt  (Kandeh 1999, 351–352; Kpundeh 
1994). Control of public resources was granted in exchange for generous illicit cutbacks to a 
series of informal business networks which over time amounted to a veritable “shadow state” 
(Reno 1995). In 1971 Sierra Leone became a republic, relinquishing formal submission of the 
prime minister to any superior authority. As President, Stevens’s hold on the levers of power was 
so strong that he was able to succeed where Albert Margai had failed: in 1978 the All Peoples’ 
Congress became the only legal party in Sierra Leone.  Officially,  a single-party state would 
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counter tribalism and factionalism. Unofficially, the merger between state and regime culminated 
the dynamic of state capture that had defined post-independence politics.
At 81 years of age and after two decades of near absolute power, in 1985 Siaka Stevens 
decided to retire,  and chose the top military official  in Sierra Leone as his  successor to  the 
presidency.  Joseph Momoh, also a Limba, had been groomed by Stevens through the higher 
echelons of the armed forces, and the elderly President saw in him a guarantee of stability, able 
to keep the military appeased without fundamentally disrupting the APC system of capture that 
he  had  so  painstakingly  worked  to  cement.  Early  hopes  that  Momoh  would  preside  over 
institutional reforms were dashed when it became clear that the tame President was unable to 
match high-flying rhetoric with meaningful actions. Unable to dismantle the informal networks 
of state capture set up by Stevens, Momoh chose instead to build his own financial position by 
empowering foreign investors and members from his own Limba ethnic group (the “Binkolo 
mafia,” so called after Momoh’s home town)  (Kandeh 1992, 93). In July of 1990 a document 
from the Sierra Leonean Bar Association encapsulated the widespread frustration with the APC’s 
rule under the new president, and listed all the ways in which the state was being subverted at the 
time:  “rampant  bribery  and  corruption  in  every  aspect  of  public  life;  unabated  misuse  and 
mismanagement of public funds and property at every level of government; non-accountability 
of  members  of  government,  civil  servants  and  all  other  persons  in  positions  of  trust  and 
responsibility in respect of their dealings with public funds and property while in the discharge of 
their duties; thinly-veiled nepotism and tribalism in every area of government and public life” 
(Gberie 2005, 36). The deleterious effects on state strength of private capture on such a grand 
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scale would become painfully evident after March of 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) launched an insurgency into Sierra Leone from its Liberian border.
The Political Economy of War and the Primacy of Private Actors
The RUF was a motley crew of Sierra Leonean dissidents, Burkinabe mercenaries, and 
Liberian rebels financed by Liberian warlord Charles Taylor in retaliation for Sierra Leone’s 
support to the ECOWAS mission that was hindering his take-over across the border (discussed 
below).  Its  leader  was  Foday  Sankoh,  a  former  army  corporal  and  erstwhile  photographer 
embarked on a personal vendetta against the APC regime (Abdullah 1998; Gberie 2005, chap. 3). 
A band of approximately 300 rebels crossed the Liberian border near the town of Bomare on 
March 23rd, 1991, and over the following months they pillaged and plundered the eastern districts 
of  the  country,  disrupting  mining  in  some  of  the  richest  diamond  fields  that  lubricated  the 
shadow state. The complacent officialdom and unequipped soldiery that Stevens and Momoh had 
created proved to be utterly unable to counter this threat (Fyle 1993, 10). Momoh’s answer was 
to flood the ranks with new recruits: unemployed and uneducated youth literally taken off the 
slums of Freetown and given a couple of weeks worth of training (Ero 2000, 19; Keen 2005, 97). 
Despite this ostensible effort to defeat the RUF, resentment began to brew among the military 
that  the  funds  that  the  President  was  supposedly  channeling  for  the  war  effort  were  being 
siphoned off by corrupt officials and commanders. A year after the beginning of the rebellion, a 
group of disgruntled soldiers ousted Momoh and installed a military junta in his stead. Calling 
themselves the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), they designated Captain Valentine 
Strasser  as  their  leader.  Although recruited  into the  army under  the single  party’s  patronage 
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system,  the  27-year-old  Strasser  nonetheless  harbored  intense  resentment  towards  the  APC 
regime  (Gberie  2005,  70).  Under  his  chairmanship  the  NPRC  launched  a  number  of 
investigations into the corrupt practices of Momoh and his entourage, leading to arrests and the 
seizure of assets and money (Hirsch 2001a, 35). There were no regulations or constraints on what 
to do with the confiscated wealth, however, and it soon became apparent that the NPRC leaders 
were no less skilled than their civilian predecessors at deriving private profit from their position 
of public power (Kandeh 1996).
The fundamental  incapacity or  unwillingness  of the NPRC junta to act  in  the public 
interest led to a situation in which the war came to be waged by private actors acting on a variety 
of motivations. On the one hand, Strasser replicated Momoh’s recruitment strategy, swelling the 
armed forces with undisciplined thugs who came from exactly the same social extraction that the 
thousands of youth who were flocking to the RUF under the promise of wealth and power. Soon 
a segment of the rank and file began to engage in convivial barter and even joint plunder with 
their  RUF counterparts,  thus becoming “sobels”:  soldiers by day,  rebels by night.  Given the 
manifest inability of the state to protect its citizens, Sierra Leoneans turned traditional hunter 
militias into paramilitary units fighting a bush war against the RUF. Organized on an ethnic basis 
and expanding their traditional obligation to act as village protectors, militias like the Kamajor 
and Tamaboro became a third major faction in the war, protecting interior communities from the 
ravages of RUF and sobels alike (Ero 2000, 21–22; Hoffman 2007). Finally, the NPRC itself had 
to contend with its military failure by engaging foreign security companies like Gurkha Security 
Guards and Executive Outcomes to fight in their behalf. In January of 1995 the RUF had seized 
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the bauxite  and titanium dioxide mines in the south-western Moyamba and Bonthe districts, 
coming  perilously  close  to  Freetown.  The  arrival  of  Executive  Outcomes  two  months  later 
helped stop the onslaught and actually turn the tide against the RUF, thanks to its South African-
trained mercenaries and tactical air support capabilities. It was unclear how the NPRC could 
afford the  company’s  fees,  and a  few months  into the contract  the government  was already 
millions of dollars in arrears. There is evidence to the fact that the NPRC contracted exploitation 
of eastern diamond fields to a sister company of Executive Outcomes in exchange for military 
support and a healthy percentage of the profits (Hirsch 2001a, 39–40; Musah 2000).
Social unrest began to grow in the capital and the NPRC began to toy with the idea of a 
transition to a democratic government. Elections were eventually scheduled for March of 1996. 
However, Strasser himself was not ready to relinquish power so easily, and he let it be known 
that he was intending to stand in the presidential election despite being 10 years younger that the 
minimum age of 40 mandated by the constitution. Growing mistrust of the ambitious Captain 
among the high-ranking military resulted in a bloodless palace coup on January 16 th, 1996. The 
new military leader, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, was the son of a Mende paramount chief, and 
had been deployed to Liberia in 1990 to participate in the ECOMOG mission against the rebels. 
Together with Strasser and other prominent NPRC members, Bio had been part of the 600-strong 
battalion set up by Momoh to specifically defeat the RUF in 1991. But by 1995 he belonged to  
the faction within the NPRC that favored holding democratic elections as soon as possible. On 
March 29th, 1996 he handed over power to the newly elected President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad 
Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP (Kandeh 1998).
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An ethnic Mandingo on his father’s side and Mende on his mother’s, Kabbah had been a 
lawyer before joining the civil service and working his way up to the post of permanent secretary 
of various ministries under Albert Margai. A commission of inquiry set under the first Stevens 
government had implicated him in corrupt affairs, and went so far as to say that he “lack[ed] 
integrity …and could easily lapse into corrupt practices…which disqualifies him from holding 
any high office for which good character and integrity are prerequisites” (Kandeh 2008, 604). At 
the time he decided to leave Sierra Leone and eventually he became a senior official at UNDP in 
Africa and New York until his retirement in 1992. After the military coup that very year Kabbah 
was asked by the NPRC to chair a National Advisory Council tasked with -among other things- 
writing a new constitution, and by 1996 he had successfully become a compromise candidate for 
the SLPP’s presidential bid  (Fyle 2006, 80–81). The 64-year-old garnered 59% of the popular 
vote,  defeating  elderly  politician  John  Karefa-Smart,  who  thirty  years  earlier  had  been  the 
presumptive successor of Milton Margai before Albert defeated him. Kabbah’s victory ushered 
the SLPP back into power after three decades, riding on a wave of deep-seated public resentment 
against the APC, which managed to garner a meager 5% of the vote. The same series of military 
successes  which  had  allowed  the  elections  to  be  held  eventually  pushed  the  RUF  to  the 
negotiating table,  and after  five months  of  discussions President  Kabbah signed the Abidjan 
Peace  Accord  with Foday Sankoh on November  30th,  1996  (Bangura  2000).  The agreement 
required  the  RUF to  demobilize  and the  government  to  finalize  its  contract  with  Executive 
Outcomes, which Kabbah did in February of 1997. This would turn out to be a fatal mistake.
The  return  of  democracy  had  done  little  to  appease  the  concerns  of  one  particular 
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constituency: the war-time military. Everyone seemed to be getting something out of democracy 
at  Abidjan  except  the  armed  forces:  RUF members  would  all  be  granted  amnesty;  Mendes 
seemed to be flocking to lucrative government positions in the wake of the SLPP’s victory; and 
the Kamajor hunter militias, which were also Mende, seemed to enjoy significantly more favor 
with  Kabbah  than  his  own  military  did.  On  May  25th,  1997,  barely  two  months  after  the 
withdrawal  of  Executive  Outcomes,  a  military  coup  ousted  the  democratic  government  on 
accusations of tribalism and corruption (Gberie 2005, 107; Hirsch 2001a, 56). The plotters freed 
from prison 37-year-old Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who awaited execution after an attempted 
coup in August 1996, and designated him Chairman of an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC). As the definite expression of the “sobel” phenomenon, one of the AFRC leadership’s 
first decisions was to invite the RUF to join them in power. Kabbah and his government escaped 
to Conakry (Guinea), and from exile they set out to coordinate the reconquest of Sierra Leone, 
relying on a formal military alliance between Nigeria and the Kamajor militias  (Musah 2000, 
93).
The spectacular  reversal of the AFRC coup propitiated the internationalization of the 
Sierra Leone conflict, which up until then had been a largely internal affair. Foreign support for 
the embattled Kabbah government coalesced around two powerful countries, an European one 
and an African one. The United Kingdom was Sierra Leone’s former colonial power, home to a 
sizable diaspora community which was closely following the events in its home country. It was 
British assistance that had funded the 1996 elections, and provided financial backing to the new 
democratic  government  (Hirsch  2001b,  53).  Across  the  border,  the  Nigerian-led  ECOWAS 
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Monitoring Group that had opposed rebels in Liberia in the previous year regarded the AFRC-
RUF alliance with great concern: the Lungi airport across the bay from Freetown had been one 
of  its  major  logistical  bases  for  operations,  and  a  small  Nigerian  contingent  had  actually 
maintained control over it after the coup. At a summit in Abuja in August of 1997, ECOWAS 
members decided to extend the ECOMOG mission into Sierra Leone following a three-pronged 
strategy of dialogue, sanctions, and use of force (Bangura 2000, 556). A provisional settlement 
was  brokered  in  Conakry  the  following  October,  but  after  the  AFRC-RUF  violated  it  the 
Nigerians pushed for a military solution. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, provided support for 
the exiled administration and promoted a UN arms embargo on Sierra Leone. Pressed with the 
problem of  channeling  financial  and  logistical  assistance  to  the  Nigerians  and civil  defense 
forces,  however,  senior  British  officials  facilitated  the  entry  of  private  firm  Sandline 
International, which belonged to the same business network that headed Executive Outcomes. 
The  Kabbah  government  hired  Sandline  to  train  the  Kamajors,  co-ordinate  with  the  20,000 
ECOMOG troops hunkered down in Lungi, and assist in the planning and execution of a major 
assault on Freetown, which would combine Nigerian forces, Kamajor militias, and about 200 
Sandline  mercenaries  armed  with  35  tons  of  Bulgarian  AK-47s,  mortars,  and  ammunition 
(Musah 2000, 98–99).
On February 18th, 1998, the assault on the capital was launched, and shortly thereafter the 
AFRC-RUF were driven out of the Freetown peninsula and far into the interior. Kabbah returned 
with  his  government,  and  appointed  the  Kamajor  leader  Sam  Hinga  Norman  Minister  of 
Defense. Instead of a resounding victory, however, the ECOMOG operation resulted in a status 
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quo not unlike the one prevailing in the early years of the war, and Nigerian troops too began to 
engage  in  widespread  pillaging  and  illicit  diamond  mining.  Moreover,  the  Sierra  Leonean 
military was filled with disloyal soldiers who turned on the Nigerians on several occasions, and 
the RUF and AFRC felt soon emboldened enough to launch a devastatingly violent attack on 
Freetown on January 6th, 1999, which caused 2000 civilian deaths (according to official figures at 
the  time)  and destroyed public  buildings  like  the  central  police  station  and the  Ministry of 
Defense.  However,  the  rebels  were  unable  to  hold  these  territorial  gains  in  the  face  of  the 
ECOMOG response, operation “Death Before Dishonor,” which expelled the RUF-AFRC from 
Freetown by January 19th with intelligence and reconnaissance support from a British navy ship 
(“No Surrender, No Deal” 1999).
In the ensuing stalemate the coordinated response of the UK, US, and UN was to push for 
negotiations (“Leaving for Lomé” 1999). The combination of external pressure on the RUF and 
the “near bankruptcy” of Kabbah’s government led to a ceasefire on April 17 th, followed by a 
peace agreement signed in Lomé on July 7th between President Kabbah and the RUF’s Foday 
Sankoh. The agreement issued a general amnesty and established a government of national unity 
in  which the RUF would have  four  ministers,  three deputy ministers,  and several  parastatal 
directors (“A Deal in Lomé” 1999). Sankoh himself, who had been tried and sentenced to death 
the  previous  year,  was  appointed  in  an  ironic  twist  Chairman  of  the  Commission  for  the 
Management  of  Strategic  Resources,  National  Reconstruction,  and Development,  giving him 
official oversight over the very diamond fields his RUF had exploited at gunpoint. Compared to 
its former rebel partners, the AFRC gained little from Lomé, having been deliberately excluded 
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from the  negotiations;  nevertheless,  Johnny Paul  Koroma was  given another  prominent  and 
-again- somewhat ironic position in the new government as Chairman of the Commission for the 
Consolidation  of  the  Peace  (UNAMSIL  1999,  para.  5).  In  order  to  ensure  the  peaceful 
implementation of the agreement, the UN Security Council approved in October of 1999 the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which began deploying in December in 
order to take over from a spent Nigerian force.
Despite the generous terms of the peace agreement,  it  soon became apparent that the 
RUF’s commitment to the process was minimal at best. Clashes between rebels and blue helmets 
became frequent at demobilization sites, with the RUF seizing weapons and vehicles from the 
hapless peacekeepers (UNAMSIL 2000b, para. 12–14). The confrontation escalated dramatically 
in  May  of  2000,  when  the  RUF  overpowered  and  took  hostage  about  500  UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers and seized about 5,000 small arms. With the country once again in the brink of 
collapse,  the  United  Kingdom  deployed  1,200  troops  with  air  and  naval  support  under 
“Operation Palliser,” aimed at evacuating nationals and providing support to UN peacekeepers 
(“The battle for Freetown” 2000). Suddenly a powerful new player on the ground, the British 
rejected the UN’s continued preference for salvaging the Lomé Agreement, and instead pushed 
for a military solution to the RUF problem (Olonisakin 2008, 66). Even after the brunt of the 
expeditionary force left the country in mid-June, hundreds of British military officers remained 
in Sierra Leone as military trainers and advisers. Sierra Leoneans cheered British troops, some of 
them reportedly asking for the United Kingdom to establish a  trusteeship over  Sierra Leone 
(“Bringing back the British” 2000). Overwhelmed by the British intervention and a re-energized 
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UNAMSIL, and severely weakened by counterattacks on its bases and supply lines in Liberia 
and Guinea, in November the RUF settled for a new ceasefire agreement signed in Abuja under 
the auspices of UNAMSIL and ECOWAS  (UNAMSIL 2000a). After the commitment of RUF 
leaders to the peace process came into question, Foday Sankoh and his fellow rebel ministers 
were arrested while RUF and CDF demobilization proceeded at an increasing pace (“The cost of 
Kabbah” 2001). The President declared the official end of the war on January 18th, 2002.
Reconstruction Government and the Return of Ethnopolitical Clientelism
Kabbah’s first five-year term was slated to end in March of 2001, but it was prolonged an 
extra year to pursue disarmament and allow enough preparations for the first  round of post-
conflict elections. Opposition groups denounced their lack of capacity for electoral organization 
and campaigning, and called for a government of national unity. However, the government stuck 
by its calendar and Sierra Leoneans finally went to the polls on May 14th, 2002. In contrast to 
1996, when Kabbah had been forced to a second round run-off, the SLPP arrived at the polls as 
the  party  that  had  ended  the  war.  Charles  Margai,  son  of  Albert  and  nephew  of  Milton, 
challenged Kabbah for the party’s nomination, but he was outmaneuvered and excluded from the 
convention on a  technicality by an alliance of party notables and Kabbah stalwarts  (Kandeh 
2003, 97). Given the foreseeable SLPP victory, the real question was who would galvanize the 
opposition vote after a decade of war, and thus define the political alternative of the post-conflict 
period. Would it be the Revolutionary United Front Party? The elderly John Karefa Smart, who 
had credibly challenged Kabbah in the 1996 elections with his United National Peoples Party? 
Or perhaps even Johnny Paul Koroma, now a born-again Christian headlining the Peace and 
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Liberty  Party?  With  the  election  results  in,  the  answer  was  simultaneously  surprising  and 
predictable:  the second most voted party in 2002 was the All Peoples’ Congress, which rose 
meteorically from 1996’s 5% of the vote to 22%. However, the undeniable victor was Ahmad 
Tejan Kabbah, whose ticket received an overwhelming 70% of the vote from a relieved and 
grateful citizenry.
By the time of his re-election, Kabbah was 70 years-old, and had shored up his position 
during  his  first  mandate  by  doling  out  cabinet  portfolios  to  smaller  opposition  parties  and 
ensuring  that  none of  his  potential  challengers  within  the party occupied  powerful  positions 
(“Moving  the  mandate”  2000).  The  President  claimed  that  his  22-person  cabinet  was 
representative of all regions and groups, but in fact it was dominated by “SLPP stalwarts from an 
aging political class” (“Kabbah’s cabal” 2002). Kabbah surrounded himself with a mix of trusted 
“old  guard”  notables,  international  bureaucrats,  and  younger  and  ambitious  SLPP political 
insiders: the SLPP leader in Parliament, S.B. Marah, had first been elected to office in 1958; the 
Minister of Finance, James Jonah, was a former UN Under-Secretary for Political Affairs whom 
Kabbah had met decades earlier during his UNDP career; and the Attorney General and Minister 
of  Justice  since  1996,  Solomon  Berewa,  was  a  powerful  SLPP player  whom Kabbah  later 
appointed  as  his  Vice-President.  This  diverse  coalition  of  elders,  technocrats,  and  political 
operators heavily constrained the President’s ability to implement his  reform agenda,  lest  he 
antagonize any one of the multiple power bases which he was forced to juggle  (International 
Crisis Group 2001b, 5). Despite an avowed commitment to transparency and the prosecution of 
embezzlement and graft (“Sierra Leone’s War Against Corruption” 1999), Kabbah’s government 
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soon found itself under suspicion of widespread corruption, as it transpired that at least four of 
his ministers were involved in illicit diamond trading (International Crisis Group 2001a, 10–11). 
As  I  detail  in  chapter  five,  the  SLPP’s  political  interference  with  public  administrative 
institutions  was  particularly  evident  regarding  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission,  with  the 
successive  attorneys  general  blocking  prosecution  of  key public  actors  (“A matter  of  graft” 
2005).
By the equator of Kabbah’s second mandate, Solomon Berewa -or “Solo B,” as he was 
known- had become the unofficial “president number two” of Sierra Leone. Before the 2002 
elections the rumor had spread that Kabbah had agreed with Berewa to step down and hand over 
the reigns of both party and state (“Model justice, for some” 2003). Despite the Vice-President’s 
denials, Kabbah did announce in 2003 that he was too weary to continue as SLPP leader, and that 
as a result he was scheduling a leadership convention for September 2005, two years before the 
next round of elections. It was apparent that with this gesture the President had made himself a 
“lame duck,” and in fact his deputy began to gradually assume some of Kabbah’s governing 
responsibilities  (International Crisis Group 2007, 5). Berewa was even more beholden to the 
SLPP patronage engine that Kabbah the outsider ever was. As Attorney General he was accused 
by the Anti-Corruption Commission of blocking prosecution of sympathetic public officials, and 
these concerns were not dispelled when a close political ally was appointed as his successor in 
2002  (International Crisis Group 2002b, 16).1 After the party conference backed him as SLPP 
leader  and  presumptive  presidential  candidate  in  September  2005,  Solo  B  embarked  on  a 
1 When Okere Adams, Minister for Marine Resources, was arrested on corruption charges in 2005, the government 
prevailed upon the courts to drop the case. Adams, by then a key fundraiser for Berewa’s presidential campaign,  
was simply moved to the Ministry of Tourism (“Aid and votes” 2007).
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seemingly unstoppable trajectory towards State House (“Flying with Solo B” 2005). However, in 
a remarkable turn of events, Berewa would actually lose the presidential elections of 2007.
The surprising defeat of Berewa at the polls was rooted in four separate factors. First, the 
government’s interference with anti-corruption efforts and failure to release audits of foreign aid 
prompted the  European  Union and United  Kingdom to  freeze  their  financial  support  to  the 
government. This powerful signal only confirmed popular suspicions that Kabbah’s government 
was more interested in self-enrichment than actual reform (“Doing good, not doing well” 2007). 
Second, the SLPP suffered significant defections from former Kamajor supporters who left the 
party when Chief Samuel Hinga Norman died while in the custody of the Special Court (Kandeh 
2008,  611).  Third,  the party also arrived at  the polls  with a  split  base after  Charles  Margai 
defected in order to form his own political platform, the People’s Movement for Democratic 
Change  (PMDC).  Margai,  nephew  and  son  of  the  country’s  two  first  prime  ministers,  had 
challenged Kabbah’s leadership in 1996 and again in 2002, and in 2007 he had competed with 
Berewa  for  the  SLPP’s  presidential  nod.  Feeling  belittled  by  the  Vice-President  and  his 
supporters,  Margai  seceded from the party and took with  him a  sizable portion of  southern 
-Mende- politicians (International Crisis Group 2007, 3). That meant that, not only was Berewa’s 
image tarnished by corruption scandals, he would also have to share the vote of his traditional 
ethno-regional  constituency with  another  party.  And fourth,  while  the  SLPP disintegrated  in 
internal power struggles, the All Peoples’ Congress (APC) had been reborn under the leadership 
of Ernest Bai Koroma.
A Temne insurance businessman and protege of Jamil Sahid Mohammed (a former APC 
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financial backer), Koroma had been an active member of the party’s youth league in his college 
years (Kandeh 2003, 197–198). As a presidential candidate in 2002, he had managed to turn the 
disgraced APC into the second most voted political party. However, as a relative outsider his 
hold on the party was at that stage tenuous, to the extent that his nomination was challenged in 
court by his opponents  (“Heading for the door” 2002). By 2007 Koroma had become a more 
savvy political player, and as part of his campaign he cunningly seized on donor and popular 
dissatisfaction  with  government  corruption,  promising  to  strengthen  the  Anti-Corruption 
Commission and run Sierra Leone as a “business concern” based on merit  and not ethnicity 
(International Crisis Group 2008, 10).
The APC’s strategy produced the desired results when Sierra Leoneans went to the polls 
on August 11th. In the parliamentary elections, Koroma’s party obtained 40.73% of the popular 
vote  to  the  SLPP’s  39.54%,  a  small  advantage  that  the  first-past-the-post  electoral  system 
amplified into a  difference of  59 to  43 parliament  seats.  While  the Northern vote coalesced 
around the APC, the Southern electorate gave the Margai’s PMDC 10 seats, all of them formerly 
held by the SLPP (Kandeh 2008, 619–620). In the presidential election Koroma won 44.3% of 
the vote, increasing the APC’s share in all regions, whereas Berewa obtained 38.3% and Margai 
13.9%. With none of the candidates achieving the 55% minimum required by law, a second 
round of elections was held on September 8th. Despite the SLPP’s efforts to rally Southerners 
around Berewa, Margai in fact threw his support behind Koroma in an unforeseen Temne-Mende 
political alliance that propelled Koroma to victory with 54.62% of the vote, almost ten points 
ahead of Berewa’s 45.38%.
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Once in power, Koroma and his governments exhibited a split personality: on the one 
hand, the reformist president who surrounded himself with a group of respected technocrats and 
pushed an aggressive agenda of change; on the other hand, the APC leader who enlisted the 
support of party insiders and indulged in the same clientelistic practices that he had criticized in 
his SLPP predecessors. At the end of the day, the administrations of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and 
Ernest Bai Koroma turned out to be not so different from each other. They were both forced to  
reconcile  whatever  reformist  urge  they  felt  with  the  realities  of  a  system  of  ethnopolitical 
clientelism in which the SLPP and APC differed in terms of region and not so much of methods. 
Both governments were faced with the inescapable contradiction of seeking to promote public 
institutional reform from a political  position predicated on strong private incentives for state 
capture.  The  empirical  chapters  below  will  explore  what  happened  once  foreign  donors 
encountered this administrative paradox.
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Table 3.1: Sierra Leone, Economic and Political Indicators
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Population
(millions)
4.30 4.50 4.73 4.95 5.15 5.33 5.48 5.61 5.73 5.87
GDP (current US$ 
millions)
805.66 935.82 991.11 1096.03 1239.4 1422.01 1663.71 1954.83 1856.39 1905.02
Per capita GDP 
(PPP, current US$)
437 541 576 608 647 693 739 778 799 827
Polity2 2 5 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 7
WGI Government  
Effectiveness
n.a. -1.51 -1.23 -1.12 -1.35 -1.18 -1.19 -1.17 -1.2 -1.19
WGI Regulatory  
Quality
n.a. -1.27 -1.15 -1 -1.08 -1.17 -1.06 -0.97 -0.78 -0.72
WGI Rule of Law n.a. -1.33 -1.22 -1.09 -1.19 -1.06 -1.05 -0.97 -0.91 -0.94
WGI Control of  
Corruption
n.a. -0.75 -0.91 -0.88 -1.1 -1.04 -0.89 -0.93 -0.93 -0.76
TI Corruption 
Perceptions Index
n.a. n.a. 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.4
Sources: World Development Indicators, Polity IV Data Series Version 2010, Worldwide Governance Indicators,  
Transparency International.
The post-conflict trajectory of Sierra Leone is a mixed picture of economic recovery and 
timid institutional transformations. As Table 3.1 shows, population increased by a third in the 
decade following the end of hostilities, the country’s GDP more than doubled from under $1 
billion to almost $2 billion, and consequently so increased per capita GDP. It is not the purpose 
of this dissertation to ascertain to what extent this growth was the result of good governing by 
Kabbah  and  Koroma,  or  simply  the  natural  rate  of  recovery  for  a  war-torn  economy  that 
gradually relocates to more or less formal productive sectors. A better indication of government 
achievements  can  be  found  in  some  of  the  most  commonly  used  country-level  governance 
datasets. The Polity data, for instance, undeniably confirms the swift trajectory from civil war to 
democracy in Sierra Leone, as vindicated by the peaceful turnover from SLPP to APC in 2007. 
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The Worldwide Governance Indicators, which are as close to a cross-national measure of state-
building  as  we  have,  point  to  both  continuity  and  change.  While  there  was  a  marked 
improvement  in  the  Sierra  Leonean  government’s  regulatory  quality  and  rule  of  law,  both 
government effectiveness and control of corruption remained in the average static during this 
period. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index confirms this latter trend of 
stability  and  continuity.  It  is  tempting  to  read  these  five  indicators  together  as  a  story  of 
institutional redesign without administrative enforcement. However, aggregate-level data of this 
kind does not provide information on the lower-level processes of state-building that I study in 
this dissertation. As the empirical cases of assisted reform in Sierra Leone will show, each sector 
had its own institutional dynamic, and it is only within it that the identities and incentives of 
local and international actors become causally evident.
3.2  The Path to State Collapse in Liberia
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf dazzled the West in 2006 with her victory in Liberia’s first post-
conflict elections. To Liberians themselves and to veteran observers of the country, however, she 
was far from a new face. Madam President had been at the forefront of opposition and high-level 
politics since the early 1980s, angering the military junta of Samuel Doe, temporarily supporting 
the military rebellion of Charles Taylor, losing to him in the 1996 election, and then jockeying to 
become the Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia in 2003. Unlike Sierra 
Leone, shaped so profoundly by the two-party alternation between APC and SLPP, the recent 
history  of  Liberia  is  defined  by  the  disintegration  of  traditional  power  organizations  and 
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arrangements which had structured the settler colony for 150 years, and by the emergence of 
powerful politicians who have been competing with each other through ever-shifting alliances 
and networks  since  the  1980s.  The debacle  of  the  national  transitional  administration  under 
Gyude Bryant  as well  as  the appearance of timid success under  Johnson Sirleaf  have to  be 
explained with reference to a pattern of big men politics whose seeds were planted sixty years 
earlier, and which has kept Liberian politics in a seemingly insurmountable state of uncertainty 
and disarray in the decades since.
The Decline of the True Whig Party and the Rise of Samuel Doe
Liberia was born in 1820 as a colony for freed African slaves from the United States, and 
it acquired sovereign status in 1847. Since 1878 the country was governed as a settler fiefdom by 
the True Whig Party, which over time extended bureaucratic government throughout the interior 
of the country not to grant political  rights but to incorporate the counties into a hierarchical 
clientelistic system. Early on it became a public official’s main concern to “know the system” in 
order to exploit it to his advantage (Brown 1989), and this patrimonialism served as the basis for 
stability and predictability until 1943. As Party big men arranged yet another orderly succession 
behind closed doors, little did they know that their decision would drastically alter the tenor of 
government in Liberia, propelling the country down the path to eventual state collapse.
In 1943 President Edwin Barclay mediated the dispute between competing aspirants and 
eventually appointed Associate Justice William S. Tubman (1895-1971) as his  successor and 
presidential candidate for the upcoming elections. In the conciliatory spirit of inclusive patronage 
that had come to define the True Whig Party, Tubman’s rival for the nomination was designated 
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by Barclay and other notables as vice-presidential candidate, and it seemed that the Associate 
Justice would become just another one in the long line of True Whig presidents, whose main 
responsibility was to protect the privileged status of settler descendants relative to the native 
population. After the election, however, Tubman set out to consolidate his own political position 
by  displacing  the  “old  guard”  with  settler  and  native  notables  who  were  personally  and 
politically loyal to him. “Through such patronage by which he removed the distinction between 
public  and  private  resources,  he  ‘made’ men,  established  alliances  with  certain  prominent 
elements  of  the  old  order,  and extended his  clientele  of  spoils  to  include  large  numbers  of 
indigenes in the hinterland and in urban centers”  (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 62). In reponse to this 
blatant break with the status quo, Tubman was challenged in the 1955 elections by the very man 
who had appointed him, former President Barclay.  The attempt to unseat Tubman ultimately 
failed, however, and thereafter no one else was able to mount a organize political alternative to 
the president during his lifetime.
The  reasons  for  Tubman’s  tenacious  survival  can  be  found in  the  particular  kind  of 
political  economy that  he promoted.  Perhaps his  central  achievement  was the adoption of  a 
policy of “Open Door” to foreign investment as an official strategy for national development. 
Unofficially,  though,  the  policy  also  served  to  enrich  him  and  his  clients  and  thereby  to 
consolidate his grasp on the Executive Mansion. Consider the ownership of rubber plantations 
that Firestone and other foreign companies were avidly exploiting: a sizable -and profitable- 
proportion of land belonged to Tubman himself (1,600 acres), to the True Whig Party treasurer 
(1,040 acres), and to Vice-President Tolbert (600 acres) (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 64). By creating an 
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entirely new source of economic rents and keeping it under tight political control, “Tubman’s 
Open Door Policy disenfranchised those settlers and natives who were not an integral part of his 
loyal  patronage  network”  (Levitt  2005,  189).  Even  before  he  was  secure  beyond  political 
challenge,  in  1951 Tubman had the  Legislature  amend the  constitution  to  allow a  president 
unlimited four-year terms. This was an egregious violation of the principles and traditions which 
had governed the settler elite, rooted in United States institutions and lore. “Being an outsider,” 
however, “Tubman was not bound by the social constraints that had obliged his twentieth century 
predecessors  to  continue  a  Monrovia  high  society tradition  of  national  leadership.”  (Sawyer 
1992, 280) He was the first Liberian President to promote the security services, for instance, and 
he  “transformed  what  began  as  an  informal  welfare  and  pension  scheme  into  a  full-blown 
network of informants, called public relations officers (PROs), reporting directly to the executive 
mansion”  (Sawyer 1992, 282). By establishing new institutions and organizations of control, 
William Tubman extended his personal domination over the Liberian state, but he also eroded the 
basis of political participation and inclusion which had kept settlers and native leaders more or 
less united.
Upon Tubman’s death, his Vice-President naturally assumed the highest office in Liberia. 
William R. Tolbert Jr. (1913-1980) had been a  Government’s disbursement officer (1936-43), 
Member of the House of Representatives (1943-51), and Vice-President (1952-71) once Tubman 
was able to get rid of his former True Whig Party rival. In classic patrimonial fashion, Tubman 
had married one of his daughters to Tolbert’s oldest son as way to cement his personal loyalty. 
But  how  such  a  famously  uncharismatic  and  disconnected  individual  could  have  become 
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president was a source of much puzzlement to everyone at the time. “His rapid rise to the vice 
presidency,” later wrote two public officials, “is attributed to Tubman’s desire to have someone 
too inexperienced, unpopular and ‘mean’ (stingy) to become a rival following the experience 
with his first vice president”  (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 67). Slowly but surely, however, the entire 
Tolbert  family came to  occupy positions  of  power  in  Monrovia:  older  brother  Frank was a 
senator and Tubman confidant, and younger brother Stephen was a successful entrepreneur who 
later became his brother’s Minister of Finance.
As President, William Tolbert seemed at first a true reformer. He very vocally set out to 
replace the inherited patronage system (which had propelled him to power) with a modernized 
civil  service,  establishing  a  political  alliance  with  “such  emergent  social  groupings  as  the 
intelligentsia, technicians and professionals, trade unions, and others who had felt disaffected 
with Tubman” (Sawyer 1992, 287). Nevertheless, he soon came across stiff resistance from an 
“old guard” weary of losing its privileges, as well as from the younger radicals who came to find 
widening discrepancies between presidential rhetoric and practice. For instance, the President 
stopped a smuggling investigations once it became clear that his brother the senator had been 
involved,  and stalled  implementation  of  anti-monopoly recommendations  which  would  have 
threatened his own business interests  (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 75). Opposition groups began to 
coalesce around a few prominent  students  and activists,  and popular  dissatisfaction with the 
government  became  alarmingly  defiant.  In  April  1979  a  proposal  to  raise  the  price  of  rice 
sparked widespread rioting against the government, which led Tolbert to replace the respected 
chief  of  the armed forces with a  politically pliable  officer  and to  appoint  his  son in  law as 
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Minister of Defense. In an address to the nation shortly thereafter he rebuked all criticism of his 
relatives’ political involvement by claiming that they were acting “within the pale of the law” 
(Dunn and Tarr 1988, 76). The political crisis escalated dramatically in the following months, 
until April 12th, 1980, when a group of 16 non-commissioned military officers (2 staff sergeants, 
4 sergeants, 8 corporals, and 2 privates) led by master sergeant Samuel Doe successfully staged a 
coup, assassinated Tolbert, and established the People’s Redemption Council.
The new military regime defended its take-over in its first policy statement: the coup had 
been “most necessary,” they argued, because of “uncontrolled corruption.” As successors to a 
depraved government, the junta members set for themselves the task of “building a new society” 
and fostering “real change” in Liberia (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 94). As sincere as Doe and his co-
conspirators may have been in their disdain for the settler oligarchy of the True Whig Party, their 
regime merely “changed the character of overcentralised and predatory rule, but did not end it” 
(Sawyer 2004, 443). With a new and crucial constituency now linked to the sinews of power, 
public expenditure on national security skyrocketed from $17.8m in 1978-79 to $44.6m in 1980-
81 (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 97). In the drive to secure widespread support through overt political 
patronage, the public sector payroll too increased from 18,000 in 1979 to 56,000 by 1983 (Dunn 
and Tarr 1988, 126–127). To complement his pilfering of state coffers, Doe would soon find a 
bountiful  source of  external  revenue in a  United States  afflicted by the tunnel  vision of the 
“second Cold War.” When it transpired in 1984 that Doe was planning to pay a visit to Muammar 
Qadaffi  in  Tripoli,  the US government  sent  ambassador  Vernon Walters  armed with  $5m in 
economic assistance to convince Doe to cancel his trip  (Adebajo 2002, 34). In the following 
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years Doe became America’s man in West Africa.
Upon  assuming  power,  the  People’s  Redemption  Council  had  decreed  a  ban  on  all 
political activities, however this was assumed to be a temporary measure until the time was right 
for  elections.  When the  ban was  eventually  lifted  on  July 26th,  1984 in  preparation  for  the 
upcoming 1985 elections, Samuel Doe was the first person to declare his candidacy for president 
as  leader  of  the National  Democratic  Party of Liberia.  His electoral  victory was a  foregone 
conclusion, one way or another. During the vote count, Doe went so far as to order his soldiers to 
beat or arrest anyone predicting an electoral defeat, and his Minister of Justice threatened to 
prosecute anyone who claimed the recount was proceeding too slowly (Adebajo 2002, 29). And 
so  master sergeant Samuel Doe was inaugurated as President of Liberia on January 6 th, 1986, 
when he communicated his program to his fellow citizens in a lofty address. “As your president,  
I have a vision of the New Republic,” he said. “I see it as a place where everyone is working 
honestly for a livelihood, where honesty and integrity are of the highest standards. But more than 
this, I see the New Republic free from lies, gossips and make beliefs, which often tend to divide 
us” (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 122). 
The promise of change did not lead to any meaningful reforms. If anything, President 
Doe  actually  perfected  the  patronage  system  which  Tolbert  had  nurtured,  coupling  it  with 
widespread repression of any semblance of opposition and with the blatant promotion of his 
Krahn  ethnic  group  in  the  military  and  the  civilian  state  apparatus.  Politics  became  so 
personalized that “political alignment for Doe or against him seems to have replaced ethnicity 
and arguably class as the core dividing factor between groups”  (Levitt 2005, 199). Thought to 
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have  diverted  $300m for  patronage  and  personal  profit  during  1980s,  Doe  exercised  direct 
control over the Forestry Development Authority, which collected logging fees independently 
from the Ministry of Finance. Ironically, the system of capture and deceit that he had created 
eventually came to unnerve him, as he intimated to US secretary of state George Schultz in 1987: 
“corruption is everywhere,” he told him, “I don’t know who to trust anymore” (Reno 1998, 85). 
The  exaggerated  capture  of  public  assets  for  private  benefit  would  eventually  prove  Doe’s 
demise.  Official  US support  for his  regime ended in 1988 after  an attempt to  place foreign 
auditors in key positions to oversee public finances failed miserably (Reno 1998, 87–88).
Taylorland and the Disintegration of Public Authority
Not all members of the military junta had been equally satisfied with the way that Doe’s 
regime  had  evolved,  and  one  of  them,  Thomas  Quiwonkpa,  was  particularly dissatisfied.  A 
prominent military official hailing as many of the troops from Nimba county, Quiwonkpa had 
quickly  become a  popular  figure,  garnering  praise  and respect  for  his  Spartan  attitude.  His 
apparent honesty would in fact become a liability for other members of the junta, for instance 
when he refused to replace his Honda Civic with an expensive car or to move into a luxurious 
house “when many of his government colleagues had done so” (Reno 1998, 85). Weary of his 
rising prominence, Doe dismissed Quiwonkpa from government, although he later offered him 
the position of secretary-general of the People’s Redemption Council  (Levitt 2005, 201). Such 
overtures did not stop the veteran military officer from staging a failed coup, which led to his  
eventual capture and death. Even after his defeat, however, his campaign against Samuel Doe 
would live on with the rebellion of Charles Gankay Taylor. 
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Born in Monrovia in 1948 the son of an Americo-Liberian father and a Gola mother, 
Charles  Taylor  actually  received  his  education  in  Boston,  where  he  obtained  an  economics 
degree from Bentley College. He returned to Liberia in 1980 and after the coup his managerial  
skills earned him a position as an administrator for the military under the patronage of Thomas 
Quiwonkpa. When the veteran military officer found out that Taylor had not received any public 
office from the People’s Redemption Council, he recommended Taylor to Doe secured for him 
an appointment as Director General of the General Services Agency, the Liberian government’s 
central  department  for  procurement.  Taylor’s  skill  as  a  public  manager  actually  earned  him 
enemies within the PRC regime, and in 1981-82 allegations surfaced that he had embezzled 
$922,382.  After  flying  to  exile  in  the  United  States,  he  was  arrested  in  May  1984  in 
Massachusetts and imprisoned awaiting extradition. However, Taylor and a few other convicts 
managed to escape jail and make his way back to West Africa, where he visited Doe’s opponents 
in Lybia, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Sierra Leone (Reno 1998, 92). On Christmas 
Eve,  1989,  he  launched  an  insurgency  against  Doe  together  with  a  band  of  rebels  calling 
themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), claiming to pursue the same struggle 
that Quiwonkpa had begun.
Feeding off ethnic tensions between the predominantly Krahn Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL) and the disaffected Gio and Mano populations of Nimba county, the NPFL insurgency 
unleashed  a  thunderstorm in  Liberian  politics,  unraveling  the  ethnopatronage  regime  which 
Samuel Doe had built over the previous nine years (Ellis 1999). Seeking to broaden his political 
base  against  Taylor,  the  President  tried  everything:  he  released  political  prisoners,  legalized 
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political parties, promised free and fair elections, and raised civil service salaries. However, AFL 
killings of Gio and Mano civilians in retaliation for NPFL actions only worsened his situation. In 
May 1990 he visited Nigeria’s head of state, general Ibrahim Babangida, in search of support. 
Soon afterward he turned to his former international patron, the United States, even publishing a 
public  appeal  in  the  Washington  Post:  “We  in  Liberia  have  always  considered  ourselves 
‘stepchildren’ of the United States. We implore you to come help your stepchildren who are in 
danger of losing their lives and freedom” (Adebajo 2002, 42–43). Just as the regime struggled to 
adjust to the new and volatile situation, so did the leading figures of the political opposition, 
among  them  university  professor  Amos  Sawyer  and  international  bureaucrat  Ellen  Johnson 
Sirleaf.  Both were prominent political  exiles at  time of the NPFL invasion as leaders of the 
opposition Association for Constitutional Democracy in Liberia, which had 2,200 members in 
the United States. The anti-Doe insurgency actually managed to split the exiles, with Johnson 
Sirleaf initially supporting Taylor and Sawyer opposing him. The warlord himself was not ready 
to count them as allies, however. He had little regard for the Association, which he once called “a 
bunch of cowards . . . [who] run and hide under beds as soon as Doe talks” (Adebajo 2002, 59–
60).
After decades of personalist politics, it was a personality rivalry within the NPFL which 
precipitated the virtual collapse of the Liberian state. Prince Yormie Johnson had been one of 
Taylor’s lieutenants, commander of a more professional wing of the NPFL staffed by former 
armed forces personnel. After splitting with Taylor to form his Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (INPFL), on September 9th, 1990 Johnson and his men successfully broke into 
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the ECOWAS headquarters in Monrovia where Samuel Doe had taken refuge, seized him, and 
killed  him.  In  the  institutional  vacuum that  followed almost  everyone with  a  gang declared 
himself president, including Taylor and Prince Johnson, but also deputy commander of the AFL 
David Nimley, Doe’s former Vice-President Harry Moniba, and other minor warlords  (Levitt 
2005,  208).  With  the  Gios  and  Manos  on  the  march  to  conquer  the  political  kingdom,  the 
Mandingos and Krahn who had been favored by the regime of Samuel Doe began to fear for 
their  future.  In  May  1991  they  organized  the  United  Liberation  Movement  of  Liberia  for 
Democracy (ULIMO) as an anti-Taylor militia led by Alhaji Kromah, a Mandingo and former 
Deputy Minister for Information under Doe, which later found support from former Doe security 
forces like the AFL 1st Infantry Battalion. However, the Mandingo-Krahn divide at the core of the 
anti-insurgency insurgents widened throughout 1992 and 1993 until the militia split into a Kranh 
branch led by former AFL officer  Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J), and a Mandingo branch led by 
Kromah (ULIMO-K) (Ellis 1999).
By that  time Taylor  had  seized  control  of  most  of  Liberia,  even if  Monrovia  stayed 
outside his grasp due to the presence of Prince Johnson’s INPFL and some international actors. 
Unable to access the resources of official sovereign statehood, Taylor settled for a privatized war 
economy  in  which  he  merged  international  investment,  rent  extraction,  and  militarization. 
Establishing his unofficial capital in Gbarnga, Taylor resorted to the same kind of patrimonial 
politics which he had accused Doe of promoting. For instance, he designated his brother Gbatu 
Taylor  as  head  of  an  “official”  Bong  Bank  and  chief  intermediary  with  international  arms 
dealers, and he integrated the Forestry Development Authority that operated in his territory into 
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the NPFL, assigning the task of overseeing commercial logging operations to his Special Forces 
Commandos. Foreign companies interested in natural resources were welcomed in Taylorland, 
but they were sometimes required to supply communications equipment and materiel  for the 
NPFL military effort. In all these informal deals, Taylor required foreigners to pay in American 
dollars, thus controlling de facto the exchange rate within the NPFL’s area of control. Instead of 
setting up a treasury and a budget process for financing his operations, he simply established 
internal  borders  in  which  his  fighters  could  “collect  their  own pay.”  William Reno  reports 
estimates of Taylor’s warlord economy as high as $200-$250 million a year (Reno 1998, 96, 99). 
But the parallel state that he set up in Gbarnga was not enough. “While Doe sought to become 
the leader of a new Liberian oligarchy, and be respected in West Africa and abroad, Taylor’s 
ambitions were more grandiose. He wanted not only to exercise total control over Liberia and all  
of its resources, but also to be the leader of the Mano basin area” (Sawyer 2004, 445).
At the beginning of the war, most Liberians had turned to the United States as the natural 
arbiter between the different parties. However, at the time American attention was focused in the 
Persian Gulf. In testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa in June of 1990, US assistant 
secretary of state for African affairs Herman Cohen made clear the American position when he 
said that the resolution of the civil war was “a Liberian responsibility.” When Doe attempted to  
bring the crisis to the UN Security Council in April 1990, his efforts were frustrated by Côte 
d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, which were allegedly supporting Taylor’s NPFL. Finding only closed 
doors in Washington and New York, the civil war became a purely West African crisis: on August 
1990 the Economic Community of West  African States finally agreed to  deploy an ECOWAS 
92
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 3
Cease-fire  Monitoring  Group  (ECOMOG)  in  Liberia (Levitt  2005,  207). At  the  time  Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf opposed international intervention and regarded ECOMOG as an invasion force 
designed to keep Doe in power. In contrast, Amos Sawyer saw greater pragmatism in throwing 
his support behind ECOMOG in the absence of an American intervention (Adebajo 2002, 60). A 
few days before the ECOWAS force began deployment, in fact, Nigeria had supported a number 
of Liberian political groups in establishing an Interim Government of National Unity (INGU), 
led by none other than professor Amos Sawyer.
The entry of ECOMOG altered the balance of power in Liberia and internationalized the 
conflict.  Taylor, in particular, accused Nigeria (which shouldered up to 70% of the mission’s 
military  and  financial  burden)  of  “occupying  Liberia,  of  violating  its  sovereignty,  and  of 
perpetrating a ‘mercenary’ campaign of genocide against its inhabitants” (Sesay 1996, 396). He 
was not alone in these claims. The fact is that different ECOWAS members supported different 
factions: Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso openly supported the NPFL against Doe, Sierra Leone 
and Guinea offered military cooperation to ULIMO, Nigeria supported anti-Taylor factions, and 
Ghana favored political accommodation  (Adebajo 2002, 243). Liberians themselves were not 
overly satisfied with ECOMOG, and the rapacity and expediency of Nigerian troops eventually 
gave rise to popular alternatives to the mission’s official acronym, like “Every Car Or Moving 
Object Gone.” And while it did throw a wrench in Taylor’s plans to take Monrovia, the regional 
force in fact froze the conflict, as no one faction was thereafter powerful enough to overcome the 
others.  In  the  meantime  West  African  nations  continued to  pursue a  settlement  between the 
warlords,  brokering  no less  than 14 peace accords  between January 1991 and August  1996. 
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When  Ghanaian  President  Jerry  Rawlings  became  ECOWAS  chairman  in  August  1994,  he 
revitalized the failed peace process with a personal commitment to a speedy resolution to the 
Liberian conflict and especially the ECOMOG mission, which was quickly becoming unpopular 
throughout the region (Sesay 1996, 399). In August 1995 West African leaders finally managed 
to put an end to the First Liberian Civil War in Abuja (Nigeria), getting the NPFL and ULIMO to 
agree  on  a  political  settlement  which  created  a  new transitional  government  to  oversee  the 
organization of democratic elections.
Liberians  finally went  to  the  polls  on  July 19th,  1997,  and in  a  desperate  attempt  to 
achieve lasting peace they ushered Charles  Taylor into the presidency with an overwhelming 
75.3% of the vote. His National Patriotic Party obtained 49 of 64 House seats and 21 of 26 
Senate seats,  with the Unity Party of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf a distant second, and the All Liberian 
Coalition Party of ULIMO founder Alhaji  Kromah third.  International observers deemed the 
election generally free and fair, but the fact was that the candidates had not entered into a level 
playing  field,  as  Taylor  was  the  “de  facto  incumbent”  in  the  election (Harris  1999,  483). 
According  to  Sawyer,  “Elections  were  held  in  an  environment  awash  with  arms,  with  ex-
combatants posing in some places as local government functionaries keeping a watchful eye over 
fearful voters” (Sawyer 2004, 450). Whatever the shortcomings of the process itself, the fact is 
that Liberians voted for Taylor freely, if only to co-opt him into stopping the war. Besides, the 
various other candidates were not themselves particularly angelic, as the “taint” of government 
experience under Tolbert or Doe touched virtually all of them who had not been warlords.
As President, Taylor set out to create Greater Liberia, a state refashioned after the model 
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he had perfected in Gbarnga, and he populated all public organizations with NPFL militias and 
supporters. After the election, for instance, he refused to allow peacekeepers to restructure the 
army as envisioned in the Abuja Accord. Instead he ordered in January 1998 the demobilization 
and retirement of 2,682 AFL troops, including many Krahn officers, in order to make room for 
the induction of thousands of former NPFL into the new army (Adebajo 2002, 235). Wearing the 
mantle  of  national  sovereignty from his  office  in  the  Executive  Mansion,  Taylor  no  longer 
needed to circumvent official institutions in his quest for power and riches, as he was now free to 
capture the state in a seemingly legal manner. Three years into his tenure, “virtually all natural 
resources, agriculture and fishing industries, had been designated as ‘essential commodities’ to 
be  controlled  by  Taylor”  (Sawyer  2004,  448).  It  was  the  perfection  of  “Liberia  Inc.,”  of 
government as kleptocracy. In his blatant pursuit of enrichment to the detriment of economic 
rehabilitation and social  welfare,  Taylor “alienated the donor community.  No aid,  except  for 
humanitarian and emergency relief, enters the country.” (International Crisis Group 2002a, 16). 
Unfortunately, there seemed to be no viable alternative to the warlord-turned-president. After the 
collapse of the True Whig Party, Liberia’s opposition had never truly coalesced around stable 
programmatic organizations with consistent policy platforms, and by the time Taylor assumed 
office whatever groups existed were “almost as disappointing as its government... Weak, tainted 
and self-interested, many parties and leaders are implicated in Liberia’s quagmire, both past and 
present.” (International Crisis Group 2002a, 18). The dynamics of state capture and collapse had 
driven their roots deep into Liberia’s political and moral economy, and democratic politics stood 
little change of generating a new incentive structure.
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The Second Liberian Civil War began in April 1999 when several armed groups crossed 
the border from neighboring Guinea as ECOMOG was preparing to withdraw from Liberia. This 
new  rebel  movement  called  itself  Liberians  United  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(LURD),  and  it  was  seemingly  composed  of  former  ULIMO-K  members,  both  Krahn  and 
Mandingo, who had been targeted under Taylor. In fact LURD had begun as a loose coalition of 
groups with Guinean backing and indirect support from Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom, and 
the  United  States.  It  shortly established liaison with  the  British military,  which was heavily 
invested in the continued stability of Sierra Leone. When President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah refused 
to be the rebels’ base of operations for fear of further Liberian support for the RUF (he even gave 
some  of  their  leaders  away  to  Taylor),  LURD  turned  to  Guinea,  where  it  found  enough 
acquiescence from President Lansana Conté. Kabbah’s fears would prove prescient: when the 
rebels invaded Liberia from Guinea Taylor retaliated by sending the Revolutionary United Front 
there. In response the Guinean President decided to provide the support necessary to take the war 
back to Liberia in November 2000. In 2001 LURD attacked Gbarnga, and although it halted its  
offensive soon thereafter it had succeeded in garnering much support from Liberians, both in 
country and in Sierra Leone (International Crisis Group 2002a). Moreover, the rebels began to 
rely on the tacit -and later explicit- support of major western powers. While making calls for 
sanctions and conflict resolution, the unofficial American and British strategy was containment: 
“As one U.S. official described it: ‘You put Taylor in a box, drain his finances, and wait for 
somebody to remove him’” (International Crisis Group 2002a, 22). With covert military support 
from the United States and United Kingdom LURD was steadily gaining ground from the north 
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even as a new Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) fought its way from the east with 
Ivoirian support. By the spring of 2003 Charles Taylor was waging a losing war on two fronts. 
By May the NPFL had control over only one third of the country, and Monrovia was under threat 
(United Nations 2003, para. 9).
Corruption and International Trusteeship after Peace
On  September  17th,  2002,  a  meeting  was  held  at  the  United  Nations  to  form  an 
International Contact Group on Liberia (comprised of the United Kingdom, France, the United 
States, Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union, and the 
United Nations), which later chose former Nigerian President General Abdulsalami Abubakar to 
facilitate peace talks among the factions (International Crisis Group 2003c, 29). At the same time 
there was still strong pressure for the US to intervene and put an end to the conflict. Outside 
Liberia,  the UK representative at  the Security Council,  Jeremy Greenstock,  cited the British 
intervention in Sierra Leone and the French one in Côte d’Ivoire as precedent. Inside the country, 
Taylor was also in favor of intervention: “we ask the international community,” he said, “most 
especially the US, to do everything in its power to take Liberia out of this mess” (Levitt 2005, 
228). United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, too, called for a multinational intervention 
force led by “a permanent member state,” which in diplomatic UN-speak could only mean the 
United States. Back in Washington the National Security Council Director for African Affairs 
Jendayi Frazer was reportedly “firmly against intervention,” and she had told her immediate 
superior Condoleezza Rice that “it would be a disaster.” As the different options were weighed, 
the lack of American commitment was visible on the ground, where the embassy kept only a 
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skeleton staff (“Weird scenes inside the gold mine: Taylor has nowhere to run but the West hasn’t 
got a plan yet” 2003). Nevertheless, President Bush kept urging Taylor to step down, and in July 
he went so far as to order a naval amphibious force with 2,300 marines to deploy off the coast of 
Liberia, albeit with an unclear mission.
In August 2003 the Security Council  authorized a new ECOWAS mission in a  U.S.-
drafted  resolution  which  included  a  controversial  clause  on  immunity  from prosecution  for 
peacekeepers, which is perhaps an indication that someone in the American government was 
considering putting boots on the ground. The first Nigerian peacekeepers arrived in Liberia on 
August 4th,  followed two days  later by a  small  contingent of seven US marines  tasked with 
assisting Nigerian logistics. Taylor eventually budged under the mounting international pressure 
and  the  specter  of  a  US  intervention  against  him.  On  August  11th,  the  President  resigned, 
ostensibly for the good of Liberia. “I have accepted this role,” he declared, “as the sacrificial 
lamb” (Levitt 2005, 235). On August 14th US marines landed in Monrovia with a mandate to aid 
ECOWAS  efforts  in  the  distribution  of  food  aid.  Four  days  later,  a  Comprehensive  Peace 
Agreement  (CPA) was signed in  Accra (Ghana)  between the government  of  Charles  Taylor, 
LURD and MODEL, as well as 17 Liberian political factions.
The CPA was designed to supersede the constitution for a period of three years until 
elections  could  be  held,  and  it  established  a  National  Transitional  Government  of  Liberia 
(NTGL) which would be assisted by a United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Charles 
Gyude Bryant, a 54-year-old Monrovia businessman and head of the Liberia Action Party, was 
appointed  as  Chairman  of  the  NTGL,  chosen  over  Rudolph Sherman  (a  longtime  friend  of 
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Taylor) and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf  (United Nations 2003, para. 15). On September 19th the UN 
Security Council approved a 15,000-strong UNMIL, which began deployment on October 1st. 
Two weeks later Bryant was sworn in as head of the transitional government, ushering in the 
period of Liberia’s post-conflict reconstruction.
As  much  as  it  was  a  political  achievement,  the  Accra  Agreement  was  a  flawed 
institutional framework, characterized at the time as “a power-sharing formula that reinforces the 
struggle for spoils of war and lacks effective structures for accountability” (Sawyer 2004, 452–
453). As the International Crisis Group aptly put it, “the peace process in Accra was about jobs: 
generals wanted to know how many positions they could command” (International Crisis Group 
2003a, 3). Cabinet seats and senior government positions were split between the former Taylor 
government (Internal Affairs, Defense, Economic Affairs, Health and Social Welfare, Post and 
Telecommunications),  LURD  (Transport,  Justice,  Labor,  Finance,  Ministry  of  State),  and 
MODEL (Agriculture, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Public Works and Land, Mines and Energy). 
“The  rest  –  national  security,  information,  education,  gender  and  development,  rural 
development  and  youth  and  sports  –  was  split  among  political  parties  and  civil  society” 
(International  Crisis  Group 2003a,  3). The ban on NTGL members  to  run  for  office  in  the 
upcoming  elections,  presumably  intended  to  focus  their  actions  on  governing  and  not 
electioneering, in fact provided them with a powerful incentive to plunder as much as possible 
while they were in office. “The character of the transitional government,” wrote the International 
Crisis Group, “makes it impossible to see how its leaders can be trusted to lay any foundation for 
state-building”  (International  Crisis  Group  2004,  12).  Six  months  after  its  inauguration,  the 
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NTGL cabinet had only held two meetings, as the leaders of each faction were instead focused 
on the 84 assistant minister positions that the CPA had not allocated (UNMIL 2004b, para. 11–
12). This was not what Liberia needed at the time. Of 22 ministries surveyed by the United 
Nations,  only defense  and  foreign  affairs  had  been  operating  without  interruption  since  the 
signature of the CPA. “All other closed down partially or completely as a result of looting during 
fighting and non-payment of salaries to civil servants” (UNMIL 2003, para. 38).
With state organizations collapsed and the NTGL focused on its own internal squabbles 
over rents and profits, it was up to international actors to steer the reconstruction process. By the 
end of the war almost 90% of activity in water and sanitation, health, and education was funded 
by donors and implemented by NGOs (Andersen 2010, 137). The International Contact Group 
for  Liberia  (with the International  Crisis  Group acting as  its  unofficial  technical  secretariat) 
enjoyed  almost  sovereign  authority  in  the  country,  with  ECOWAS  leading  the  transitional 
political process while the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations took care 
of the security and humanitarian situation  (Sawyer 2008, 180). The chief of UNMIL, Special 
Representative  for  the  Secretary  General  Jacques  Paul  Klein,  was  openly  disdainful  of  the 
NTGL,  calling  its  warlord  members  “gangsters”  and  dismissing  them  as  “mere  criminals” 
(International  Crisis  Group  2003a,  2).  Together  with  Kenyan  general  Daniel  Opande, 
commanding officer of UNMIL, Klein was considered to be the pro-consul of the international 
community in Liberia, far more powerful than Chairman Bryant. An article published in Africa 
Confidential  summarized  the general  sentiment  when it  concluded that  “Bryant  [had]  barely 
more authority than a district officer.” (“Silencing the guns: After the fund-raising conference in 
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New York, the focus shifts to disarmament and political reconciliation” 2004) UNMIL deployed 
civil  affairs  officers  in  “17 ministries,  the  National  Transitional  Government  of  Liberia,  the 
Monrovia  City  Council,  and  14  major  agencies  and  parastatals”  (UNMIL  2004a,  37). 
Nevertheless, corruption scandals became the order of the day, and as the day of the election 
drew closer  there a was growing yearning -within and outside Liberia-  to  move beyond the 
transitional phase.
Of 59 political parties formally registered in Liberia in 2005, 21 contested the presidency. 
The  country’s  first  post-conflict  elections  were  defined  by  three  central  factors:  first,  the 
remarkable disappearance of rebel forces from the political process (neither LURD nor MODEL 
were taking part in the election); second, the absence of an incumbent, as the NTGL members 
were banned from running; and third, the fragility of party loyalty in a context of platforms that 
were virtually interchangeable except  for the ethnoregional  constituency that  they catered to 
(Harris 2006). Parties only differed according to their individual origins and the socioeconomic 
make-up of their core support. Among those with a national base and sustained presence, the 
Liberia  Action  Party  of  Chairman  Bryant  had  been  formed  as  a  party  of  middle-aged 
businessmen, technocrats, and chiefs in rural areas, which was the same constituency as that of 
Ellen  Johnson  Sirleaf’s  Unity  Party;  the  United  People’s  Party  was  a  party  of  the  young 
dispossessed,  not  unlike  footballer  George  Weah’s  Congress  for  Democratic  Change,  which 
Africa Confidential called  “a motley crew of veteran radicals, chancers and outright crooks.” 
(Sawyer 2008; “The soccer vote:  After 14 years of war,  Liberians mistake a footballer  for a 
politician” 2005).
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On October 11th, 2005, Liberians went to the polls under the security umbrella of 15,000 
UN peacekeepers. On the first round of the presidential elections, George Weah of the CDC 
turned out to be the most popular candidate with 28.3% of the vote, followed by Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf of the Unity Party with 19.8%, and Charles Brumskine of the Liberty Party with 13.9%. 
In  the  second  round  of  presidential  vote  held  on  November  8th,  however,  Johnson  Sirleaf 
managed  to  turn  this  result  around  and  obtained  59.4%  of  the  vote.  This  strong  popular 
endorsement had not translated into support for her party, however. Modeled after the American 
system, the Liberian legislature was split into a 64-member House of Representatives and a 26-
member Senate. On October 11th Johnson Sirleaf’s Unity Party had obtained 8 seats in the former 
and 4 in the latter. In fact both chambers exhibited a remarkably fractured party composition (11 
in the House, 9 in the Senate), which would hinder the President’s legislative agenda and force 
her to strike deals with the various big men who had now become elected representatives. Men 
like former warlord Prince Yormie Johnson, who fifteen years earlier had videotaped himself 
murdering President Samuel Doe and was now an elected senator.
Ellen  Johnson  Sirleaf  coupled  a  professional  background  in  the  World  Bank  with  a 
prominent role in Liberian opposition over several decades, so naturally there were high hopes 
among donors that the first female African head of state would be a staunch reformer and a 
trustworthy ally. A Minister of Finance under the Tolbert administration and erstwhile leader of 
the Liberia Action Party, Johnson Sirleaf had been briefly jailed by Samuel Doe in the early 
1980s after she declared in the US that Liberia was ruled by “many idiots.” (When Doe released 
her two weeks before the 1985 election he immediately collected $24m in economic aid) (Reno 
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1998, 87). Despite painting herself as an “untainted, maternal figure,” few inside Liberia could 
forget her past as a former minister, Taylor supporter, and, despite her native ancestry, “a member 
of  the old urban elite”  (Harris  1999, 444).  As president,  Johnson Sirleaf  accepted the “tacit 
trusteeship” exercised by the international community, which was acknowledged by all even if 
everyone rushed to affirm that it  did not weaken Liberian sovereignty  (Andersen 2010). She 
pleased  donors  by  underlining  repeatedly  the  centrality  of  governance  reform  for  her 
administration, and in particular the need to fight corruption, which she declared “public enemy 
number one.” However, by early 2011 her true motivations were still an enigma to all except 
those closest to her, and the general view, as related to me by a member of the diplomatic corps, 
was that she could have either a clean government or a capable one, but not both.
Table 3.2: Liberia, Economic and Political Indicators
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Population
(millions)
2.94 3.00 3.04 3.09 3.18 3.31 3.48 3.66 3.84 3.99
GDP (current US$ 
millions)
543.00 559.30 410.20 460.00 530.20 611.86 734.93 842.51 879.46 986.20
Per capita GDP 
(PPP, current US$)
431.31 445.92 308.69 319.87 338.23 361.57 388.05 403.61 409.94 418.79
Polity2 0 0 1 3 5 6 6 6 6 6
WGI Government  
Effectiveness
n.a. -1.61 -1.50 -1.57 -1.36 -1.20 -1.28 -1.32 -1.21 -1.24
WGI Regulatory  
Quality
n.a. -1.74 -1.69 -1.88 -1.55 -1.37 -1.21 -1.34 -1.20 -1.06
WGI Rule of Law n.a. -1.83 -1.68 -1.68 -1.38 -0.87 -1.01 -1.18 -1.07 -1.01
WGI Control of  
Corruption
n.a. -1.18 -1.22 -1.26 -1.04 -0.49 -0.33 -0.65 -0.53 -0.51
TI Corruption 
Perceptions Index
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.2 n.a. 2.1 2.4 3.1 3.3
Sources: World Development Indicators, Polity IV Data Series Version 2010, Worldwide Governance Indicators,  
Transparency International.
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Liberia’s population grew by a million in the first eight years after the end of its second 
civil  war. Unfortunately,  economic growth could not keep up with this demographic change: 
while  GDP did  more  than  double  between 2003 and  2010,  this  translated  into  a  per  capita 
increase  (at  purchasing  power  parity)  of  little  more  than  $100.  Compared  to  Sierra  Leone, 
therefore, it was taking Liberia much longer to reactivate economic activity and draw it into the 
formal sector.  Like its neighbor across the Mano river, the Liberian government registered a 
significant improvement in regulatory quality and rule of law during these years. In contrast to 
Sierra Leone, however, these gains were matched to some extent in government effectiveness 
and especially in terms of corruption, with a marked drop after the enactment of the Governance 
and Economic Management Assistance Program in 2005. Chapter 5 below will directly question 
this  perceived  success  at  the  aggregate  level  by  delving  into  the  specifics  of  GEMAP 
implementation,  and  particularly  of  its  failed  anti-corruption  measures.  In  fact,  the  case 
narratives  of  that  chapter  turn  country-level  indicators  on  their  head,  showing  a  marked 
improvement  in  the  control  of  corruption  in  Sierra  Leone,  not  Liberia.  This  proved  the 
limitations of aggregate data (especially those based on expert surveys) in studying the anatomy 
of state-building processes.
3.3  Aid Dependence and Donor Partners
Sierra Leone and Liberia were two highly aid-dependent countries during the first decade 
of  the  21st century,  and  their  legacies  of  state  capture  and  collapse  required  all  but  a  full 
construction of new public institutions and organizations. Despite massive inflows of foreign aid 
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to both countries,there were in fact only a handful of donors whose contributions were central to 
civil service reform, anti-corruption reform, and security sector reform. They were two bilateral 
donors,  the  United  Kingdom and  the  United  States,  as  well  as  three  multilateral  ones,  the 
European Commission, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program. In their 
programmatic  approach  and  attitudes  towards  local  compliance  and  noncompliance,  the 
bilaterals  enjoyed the clout  and decision-making autonomy of  sovereign authority,  while  the 
multilaterals had to tread much more carefully in order to abide by more stringent or technical 
mandates.  There  was also  variation,  however,  in  terms  of  their  willingness  to  use  whatever 
means they had at their disposal as an inducement for reform. Chapters 4 through 6 below will 
explore these limitations in greater detail.
Aid Profiles
Between 2001 and 2010 Sierra Leone received official development assistance equivalent 
to 30% of its gross domestic product, a ratio that went down yearly from over 40% at the end of  
the civil war to a still sizable 25% by 2010 (see table 3.3). By comparison, the government’s tax 
revenues had hovered near a stable 11% of GDP during the same decade,  and expenses had 
oscillated between 29% and 17% of GDP. The figures are clear: the Sierra Leonean state had to 
rely on foreign aid for  an important  portion of its  operations in  the immediate  post-conflict 
period.  Most  OECD  member  states,  some  non-OECD  donors,  and  most  large  international 
organizations  disbursed  aid  to  Sierra  Leone at  one  point  or  another.  As  the  former  colonial 
power, still tied to the war-torn country by culture and social networks, the United Kingdom was 
the major reconstruction donor for Sierra Leone, its contribution amounting to 17% of all the 
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ODA granted throughout the decade. It was followed closely by the European Union institutions, 
in particular the European Commission, which provided 15%, and by the World Bank group 
through its International Development Association, with 11%. Behind these big three, a slew of 
bilateral  and  multilateral  donors  ensued  in  a  gently  sloping  distribution  reflecting  a  widely 
distributed international footprint.
Table 3.3: Official Development Assistance to Sierra Leone
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Total (current  
US$ millions)
334.82 383.12 337.08 376.29 339.85 380.47 549.78 378.21 448.26 466.85 3944.73
ODA % GDP 42 41 34 34 27 27 33 19 24 25 30
Tax Revenue 
% GDP
12 11 12 11 11 11 10 11 11 n.a. -
Govt. Expenses
% GDP
28 29 26 23 23 22 17 20 23 n.a. -
Main ODA Donors (%)
United Kingdom 15 14 16 16 18 17 16 24 18 18 17
EU Institutions 12 6 8 17 25 16 13 12 24 17 15
IDA 20 12 9 10 15 12 6 13 8 12 11
United States 8 18 17 8 6 6 4 4 4 6 8
IMF 10 9 5 11 5 2 0 5 4 9 6
Netherlands 11 5 6 3 2 2 9 0 0 0 4
Germany 4 4 4 3 2 3 7 4 4 3 4
Japan 0 0 1 0 1 11 5 4 8 3 4
Italy 0 5 3 7 0 1 8 0 1 0 3
Ireland 1 0 2 1 2 3 3 4 3 3 2
Others 20 25 29 24 23 28 29 29 25 29 26
Sources: World Development Indicators, OECD Development Assistance Committee.
Liberia’s aggregate aid profile during the same period (bearing in mind that its second 
civil war ended in 2003) is fairly similar to Sierra Leone’s. Between 2001 and 2010 official 
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development assistance amounted to about 34% of the country’s gross domestic product. What is 
remarkable about Liberia is the frailty of the government’s accounts, which is reflected in the 
dearth of data available on government tax revenue and expenses, which appeared to be more 
than  one  order  of  magnitude  lower  than  in  Sierra  Leone.  Perhaps  an  artifact  of  opacity  or 
collapse of public finance management capacity, it is nonetheless clear that, if anything, Liberia 
was an even more aid-dependent country than Sierra Leone. Still, the distribution of international 
assistance there, too, assumed the shape of a gradual slope (table 3.4). Not a colonial power as 
such but certainly a parent state and later foreign sponsor, as well as the central destination for 
the Liberian diaspora, the United States provided 20% of total ODA during the period, in certain 
key years reaching a share as high as 48%. In second place one finds the International Monetary 
Fund with 19%, but this is an artifact of a few very large grants from its concessional trust fund 
that were approved in the last few years of the decade. A similar factor places the IDA as third 
major donor, with 10%. The EU institutions, with 8% of the aggregate total, had in fact been 
more reliable international partners for Liberia, at one point providing up to a quarter of total 
foreign aid. After them followed a number of smaller bilateral contributions from OECD donors.
107
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 3
Table 3.4: Official Development Assistance to Liberia
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Total (current  
US$ millions)
38.48 55.16 106.94 213.25 222.49 260.45 701.39 1250.99 512.57 1419.26 4780.98
ODA % GDP 5 6 11 19 18 18 42 64 28 75 34
Tax Revenue % 
GDP
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.32 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Govt. Expenses
% GDP
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.34 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Main ODA Donors (%)
United States 33 27 28 48 39 34 15 22 19 9 20
IMF -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 5 38 19
IDA 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 0 8 3 10
EU Institutions 23 17 14 14 24 17 6 4 12 6 8
Germany -17 -4 -3 -1 1 3 1 25 5 4 8
France 4 3 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 16 6
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 1 3 9 4
Sweden 3 2 5 6 7 6 3 2 8 2 3
United Kingdom 3 5 7 8 3 6 2 3 7 2 3
Norway 2 4 8 5 3 3 4 3 3 2 3
Others 50 46 39 20 23 23 10 12 30 9 15
Sources: World Development Indicators, OECD Development Assistance Committee.
The data from tables 3.3 and 3.4 illustrates a certain symmetry between Sierra Leone and 
Liberia as aid recipients: multiple contributions by OECD bilaterals, overshadowed slightly by 
large disbursements from international financial institutions and a major industrialized partner. 
The landscape changes markedly, however, once the focus is narrowed down to state-building 
assistance. There is in fact no indicator or reporting category for aid which deals with state-
building as conceptualized in this dissertation. Instead, the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System 
has a number of concepts which only very imperfectly capture support for institutional reform. 
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Still, as an aggregate expression of donor presence, these data offers some interesting insights. 
For instance, consider the wide-ranging “Government & Civil Society - General” concept, which 
includes everything from public finance management to elections and NGOs. As a measure of 
institutional assistance it is far too coarse, and it does not discriminate between state and regime 
reform; as an indicator of what donors are able and willing to engage in explicitly political tasks,  
however, it is not without value. Against the relatively flat distribution of total aid to all sectors, 
table 3.5a shows that Government & Civil Society ODA in Sierra Leone was dominated by three 
donors:  together,  the United Kingdom, the EU, and the World Bank (through IDA) supplied 
almost  75% of  all  aid.  The leading role  of the United Kingdom, which was visible  but not 
remarkable for general assistance, becomes starker in this explicitly political sector: 39% of all 
ODA targeting political institutions and organizations between 2002 and 2010 came from the 
UK. In the case of Liberia, in contrast, the leading role of the United States in overall aid all but 
disappears, taking a back seat to the World Bank, which amounts to a staggering 60% of ODA 
(table 3.5b). Again, the fragmented distribution of foreign assistance dissipates to make way for 
just a handful of donors, particularly the United States (20%) and to a lesser extent Sweden (4%). 
Finally, both in Sierra Leone and Liberia the data shows how the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), which was crowded out by bilaterals in terms of total aid, was in fact one of 
the major Government & Civil Society donors, a preeminence that will become more evident and 
causally relevant in the case studies.
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Table 3.5a: Government & Civil Society ODA to Sierra Leone
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Total (current US$ m) 34.41 45.09 46.32 49.24 90.44 79.75 75.74 84.25 82.99 588.43
As % of ODA 9 13 12 14 24 15 20 19 18 16
Main SB-ODA Donors (%)
United Kingdom 41 33 52 45 35 40 52 29 29 39
IDA 48 26 30 33 16 6 8 11 26 20
EU Institutions 5 2 2 4 11 22 13 32 13 14
US 1 9 7 5 4 6 6 5 13 6
UNDP 0 0 5 4 4 6 6 3 4 4
Others 4 29 3 9 29 20 14 20 15 18
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee.
Table 3.5b: Government & Civil Society ODA to Liberia
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Total (current US$ m) 1.30 4.11 15.50 8.95 10.72 373.57 26.72 69.80 91.12 601.78
As % of ODA 2 4 7 4 4 53 2 14 6 13
Main SB-ODA Donors (%)
IDA 0 0 0 0 0 94 -41 14 14 60
United States 75 82 85 28 44 4 72 46 34 20
UNDP 0 0 10 20 22 1 18 7 6 4
Sweden 0 0 0 3 4 0 5 11 14 4
Others 25 18 5 48 30 2 46 23 32 12
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee.
What if we filter out electoral and NGO assistance and focus instead on actual state-
building assistance? Tables 3.6a and 3.6b do this by focusing on a composite measure of aid to 
public finance management, public policy, legal and judicial development, and anti-corruption 
efforts. Interestingly, while in the Sierra Leonean case the shares of assistance remain relatively 
unchanged from the larger Government & Civil Society cluster, in Liberia the leadership of the 
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World Bank becomes even more salient, with the United States dropping to 15% of total aid. 
Again, these measures are imperfect representations of what is happening on the ground: not all 
aid is categorized as ODA, and the Creditor Reporting System database has to be taken with a 
grain of salt as the work in progress that it is. But even a cursory reading of the aid data shows a 
crucial difference in the distribution of foreign assistance to state-building in the two countries. 
Sierra  Leone’s  reconstruction  process,  and especially  its  post-conflict  state-building  reforms, 
were disproportionately supported by a bilateral leading donor, the United Kingdom. Across the 
border, in contrast, the United States performed its natural leading role only in terms of general 
assistance, but actually shied away from political entanglements by taking a back seat to the 
World Bank, a multilateral. Donor identity matters for the purposes of strategic interaction, and 
the freedom that a bilateral has to engage in open dialogue about institutional change with a 
recipient  government  far  exceeds  the  balancing  act  that  multilateral  managers  and  mission 
leaders have to carry out due to their collective chains of reporting and command. The case 
studies in chapters 4 through 6 will demonstrate this point empirically.
Table 3.6a: State-Building ODA to Sierra Leone
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Total (current US$ m) 28.16 37.03 37.22 36.38 70.06 45.50 45.43 58.70 49.14 406.95
As % of ODA 7 10 10 11 18 8 12 13 11 11
Main SB-ODA Donors (%)
United Kingdom 37 35 58 53 29 52 46 33 37 41
IDA 58 27 30 33 15 5 12 11 26 21
EU Institutions 2 2 2 3 10 6 13 40 6 11
United States 1 9 7 7 6 10 7 5 17 8
Others 1 28 3 5 40 27 22 12 14 19
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee.
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Table 3.6b: State-Building ODA to Liberia
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Total (current US$ m) 0.08 0.13 5.09 2.72 4.37 370.08 19.00 43.82 48.76 494.05
As % of ODA 0 0 2 1 2 53 2 9 3 10
Main SB-ODA Donors (%)
IDA 0 0 0 0 0 94 -61 11 21 71
United States 2 100 70 1 32 3 92 44 38 15
UNDP 0 0 29 67 54 1 25 8 8 4
Others 98 0 0 31 13 1 43 36 32 9
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee
In highlighting the divergent roles of leading bilateral donors at the sectoral level, these 
data have also shown that overall aid figures may be misleading for the purposes of analyzing 
assistance to institutional change. As I argued in the introduction, the anatomy of state-building 
can be truly understood only at a level of detail that is impossible to grasp with country-level  
indicators. In terms of foreign aid, in particular, there is another key reason why the aggregate 
numbers are deceptive: despite the fact that 23 bilateral OECD donors have disbursed ODA to 
Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2010, only a handful of them had an actual presence in the 
ground: the United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland, Germany, and Italy. A similar pattern 
was evident in early post-conflict Liberia, where besides the US embassy and EU mission there 
were only a British political officer, a German political officer, and a French attaché (European 
Commission 2004, 21). Far more than aid commitments and disbursements, the existence of a 
field office is an actually informative indicator of the kind of relationship that a donor wants to 
establish with a recipient partner: on-the-ground personnel allow for an immediate technical and 
political dialogue, for an active voice in development and partners working groups and meetings, 
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and for closer and more reliable monitoring. A donor disbursing money from abroad has to rely 
on  ad  hoc  evaluations  by  consultants  whose  terms  of  reference  are  carefully  specified,  or 
alternatively on the assessments carried out by other donors -usually the multilaterals- to whose 
standards and expectations it is thus held hostage. As I will discuss further in chapter 7, effective 
state-building assistance requires a physical presence in the recipient country.
Principle and Practice of Local Ownership and Donor Coordination
Aid actors operating in the first decade of the 21st century were much more self-conscious 
about  the  unintended  effects  of  their  assistance  than  they  had  ever  been.  These  concerns 
coalesced  around  the  negative  externalities  of  donor  proliferation  and  less-than-charitable 
disbursement practices, like tying aid to the procurement of donor-country services or materiel. 
In  2003 ODA recipients  and providers  signed the Rome Declaration on Harmonization as  a 
collective response to “the growing evidence that, over time, the totality and wide variety of 
donor  requirements  and  processes  for  preparing,  delivering,  and  monitoring  development 
assistance  are  generating  unproductive  transaction  costs  for,  and  drawing  down  the  limited 
capacity of, partner countries” (OECD 2003). Seeking to consign this and other related problems 
to  the  dustbin  of  history,  more  than  150  aid  providers  (bilateral,  multilateral,  and  non-
governmental) as well as recipients signed in 2005 the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(OECD 2005). A policy statement full of ambitious and detailed targets for the betterment of 
official development assistance, the Paris Declaration detailed a series of commitments based on 
the guiding principles of recipient ownership of reforms, donor alignment of assistance with 
recipient strategies and country systems, collective harmonization of foreign aid, results-oriented 
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management,  and  mutual  accountability  between  donors  and  recipient.  These  principles 
translated into 12 observable indicators, such as the gradual shift from project- to program-based 
disbursement  or  from  parallel  implementation  units  (PIUs)  to  the  recipient’s  own  public 
organizations. The set of aspirations embodied in the Paris Declaration was further ratified by the 
heads of bilateral and multilateral aid organizations in the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action once it 
was evident that progress had been steady but slower than expected (OECD 2008a).
Even  as  these  principles  were  conceptually  evolving  and  gradually  infiltrating  the 
strategies and programs of aid donors and recipients, they had already served as aspirational 
guidelines for assistance in places like Sierra  Leone and Liberia.  In terms of the theoretical 
framework of this dissertation, they can be boiled down to two central concerns: ownership and 
coordination. Government ownership of reform is one of those seemingly commonsensical yet 
surprisingly problematic ideas that recurrently fascinate the development community, and I will 
discuss it in a prescriptive sense in chapter 7 below. For now, from a purely analytical standpoint, 
it is useful to conceptualize ownership as an expression of the agency relationship inherent in 
foreign aid. Specifically, it represents the degree to which the aims of the agent overlap with 
those of the principal. In programmatic statements such as the Paris Declaration, donors have 
concluded  that  the  best  way  to  overcome  the  agency  problem  is  to  delegate  on  recipient 
governments  only those  tasks  that  they  themselves  are  willing  to  assume.  In  principle,  this 
conceptual shift turns donors into supportive partners instead of adversarial creditors. In practice, 
however, the structure of incentives inherent to contexts of state capture and collapse should 
prevent local actors from truly agreeing on meaningful institutional reform, as I have argued in 
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chapter  2  above.  Ownership of  means,  it  turns  out,  is  much more  tenuous  and fragile  than 
ownership of aims: everyone wants to have an efficient public bureaucracy, but not everyone is 
willing to incur in the political costs of firing inefficient public officials.
Donor coordination, which the Paris and Accra aspirations hold to be a panacea of aid 
effectiveness, is also easier said than done. Its application and enforcement requires by itself a 
significant  amount  of  political  heavy-lifting,  mostly  in  terms  of  reconciling  all  donors’ 
idiosyncratic budget cycles, strategic and tactical preferences, and standards of reporting and 
evaluation. Again, despite being an eminently intuitive notion, coordination reveals itself to be a 
deceptive platonic ideal which is bound to falter when it meets the intrinsic messiness of reality. 
In terms of this dissertation’s analytical framework, the coordination buzzword maps directly 
onto the third strategic dilemma outlined in chapter 2 above: a collective action problem between 
individual  donors  imbued  with  diverse  ideational  and  material  interests.  As  an  actor-level 
solution to this  dilemma, coordination require individual aid organizations to relinquish their 
agency to some centralized scheme or to another aid actor; while this may make sense strictly 
from the perspective of disbursement externalities, it is impractical once donor domestic politics 
are taken into account. As an institutional solution, in turn, coordination is but a second-order 
collective action problem, in so far as it necessitates the creation of an incentive scheme that 
prevents free-riding. The  case  studies  in  the  following  chapters  will  explore  the  strategic 
challenges  of  ownership  and  coordination  and  principles  for  aid  effectiveness.  Still,  it  is 
informative  to  briefly  review their  surface-level  application  in  Sierra  Leone  and Liberia,  as 
captured by OECD evaluation surveys on the implementation of Paris Declaration principles.
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Using World Bank standards, the OECD surveys awarded Sierra Leone’s development 
strategies a “D” in 2006, then a “C” in 2008 and 2010 (with “A” being the best and “E” the 
worst). These lackluster grades reflect the existence of policy agendas hampered by a missing 
link between budget provisions and policy objectives as well as by dire capacity gaps in the 
implementation stage. Perhaps more interesting are the survey results regarding donor behavior. 
On the positive side, 95% of all aid was untied, thus addressing one of the traditional pet peeves 
of aid skeptics. On the negative side, there was no framework for mutual accountability between 
the government and its international partners, and little in the form of result-based management 
of aid. Coordination with country programs did improve from 22% to 73% between 2008 and 
2010,  but  over  60%  of  participating  aid  organizations  avoided  in-country  public  finance 
management  and  procurement  systems,  approximately 45% of  all  aid  was  not  aligned  with 
government  priorities,  and the national  budget  accounted  for  30% (2008) to  58% (2010) of 
foreign assistance. Finally, donor coordination was limited and on the decline, both in terms of 
joint analysis  (34% in 2010, down from 56% in 2008) and especially of joint missions (14%, 
down from 27%)  (OECD 2008b, sec. 47, 2011b, 74). “If progress is to be made,” one of the 
surveys concluded, “the government will need to show greater leadership and donors will need to 
work with the government to build its capacity. Progress is being made toward strengthening 
donor  partnerships,  but  donors  must  do  more  to  respect  the  leadership  exercised  by  the 
government”  (OECD 2008b, 47–17).  “In short,” in  the words of a DfID official  working in 
Sierra Leone between 2004 and 2006, “the scene was rather reminiscent of a school disco – a 
large number of disparate actors all waiting at the edge of the dance floor for someone to take the 
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lead.  With  leadership  comes  accountability,  however,  and  the  GoSL and  donors  alike  were 
reluctant to make the first move” (M. White 2008, 11).
The  prospects  of  Paris  Declaration  implementation  in  Liberia  were  grimmer.  The 
government’s  development  strategies  received a “D” from the World Bank in terms of  their 
operational worth, in particular due to the fact that most aid was being delivered outside of the 
government budget: 5% of total ODA in 2010 was aligned with local priorities, and only 2% was 
registered in the national budget (both figures were up from 0% in 2008). Over 90% of aid was 
untied, but by 2010 there remained 4 parallel implementation units of the 16 that the 2008 survey 
had identified, only one third of aid actually used in-country procurement and finance systems, 
and a scant 12% of aid was channeled through programs instead of projects, technical assistance, 
or NGOs. While there was significant coordination in terms of analytic work (66% in 2008 and 
43% in 2010), joint missions barely encompassed more than 10% of total aid inflows. Whatever 
results-based frameworks there existed received a “D” or “C” grade, and -as in Sierra Leone- 
there were no mechanisms for mutual accountability (OECD 2008b, 27, 2011a, 70). As the 2011 
report concluded: “There is a consensus that co-ordination between development partners, and 
between development partners and government, is less effective than it should be. There is no 
lead development  partner  co-ordination agreement,  and no forum for effective co-ordination. 
Development partners feel that government does not provide a sufficiently strong co-ordination 
lead” (OECD 2011a, 14).
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Introducing the Key State-Building Donors
The United Kingdom was the indisputable leading donor in Sierra Leone’s first decade of 
peace. In fact it had become an external backer of President Kabbah already in 1997, and by 
2012 it still  maintained military advisers in the Ministry of Defense and Sierra Leone armed 
forces. Fifteen years, and counting. This long-term commitment was not a mere succession of 
improvisations, but a conscious political effort which originated in an unlikely combination of 
personal involvement by a prime minister (Tony Blair’s father had once taught in Sierra Leone),  
commitment to an “ethical foreign policy” by an enterprising new government, and diaspora and 
cultural  ties  to  a  former  colony.  In  November  of  2002  the  United  Kingdom  took  the 
unprecedented  step  of  signing  a  10-year  memorandum of  understanding  with  Sierra  Leone 
governing the terms of its bilateral assistance, with administrative reforms featuring prominently 
as  some  of  the  key  triggers  for  the  yearly  tranche  of  conditional  assistance  (DfID  and 
Government of Sierra  Leone 2002).  This move was coupled with the equally unprecedented 
decision to start providing budget support to Sierra Leone, despite the fact that the high-risk post-
conflict country did not meet any of the standard criteria for such kind of foreign aid  (691429 
Bilateral  donor  official,  London  2011).  Over  the  next  ten  years  the  British  Department  for 
International Development (DfID), albeit  without a permanent office in Freetown until 2005, 
would  have  a  hand  in  every  major  state-building  reform  taking  place  in  the  country,  and 
particularly in  the  administrative  ones,  like  the  Audit  Service,  Anti-Corruption  Commission, 
Governance Reform Secretariat,  Office of National Security,  and Public Sector Reform Unit. 
These interventions will be explored in detail in the empirical chapters that follow. As a snapshot 
of what this bilateral assistance program looked like, consider the year 2006, when British ODA 
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comprised “£40m a year, of which up to £15m (37%) goes to direct budget support. The balance 
is divided between good governance and public-sector reform (26%), security and justice (18%), 
private-sector development (15%) and human development (4%)”  (European Commission and 
DfID 2007, 24). 
In  Liberia,  DfID capitalized  on  the  expertise  it  had  developed  in  Sierra  Leone as  it 
provided assistance for the elaboration of  civil  service and anti-corruption strategies.  It  thus 
became a crucial donor for administrative design, although its small relative size (and an in-
country presence being limited to  one individual  chargé d’affaires)  minimized its  impact  on 
enforcement.  The  visible  and  vocal  commitment  to  reform in  Liberia  mirrors  the  behavior 
displayed  in  Sierra  Leone,  and  together  they  confirm  the  United  Kingdom  as  the  leading 
administrative state-building donor for the first decade of the 21st century, animated as it was by 
DfID’s enterprising rethinking of the basic logics and principles of development assistance, by a 
willingness to carry out honest -even devastating- aid evaluations and then make them public, 
and finally by a concern to use British taxpayers’ money to generate meaningful change (683032 
Bilateral  donor  official,  Freetown  2010).  It  would  be  tempting  to  classify  Britain  and  its 
Department for International Development as the “good guy” in this dissertation, but the cases of 
civil  service  and  security  sector  reform  will  highlight  the  limitations  of  even  the  most 
intellectually and politically committed donor when strategic concerns get in the way, or when it 
has  to  rely  on  coordinated  action  with  other  international  partners.  Donor  intentions  often 
succumb to incentives, as I demonstrate throughout this dissertation. In any event, the fact that 
DfID was a ministry-level agency with a direct line to its political leadership enabled it to display 
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some ingenuity and boldness where others would have shown conservatism and caution.
The United States was a very minor partner in Sierra Leone, supporting such areas as 
community development, civic dialogue at the local level, food programs, HIV sensitization, or 
mining  sector  transparency  (European  Commission  and  DfID  2007;  European  Commission 
2005b). In Liberia, however, the US was the natural leading donor, even if this potential was 
never fully realized in terms of state-building. Regardless of the various interventions undertaken 
in the country by the State Department, the Pentagon, and USAID, the United States was forced 
to contend with its “original sin”: the failure to intervene to put an end to either the first or the 
second  Liberian  civil  wars.  That  sin  of  omission,  together  with  the  legacy  of  exploitative 
investment under the “Open Door Policy” and tacit endorsement of Doe’s dictatorial regime, 
soured the perceptions that many Liberians had of their parent nation. “In the decades since the 
United States began intervening in the fate of this small West African territory,” read the report 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “it has alternately supported, exploited, welcomed, 
and abandoned Liberia and Liberians. While the relationship over time has been complex, during 
several key periods the United States’ actions and omissions have led to disastrous results for 
Liberians” (Government of Liberia 2009a, 303). To compound this problematic relationship, by 
the late 1990s poor relations between the United States and the Taylor regime had “virtually 
stopped all USAID activities,” forcing the United States to re-establish its aid presence from 
scratch (European Commission 2004, 15–16).
After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement the US focused on the first pillar of the RFTF 
-security- by contributing a sizable share of UNMIL’s budget. The early American response to 
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the  needs  of  post-conflict  Liberia  also  consisted  in  support  to  community-level  conflict 
resolution and to democracy promotion through civil society organizations. To that end in 2004 
USAID’s Office of Transitional Initiatives launched a program in Liberia to assist civil society 
organizations and supply basic equipment to some government ministries (“These were literally 
metal ship ‘containers’ full of furniture and supplies and popularly called ‘Ministries in a Box’”) 
(USAID 2005, 4). The 2005 operational strategy highlighted a number of key areas of support: 
community  rehabilitation  and  reintegration,  elections,  healthcare,  agriculture,  forestry,  civil 
society, as well as transparency in public administration, which would fall under the American 
component  of  GEMAP  (USAID  2006,  4–6).  Over  the  following  years  USAID  would  also 
provide support to the legislature and to the judicial  sector.  The scale of this assistance was 
staggering  for  such  an  impoverished  country.  In  fiscal  year  2006-07,  for  instance,  America 
channeled  about  $190  million  to  Liberia,  “of  which  about  $35  million  for  humanitarian 
assistance, $40 million for security sector reform through the Department of Defense, and $115 
million  for  development  assistance”  (European  Commission  2007c,  26).  Overall,  the  state-
building effects of American aid to Liberia were hindered by certain donor features intrinsic to 
the  US in  general,  and to  USAID specifically (under  constant  siege  as  it  was  from the  US 
Congress): the focus on democracy promotion via civil society organizations, the requirement to 
delegate interventions to private contractors and NGOs, or the unwillingness to risk political flak 
over a more confrontational position were all factors against a political strategy of state-building 
assistance.  Thus while  other  donors  looked to  the  US for  leadership  in  Liberia,  its  political 
attitude regarding administrative reform was that of an enabler at best, and that of a spoiler at 
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worst.
The European Commission was a central but never leading donor for certain kinds of 
state-building reforms in both Sierra Leone and Liberia, with a sustained focus on institutional 
transformation from a very early time. Under its 1998 national indicative program, European 
support  to  Sierra  Leone was split  in  three  areas:  1)  public  sector  reform,  good governance, 
democratization, and human rights; 2) rehabilitation and development of social sectors; and 3) 
infrastructure. However, the resumption of hostilities all but paralyzed implementation of this 
agenda  (European Commission 2003a, 16). The 2003-2007 program of assistance focused on 
two focal sectors: rehabilitation of priority infrastructure, and good governance and institutional 
building,  with  an  emphasis  on  decentralization,  public  finance  management,  civil  society 
empowerment,  and delivery of social  services  (European Commission 2003b). For the 2008-
2012 period the European Commission coordinated its medium-term programming with DfID, 
and under the resulting joint country strategy the EC would provide supplementary assistance to 
agriculture and environmental  protection while  continuing its  support  to  the focal  sectors  of 
infrastructure  and  governance,  with  a  new  emphasis  on  civil  service  reform  (European 
Commission  and  DfID  2007).  All  throughout  this  period  the  European  Commission  was 
providing Poverty Reduction Budget Support under a coordination scheme with DfID, the World 
Bank, and the African Development Bank (European Commission 2007a).
With  regards  to  Liberia,  in  1990  the  European  Community  had  ceased  all  regular 
development assistance, but it had maintained a field office in Monrovia and kept a political 
dialogue opened with the government. In 2001, under the terms of the Cotonou Agreement for 
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Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific nations, the EC started negotiations with the Taylor regime for the 
resumption of aid (European Commission 2004, 16). Initial support to post-war Liberia centered 
on infrastructure, health, and community development (European Commission 2005a, 6). For its 
first country strategy and indicative program the EC’s focal sectors were county development 
and education, with smaller interventions supporting civil society organizations and some of the 
central governance commissions emerging from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That last 
component would evolve into an Institutional Support and Capacity Building Program (ISCBP) 
which made the EC one of the key donors in institutional reform at the strategic policy-making 
and  administrative  levels  (European  Commission  2007b).  After  the  European  Commission 
became one of the early promoters of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance, its 
second country strategy and indicative program (for 2008-2013) shifted the two focal areas to 
rehabilitation  (including  economic  revitalization  and  access  to  basic  social  services)  and 
governance, with a very clearer emphasis on public finance management and decentralization 
(European Commission 2007c). Within GEMAP the EC would become a crucial donor in anti-
corruption  reform  through  its  support  for  the  General  Auditing  Commission,  which  was 
nonetheless  hampered  by  an  unwillingness  or  inability  to  engage  in  politically  delicate 
confrontations with the government (581120 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011).
The World Bank group, and particularly the International Development Association, was 
the second of the three main multilateral donors in post-conflict state-building in the Mano River 
region. In Sierra Leone, its Transitional Support Strategy encompassed assistance to the health 
sector,  education,  HIV/AIDS, and public sector management  (European Commission 2005b), 
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and the Bank also provided budget support through loans and grants  (European Commission 
2007a).  More  specifically,  with  the  European  Commission,  African  Development  Bank,  and 
DfID, it was part of a Multi-Donor Budgetary Support initiative  (World Bank 2006b, 7). The 
International Development Association was the leading donor in decentralization, local capacity-
building, and public finance management; in non-state-building-related areas, it also led in water 
and power supply (European Commission and DfID 2007, 29).
Despite having been absent from Liberia since 1984 once the country entered into arrears 
for its loans, the World Bank regained its place as a central donor from the moment the CPA was 
signed, co-authoring with the UN a Joint Needs Assessment in December of 2003 that became 
the  foundation  for  a  Results-Focused  Transitional  Framework,  the  first  true  developmental 
strategy of the post-conflict period. In its 2004 Country Re-Engagement Note the Bank outlined 
three  overarching  objectives  for  the  post-conflict  period:  rapid  and  visible  socioeconomic 
revival,  establishment  and  strengthening  of  state  institutions,  and  establishment  of  a  local 
coordination  and monitoring  mechanism for  international  assistance  under  the  RFTF  (World 
Bank 2004, 13–14). In 2004 a survey of donor activity had the World Bank funding projects for 
public  sector  reform,  community  development,  revenue  and  expenditure  management, 
procurement reform, natural resources management, and support to the RFTF Implementation 
and Coordination Office (European Commission 2005a). By 2007 Liberia still did not qualify for 
International Development Association credits, so the World Bank channeled its assistance as 
“prearrears clearance grants” amounting to $60 million and targeting “economic management 
and institutional capacity building, community empowerment and infrastructure, namely roads, 
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ports, airports, water, electricity and telecom”  (European Commission 2007c, 26). In terms of 
institutional capacity, the World Bank provided technical support to the Public Procurement and 
Contracts  Commission,  Ministry  of  Finance,  Forestry  Development  Authority,  the  Senior 
Executive Service program, and the judiciary (European Commission 2008).
The  last  major  state-building  donor,  and  the  third  multilateral  one,  was  the  United 
Nations Development Program, which was a key actor in civil service reform in both countries. 
Under its 2004-2007 country program, UNDP’s assistance to Sierra Leone included support to 
the  PRSP process,  biodiversity,  security  sector  reform,  and  particularly  governance  reforms 
targeting  the  rule  of  law,  decentralization,  elections,  public  sector  reform,  general  capacity 
building, and citizen empowerment (European Commission 2005b). UNDP was the lead agency 
supporting the 2007 elections as well as in the monitoring and evaluation of the government’s 
poverty-reduction  targets.  More  importantly,  UNDP was  a  central  partner  for  the  European 
Commission and DFID on civil service reform (European Commission and DfID 2007, 30). In 
Liberia, UNDP had only maintained a “skeleton presence” during the Taylor years, and so its 
activity only really began after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement  (European Commission 
2004,  16).  The  organization’s  country  strategy  plan  for  2003-2007  focused  on  six  areas: 
democracy, community development, human rights and gender, HIV/AIDS response capacity-
building, and environmental management. In terms of institutional reform, UNDP supported the 
Governance Reform Commission (later Governance Commission) for the formulation of various 
policy initiatives. By 2008 these kinds of state-building interventions had assumed a central role 
for  UNDP,  and  the  2008-2012  country  strategy  was  split  in  two  broad  areas  of  pro-poor 
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economic  development  and  democratic  governance,  the  latter  encompassing  a  wide  brief 
targeting civil society, electoral legislation, or public administration reform (UNDP 2008, 3–5). 
In  Liberia  as  in  Sierra  Leone,  UNDP was  a  crucial  sponsor  of  civil  service  reform,  but  its  
organizational  mandate  to  mediate  between  donors  and  recipients  and  to  avoid  open 
confrontations minimized its ability to promote meaningful administrative change.
There were other donors who supported state-building in a limited or piecemeal fashion, 
but their role is virtually irrelevant in the case studies. In Sierra Leone, the African Development 
Bank provided budget support in coordination with the EC, DfID, and the World Bank, while 
Germany assisted in public outreach for the Anti-Corruption Commission, and Ireland provided 
assistance to the National Electoral Commission  (European Commission and DfID 2007). In 
Liberia, Sweden provided assistance to judicial and security sector reform as well as support for 
developmental coordination through the LRDC, and Norway supported several good governance 
initiatives as well as police reform through a UNDP trust fund (European Commission 2007c, 
2009a). However, all of these aid contributions pale in comparison with those of DfID, USAID, 
the European Commission, the World Bank, and UNDP, all of them directly involved in state-
building reforms at the political, strategic, and implementation levels. Together with local public 
actors working under the Kabbah, Bryant, Johnson Sirleaf, and Koroma administrations, these 
donors are the protagonists of the analytic narratives that follow.
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4.  Building Effectiveness: The Politics of Aid and 
Civil Service Reform
The Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Human Resources Management Office 
(HRMO) are the two central organizations involved in the direction and control of the entire 
Sierra Leonean civil service. During my time in Freetown I had the chance to visit both for some 
interviews, but I also caught a glimpse of what the administrative engine of bureaucratic reform 
in Sierra Leone physically looked like. The HRMO was a relatively recent innovation, four years 
old by the time I visited it. Established partly in reaction to foreign demands for tangible results, 
it was housed in a high-rise building in central Freetown, newly painted and seemingly equipped 
with all the amenities of a modern professional office. The government of Ernest Bai Koroma 
had made the HRMO the centerpiece of its civil sector reform strategy, endowed it with a wide 
policy brief, and managed to secure enough international funding to get it up and running. Oddly, 
when I asked for the foreign expert seconded to the Office whom I was supposed to meet with, 
the staff kept responding with puzzled stares until the man himself happened to walk by and said: 
“Don’t you know who works with you in this office?”
A few blocks away, also in downtown Freetown, stood the premises of the Public Service 
Commission. Housed in a dilapidated two-story building but using only the upper one, it was 
basically an L-shaped corridor with a series of nondescript doors to its sides, one of which had 
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the label “Chairman.” Sometimes there was a receptionist in the office next to the main door, 
which was wide open during the day. Other times there was just a bored man who did not think 
to inquire as to who I was or what business I had with the Commission. Despite its appalling 
conditions, the PSC was in fact a decades-old organization with the constitutional mandate to 
oversee the recruitment and management of the entire civil service. Over the decades it had been 
neglected, ignored, reduced to irrelevance and, by the time foreign donors took an interest in 
civil service reform, entirely bypassed to the benefit of a new HRMO free from the stench of 
state capture. If the HRMO embodied the promise of state-building in Sierra Leone, the PSC was 
the definitive proof of its persistent failure.
In the anatomy of  state-building,  civil  service reform strengthens the body itself,  the 
skeleton and muscles that animate the state as a political organization. The state exists only as 
long as  there is  an  administrative  staff  enforcing its  institutions.  The allegiance  of  the civil  
service to an ethos of formalism, impersonality, and rationality determine whether the state will 
have any ability to enforce public institutions, or whether it will be a mere vessel for private 
benefit. The public bureaucracy is thus instrument and locus of state-building politics, the first 
theoretical problem of which -albeit not necessarily the first practical problem- is ensuring that 
the civil service is staffed and organized in accordance with administrative principles. This is an 
inherently contentious  process  everywhere,  but  more so in  weak and collapsed states  where 
public bureaucracy has become a source of clientelism and patronage politics.
This chapter explores the institutional politics of foreign assistance to civil service reform 
in post-conflict Sierra Leone (2001-2011) and Liberia (2003-2011). I begin the chapter with a 
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discussion of the politics of bureaucracy and bureaucratization, using the logic of private and 
public institutions as a bridge between Weberian theory and public administration research. In 
particular, I focus on two broad kinds of administrative reform -personnel and organizational 
restructuring- whose distributional consequences are bound to generate tension between private 
and public institutions. I then proceed to the cases. For each of them I outline in turn the legacies  
of  state  failure  and  capture,  the  aims  and  expectations  that  international  actors  set  for  the 
recipient governments, and the prospects for donor collective action given relative commitments 
to  reform  and  the  presence  of  coordination  frameworks.  Having  defined  the  theoretical 
expectations for each case in this way, I then explore whether they are borne out through case 
narratives of foreign support for reform. I close the chapter with a brief reflection on implications 
both for the analysis civil service reform and for the larger study of externally-supported state-
building.
4.1  The Politics of Bureaucracy and the Challenges of Reform
Many studies of bureaucracy harken back in one way or another to the seminal work of 
German “ur-sociologist” Max Weber, who identified the emergence of bureaucracy (monocratic 
bureaucracy, to be precise) as a crucial component of modernity, coterminous with -and indeed 
necessary for- the rise of the modern state, capitalism, or mass democracy. His conceptualization 
of  the  emergence  of  a  form  of  domination  based  on  regulations  and  impersonality  was 
nonetheless  a  contentious  one,  inasmuch  as  it  subverted  pre-existing  social  orders  based  on 
tradition  and  personalism.  The  tension  between  bureaucracy  and  patrimonialism,  in  Weber, 
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represents the conflict between merit and inheritance, between law and custom, and ultimately 
between the office and the official. Public and private institutions were fated to clash with the 
development of impersonal administration, and thereby of the modern state.
The Subversive Nature of Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy is first and foremost an expression of what Weber called “legal authority”: a 
form of administration based on continuous obedience to a consistent system of abstract rules for 
the  conduct  of  official  business,  arranged  in  a  clear  hierarchy  based  on  the  principles  of 
jurisdiction and written record, and within which no official -not even the highest one- is free 
from rule-bound conduct or allowed to appropriate his position or means of administration for 
personal  use  (Weber  1978,  217–219).  Monocratic  bureaucracy,  as  “the  pure  type”  of  legal 
authority,  consists of individual officials recruited on a technical basis in exchange for fixed 
salaries, who are subject to authority only within the confines of official obligations defined by 
clear spheres of legal competence, and whose official conduct is controlled and disciplined in a 
“strict  and  systematic”  manner  (Weber  1978,  220–221).  This  abstract  and  comprehensive 
conceptualization  ultimately boils  down to  a  very basic  notion:  impersonal  and  self-policed 
administration. And even if this rational type of legal authority applies to virtually every modern 
form of  organization  -churches,  firms,  armies,  parties,  etc.-,  “the  most  striking  case”  of  its 
development is the “modern Western state” (Weber 1978, 223).
Bureaucracy may be a requirement for mass public administration, but its development, 
like  that  of  capitalism or  democracy,  is  not  devoid  of  social  -and  especially  redistributive- 
consequences. First, the focus on technical knowledge and recruitment results in a “leveling of 
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status”  (Weber  1978,  225–226).  Under  bureaucracy  birth  and  kinship  become  irrelevant 
categories for holding office, in stark contrast with traditional caste- or class-based forms of 
authority, where access to administrative positions (for instance ecclesiastic, or political) is the 
privilege of a group of actors related to each other by birth or some form of constructed kinship. 
In such contexts, even when administrative office is not inherited from parent to offspring it is 
always  reassigned  within  the  boundaries  of  the  same  patrimonial  group,  which  is  clearly 
demarcated by tradition and social convention. Bureaucratization undermines such patrimonial 
social differentiation by creating an organizational space that anyone with the right qualifications 
can access. This leveling of status is only reinforced after an official is recruited, as his conduct 
becomes regulated by strict norms of formalism and impersonality which guarantee equality of 
treatment  to  every individual  belonging to  the  same empirical  category.  Therefore even if  a 
member of a privileged group attains public office, he is in principle unable to use his office for 
his  peers’  benefit,  lest  he  face  disciplining  by  the  the  bureaucratic  organization.  Under 
bureaucracy,  therefore,  administrative office ceases  to  be an entitlement  or  patrimony which 
exists for both public duty and private enjoyment.
Bureaucracy removes individuals from the tapestry of community life,  full  as it  is of 
norms of  reciprocity  and allegiance,  and severs  the  link  between their  personal  and official 
conduct through control and discipline mechanisms. In so far as they act in an official capacity, 
individuals are no longer supposed to orient their behavior towards private norms: they have 
become instruments of a public organization. The basic requirement for such an organization to 
work, in the words of Chester Barnard, is “self-abnegation, the surrender of control of personal 
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conduct, the depersonalization of personal action”  (Barnard 1938, 84). And what, if not social 
norms, should public officials respond to? “Common purpose,” Barnard says, the set of goals 
that animate the organization above and beyond the needs and ideas of every one of its individual 
members. For state bureaucracies, the source of such purpose is clear: “The law, the whole law 
and nothing but the law,” writes Samuel E. Finer. “Anything else is punishable”  (Finer 1950, 
134). If the spirit of public service is supposed to shape the interests of public actors, the letter of 
administrative  law regulates  their  behavior,  and  sanctions  them when  they misuse  or  abuse 
public office.  Administrative regulation is  thus the first  line of defense against  “non-rational 
considerations, personal feelings and sympathies, clientelism, and corruption” (Olsen 2008, 22). 
At  the  very  least  such  is  the  ideal  type.  The  alternative  to  bureaucracy in  the  field  public 
administration, as Weber beautifully put it, is “dilettantism” (Weber 1978, 223).  But this is an 
alternative which may be perfectly desirable to those whose position in society depends on the 
persistence of informality and personalism.
The Institutional Politics of Bureaucratization
Bureaucratization loosely based on the Weberian ideal type has long been a prescription 
for weak states (Adamolekun 1991; Goldsmith 1999). It just “never goes out of style” (Caiden 
and Sundaram 2004). Civil service reform in particular involves a panoply of changes to the way 
the civil service is staffed (recruitment, training, grading, payment, retirement, sanctioning...) and 
to the way it is functionally organized (sizing, restructuring, mandates, accountability...)  (Kaul 
1996;  Olowu  1999). In  both  cases  the  aim  is  to  guarantee  impersonality,  formalism,  and 
rationality. These reforms, however, rarely manage to enact meaningful institutional change in 
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the face of powerful “contextual factors” such as entrenched nepotism and clientelism (Andrews 
2008;  Grindle 1997b).  Context  is  crucial  because  administrative change in  the public  sector 
creates winners and losers, and its redistributive implications shape the process of institutional 
continuity and change (Grindle 1996; Schneider and Heredia 2003). Public organizations in all 
states -but especially in weak ones- are a source of political power due to their potential for the 
redistribution of patronage, whether direct (in the form of jobs) or indirect (in the form of rents).  
When political actors collectively benefit from this privatization of public administration, there 
are  no  individual  incentives  for  any  one  of  them  to  support  reform  towards  Weberian 
bureaucracy (Geddes 1994; Kjaer 2004). From this perspective civil service reform is in essence 
a problem of institutional tension, between private incentives for clientelism and favoritism, on 
the one hand, and public rules about administrative impersonality and formalism, on the other.
The  development  policy community is  no  stranger  to  the  fundamentally  institutional 
dilemma that the “good government imperative” generates (Grindle 1996, 1997b). The drafters 
of the 1997 World Development Report, which was devoted to understanding the role of the state 
and the politics of administrative reform, explicitly moved beyond technical interpretations of 
bureaucratic  failure  and  reconstruction  and  into  the  redistributive  politics  that  institutions 
enshrine. “In most countries where the state has collapsed,” the Report noted, “there are forces 
that have an interest in perpetuating a state of anarchy, and whose unbridled pursuit of riches or 
power would be constrained by a state with the capability to make rules, collect revenue, and 
enforce the law” (World Bank 1997, 159). These are precisely the kinds of actors who may have 
strong material and ideational incentives to oppose administrative reform. How, then, can new 
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public institutions overcome such powerful interests and social norms?
In his sociology of law, Weber delved into the problems of reconciling new laws with 
pre-existing customs and conventions. Legal norms, according to him, affect the material context 
of  social  actors;  they  also  guarantee  all  kinds  of  positions  of  authority:  familial,  religious, 
political, etc. Law -and by extension, bureaucracy- is intimately connected to the distribution of 
interests among social groups, insofar as “any authority guaranteeing a legal order depends, in 
some way, upon the consensual action of the constitutive social groups, and the formation of 
social groups depends, to a large extent, upon constellations of material interests” (Weber 1978, 
334). The problem for the would-be reformer or bureaucrat is that adherence to legal norms does 
not necessarily arise out of an ideational commitment to them, but also out of social sanction by 
the actor’s group, or even out of the “unreflective habituation” of customary behavior  (Weber 
1978, 312). The strength of these social norms and practices becomes especially apparent when 
one pursues legal reform of any kind (backed by state coercion), because “where it transforms a 
custom into a legal obligation (by invocation of the ‘usual’) often adds practically nothing to its 
effectiveness, and, where it opposes custom, frequently fails in the attempt to influence actual 
conduct”  (Weber  1978,  320).  This  applies  as  much  to  legal  authority  outside  as  inside  of 
bureaucratic administration: private institutions rooted in a pattern of material interests and social 
authority (of material and ideational incentives) will clash with new public institutions.
This conflict between private and public institutions unfolds constantly in the minds of 
public officials. So why would they comply with bureaucratic authority instead of succumbing to 
social  pressures?  After  all,  as  Chester  Barnard  argues,  an  individual’s  relation  to  any large 
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organization,  like  public  administration,  is  always  mediated  by those closest  to  him:  family, 
friends,  and  peers.  Conventional  answers  to  this  question  have  relied  either  on  some  form 
utilitarian  self-interest,  or  on  some kind of  principled  organizational  culture  or  public  spirit 
(DiIulio 1994; Grindle 1997a). For Barnard himself the solution to this dilemma lies in the use of 
incentives: “Regardless of his history or his obligations he must be induced to cooperate, or there 
can be no cooperation.” These incentives can be material (“objective inducements”) or ideational 
(“states of mind”), and both types are usually jointly necessary for the functioning of public 
bureaucracies (Barnard 1938, 139, 141). When incentives of either kind fail, however, the result 
is usually “rent-seeking” on the part of public actors, which has been a powerful theoretical 
argument for de-bureaucratization policies seeking to minimize the size and discretionary power 
of public organizations (Krueger 1974; Olsen 2008). 
The challenge of establishing a monocratic bureaucracy in the Weberian sense is thus 
two-fold. There is the first-order problem of enforcing new rules on a recalcitrant society, awash 
with customs and interests that are incompatible with bureaucratic government. But even before 
that there is a second-order problem: enforcing administrative rules on the bureaucracy itself, in 
order to ensure that it adheres to the principles of formalism and impersonality. This second-
order dilemma is precisely the one faced by every public actor or foreign donor who embarks on 
civil service reform.
Mindful  of  these  twin  challenges,  the  policy  community  is  constantly  searching  for 
indications of “commitment” or “political will” on the part of recipient country leaders, which 
conventional  wisdom holds  to  be  the  recipe  for  successful  reform  (Kaul  1996;  Macgregor, 
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Peterson,  and  Schuftan  1998;  McCourt  2003).  The  problem is  that  political  will  cannot  be 
demonstrated  ex  ante with  mere  agreement  on  a  policy  or  strategy:  proper  enforcement  of 
administrative institutions policing a formal and impersonal public bureaucracy, and not just the 
adoption of new regulations, is the true test of commitment. Monitoring this kind of political will 
is not easy, especially when bureaucracies are so weak in terms of human and organizational 
resources that institutional subversion can be misconstrued as a deficit of technical capacity. On 
the one hand, civil service reform is guilty of the fundamental paradox of expecting weak public 
organizations to strengthen themselves. On the other hand, this patent fragility is an easy excuse 
for  malfeasance,  and we should expect  public  actors  interested in  continued subversion and 
continued foreign assistance to emphasize how capacity-building has to be the immediate task. 
Weak capacity can always be invoked to justify delays in strategy and policy formulation, as 
plans  and  initiatives  shuffle  endlessly  between  inefficient  ministries  and  agencies,  ad  hoc 
steering committees, high-level retreats, and stakeholder consultations. These are just some of 
the stalling and sabotage strategies that recalcitrant public actors can use to ensure the continued 
enforcement of private institutions, and that we should expect in analytic narratives of reform.
Theoretical Introduction to the Cases
When donors arrive in post-conflict states they usually encounter entrenched habits of 
informal and personalized administration, a primacy of private institutions over public ones. And 
while the economic and political crisis inherent to reconstruction settings may prompt local state 
elites  to  launch civil  service  reforms,  their  success  will  ultimately depend on the  prevailing 
balance of institutional  politics  (Grindle 1996;  Schneider  and Heredia 2003).  In this  kind of 
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social  context  it  falls  to  external  actors  to  use  their  resources  to  reshape  the  structure  of 
incentives. In the rest of this chapter I analyze the reform of public bureaucracies through the 
lenses of personnel and organizational reform, which aggregate a number of policy areas prone 
to  private  capture,  such  as  recruitment  or  performance  monitoring,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
hierarchical and jurisdictional clarity and rationality, on the other. Under complete penetration of 
the civil service by private institutions, the logical expectation would be to observe ministries 
and agencies with opaque recruitment and promotion procedures, unclear or redundant mandates 
and  functions,  and unchecked noncompliance  with  administrative  rules  and  procedures.  The 
opposite  conceptual  pole  would  embody  the  Weberian  ideal  of  impersonality,  formalism, 
documentation, and rationality. The subversive nature of bureaucracy, the institutional politics of 
bureaucratization,  and  the  common  agency  problems  of  aid  and  state-building  all  become 
apparent in the first decade of civil service reform in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
The case narratives in this chapter provide a clear illustration of the conceptual premise 
and  two  strategic  dilemmas  of  state-building  assistance,  highlighting  the  ease  with  which 
powerful informal legacies can undermine well-meaning but uncoordinated international support. 
Both Sierra Leone and Liberia emerged from civil war with administrative institutions weakened 
after decades of capture and ultimate collapse, their civil services bloated, nepotistic, and free 
from regulation and sanction. Donors were thus faced with the most immediate task of post-
conflict state-building: establishing public capacity for institutional enforcement. Following the 
logic of the explanatory typology presented in chapter 2, we should expect to see reform efforts 
unfold  along  the  following  lines.  In  Sierra  Leone  under  a  leading  donor  unwilling  to  use 
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conditionality,  institutional  change should be limited to  window-dressing alterations,  without 
actual administrative enforcement of new civil service regulations, and state-building assistance 
will thus unfold according to the logic of concession. Later, with the beginning of multiple-donor 
support, this agency dynamic should be complicated by the presence of actors with different 
levels of commitment to reform, and thus inconsistent preferences in terms of monitoring and 
enforcement: diversion, not concession, will characterize state-building assistance. Similarly, in 
Liberia, we should expect the government to profit from this same logic of diversion by enacting 
mostly superficial transformations without negative reactions from donors that are less interested 
in aggregate-level outcomes than specific project outputs. The analytical implications of each 
type will become evident as we see the structure of incentives evolve in each country over the 
first decade of civil service reforms.
4.2  The Structure of Incentives for Civil Service Reform in 
Sierra Leone
This  case  study  covers  approximately  twelve  years  of  policy  efforts  to  reform  the 
ineffective  and unaccountable  civil  service  of  Sierra  Leone,  between  2001 (although  policy 
initiatives  actually  date  back  to  1997)  and  2011.  This  narrative  of  inchoate  rationalization, 
formalization, and depersonalization spans two presidents, three administrations, and two clearly 
differentiated periods of donor support: a first phase (2001-2007) dominated by Sierra Leone’s 
leading international backer, the United Kingdom, and focused on organizational reform; and a 
second phase (2008-2011) in which additional international actors, chiefly the United Nations 
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Development  Program  and  the  European  Commission,  joined  the  British  in  a  multi-donor 
intervention mostly centered on personnel reform.
Public Will and Private Incentives
Civil service reform was recurrently invoked as a strategic necessity by the various post-
conflict governments of Sierra Leone. The administration of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah made civil 
service reform a policy priority shortly after his electoral victory in 1996: with British support he 
launched  a  Public  Sector  Management  Support  program,  which  was  later  merged  into  a 
“National  Strategy for  Good Governance  and Public  Sector  Reform”  (Government  of  Sierra 
Leone 1997). Unfortunately, the sudden coup d’état by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
put an end to the government’s aspirations, effectively placing the reform effort on hold for three 
years. It was the British Department for International Development (DfID) and UNDP who in 
2000  resuscitated  the  strategy,  which  the  government  later  incorporated  into  the  larger 
frameworks of a 2001 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP), a 2002-2003 National 
Recovery  Strategy  for  2002-2003,  and  a  20-year  vision  document  subbed  “Sweet  Salone.” 
Kabbah’s commitment was then restated in the full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 
adopted in 2005, which called for “speedy public sector reform based on a review of public 
sector  functions,  institutions,  processes  and  staffing  needs,  and  civil  service  pay  structure” 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2005c, xii).  In 2007, ten years after the first good governance 
strategy was  formulated,  the  arrival  of  Ernest  Bai  Koroma at  State  House had a  seemingly 
catalytic effect, resulting in new programs on public sector and civil sector reform under the 
rubric  of the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.  Measured strictly in terms of policy 
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statements and strategies, both of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict governments demonstrated ample 
high-level political commitment to reform. Unfortunately, their ostensibly public-spirited ethos 
was stacked against a powerful legacy of private institutions.
Reforming the public sector in general, and the civil service in particular, was going to be 
a daunting proposition considering the sorry state and lackluster history of the Sierra Leonean 
state. It took a just a few years for the country’s second Prime Minister, Albert Margai (1964-
1967), to unravel the delicate ethnic balance struck by his predecessor, flooding the state with his 
Mende  supporters  and  paving  the  ground  for  the  eventual  rise  to  power  of  Siaka  Stevens 
(Cartwright 1978). Under the rule of Stevens (1967-1985), and especially after the transition to a 
one-party regime in 1978, the logic of capture initiated under the second Margai was perfected 
throughout the Sierra Leonean public sector,  giving rise to a veritable “shadow state” which 
shifted large swaths of the national political economy towards informal networks (Reno 1995). 
The President’s secretary and head of the civil service, Abdul Karim, reportedly operated “an 
elaborate tribute system of appointments and promotions based on bribes,” with some positions 
in diamond-rich districts requiring as much as an initial $10,000-equivalent bribe supplemented 
by monthly $8,000 payments (Kandeh 1999, 351–352). When Joseph Momoh (1985-1991) was 
appointed as Siaka Stevens’s successor, there was a briefly a sense that things might actually 
change for the better. However, his tenure was as predatory and nepotistic as Stevens’s, and the 
President used public offices liberally in order to empower the “Binkolo Mafia,” so-called after 
his home town. Whatever hopes had been nurtured were in fact quickly dashed when he retained 
17 out of 20 Stevens loyalists in his cabinet, including regime old hands who kept an iron grip on 
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the juiciest ministries. This led an analyst to claim that “throughout the 1980s it was more a 
matter  of  who  one  knew,  and  not  what  one  did,  that  was  regarded  as  the  key to  personal 
betterment” (Kpundeh 1994, 140, 150). By the time the war began in 1991, with the subsequent 
destruction and neglect of public organizations, the Sierra Leonean civil service had virtually 
become a subsidiary of the All Peoples’ Congress, unchecked in its pursuit of private benefit for 
the ruling elite and its clients.2 After assuming power, the military National Provisional Ruling 
Council (NPRC) did not make things any better: in fact the new regime exhibited a “widespread 
disregard”  for  administrative  regulations,  and  it  staffed  public  organizations  with “largely 
unqualified, inefficient and submissive officers” (Government of Sierra Leone 1997, 1).
In 1996 President Kabbah, according to his own strategy, had  “inherited a thoroughly 
demoralised  and  discontented  Public  Service”  (Government  of  Sierra  Leone  1997,  2), 
disproportionately  composed  of  junior  and  support  officers  incapable  of  conducting  policy 
evaluation or design. The Public Service Commission, established in 1948 as the civil service’s 
major administrative body, had been severely subverted and politicized in the decades since, 
further  weakening  institutional  control  on  the  meritocracy and  integrity  of  the  civil  service 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2010c, 17). A national security review conducted in 2005 found 
that  one  of  the  major  threats  to  Sierra  Leone was  its  “de-motivated  and de-spirited”  public 
workforce,  whose  discipline  and  responsibility  were  undermined  by poor  remuneration  and 
2 According to sections 138 (3) and 139 (3) of the 1978 constitution: “No person shall be appointed to any of the 
offices to which this section applies or continue in any such office unless he is a member of the recognized 
party.”  In combination, these provisions included: principal  representatives abroad, the police commissioner,  
commanders of  the armed forces, permanent secretaries, secretaries to the president and vice-president, the  
secretary to the cabinet, the financial secretary, the secretary to the foreign minister, the establishment secretary 
(head of the civil service), the development secretary, the director of public prosecutions, the solicitor-general, 
and the administrator and registrar general (Government of Sierra Leone 2010c, 17).
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conditions of service. The acute lack of public ethos and administrative enforcement were jointly 
responsible for “decaying and dysfunctional public institutions, the inability of government to 
implement  policies  and,  above all,  rampant  and endemic  corruption”  (Government  of  Sierra 
Leone 2005d, 9–10). Two years earlier a survey of public officials had pointed to “deficiency in 
the entire system,” including significant political interference in recruitment practices. Over half 
of  public  officials  consulted  had  reported  management  decisions  based  on  “influential 
connections” and “political ties or pressure.” More worryingly, around 45% of them simply did 
not  understand  their  organization’s  mandate  and  objectives,  or  its  rules  and  responsibilities 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2003c, 37, 42). Although there can be no reliable measurement of 
the strength of private institutions, all the available evidence points to a deeply politicized and 
dysfunctional civil service. Precisely the kind of conditions under which administrative reform is 
unlike to prosper.
Donor Aims and Agendas
In its perpetually restated plan to bring its broken bureaucracy up to modern standards, 
the  Sierra  Leonean  government  relied  on  foreign  assistance  from a  number  of  donors.  The 
original  1996  public  sector  reform program had  been  developed  with  funding  from DfID’s 
predecessor, the UK Overseas Development Agency, but the World Bank and UNDP had also 
conducted  several  studies  at  the  time  (Government  of  Sierra  Leone  1997).  However,  true 
international involvement in reform began around the year 2000, and it can be divided into an 
early  phase  (2001-2007)  dominated  by  DfID’s  assistance  through  its  sponsorship  for  a 
Governance Reform Secretariat, and a later phase (2008-2011) of support from DfID, the World 
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Bank, UNDP, and the European Commission for public sector and civil sector reform through a 
new Public Sector Reform Unit.
The United Kingdom became involved in civil service reform in Sierra Leone, as it did in 
anti-corruption or security transformations, before it actually had a plan for what to do or how to 
do it. Britain’s first explicit assistance strategy was a 10-year “Memorandum of Understanding” 
signed by DfID’s chief  Clare Short  and President  Kabbah in November of  2002  (DfID and 
Government of Sierra Leone 2002). In exchange for continued technical assistance and budget 
support (to the tune of £120 million over the first three years), the government of Sierra Leone 
committed itself to a number of economic and governance reforms. But while the agreement was 
fairly detailed in matters of corruption or security, it was entirely silent on the civil service. This 
may be surprising,  considering that a year earlier  DfID had begun a program of support for 
public sector reform. In fact, however, that program was largely confined to a purely technical 
approach based on analysis and recommendation, without political conditionality of any kind, 
and it had assumed a shared vision between donor and government on what the reform effort 
should aspire to achieve (DfID 2008a, 32). It was not until 2007 that CSR was formally included 
in DfID’s joint country strategy with the European Commission. Implicitly, therefore, from a 
principal-agent perspective British assistance to this area of reform was assessed under the more 
general aid umbrellas provided by the iPRSP and PRSP, whose monitoring arrangements were 
far from comprehensive. To begin with, the iPRSP had not actually set a coordinated monitoring 
mechanisms  for  donors.  And  when  a  Development  Partnership  Committee  (DEPAC)  was 
eventually established for quarterly monitoring of implementation, it did not perform particularly 
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well: in 2006, for instance, it only managed to hold one meeting in the entire year (World Bank 
2006a, 3). During the first phase of CSR assistance, it was clear that the United Kingdom as a 
donor was more interested in administrative design than in enforcement.
In 2006 Sierra Leone’s donors signaled their concern through an “Improved Governance 
and Accountability Pact” which focused attention on “critical areas” of reform, including the 
civil  service.  Unfortunately,  monitoring  of  implementation  remained  within  the  somewhat 
ineffective  DEPAC  forum,  and  the  agreement  attached  no  explicit  consequences  to 
noncompliance with its benchmarks  (Government of Sierra Leone, African Development Bank, 
DfID, European Commission, and World Bank 2006). The limitations of IGAP foreshadowed the 
challenges faced by donors in the second phase of support for public sector and civil service 
reform  (2008-2011),  the  centerpiece  of  which  was  a  comprehensive  Public  Sector  Reform 
Program (2009-2012) which included a major Civil Service Reform component. Working under 
the coordination of a new Public Sector Reform Unit tasked with monitoring implementation of a 
government-owned plan, donors were represented in a dedicated steering committee assisted by 
a technical working group (Government of Sierra Leone 2009a, 27). But despite the new policy 
alignment and coordination framework, the government’s aid inflows would be determined by 
each  donor’s  individual  expectations  of  performance.  And  this  leads  to  the  third  strategic 
dilemma of assistance to civil service reform in Sierra Leone.
Donor Coordination
Between 2001 and 2007, DfID really had no one to coordinate its CSR assistance with. 
One  donor,  one  recipient;  one  principal,  one  agent.  Things  got  more  complicated  once  the 
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government launched its ambitious donor coordination initiative for public sector reform, which 
counted on support from UNDP, DfID, the World Bank, and the European Commission. For, 
although the administration had hoped for a basket fund of pooled aid, the new program ended 
up having to reconcile distinct donor projects consistent with preexisting strategies and subject to 
idiosyncratic project cycles and benchmark monitoring. For instance, UNDP established its own 
multi-donor trust fund for its project, monitored against its own results matrix (UNDP 2009); and 
due to its corporate policy profile it was not ready to suspend a 3-year assistance program even if 
major  underperformance was identified  (462581 Multilateral  donor official,  Freetown 2010). 
Others  would also design  their  separate  projects,  animated by entirely different  aims.  “To a 
significant  extent there has been strategic agreement among donor principals,”  concluded an 
official involved in donor coordination, “but this has not materialized at the disbursement level” 
(186856 Expatriate PSR official, Freetown 2010). From one donor, one recipient, the dynamic 
evolved into one donor, one separate agency relationship with the recipient. And consequently: 
one  donor,  one separate  framework for  monitoring  and sanctioning compliance.  The second 
phase of civil  service reform assistance in Sierra Leone, unfolding according to the logic of 
diversion, was ripe for a collective action problem.
Having  established  the  primacy  of  private  incentives  over  public  administrative 
institutions,  the  limited  commitment  and  ability  of  external  actors  to  monitoring  and 
enforcement, and the further threat of free-riding in the later period of assistance, the stage is 
now set for a narrative of civil service reform exploring the institutional effects of -first- leading 
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and -later- uncoordinated foreign support for administrative change. Whether the first period of 
state-building assistance resembled more the first or the second explanatory types outlined in 
chapter 2 would depend entirely on the level of British commitment: should DfID demonstrate a 
strong commitment to effective administrative enforcement, as a principal it could potentially use 
its  aid  to  overcome the  government’s  incentive-compatibility  constraint.  The  later  period  of 
reform, however, was bound to reflect the dynamics of the fourth ideal type, diversion, in which 
collective action problems prevent international actors from jointly monitoring and sanctioning a 
reluctant agent, therefore leaving the effective level of administrative enforcement at the mercy 
of local patrimonial politics.
4.3  Tracing the Process of Civil Service Reform in Sierra Leone
The 1997 Good Governance and Public Service Reform strategy had created a program 
and subcommittee on Civil Service Reform as “a critical arm to increase the productive capacity 
of  the  public  sector,”  and it  aspired  to  develop  a  new salary  and  grading  structure,  a  new 
incentive  system,  new human  resource  regulations,  new recruitment  procedures,  and  a  new 
evaluation  system  (Government  of  Sierra  Leone  1997,  32–35).  Although  the  initiative  was 
stillborn due to the military coup two months later and the subsequent three years of intermittent  
conflict, it did plant the organizational seed for what would be the first phase of civil service 
reform in Sierra Leone: a Governance Reform Secretariat designed to provide strategic guidance 
and coordination to all actors involved in the process (Government of Sierra Leone 2000).
The governance program was brought back to life with funding from DfID and UNDP in 
146
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 4
2000  (Government of Sierra Leone 2001a, 22). President Kabbah’s main objective was at that 
stage personnel reform, which had become a pressing need after decades of politicization and 
lack of accountability. To that end he created in September 2003 a “Presidential Commission” 
tasked with designing a strategy for restructuring the senior civil service. “Without a good, first 
class civil service,” he said, “we cannot be able to build enough wealth to enable us sever our 
dependence on foreign aid” (United Nations 2004b, 9). The deliberations of the Commission led 
to a specific proposal that the government then took to donors: the creation of a Senior Executive 
Service,  “a  structured  and  recognised  public  sector  management  cadre”  that  would  staff 
nonpolitical offices in the higher echelons of public bureaucracy (Government of Sierra Leone 
2005c, 77). In terms of larger personnel reform, the administration was also exploring a pay and 
grading review as a precondition for further donor support, as well as the creation of a new 
Human Resources Management Office (HRMO) to take up some of the administrative roles of 
the derelict Public Service Commission.
Despite these aspirations regarding personnel, the main thrust of change in this initial 
period was in fact organizational. Between 2002 and 2008, the DfID-funded Governance Reform 
Secretariat conducted a number of management and functional reviews (MFR) of key ministries 
in  order  to  diagnose  organizational  overlaps  and  inconsistencies,  determine  the  levels  of 
compliance  with  administrative  laws  and  regulations,  and  make  recommendations  for 
rationalization. The reviews were carried in two batches, 2002-2005 and 2005-2008. Initially the 
focus  was  on the  line  ministries  most  vulnerable  to  capture  of  public  resources:  Education, 
Health, Agriculture, and Local Government. These were complemented in 2003 with reviews of 
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the ministries of Trade and Defense (crucial for the United Kingdom’s security sector reform 
effort). In contrast, the second phase shifted attention largely to ministries responsible for the 
management and extraction of national wealth: Development and Economic Planning (2005), 
Mineral Resources (2005), Fisheries and Marine Resources (2006), and Internal Affairs (2007). 
The findings of these reviews were emblematic of the dilapidated conditions in which the entire 
civil service found itself. At the Ministry of Education, for instance, evaluators found systematic 
personnel irregularities, pervasive disregard for administrative procedures, low levels of morale 
and  discipline,  and the  generalized  and unchecked violation  of  basic  performance standards 
(Government  of  Sierra  Leone  2002b,  1–2).  Many  of  the  recommendations  were  properly 
administrative  in  the  Weberian  sense,  aimed at  increasing  the  formalism,  impersonality,  and 
rationality of each ministry. In the case of the Ministry of Fisheries, they included such proposals 
as developing a ministerial code of conduct and discipline (including “an immediate ban on the 
use of personal radios /televisions on official premises”), strengthening the internal audit unit, 
rationalizing  personnel  requirements,  contracting  out  “non-core”  activities  (such  as  the 
“messengers” and errand people that are ubiquitous in Sierra Leonean public offices), merging 
duplicated offices, or conducting a “root and branch review” of personnel practices (Government 
of Sierra Leone 2006a, 8–12).
Even as  the second set  of  MFRs were being published,  President  Kabbah’s  attention 
remained  focused  on  his  quest  for  an  aid-funded  Senior  Executive  Service  program. 
Unfortunately  for  him,  donors  did  not  seem  ready  to  oblige,  and  in  fact  were  becoming 
increasingly anxious about the lagging pace of organizational reform, eventually coming to the 
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collective  realization  that  an  entirely  new  approach  to  reform  was  necessary  (European 
Commission  2007a,  3).  At  the  2005  meeting  of  the  donor  Consultative  Group  in  London, 
government officials sought to allay these concerns by presenting a brand new “Task Force on 
Capacity Building in the Public Sector,” but they provided no clue as to what strategy the task 
force was supposed to follow or implement  (European Commission 2007a, 3). The text of the 
“Improved Governance and Accountability Pact” signed between the government and its main 
international backers in July 2006 betrays a certain impatience with the progress of civil service 
reform, or lack thereof. Ten years after the government had first requested support, and five after 
donor support had enabled actual implementation, Kabbah’s administration still had a number of 
basic tasks to complete. The “road map” for CSR had not been completed, and there was no 
policy  framework  for  the  review  of  pay  and  grading,  training,  or  payroll  verification.  The 
recommendations of the five management and functional reviews approved by cabinet were still 
to  be  implemented.3 And  the  new  Human  Resources  Management  Office  had  not  been 
established, let alone instructed to work on comprehensive personnel reform  (Government of 
Sierra Leone, African Development Bank, DfID, European Commission, and World Bank 2006). 
A new civil  service code had been drafted and reviewed in 2003-2004, but  it  had not  been 
formally adopted due to disagreements over grading, pay, and promotions (World Bank 2008b, 
note 40). As to the recommendations of a 90-day review of organizational architecture, they still 
had to be endorsed by the very cabinet which had launched the whole exercise (Government of 
3 The fact that the Minister for Presidential Affairs was at the helm of the Governance Reform Secretariat did not  
make it any easier for Kabbah to justify why the recommendations were not being implemented. If anything, it  
gave wings to suspicions of political interference. This was also the case with the official acting as head of the  
civil service, a responsibility that Kabbah shifted from the Establishment Secretary to the secretary to his own  
office (International Crisis Group 2008, 11, 9).
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Sierra Leone 2006c, 38).
When the Consultative Group met in Freetown in November of 2006, the head of DfID’s 
country office did not mince words in his evaluation of reform efforts thus far. In response to 
complaints  about  lack  of  capacity  and  imperfect  donor  coordination,  he  claimed  that  the 
government should “provide no more excuses” and focus on implementation. The slow pace of 
reform could  not  be  attributed,  he  believed,  to  resource  constraints:  instead  he  called  for  a 
“change of culture” so that “people and institutions were held to account for poor performance.” 
Britain was “prepared to increase its level of assistance to Sierra Leone,” he said, “but only if 
there  was a  real  commitment  to  partnership  and reform that  was clearly measurable  on the 
ground”  (World Bank 2006a, 5). This kind of negative assessment was mirrored in the joint 
DfID-EC assistance strategy finalized in 2007, which found that “In spite of innumerable studies 
and several management and functional reviews of ministries, there is still no agreed overall civil 
service reform strategy or consensus on the future size and shape of government”  (European 
Commission and DfID 2007, 8). A 2006 report on public service reform carried out by DfID cut 
to  the  core  of  the  problem:  “Donors  have  tended  to  assume  that  by  creating  new  formal 
institutions (e.g. legal codes, procedures, implementation units) they will be able to replace or 
side-line old informal ways of doing things. However, our analysis of public sector reform has 
demonstrated  that  informal  institutions  and  practices  have  an  inertia  and robustness”  (DfID 
2008a, 27).
In  2008 a  wide-ranging evaluation  of  a  decade  of  British  assistance  to  Sierra  Leone 
highlighted the civil service as one of the outstanding areas where not even a little progress, 
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however slow and fragile, had been achieved at all. To explain this the drafters put forth the 
theory that DfID had simply adopted a fundamentally flawed approach to civil service reform:
Performance and results have been limited, although at the rhetorical level there has been 
agreement among the stakeholders of the need for civil service reform. The fundamental 
issues  are  that  DFID’s  support  was  based  on  a  technocratic  approach,  carrying  out 
analysis  and  then  developing  proposals  on  what  should  be  reformed.  This  approach 
assumed three conditions were in place. First, that there was sufficient political will and 
interest in place. Second, that the donors and government shared a common vision of 
what type of civil service should emerge from the reform process. Third, that there was 
sufficient technical and management capacity in place in ministries and government to 
actually implement proposals. None of these conditions held and hence the support was 
over-ambitious (DfID 2008a, 32).
Eventually the cabinet did adopt a Public Sector Pay Policy Framework in January of 
2007  (Government of Sierra Leone 2008a, 158). It also managed to develop various training 
policies with DfID and World Bank assistance, even if it could not garner donor support for its  
Senior Executive Service scheme (Government of Sierra Leone 2008e, 38, 16). And the Human 
Resources Management Office finally began working. But by that time the election season had 
begun. When Ernest Bai Koroma assumed the presidency in late 2007, it seemed that public 
sector reform -all areas of reform, in fact-  would be finally given the priority that had been 
lacking under the previous administration.
In his speech at the opening of the new parliament, President Koroma told legislators that 
he was “concerned about the tendency of some civil servants to use their offices to undertake 
private enterprise” (International Crisis Group 2008, 9). Almost immediately he seemed to make 
good on his campaign promise to run the country “like a business concern,” by establishing a  
transition team tasked with consulting the outgoing administration and drafting a report on the 
status of the executive  (United Nations 2007, para. 11). In order to address donor calls for the 
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new government to “accelerate the reform of the civil service” (World Bank 2006c, 7), Koroma 
not only developed a new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, but decided to infuse new life into 
the Governance Reform Secretariat by turning it into a Public Sector Reform Unit (PSRU). The 
new agency would be in charge of coordinating implementation of an ambitious new Public 
Sector  Reform  Program  which  acknowledged,  for  the  first  time  in  a  public  government 
document,  the  need  to  overcome  “substantial  resistance  to  change  in  the  public  sector” 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2009a, 8). 
As part of the new agenda Koroma’s administration developed a Civil Service Reform 
Program (Government of Sierra Leone 2009b), the first dedicated strategy of its kind in post-
conflict Sierra Leone. The document presented a snapshot of an overgrown public sector and a 
mostly  unqualified civil service: a total of 20 ministries and 56 departments and agencies were 
staffed by 15,272 public officials, of which only 2,092 (13%) were professional administrators. 
This dearth of human capacity,  together with a perceived absence of political will,  was held 
responsible for the “extremely patchy” implementation of the 14 MFRs (Government of Sierra 
Leone 2009b, 5–6). Over the next three years (2009-2012) the new strategy aspired to achieve 
several key transformations. First, using the MFR process and “change management teams” to 
align ministries  and agencies  with the  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  and the process  of 
decentralization.  Second,  launching  a  rationalization  of  staff,  pay,  and  incentives,  including 
covering  the  administrative  “missing  middle”  (between  menial  and  political  work)  through 
diaspora and senior-level programs. And third, improving CSR coordination and management 
through the Human Resources Management Office and a Steering Committee on Civil Service 
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Reforms.
Koroma hoped that the new CSR strategy -with an estimated cost of $25 million over 
three years- would be funded by donors through a basket aid fund, and it did indeed count with a 
priori interest from DfID, UNDP, the European Commission, and the World Bank. But one of the 
hurdles to implementation that the strategy identified was the possibility that “donor agencies 
may not  accept  the  notion  of  pooling  funds,”  a  prospect  that  only increased  the  risk  of  “a 
piecemeal  and uncoordinated approach to  the reform process”  (Government  of  Sierra  Leone 
2009b, 21, 22). This assessment turned out to be spot on, as “donor coordination” was revealed 
to  mean  that  every  donor  established  separate  assistance  programs  with  the  government 
(Government  of  Sierra  Leone  2010h).  For  instance,  UNDP  quickly  supplied  a  one-year 
“Emergency Capacity Support Program” intended to support organizational support to central 
administrative  organizations,  technical  assistance  for  a  voluntary  retirement  program,  and  a 
senior-level salary enhancement program targeting one hundred public officials (UNDP 2009); it 
simply could not wait for the others if it was to match the planning and budgeting rhythm of its  
New York headquarters (186856 Expatriate PSR official, Freetown 2010). The World Bank, for 
its  part,  continued support  through its  governance  reform and growth credits  funding PRSP 
implementation (World Bank 2009). The European Commission had earmarked €10 million for 
support to HRMO and the Public Service Commission, as well as for “pilot civil service reform 
in some key ministries” (European Commission 2009b, 17). But the Freetown delegation’s first 
project was in fact rejected by Brussels on the basis of political risk (833942 Multilateral donor 
official, Freetown 2010). As to DfID, it signed a memorandum of understanding for a 4-year 
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program of support to the PSRU, subject to compliance with certain deliverables after the first 
two years, such as the development of an action plan for donor assistance, a new retrenchment 
policy, or the completion of a teacher payroll verification exercise (Government of Sierra Leone 
2010f).
The government made some progress under this new phase of reform, mostly reducing 
the civil service from around 17,000 to 12,000 after a payroll and personnel verification exercise 
conducted in 2009 with DfID support. It drafted a Civil Service Code and a new pay structure 
policy,  and  it  began  to  discuss  a  retrenchment  plan  (Government  of  Sierra  Leone  2010e). 
However, reforms soon fell victim to their political implications. The new pay policy drafted by 
the  HRMO and  endorsed  by the  PSRU was  stalled  at  the  cabinet  (186856  Expatriate  PSR 
official, Freetown 2010). The teacher verification project became an issue of contention, leading 
to a confrontation between the PRSU officials and a Ministry of Education unwilling to release 
funds for the initiative unless it exercised absolute control over them  (Government of Sierra 
Leone 2010e).  More importantly,  the introduction of  new administrative regulations was not 
accompanied with a strengthening of the organizations that were supposed to enforce them. If 
anything,  the  new  program  had  introduced  greater  chaos  into  the  system  of  checks.  The 
independent  Public  Service  Commission,  which  was  constitutionally  mandated  to  enact  and 
monitor recruitment and promotion, was turned into a policy planning agency (a task for which it 
had absolutely no capacity), while its oversight competences were hived off to an HRMO which 
was actually working as  a  policy-making office  (Government  of  Sierra  Leone 2010c).  As a 
result,  there was “a big confusion as to the chain and command and reporting within public 
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service” (737404 Expatriate CSR official, Freetown 2010). As to the much-touted “performance 
contracts” which Koroma had signed with his ministers, they were having “little to no impact” 
due to the disconnect between appointed and professional officials: ministers feared that civil 
servants where sabotaging them by underperforming, while career officials felt an utter lack of 
policy guidance (186856 Expatriate PSR official, Freetown 2010).
Lack of progress on teacher verification and pay policy eventually led DfID to announce 
that it was withdrawing its support for the PSRU starting December 1st, 2010  (Government of 
Sierra Leone 2010g). In contrast, UNDP decided to continue its support to the program despite 
having  actually  disbursed  no  more  than  25% of  its  budgeted  funds  in  2009-2010  (186856 
Expatriate PSR official, Freetown 2010). As to the European Commission and the World Bank, 
the  both  launched  new assistance  projects  of  their  own,  even  as  the  public  sector  program 
remained plagued with weak, uncoordinated, and fragmented monitoring (Government of Sierra 
Leone 2011). CSR quarterly review meetings failed to convene as stipulated, leading to a a more 
informal  system of  donor  coordination  based  on  inter-personal  contacts  between  individual 
officials (462581 Multilateral donor official, Freetown 2010), and even then some local officials 
attributed donors a greater concern with their  own budgets than with achieving coordination 
(071023  Senior  civil  service  official,  Freetown 2010).  But  beyond  the  problem of  securing 
collective  responses,  the  very standards  of  compliance  were  irreconcilable.  Each  donor  had 
separate  monitoring,  reporting,  and procurement  mechanisms,  and agreement  at  the strategic 
level failed to materialize at the disbursement level: as one participant told me, “in actuality 
donors do not speak with the same voice”  (186856 Expatriate PSR official,  Freetown 2010). 
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UNDP, for instance, considered “government leadership and commitment” a “key measure of 
success”  for  its  assistance  (462581  Multilateral  donor  official,  Freetown  2010).  Its  entire 
philosophy was to be a “development partner,” not a “donor,” and it saw itself as an intermediary 
between  the  government  and  its  foreign  partners  when  their  relations  deteriorated  (608597 
Multilateral donor official, Freetown 2010). For other donors, the expectations were indeed to 
have on paper a clear payroll, an efficient and transparent recruitment process, and a right-sized 
civil service; in terms of substance, however, there was little hope that these reforms would ever 
be implemented (833942 Multilateral donor official, Freetown 2010).
Even  if  aid  actors  supporting  civil  service  reform had  solved  their  collective  action 
problem,  this  would  not  have  necessarily  resulted  in  actual  enforcement  of  administrative 
institutions. CSR donors had from the beginning focused on the kind of “soft capacity building” 
which does not take root, assuming that structures would make outcomes despite the prevalence 
of informal systems (737404 Expatriate CSR official, Freetown 2010). Instead of grappling with 
the civil service as a holistic problem, they had  created a “shadow civil service” of organizations 
like the HRMO that existed outside of the normal system and were staffed by “dollar boys,” so-
called because their salaries were paid by donors in American currency  (071023 Senior civil 
service  official,  Freetown  2010).  To  political  problems  they  had  responded  with  technical 
solutions, and they were not willing to proceed in any other way; not even the United Kingdom, 
which in other areas of reform had been more than willing to  exert  political  pressure.  Civil 
service reform in post-conflict Sierra Leone came to be resemble pretty closely the kind of failed 
state-building assistance lacking donor coordination and commitment presented in chapter 2 as 
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the logic of diversion. Without a countervailing external incentive towards administrative reform, 
it is not surprising that local elites subject to powerful private institutions managed to achieve so 
little.
4.4  The Structure of Incentives for Civil Service Reform in 
Liberia
Much like their peers across the border, Liberian elites and their international sponsors 
devoted  no  small  amount  of  energy to  bringing  the  country’s  civil  service  up  to  Weberian 
standards in the years following the end of the second civil war (2003-2011). With Taylor out of 
the picture and a transitional government in place, civil service reform began in Liberia largely 
as  a  donor-led  initiative faced with the  enormous challenge  of  uprooting private  institutions 
resulting from decades of politicization and capture. In contrast to Sierra Leone, however, the 
Liberian  CSR  effort  was  from  the  very  beginning  a  multiple-donor  affair,  defined  as  an 
aggregation of basically technical agendas which were only very imperfectly coordinated by the 
successive governments and their foreign sponsors. Civil service reform in Liberia is thus an 
almost perfect example of diversion: post-conflict state-building under uncoordinated assistance 
unwilling or unable to ensure the enforcement of administrative institutions. As in Sierra Leone’s 
second phase of assistance, whatever progress could be made would depend on the political will 
of the transitional and elected Liberian governments, and ultimately on the personal commitment 
of its public officials.
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Public Will and Private Incentives
Liberia’s era of post-conflict civil service reform began with the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement  signed in  Accra  in  2003.  While  it  did  not  explicitly include  CSR as  one  of  the 
political issues that the parties had agreed upon, it did plant the seeds of eventual reform with 
two key provisions. Article XVI established a Governance Reform Commission (GRC) to serve 
as “a vehicle for the promotion of the principles of good governance in Liberia,” which among 
other  tasks  was  supposed  to  “develop  public  sector  management  reforms.”  And  Annex  IV 
mandated that leadership of the Civil Service Agency (CSA) was to be allocated to “Political 
Parties  and  Civil  Society”  instead  of  one  of  the  warring  factions  composing  the  National 
Transitional  Government  of  Liberia  (NTGL)  (Government  of  Liberia  2003).  GRC and CSA 
would  thenceforth  be  the  two  central  organizations  for  civil  service  reform  in  Liberia. 
Interestingly, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf herself was the first Chairperson of the GRC; later, upon 
assuming  the  presidency,  she  would  revamp  it  as  an  independent  policy-making  entity,  re-
branding it as the Governance Commission (GC) (Government of Liberia 2007a). By that time 
the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy had already developed a more specific set of CSR tasks 
for the Commission,  such as “streamlining the civil  servants roster  to right-size and remove 
ghost workers, strengthening the capacity of the civil service agency, harmonizing civil service 
rules and procedures and streamlining the mandates and structures of government ministries, 
public corporations and autonomous agencies” (Government of Liberia 2007c). But it would not 
be  until  2008  that  a  three-year  Civil  Service  Reform  Strategy  was  prepared  with  British 
assistance  and  incorporated  under  the  umbrella  of  a  full  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy 
(Government of Liberia 2008b). Like their Sierra Leonean counterparts, Liberia’s post-conflict 
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governments had made CSR a permanent priority of their reconstruction agenda.
The Liberian civil service was in dire need of reform. Historically, the settler ruling class 
in Monrovia had extended the public service into the hinterland as a way to incorporate and 
neutralize potential political rivals. As a result, progression through the national bureaucracy did 
not  proceed  according  to  Weberian  principles  of  hierarchy  and  merit,  but  on  the  basis  of 
expediency,  personal  enrichment,  and  fluid  political  bargaining.  “The  preoccupation  of  the 
individual,  at  whatever  level,  thus  became to  ‘know the  system’ and to  play it  to  his  own 
advantage” (Brown 1989, 377). During his presidency William Tubman (1944-1971) replicated 
this patrimonial system, even as he took it away from the settler elite and used it to build his  
support among a lower-class clientele, to such an extent that the presidency “became, directly or 
indirectly,  the ultimate source of individual livelihood.” Tubman’s successor, William Tolbert 
(1971-1980),  was  groomed  within  this  very  patronage  network  yet  once  in  the  Executive 
Mansion he sought to introduce “a system of civil administration,” a policy which favored urban 
professionals and antagonized the old guard. When Samuel Doe’s military junta replaced Tolbert 
in 1980, it did little more than reinstate in government positions a coterie of former Tubman-era 
junior officials and politicians “who sought personal fortune at all costs”  (Sawyer 1992, 185, 
187, 295). This pattern was only amplified under Taylor’s “Greater Liberia” and “Liberia Inc.”
There had been several attempts at reform since the establishment of the Liberian civil 
service in 1934, including a “Special Commission on Government Operations” established in 
1960, the creation of the Civil Service Agency itself in 1973, or the adoption of “Standing Orders 
for the Civil  Service” in 1983  (United Nations 2004a, 11). Even Charles Taylor himself had 
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established  a  “Committee  for  the  Pursuit  of  Governance”  with  UNDP  support.  But  the 
Committee conveniently found that most of Liberia’s public sector problems were technical and 
not political (718456 Senior elected official, Monrovia 2011). These reform efforts hardly made 
a dent on the prevailing private institutions that defined the civil service. By the time the CPA 
was signed in 2003, the NTGL found itself in charge of a unknown number of public officials 
(“ghost workers” made estimates range between 20,000 and 60,000 due to ), whose salaries had 
been eroded by inflation several orders of magnitude below 1980s levels, and who were free 
from effective control by an incapable and politicized Civil Service Agency (DfID 2006, 12–13). 
At  a  workshop held in  2004 Liberian legislators  argued that,  besides low salaries4,  the civil 
service was afflicted by “lack of education and understanding of government, dishonesty and 
greed,  lack  of  accountability  and  the  lack  of  commitment”  (United  Nations  2004a,  13).  An 
American-style  “shallow”  civil  service,  topped  with  four  layers  of  political  appointees,  had 
developed “a patronage culture that values loyalty over performance, informal relationships over 
chain-of-command,  illusory consensus-building  over  critical  thinking,  and acquiescence  over 
analysis and competition of ideas” (Government of Liberia 2008b, 9). There were no standards 
of conduct, no meritocratic recruitment procedures, no sanctioning mechanisms, and therefore no 
accountability. Decades of political patronage, exacerbated during the civil war, had created a 
“bottom-heavy”  civil  service  with  a  disproportionate  number  of  unqualified  and  unskilled 
officials.  Morale  was  “poor”;  professional  ethics  “questionable  and  difficult  to  enforce” 
(Government of Liberia 2007c, 63, Annex 2). 
4 From an average of a monthly $1500 salary in the late 1970s, the steady decline of the Liberian dollar relative to  
the American one had led to average salaries of $50 a month in the early 2000s (DfID 2006, 12). 
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Donor Aims and Agendas
Liberia’s international partners were not oblivious to the problems of public bureaucracy, 
nor the need to address them if post-conflict reconstruction was to prosper. The 2004 Results-
Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) which enshrined aid priorities for the immediate years 
after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did in fact contain a number of provisions on civil 
service  reform.  By  June  2004  it  expected  the  NTGL to  complete  a  civil  service  census, 
reinvigorate the CSA, prepare work on personnel and organizational restructuring. By December 
2004 it expected ghost workers to be removed from a consolidated payroll, and the NTGL to 
begin to take action on the restructuring reports. A fully empowered CSA was to begin issuing 
new regulations and restoring transparency by June 2005 (National Transitional Government of 
Liberia 2004). Despite having a detailed implementation matrix, the RFTF was not in fact a 
holistic  program,  but  a  collection  of  aims,  which   individual  donors  began  to  support  with 
projects  launched  soon  thereafter,  which  can  be  divided  in  three  categories:  support  to  the 
Governance Reform Commission (the main policy body); support to the Civil Service Agency 
(the organization tasked with enacting CSR); and support to specific projects targeting different 
offices or cadres within the civil service.
As part  of a “Capacity Building Support for Governance” program, UNDP signed in 
April 2004 a memorandum of understanding governing a two-year project of financial support to 
the Governance Reform Commission, budgeted at half a million dollars. This was part of an 
attempt by the multilateral donor to “jumpstart” the governance aspects of the RFTF  (UNDP 
2004). The European Commission also provided technical support to the GRC under the terms of 
its  Governance  and  Economic  Management  Assistance  Program  (GEMAP)  commitment 
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(European Commission 2007c). And in July 2004 DfID followed in UNDP’s footsteps with a 
“Governance  and  Economic  Implementation  Support  Program”  aimed  at  the  preparation  of 
preparatory  studies  on  civil  service  restructuring  at  the  GRC,  including  management  and 
functional reviews of the Liberia Institute of Public Affairs and the Civil Service Agency. This 
assistance was broadened beyond the GRC in 2006 with the “Capacity Building for the Civil 
Service Program” (CISCAB), a 30-month project also targeting the Liberian Institute for Public 
Affairs and especially the Civil Service Agency (DfID 2006). The World Bank provided support 
to the CSA by financing a number of diagnostic studies through a “Civil Service and Governance 
Support Program,” and would later finance an “Economic Governance and Institutional Reform 
Project” with a human resources component  (World Bank 2007, 10).  And the United States, 
through its Office of Transitional Initiatives, channeled between 2006 and 2007 $1.5 million to 
ministries and agencies for short-term technical assistance (USAID 2007). Finally, when UNDP 
developed with the government a Senior Executive Service program aiming to supply much-
needed professionals for the higher echelons of public organizations, a number of donors jumped 
on the bandwagon, including the World Bank, Greece, the United States, and the NGO Humanity 
United (World Bank 2007, 3).
In  all  these  projects,  donor  approaches  remained  eminently  technical.  This  suited 
perfectly the  corporate  role  of  UNDP as  a  “facilitator”  working with  recipient  governments 
(143387 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). Another multilateral donor, the European 
Commission, operated through a “demand-driven” programming approach subject to Brussels-
dictated project cycles that hampered quick reaction to lack of performance, which even then 
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would  have  to  be  agreed with  member  states  (581120 Multilateral  donor  official,  Monrovia 
2011). Bilateral donors may have been more willing to deploy institutional conditionality, and 
indeed DfID’s CISCAB program was designed with an array of clearly designated “observable 
verifiable  indicators.”  But  at  the  end  of  the  day the  significance  of  this  conditionality  was 
relatively minor, as the United Kingdom did not “envisage a role as a major donor partner of 
Liberia” (DfID 2006, 9). As to the United States, which could have been able to act as leading 
donor and thus engage the government on a political level, it had deliberately chosen to focus on 
small-scale capacity-building projects. As far as one could speak of any aid conditionality, it  
remained enshrined in the ambitious Results-Focused Transitional Framework, the interim and 
full poverty reduction strategies, and the CSR Strategy, all of which were based on the premise 
of collective monitoring of government efforts.
Donor Coordination
Civil service reform was from the beginning an amalgam of separate priorities agreed 
between external actors and the government of Liberia. This was fertile ground for a collective 
action problem, and indeed the RFTF had clearly failed to create any durable forum for aid 
coordination. For instance, by 2006 DfID was working on the assumption that given “available 
information” they were likely to work with the European Commission and UNDP in their CSR 
program  (DfID  2006,  11).  The  lack  of  certainty  in  its  programming  documents  is  a  clear 
indicator of the extent of disconnect between external actors. When the new government of Ellen 
Johnson  Sirleaf  came  to  office  that  year,  it  established  a  Liberian  Reconstruction  and 
Development Committee (LRDC) tasked with coordinating implementation of the -first interim 
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and later full- Poverty Reduction Strategy, both between ministries and agencies and between the 
government and donors. To that end the PRS third pillar, “strengthening governance and the rule 
of law,” would have its own dedicated working committee monitoring and evaluating public 
sector and judicial sector reforms  (Government of Liberia 2007c). The LRDC framework was 
supposed to provide a high-level forum, underneath which other programs could set up their own 
coordinating schemes, like the Implementation Committee which oversaw a Senior Executive 
Service  multi-donor  trust  fund  (World  Bank 2007),  or  the  CSR Donor  Coordination  Forum 
established under the Civil Service Reform Strategy launched in 2008 (Government of Liberia 
2008b, 62). This locally owned architecture of fractal aid coordination was supposed to achieve 
inter-donor harmonization as  well  as  donor-government  alignment,  and thus  avoid the usual 
pitfalls of duplication and contradictory assistance.
Actual coordination by the LRDC, however, left much to be desired. The government 
itself acknowledged as much when it lamented the “weak communication between coordinating 
bodies” (Government of Liberia 2010a, 45), but a public official involved in the process phrased 
it rather more colorfully: the first two years of the PRS had been “chaotic,” with every donor 
pursuing  their  own agendas  separately  (274889  Governance  official,  Monrovia  2011).  Even 
when it started to do some proper coordinating, the pillar working committee on governance 
tended to focus on technical issues, with little dialogue about fundamental challenges  (518975 
Multilateral  donor official,  Monrovia 2011). The situation did not look any brighter at lower 
levels of aggregation. For instance, by 2011 the CSR Donor Coordination Forum was yet to be 
inaugurated,  with every major actor involved “playing wait  and see”  (489986 CSR officials, 
164
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 4
Monrovia  2011),  and still  the government  kept  establishing new working groups,  reportedly 
bringing the overall number to 28 (895362 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). Donors 
themselves were not outperforming the LRDC by much, and some officials came to think that 
aid  coordination  had  never  been  a  “reasonable  aspiration”  to  begin  with  (733895  Senior 
governance official, Monrovia 2011). The troubling fact was that collective action would have to 
rely on two big Achilles’ heels: whatever was not coordinated through the United States, which 
was unwilling to lead politically, was to be coordinated through the United Nations, which was 
unable to get its own agencies to agree among themselves  (581120 Multilateral donor official, 
Monrovia 2011).  In practical terms there was coordination after a fashion, but it was based on 
good personal relationships among the expatriates in Monrovia, not on any sort of institutional 
framework that could ensure clarity and continuity  (572119 Bilateral donor official, Monrovia 
2011). The small number of donors present in Monrovia, paradoxically, had demonstrated to be 
less of an asset than Mancur Olson would have predicted. Their aims, standards of success and 
failure, and relations with the government were simply too different to be reconciled.
A prevalence  of  private  legacies  over  administrative  institutions,  a  mostly  technical 
commitment of external actors, and an ever-present threat of free-riding were the key features of 
foreign support for civil service reform in Liberia, as they had been in Sierra Leone’s later period 
of  assistance.  In  combination,  they are  likely to  shape  an analytic  narrative  of  civil  service 
reform  in  line  with  the  political  dynamics  of  the  fourth  type  of  state-building  assistance, 
diversion, which expects a limited impact of foreign aid on institutional change.
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4.5  Tracing the Process of Civil Service Reform in Liberia
In  early  2004  the  United  Nations  and  the  World  Bank  carried  out  a  Joint  Needs 
Assessment for the transitional government which laid the basic conceptual foundations for post-
conflict CSR in Liberia. On the one hand, beyond “upgrading and revitalization,” there was the 
“even  more  challenging”  problem  of  enacting  “norms  of  transparent  and  law-abiding 
governance” in the civil service. On the other hand, without the necessary transformations the 
reconstruction  effort  would  be  slow  and  unsustainable,  and  this  made  foreign  assistance 
“essential”  (United  Nations  and  World  Bank  2004,  11–12).  Taken  together,  these  two 
observations had but one logical implication: in the short term donors themselves would have to 
be the agents of administrative change. 
The initial  focus of support  was establishing a  Governance Reform Commission that 
could provide policy guidance to the process, as well as strengthening the Civil Service Agency 
that could manage it. Concrete international support for both organizations first arrived in the 
form of UNDP’s “Capacity Building Support for Governance” program and DfID’s “Governance 
and Economic Implementation Support Program.” Both initiatives were  designed as catalysts of 
reform, empowering the GRC and CSA with basic capacity building and providing them with the 
first  ever  snapshots  of  the  post-conflict  civil  service.  The  idea  was  not  that  the  National 
Transitional Government would immediately move on with implementation, but rather that the 
new government to be elected in 2006 would find the groundwork of reform already laid out 
(DfID 2006, 9). Administrative design was the only real aspiration of the early years of foreign 
assistance.
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However, donors soon began to experience the tensions inherent in working with a make-
shift  government  composed  of  former  warring  factions  whose  investment  in  Liberian 
reconstruction was limited by design to a 3-year time horizon. Unsurprisingly, different members 
of the NTGL maintained a competitive focus on personal benefit. One faction in particular, the 
Liberians  United  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (LURD),  felt  that  it  had  “liberated” 
Liberia and was thus entitled to a greater share of power  (European Commission 2005a, 8). 
Animated  by such  private  incentives,  the  NTGL soon  found  itself  marred  by  scandal  after 
scandal,  and devoid  of  much transparency or  accountability  (Ebo  2005,  8).  In  this  political 
environment, it is not surprising that the Governance Reform Commission became a donor-led 
organization  virtually  orphaned  by  the  NTGL  (European  Commission  2007c,  7),  whose 
management and functional reviews were hamstrung by “formidable challenges” in obtaining 
reliable  information  from  reluctant  MDAs  (UNDP  2007).  Not  only  was  the  transitional 
government doing little to address the fundamental problems of the civil service, it was in fact 
continuing the pattern of using of public appointments as patronage for its clients and supporters 
(World Bank 2007, 4). The mark of the corrupt NTGL was felt throughout all sectors of reform, 
and overall progress under the Results-Focused Transitional Framework was so slow that donors 
began to reduce or withhold their  aid disbursements  (World Bank and African Development 
Bank 2007, 22).
A  new  era  of  civil  service  reform  began  when  Ellen  Johnson  Sirleaf,  erstwhile 
Chairperson of the Governance Reform Commission, was sworn in as Liberia’s democratically 
elected  President  in  January  of  2006.  Barely  two  months  after  assuming  office  she  issued 
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Executive Order 2, which infused the CPA-engineered GRC with new life and an array of new 
mandates,  including  the  development  of  a  code  of  conduct  for  the  civil  service.  This 
demonstrable  change  in  high-level  political  will  managed  to  attract  renewed  interest  from 
international partners (European Commission 2007c, 7 in Annex 3). The new administration also 
made the new CSA Director General a member of the cabinet as a way to signal ownership of 
civil  service  reform,  and  shifted  away  from  the  NTGL’s  obstructionist  path  by  promoting 
organizational  reviews of key MDAs. The policy objectives included in the Interim Poverty 
Reduction Strategy were indeed ambitious: developing a CSR strategy by March 2007 and a 
human capacity strategy by November 2007; implementing a new civil service compensation and 
benefits  scheme by January 2007;  developing job descriptions  and recruitment  procedures  a 
month later;  and adopting legislation on the new mandates and structures for ministries and 
agencies by May 2007 (Government of Liberia 2007c, 68–69). At this time the government also 
formulated what would be the centerpiece of its CSR effort: a Senior Executive Service (SES) 
program which  would  deploy 100  local  and  diaspora  professionals  across  the  civil  service, 
recruited according to technocratic standards and remunerated with generous salaries “topped 
up” by donor funds.
On the surface SES was a brilliant idea. Instead of waiting for the kind of wholesale 
restructuring of the civil  service which would enable promotion and recruitment of qualified 
individuals, the program would target key offices within ministries and agencies and staff them 
with professionals hired according to international standards. Not only would it imbue public 
organizations with much needed capacity, it would encourage skill transfer to non-SES officials 
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and thus propel reform at a micro level. This was exactly the kind of program that Kabbah’s 
government had sought for Sierra Leone, but it was Liberia’s Johnson Sirleaf who managed to 
successfully excite donors’ imaginations, garnering support from the big three -UNDP, the World 
Bank, and the United States- and others to such an extent that it overcame the vested reluctance 
within the aid community to finance civil servants’ salaries (World Bank 2007, 2). SES was also 
exceptional in that it represented the first truly coordinated program of donor assistance to civil 
service reform in Liberia, even if in actuality it relied on two different aid channels: while UNDP 
had set  up a trust fund directly targeting the CSA as managing stakeholder,  the World Bank 
decided to supply its assistance via a Public Financial Management Unit that it had established at 
the Ministry of Finance, and which had the kind of control mechanisms that the CSA still lacked 
(World Bank 2007, 14). Such disbursement discrepancy notwithstanding, the government was 
able to secure external commitments amounting to over $5.4 million (70% of the proposed cost) 
for the three-year program. This despite the obvious risk that “those with a vested interest in 
traditional patronage based management” may oppose the initiative (World Bank 2007, 18). The 
real problem with SES, nonetheless, was that it contained a fundamental design flaw: program 
success would only be attained if progress was made in the broader civil service reform agenda. 
By itself, SES could not establish new administrative institutions, nor ensure their enforcement 
beyond the restricted briefs of its participants. Perhaps it was not such a brilliant idea after all.
At first the new government seemed to be securing victory after victory in the process of 
reform. By 2007 the GRC had sponsored management and functional reviews of 18 ministries 
and 3 central management agencies (UNDP 2007). In February of that year the Director General 
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of the Civil Service Agency presented to donor partners a CSR “vision paper” intended as a 
stepping stone towards a full  fledged CSR strategy  (World Bank 2008a, 5). The government 
successfully removed 7,000 “ghost” civil servants from the payroll, began settling salary arrears 
for the “living” ones, and developed in September of 2007 a code of conduct for civil servants 
(Government of Liberia 2008e, 18). However, organizational reform was proving to be much 
more difficult than the government had anticipated (or wished), generating tensions at the level 
of  enforcement  which  donors  were  quick  to  notice.  The  United  States,  for  instance,  had 
implemented  a  “Building  Recovery and Reform Through Democratic  Governance”  (BRDG) 
program of  short-term technical  assistance  (STTA) between  September  2006 and  December 
2007. While -according to evaluators- “ministerial  stakeholders” held the program experts  in 
high  regard,  they  were  not  equally  fond  of  the  actual  changes  said  experts  were  trying  to 
implement.  According  to  the  final  evaluation  report,  “BRDG made  some miscalculations  in 
determining  whether  an  institution  had  a  verifiable  interest  in  implementing  the 
recommendations provided by the STTA consultant”  (USAID 2007, 10). The result was to be 
expected: the politics of patronage thwarted reform wherever the contractors did not focus on 
purely technical capacity-building (such as, tellingly,  in the Ministry of State for Presidential 
Affairs). But instead of engaging the government to address the problem, BRDG program leaders 
simply suspended the problematic STTA and focused instead on the non-problematic ones. The 
United States thus shirked the leading role it  could have played, leaving the enforcement of 
administrative reforms to other, more committed donors who may have been willing to bear that 
burden.
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In the meantime, the government of Johnson Sirleaf kept producing new strategies and 
enunciating action priorities. According to the 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy, the legislature 
would officially adopt the code of conduct for public servants by December 2008, while the Civil 
Service Agency and Governance Commission would rationalize and restructure ministries and 
agencies by June 2009. The administration did not mince words regarding the need to implement 
these objectives,  as  “any failure in  this  regard would likely have negative consequences for 
implementation of the overall PRS process” (Government of Liberia 2008e, 161). To that end it 
formulated  -with  World  Bank and British  assistance-  a  “Civil  Service  Reform Strategy”  for 
2008-2011, which aimed to put an end to the “piecemeal, problem-specific and reactive fashion” 
in which previous CSR initiatives had been carried out (Government of Liberia 2008b, 11). Its 
overarching  objectives:  restructuring  and  rightsizing,  pay  reform,  improved  service  delivery, 
better  human  resources  management,  leadership  development,  and  gender  equity.  More 
specifically,  it  endorsed  the  following policies:  correcting  the  38  functional  overlaps  among 
ministries  and  agencies  that  the  Governance  Commission  had  identified;  flattening  the 
superstructure of political appointees by introducing principal administrative officers after the 
British model; preparing and adopting a  medium-term pay strategy; or updating the legislative 
framework through a new civil service law. Implementation would be led by an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee, conducted through a Civil Service Reform Directorate within the CSA, consulted via 
a Stakeholders’ Forum, and aligned with foreign assistance through a CSR Donor Coordination 
Forum  (Government of Liberia 2008b, 59–62). With a new strategy in place, the government 
sought to galvanize local and international support for civil service reform to an unprecedented 
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degree.
Among Liberia’s international partners, DfID would turn out to be the main facilitator 
and  later  main  critic  of  the  CSR Strategy:  despite  its  crucial  role  in  drafting  it  through  its 
CISCAB team, the British assistance to the process was suspended in 2010. DfID had developed 
the program with high aspirations, and not a little certain pride in its accrued expertise on civil 
service reforms (DfID 2006, 11). As it had in Sierra Leone, the British aid agency had specified a 
number of clear performance indicators for the CSA and GRC under the terms of its support, 
such  as  pay  reform,  a  new  personnel  policy,  or  a  new  performance  management  system. 
However, it decided to let CISCAB expire without renewing it due to increased concern over the 
lack of tangible outcomes and questionable level of political leadership demonstrated by the CSA 
Director  (674691 Bilateral  donor official,  Monrovia 2011).  Indeed, by 2011 the work of the 
much-vaunted CSR Directorate, staffed in fact with SES professionals, had been slowed to a 
snail’s pace due to resistance to restructuring. At the time not even half of the ministries and 
agencies  reviewed  by  the  Governance  Commission  had  implemented  its  recommendations 
(489986  CSR  officials,  Monrovia  2011).  Some agencies  were  simply  ignoring  the  GC  by 
developing their own strategies, based on “cosmetic” and “ill-conceived” approaches to reform 
(354978 Auditing officials, Monrovia 2011). There was strong opposition in particular to the idea 
of substituting a career administrative officer for the politically appointed assistant ministers. In 
this and other similar examples, public officials were simply demonstrating that “rational self-
interest comes before national interest”  (733895 Senior governance official,  Monrovia 2011). 
The PSR itself had been “heavy on outcomes,  but not so on outputs,” leading to a veritable 
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“quagmire” of conflicting impact assessments and lessons learned (274889 Governance official, 
Monrovia  2011).  The  government  recognized  this  basic  problem,  albeit  under  a  remarkable 
veneer of “donorspeak,” when it succinctly noted in its first PRS progress report that “Ownership 
is not backed by sectoral leadership”  (Government of Liberia 2010a, 45). A UNDP report on 
Liberia’s  public  administration  found  that  “Public  sector  reform  rhetoric  far  exceeded  the 
commitment to undertake and sustain reform initiatives.” Consequently, “When critical decisions 
were  made  at  the  cabinet  level,  some  cabinet  ministers  decided  not  to  cooperate  in  the 
implementation of the decisions” (UNDP 2011, 9). But the problem was that at the most basic 
level the framework of public institutions governing the civil service was inadequate, and even 
then it was hardly implemented (DeGroot, Talvitie, and Umarov 2011). A sympathetic participant 
could  not  avoid  the  conclusion  that  public  sector  reforms  in  general  had  been  “lackluster” 
(143387 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011).
The lagging pace of administrative change after eight years of assistance betrayed the 
failure of commitment and coordination on the part of donors. Despite adopting a medium-term 
pay strategy and yet another two strategies (this time for capacity building and public sector 
reform in general), the “Code of Conduct for Public Officials” which the President had submitted 
to the legislature in September 2007 was in 2011 nowhere near adoption as law, despite some 
explicit pressure from international actors  (402969 Governance official, Monrovia 2011).5 The 
proposed new legislation for the civil service, in turn, remained to be developed. As to the Senior 
5 In early 2012 President Johnson Sirleaf promulgated the Code of Conduct as Executive Order 38, hoping to use  
her public signature as political pressure on legislators  (Government of Liberia 2012). Shortly thereafter the 
outgoing legislature committed the bill to the archives of the House (Boima J. V. Boima 2012), but the newly 
inaugurated Senate seemed much more amenable to the idea of finally enacting the Code into law (Genoway 
2012).
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Executive Service, its “immediate impact” and “success stories” could not hide the fact that, 
once its original three-year time frame had ended, the government was still unable to pay for the 
“topped-up” salaries. Consequently absorption of SES professionals into the civil service was 
postponed at least until June 2012 in order to “allow time for further reforms to take place” 
(Government of Liberia 2010b, 8). Still, no other donors besides DfID were willing to revise the 
terms of their  assistance.  The World Bank, for instance,  deemed implementation of the PRS 
“satisfactory” despite the fact that only 20% of specific deliverables had been achieved the first 
year  (World Bank 2010, 9). UNDP, in turn, enthusiastically maintained support for its various 
technical CSR programs despite a mid-term evaluation in which,  to  the question of whether 
progress had been achieved, the drafters could only answer with a “reluctant ‘Unsure’” due to a 
“disconnection” between the country program framework and what the office had actually been 
doing  (UNDP 2010b, 33). The nature of donor-recipient relations in Liberia was clear to all: 
“there is no conditionality these days” (895362 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). 
Absent a leading donor willing and able to ensure that the administrative organizations 
-the  Civil  Service  Agency  and  Governance  Commission-  were  given  the  teeth  which  they 
needed, it was unclear that private institutions in the Liberian civil service would cease to define 
the  behavior  of  public  officials  in  the  years  to  come.  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the 
government could rise by itself above dominant clientelistic practices. “Given her huge political 
clout,”  a  donor  official  commented,  “the  President  could  force  resignations.  But  she  too  is 
captured by coalitions in the executive and the legislature” (895362 Multilateral donor official, 
Monrovia 2011). Much as in Sierra Leone, donor reluctance to engage the government on a 
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political level had stymied the prospects of administrative change in the civil service, and thus of  
meaningful post-conflict state-building.
4.6  Implications
The comparison of civil service reform efforts in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia 
generates interesting insights both for the study of CSR as a policy process, and for the larger 
study of external assistance to state-building.
Both  cases  are  strikingly  similar  in  the  extent  to  which  personnel  reforms  outpaced 
organizational  ones.  Management  and  functional  reviews  of  ministries  and  agencies  were 
conducted in the two countries by independent governance agencies funded by donors, and yet 
by the end of the period under study, implementation of all but the most banal recommendations 
was lacking in public organizations. The obvious lesson to be learned from this outcome is that  
assistance to central policy-making organizations may be easier for donors, and even necessary 
for  the  purposes  of  strategic  design,  but  it  leaves  implementation  of  whatever  policies  are 
adopted vulnerable to the whims of semi-autonomous ministers and senior civil servants whose 
very livelihoods are threatened by reform. Without administrative sanctioning powers, central 
agencies are great agents of institutional design, but not-so-great agents of enforcement. This 
calls for a fundamental rethinking of CSR assistance programs, which need to explicitly couple 
design and enforcement by investing cabinet members or internal reform units in the success and 
failure of state-building assistance.
Even  though  they seemed  to  enjoy greater  success  than  organizational  restructuring, 
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personnel  reforms were still  subject  to  the powerful  incentives  of private  institutions.  While 
governments were able to carry out some truly heroic efforts towards payroll consolidation, staff 
retrenchment, and pay reform, they were much less successful in terms of enacting -let alone 
enforcing- administrative policies and regulations. The civil service codes of both Sierra Leone 
and Liberia are perfect illustrations of this problem: whereas the former got stuck at the cabinet 
level, the latter made it through only to be stalled at the legislature for five years (and counting). 
This  kind  of  deliberate  interference  with  reform  betrays  the  perceived  power  of  public 
administrative institutions, even in post-conflict states where private incentives are prevalent, 
inasmuch as the codes would have created a public standard of behavior against which deviations 
could be easily measured. The obvious lesson is that donors should generate early momentum 
towards  adopting  and  implementing  such  codes,  as  they  will  provide  an  immediate  and 
observable indicator of political commitment, and lay down the new standards against which the 
reformed public bureaucracy is supposed to perform.
In any event, civil service reform in both Sierra Leone and Liberia was characterized by 
eminently technical ownership by their respective governments, with the successful adoption of 
the rhetoric of the aid community, or “donorspeak.” Both processes were defined by ambitious 
and ultimately less than successful poverty reduction strategies which focused more on outputs 
than outcomes,  and which caused a proliferation of ineffective coordinating and consultative 
fora.  This  kind  of  pseudo-bureaucratic  behavior,  organized  around  meetings  and  strategies 
instead of monitoring and sanctioning, is the kind that we should expect in countries that may 
have the strategic  wish to  reform, but  lack the political  will  to  do so.  Instead of  promoting 
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elaborate and comprehensive strategies, therefore, donors concerned with administrative reform 
would be wise to focus on enforcement first and foremost, even at a small scale, and proceed in 
an  incremental  fashion  instead  of  devoting  years  to  developing  unenforceable  holistic 
frameworks.
The failure of both Sierra Leonean and Liberian elites to effectively organize and oversee 
their civil service reform initiatives can be attributed, to a not insignificant degree, to the failure 
of their respective donors to coordinate and monitor their own aid interventions. The parallels are 
particularly  striking  between  the  dynamics  of  international  support  for  each  country’s  civil 
service reform strategies after 2008: in both cases only one bilateral donor, the United Kingdom, 
established  a  consequential  set  of  observable  benchmarks,  and  when  it  decided  to  suspend 
assistance on the basis of insufficient political commitment, its international counterparts (the 
European  Commission,  UNDP,  the  World  Bank,  or  the  United  States)  simply  continued  to 
disburse their  aid according to much less exacting standards.  The remarkable equivalence in 
political dynamics between the cases demonstrates the problems of multiple-donor state-building 
assistance, which are likely to result in major diversion of external inducement due to differential 
levels of commitment to administrative reform.
It is important to note, however, that this is not an inevitable outcome. As the next chapter 
will demonstrate through detailed narratives of assistance to anti-corruption reform, a committed 
leading  donor  can  profoundly  alter  the  structure  of  incentives,  triggering  the  kind  of 
administrative enforcement that was patently absent in these cases of civil service reform.
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5.  Building Transparency: The Politics of Aid 
and Anti-Corruption Reform
Driving around Freetown in the back of a motorcycle is one of the easiest ways to come 
across  the  everyday  reality  of  corruption.  The  center  of  the  city  is  subject  to  obscure  and 
malleable regulations allowing or forbidding the passage of public moto-taxis. Except for the 
very center of town this does not seem to be a blanket prohibition, as there are often alternative 
routes available.  And there are not enough police officers to cover every possible street and 
roundabout, so each day the hapless passenger becomes an unwitting spectator in a game of 
cunning -a lottery, really- between police officers and the brotherhood of motorcyclists. If you 
happen to take the wrong turn, you run the risk of running into a couple of police officers ready 
to drop on the ground a spiked plank in order to bust the motorbike’s wheels. This happened to 
me once as I was returning from a meeting.
The  spikes  were  not  enough  to  stop  my driver,  but  a  surprisingly  quick  and  strong 
policeman grabbed the back of the bike and held it up to stop us. It was evident from the very 
beginning that  the seemingly furious officers could be persuaded to forget the incident.  The 
problem was that everyone in the street had witnessed the seizure of the motorbike,  and the 
policemen did not want to lose face in the neighborhood. My driver’s solution was ingenious: he 
talked to the owner of a rather large store in the street, who happened to be from the same ethnic 
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group as the officer. He gave some cash to the man (equivalent to no more than $5), and asked 
him to talk to the unreasonable but law-abiding policeman. It took some time, and a bit of mock 
indignation on everybody’s part, but eventually he seemed to relent. What happened then was 
interesting. “Walk towards that corner,” the driver told me, pointing to the other end of a cross-
street. Before I could ask for clarification he got on the bike with the police officer, who was 
ostensibly taking the offending vehicle to the depot and its driver to the precinct. What was 
actually  happening,  in  fact,  was  that  the  officer  wanted  to  be  seen  leaving the  place  as  an 
unflinching enforcer of law and order, but once around the corner he stopped, took the money, 
and happily waved us good-bye.
As an example of a private institution, the abuse of public office for personal benefit may 
be less pervasive that the patrimonial management and staffing of public organizations (chapter 
4), and certainly less dangerous than an unwieldy security sector (chapter 6). But corruption is 
the most politically salient issue of the three, prone to a level of scandal and public discussion 
that  the others  rarely attain.  One does  not  need to  be an expert  in  security or public  sector 
management to understand corruption: it is intuitive and crystal clear, and a powerful sign of the 
probity of public officials. From a purely analytical perspective, corruption is a better indicator 
of public actor preferences, as it is easier to pinpoint efforts as well as barriers for administrative 
enforcement. In that sense, international donors are more likely to encounter open obstructionism 
from  local  elites  in  clear  matters  of  corruption  than  in  nebulous  issues  of  public  sector 
management. That makes the analysis of anti-corruption reform a privileged window into the 
anatomy of state-building assistance.
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I begin the chapter by discussing the theory of corruption and anti-corruption, subsuming 
it under the institutionalist logic that animates this dissertation. Specifically, I emphasize two 
types of administrative institutions, reporting and sanctioning, whose enforcement will determine 
the success or failure of reform. I then proceed to the cases. For each of them I outline in turn the 
legacies of state failure and capture, the aims and expectations that international donors set for 
the recipient governments, and the prospects for collective action given relative commitments to 
reform and the presence of coordination frameworks. Having defined the theoretical expectation 
for  each  case  in  this  way,  I  then  explore  whether  they  are  borne  out  through  explanatory 
narratives of foreign support for reform. I close the chapter with a brief reflection on implications 
both for the analysis of civil service reform and for the larger study of state-building assistance.
5.1  Private Subversion and Administrative Policing: The 
Institutional Politics of State Corruption
Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. It is the conceptual opposite of 
administrative enforcement, and thus a fundamentally institutional phenomenon: for corruption 
to exist there have to be state organizations staffed by individuals who are subject to ethical 
codes and administrative rules delineating the boundaries between the public and the private 
sphere.  It  is  this  distinction  between  public  and  private  institutions  that  justifies  the  word 
“abuse,” which denotes infraction, instead of the neutral term “use.” It would be pointless to 
discuss the idea of corruption in those places where public and private institutions are one and 
the same: there would be no state to speak of in that case. Instead, it is where public and private 
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institutions differ, however slightly, that corruption becomes a meaningful category for analysis. 
One could make a further conceptual distinction between so-called political corruption, affecting 
the enactment of rules, and bureaucratic corruption, affecting their enforcement, but at the end of 
the day they are but expressions of what most scholarship and policy research considers the basic 
definition (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999; Bardhan 1997, 2006). The most important questions are: 
Why do people engage in corrupt behavior? Do they do so because the can, or because they 
believe  it  is  just?  Most  crucially for  the  problem of  state-building  assistance,  what  sorts  of 
organizational and institutional arrangements can hope to curb corruption when it is widespread 
and entrenched?
Bridging the Material and Ideational Incentives for Corruption
There are two general theoretical approaches to the problem of corruption, “sociological” 
and “economic,” and they focus on different causal variables and mechanisms. The economic or 
political-economic approach conceptualizes corruption as a principal-agent problem, in which 
the guiding idea is the primacy of incentives (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Bardhan 2006). In its most 
simple and intuitive formulation, public actors everywhere are subject to a universal motivator: 
self-interest,  “including an interest  in the well-being of one’s family and peer group” (Rose-
Ackerman 1999,  2). Individual  officials  thus  face  a  basic  choice:  they can  use  their  public 
position  for  its  intended,  regulated  purposes,  or  they  can  carry  out  their  obligations  while 
extracting  some  personal  benefit  from them.  However  much  we  complicate  this  model,  its 
solution usually boils down to the question of incentives: is it more beneficial or costly for the 
public actor to behave honestly or to be corrupt? If there is close monitoring from superiors, or if 
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the  punishment  for  getting  caught  is  dire,  it  might  not  be  rational  to  abuse  public  office. 
Conversely,  if  supervision is  limited and sanction mechanisms are lenient,  only an irrational 
public official would refrain from extracting a little side benefit from his job. Economic-minded 
analysts of corruption thus focus on the kind of structural features that may change either the 
payoff structure or the game itself,  like the expected costs  from monitoring and sanctioning 
(Becker and Stigler 1974), the degree of discretionary power enjoyed by public officials (Chand 
and Moene 1999), or the different externalities of centralized or diffused authority  (Bardhan 
2006; Gillespie and Okruhlik 1991).
Like  many  abstract  models,  the  theory  of  corruption  as  agency  makes  no  specific 
assumptions about a public official’s values, or the meanings he attaches to his public status and 
responsibilities.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  alternative  sociological  approach,  this  is  a 
fundamental misconception. Every individual is embedded in a community awash with various 
expectations and social  norms about  what  is  honest,  smart,  or desirable.  Culture,  that  tricky 
social  concept,  becomes  the  principal  theoretical  engine  of  corruption:  whereas  some 
communities value a culture of impersonality and public service, others may see public office as 
another source of welfare for the official’s dependents (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 106). Corruption, 
in those cases, represents “a way of life, a mode of business and politics,” and capturing public 
resources becomes “the cultural thing” to such an extent that those who abstain are subject to 
social  rejection  (Ellis  2006). Formal bureaucracy in the Weberian sense is,  after  all,  a fairly 
recent innovation, and even the most advanced industrial democracies exhibit a residual level of 
corruption. The difference between stronger states and weaker states, for this approach, is not the 
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relative strength of administrative institutions and sanctions, nor the presence of a vibrant private 
sector where everybody can make a decent living—it is the fact that some states are embedded in 
societies which have a negative valuation of corruption, whereas others are subject to a neutral or 
even positive valuation of the private use -not abuse- of public office. In these cases  a “moral 
economy  of  corruption”  emerges  which  reproduces  a  routine  form  of  corruption  in  public 
administration, based on social expectations about the informal redistribution of resources from 
state coffers toward society (Olivier de Sardan 1999).
There have been conscious attempts to supply a conceptual middle ground between both 
approaches. One such attempt is the study of the social capital that allows corrupt networks to 
coalesce around shared expectations and values, whether these networks are criminal or quasi-
criminal (della Porta and Vannucci 2004), or simple mechanisms for group solidarity when trust 
in public actors and institutions is low (Olivier de Sardan 1999; Hellsten and Larbi 2006; Morris 
and Klesner 2010). Regardless of its character, a network coordinating and sustaining corrupt 
patterns of behavior can overcome individual decision-making, and thus act as as a major factor 
in the perpetuation of capture underneath formal administrative changes  (Fjeldstad 2003). An 
expansion of this line of argumentation would consider whether social interactions even allow 
for steadfast honesty regardless of individual values, and perhaps conclude that “the problem of 
corruption is not so much the morally corrupt few as the behaviorally corruptible many” (W. L. 
Miller 2006, 371). This is an implication mirrored in game-theoretic equilibrium analyses, where 
the utility of being an honest individual can be extremely low when everyone else is dishonest 
(Mishra 2006). Compared to the warmth and coziness of corruption, in this sense, honesty is a 
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recipe for asocial loneliness.
Like all culturalist-versus-rationalist debates, the sociological-economic divide regarding 
corruption reflects less a fundamental chasm than the use of different analytical lenses. Abstract 
models of incentives always require some grounding in cultural settings to attain any semblance 
of  plausibility.  And  value-based  explanations  can  seldom explain  change  in  norms  without 
recourse to non-cultural factors. The intersection between both approaches is obvious: cultural 
norms  and  values  are  incentives  in  the  minds  of  public  officials,  and  the  consolidation  of 
incentive equilibria can give rise to new norms about what is public and private  (Hellsten and 
Larbi 2006). Any analysis of corruption, and therefore of anti-corruption, would be remiss to 
neglect this connection. Without it the only practical implications we can generate are simply 
unrealistic: either corruption will be washed away by the sheer influx of money in the form of 
salaries and fines,  or it  will  depend on virtually immutable values  which bound societies to 
remain unchanged unless culture itself is uprooted (Rose-Ackerman 2006, xx).
In this  dissertation I opt for a more flexible understanding of the interaction between 
public and private institutions, and thus of the concept of corruption: material and ideational 
utility together shape the incentives of public officials, and regardless of their location in the 
public-private spectrum they can always be swayed one way or the other by strong normative or 
distributional  changes.  In  the  Weberian  sense,  this  reflects  the  notion  that  both  instrumental 
rationality and value rationality affect an actor’s conscious decision-making  (Weber 1978, 24–
25); this is but a recognition of the basic principle of contextualized agency. I begin with the 
reasonable assumption that public officials all over the world are well aware of the distinction 
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between  public  and  private,  formal  and  informal,  regardless  of  the  relative  levels  of  actual 
enforcement. They are slaves, in a way, to mutually conflicting sets of rules, and they use cues 
from their  personal relationships as well  as from organizational customs in their  decision to 
enforce public  institutions,  private  institutions,  or  some combination of the two.  Changes  in 
patterns  of  administrative  enforcement  and corruption  are  thus  possible  via  two distinct  but 
complementary causes: new norms, or new material costs and benefits. For the sake of simplicity 
I will use the term incentive to encompass both sets of factors: material incentives and ideational 
incentives.
Institutions for Monitoring and Sanctioning Corruption
Administrative  institutions  can  generate  new  material  and  ideational  incentives. 
Materially, they can attach costs to the decision to abuse public office by imposing penalties and 
increasing  the  chances  of  getting  caught.  Ideationally,  strong  administrative  enforcement 
reshapes the structure of incentives and -over time- the behavioral patterns of all actors involved. 
The anti-corruption research and policy community has long pondered whether ideational or 
material incentives contain the secret to curbing state capture, and has reached the demoralizing 
conclusion that while a cost-benefit transformation may have positive short-term effects, it  is 
attitudinal  change in  society at  large  that  ensures  the  penetration  and sustainability  of  anti-
corruption reforms (Rose-Ackerman 2006). Since I am concerned with relatively short periods of 
time, measured in years, it would be unreasonable to expect observable changes in basic social 
norms, especially those which have blossomed under decades of corruption and state collapse. 
However, the crystallization of a given path out of a critical juncture depends on the dedicated 
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efforts of purposeful actors and organizations to impose some institutions over others. And so 
anti-corruption administrative laws and regulations that report and sanction are essential even in 
such an early stage. 
By  definition,  the  dominant  political-economic  approach  to  corruption  generates 
prescriptions  based  on the  effect  of  institutions  on  material  incentives.  These  include  better 
screening  of  agents,  greater  rewards  and  penalties,  or  more  comprehensive  gathering  of 
information  (Klitgaard  1988);  strengthening  “horizontal  accountability”  across  public 
organizations  (O’Donnell 1998); devising better constitutional checks and balances  (Kunicová 
and  Rose-Ackerman  2005);  enhancing  the  political  autonomy  of  auditing  and  monitoring 
organizations  (Melo, Pereira, and Figueiredo 2009); or delineating more clear responsibilities 
(Tavits 2007). At the level of the regime, variables such as presidentialism or federalism are said 
to have a dampening effect on corruption, no matter how feeble the actual supporting evidence is 
(Treisman 2007). At a lower, bureaucratic level of analysis  the focus shifts to organizational 
restructuring, monitoring, and sanctioning (Rose-Ackerman 1978). One frequent prescription is 
the reform of salary structures in the civil service  (Bardhan 2006); under perfect information, 
state principals simply need to remunerate their agents enough to deter corrupt behavior (Becker 
and  Stigler  1974). The  problem  is  that  when  monitoring  and  sanctioning  mechanisms  are 
themselves suboptimal, higher salaries may come to be seen not as an incentive but as an added 
benefit  to  corrupt  behavior  (Fjeldstad  2003). Moreover,  it  can  be  actually really  difficult  to 
causally separate dishonest losses from mere incompetence, especially in weaker states (Bardhan 
2006, 346). Anti-corruption approaches based on rules and sanctions, in turn, have complications 
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of their own. First, they generate a second-order problem, namely how to ensure that oversight 
officials themselves act in an honest manner. Second, they could  in fact distort  the official’s 
motivation away from public ethics, which is hardly a desirable outcome. And third, in any event 
they can hardly be expected to keep up with the market for corruption in order to “outbid the 
briber”  (Lambsdorff  2009). Regardless of  the promises  and challenges  of  different  incentive 
mechanisms, the reality is that for the most part states with high corruption levels have already 
adopted the necessary reporting and sanctioning institutions: it is the level of enforcement which 
leaves much to be desired (Doig and McIvor 2003).
There  is  one  enforcement-oriented  prescription  which  occupies  the  conceptual  space 
between high-level constitutional rules and low-level salary structures and which has attained a 
certain popularity in the anti-corruption community over the last few decades: the establishment 
of dedicated, independent anti-corruption agencies with administrative enforcement powers over 
the  entire  public  sector  (Klitgaard  1988;  Doig  1995;  Meagher  2005).  The earliest  and most 
famous examples are Singapore’s Corruption Prevention Investigative Bureau, created in 1952, 
and Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption, established in 1974 (Johnston 
1999; Heilbrunn 2006). The latter in particular was designed with a wide mandate encompassing 
education, prevention, investigation, and prosecution, and it demonstrated that a dedicated and 
empowered agency can overcome perceived “cultural traits”  (Klitgaard 1988, 120). Its much-
touted success has turned it into a model for many a developing country government seeking to 
demonstrate its anti-corruption bona fide.
However,  there are  a number of  basic  problems with the independent  agency model, 
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especially the one fashioned after Hong Kong. First,  they are incredibly costly organizations, 
which  are  hardly  affordable  even  in  the  short  term  by  cash-strapped  developing  country 
treasuries. Second, they are likely to generate resentment in other public sector organizations as 
well as “poach” much-needed qualified personnel from them (Doig 1995, 161). Moreover, they 
can have little impact by themselves in the context of a reluctant public sector (Johnston 1999), 
and the track record indeed suggests that agencies frequently succeed in contexts where broader 
administrative  institutions  are  already effective  (Meagher  2005). Third,  they wield  immense 
administrative  power,  which  can  get  out  of  hand  in  contexts  where  legislative  and  judicial 
oversight  are  weak  or  nonexistent  (Klitgaard  1988;  Meagher  2005). Fourth,  and  most 
importantly, they may be used as token reform efforts aimed at satisfying international standards 
or conditionality, but ultimately designed to fail by astute governments unwilling to undermine 
the rents that ensure their political survival  (Heilbrunn 2006). In any event, the promise of the 
model  is  certainly  alluring  in  countries  where  constitutional  and  administrative  checks  and 
balances are feeble.
Theoretical Introduction to the Cases
Independent agencies are particularly attractive “one-stop shops” for donors concerned 
about corruption but who do not want to engage with usually bloated and captured judiciaries 
and bureaucracies; it is the so-called “enclave approach”  (Doig 1995).  As in all state-building 
assistance, however, donors face a basic problem of imperfect information: they can never be 
fully sure about the recipient officials’ motives, and it may take a long time to screen corrupt 
leaders  from honest  ones  (Tangri  and  Mwenda  2006). Political  will  is  difficult  to  pinpoint, 
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although there are some revealing indicators, like the locus of initiative for reform, the degree of 
analytical rigor, the degree of support mobilized, the presence and credibility of sanctions, and 
the continuity of effort  (Brinkerhoff 2000). African leaders, for instance, have historically been 
all  too willing to  launch high-minded anti-corruption initiatives,  only to  leave implementing 
agencies  starved  of  resources  or  politically  hamstrung  (S.  P.  Riley  1998). The  prospects  of 
success of anti-corruption agencies thus rely on de facto donor operation during the initial years 
(Doig 1995, 163), even if such concentrated foreign support may detract from a more sectoral 
approach  to  transparency  and  accountability,  and  suffer  from the  usual  ailments  of  foreign 
assistance,  like  short  project  cycles  and  institutional  memory,  or  inadequate  coordination  of 
funding (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2006, 2007).
Post-conflict settings complicate further these basic challenges of external assistance to 
anti-corruption reform (Rose-Ackerman 2009). Administrative institutions often have to be built 
from scratch in places where state capture is not a moral dilemma but an entrenched survival 
strategy. A fragile peace creates significant uncertainty, shortening local actors’ time horizons in 
a drastic manner: public officials might as well “cash in” while they can, for no one can tell what 
will happen tomorrow. Moreover, a time of social instability may not be the best occasion for a 
politically-charged institutional reform with major distributional implications. This is the kind of 
environment  that  post-conflict  donors encounter.  Simply put,  private  institutions are  reliable, 
public  ones  are  not.  And  the  incentives  structure  is  deeply  set  against  anti-corruption 
enforcement, so that public officials are unlikely to start behaving in a radically different way 
(Doig and Tisne 2009). A context of residual and conservative state capture leaves external actors 
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with a  political  choice:  Will  they provide an external  incentive for  the enforcement  of  anti-
corruption institutions, or will they rely on the calculation of local public officials?
The  conceptual  premise  and  two  strategic  dilemmas  developed  in  chapter  2  appear 
clearly: left to their own devices public officials will enforce private institutions, so that donors 
seeking administrative enforcement will have to rely on reluctant or obstructionist agents, and 
monitoring them in order to enact conditionality will be all the more difficult when multiple 
donors attempt to coordinate their efforts. Sierra Leone’s anti-corruption agenda was shaped by a 
single donor, the United Kingdom, whereas Liberia was the recipient of institutional assistance 
by  multiple  donors.  If  the  cases  of  reform  presented  below  bear  any  resemblance  to  the 
explanatory types  presented  at  the  end  of  chapter  2,  in  Sierra  Leone we should  expect  the 
dynamics  of  a  pure  agency  relationship  in  which  the  success  of  foreign  aid  in  inducing 
meaningful reform crucially depends on the willingness of the leading donor to apply credible 
conditionality: a commitment to administrative enforcement will result in a dynamic of tension, 
whereas  a  focus  on  design  will  lead  to  a  dynamic  of  concession.  In  contrast,  the  GEMAP 
experiment in Liberia combines the challenges of agency with those of donor collective action, 
which  should  make  it  difficult  to  coordinate  a  system of  rewards  and  punishments  able  to 
overcome the moral hazard imperative for local public actors. On the one hand, even if all donors 
are interested in enforcement collective conditionality will be subverted by the incentives of the 
least committed member. On the other hand, if most donors are interested in design, then the 
impact of reform-minded donors will be diverted by contradictory inducements.
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5.2  The Structure of Incentives for Anti-Corruption Reform in 
Sierra Leone
The process of anti-corruption reform in Sierra Leone began even before the war was 
officially over. In 1999 the -then embattled- President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah launched a “war 
against corruption” after his main backers, bilateral and multilateral aid donors, warned him that 
their assistance was conditional on an assurance that their funds would not simply vanish in the 
unreliable public finance system (“Sierra Leone’s War Against Corruption” 1999). It is difficult 
to exactly pinpoint the first cause for anti-corruption state-building in Sierra Leone, whether it  
was purely external,  purely internal,  or an uneasy mix of the two. Regardless, the analytical 
trajectory of administrative change was defined by the close interaction between the two post-
conflict administrations and their closest international ally, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. In the following sections I present the local legacies, donor aims, and 
process of interaction in anti-corruption reform at the sector level in Sierra Leone, before delving 
into the more fine-grained dynamics of the case through a detailed narrative of the rise, decline, 
and rebirth of the Anti-Corruption Commission.
Public Will and Private Legacies
If political will is to be measured in the adoption of laws and strategies, the successive 
governments of Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2012 certainly displayed it in no small measure. 
Already in 1998 the democratically-elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah adopted an 
Audit Service Act intended to revamp and strengthen the fundamental reporting organization in 
Sierra Leone. Two years later his  government passed an Anti-Corruption Act establishing an 
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Anti-Corruption  Commission  (ACC) after  the  Hong Kong  model.  In  2005  a  National  Anti-
Corruption  Strategy  was  adopted  in  order  to  institutionalize  a  sustained,  coordinated, 
government-wide campaign against public corruption. However, by that time the efficacy of the 
ACC was in question due to widely shared suspicions of political interference. From his arrival  
to  State  House  in  2007,  President  Ernest  Bai  Koroma seemed  determined  to  relaunch anti-
corruption efforts through a campaign of “attitudinal change” as well as a commitment to review 
the  ACC  Act,  which  his  administration  did  in  2008.  And  a  new  National  Anti-Corruption 
Strategy was promulgated in 2008, aiming to define a “national integrity system” according to 
international best practices emanating from Transparency International and other organizations.
Regardless of their motivations and achievements, both Kabbah and Koroma were fairly 
courageous in their  open fight  against  corruption,  a legal concept condemning some deeply-
rooted social norms which were a constituent element of Sierra Leonean society. Historically, 
this culture had originated in the combination of extended family obligations and the norm of 
offering gifts to traditional rulers, with any failure to observe such conventions being frowned 
upon (Transparency International 2004, 21–22). The “shakehand” which embodied the culture of 
gift-giving steadily increased during the post-colonial period, and the misuse of tradition fed into 
increasingly widespread corrupt practices. As an anti-corruption official put it: “If you are in a 
high office people expect you to make money; you receive visitors constantly, and if you do not 
pay, social sanction ensues” (970364 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). The process of state 
capture in Sierra Leone began in earnest with the second Prime Minister, Albert Margai (1964-
1967),  who  redistributed  public  offices  to  the  benefit  of  the  southern  Mende  peoples 
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overwhelmingly filling  the  ranks  of  his  Sierra  Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP),  and  who later 
attempted -unsuccessfully- to create a single-party state. But it was Margai’s successor, Siaka 
Stevens, who first as Prime Minister (1968-1971) and later as President of the republic (1971-
1985) would transform the Sierra Leonean state into an instrument of personal enrichment for his 
Temne and Limba cronies within the All Peoples’ Congress (APC). In a broadcast to the nation a 
few days after the proclamation of Sierra Leone as a presidential republic, Stevens had told the 
people: “We are all in office not for the sake of our personal ambitions but in order to make this a 
better  country  to  live  in” (Transparency International  2004,  25). The  reality  of  his  regime, 
however,  was  far  from  such  lofty  aspirations.  For  instance,  Stevens  turned  control  of  the 
diamond industry over to a prominent Lebanese businessman, who not only attended cabinet 
meetings and was able to veto ministerial decisions, but was also allowed to keep his own 500-
strong paramilitary force. At a lower level, it was common knowledge that one could become 
appointed district office in diamond-rich Kono in exchange for an initial payment of Le10,000 
(about $10,000 at the time) followed by monthly disbursements of Le8,000 (Kandeh 1999, 351–
352).
When Stevens designated Joseph Momoh as his successor to the State House in 1985, 
Sierra Leoneans hoped for some semblance of change. What they got, in contrast, was continuity, 
albeit with some new faces: relying on his fellow Limbas, Momoh governed through an ethnic 
network  known  locally  as  the  “Binkolo  mafia”  and  through  a  Limba  political-cultural 
organization called “Ekutay.” Entrance into the society was highly priced, as it all but guaranteed 
fantastic  opportunities  for  pillage:  one of  Ekutay’s  members,  Momoh’s  Minister  of  Finance, 
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reportedly embezzled $15 million from state coffers, while another, Sierra Leone’s Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, sold the premises of the diplomatic mission in New York 
for his own benefit. While not as violent as Stevens, Momoh’s regime was no less predatory, and 
his anti-corruption strategy was limited to having officials reimburse the state for what they had 
taken  (Kandeh 1999,  353). Little  if  anything was done to  address  the  various  scandals  that 
became public, such as “Vouchergate” (1982), “Squandergate” (1984), or “Milliongate” (1987).6
Feeling neglected by Momoh, and ostensibly motivated by a desire to defeat the RUF 
rebellion,  the National  Provisional  Ruling  Council  (NPRC) seemed at  first  eager  to  end the 
culture of impunity for public officials, and in fact launched three commissions of inquiry into 
irregularities committed under the previous APC government. These failed nonetheless to act as 
deterrents for further corruption, and mostly served to legitimize the NPRC’s coup  (Kpundeh 
1994, 146–147). It was not long, in fact, before the military leaders started to behave like their 
predecessors, using their public offices as an avenue for self-enrichment. In the words of the first 
Minister of Finance appointed after the 1996 elections, “those boys looted everything they could 
lay hands on - not a cent was left in the treasury; they stole everything”  (Kandeh 1999, 355). 
When a brief respite in the war with the RUF presented the opportunity to re-establish multiparty 
democracy, Sierra Leoneans elected a former protegé of Albert Margai, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 
who failed to fundamentally alter the political landscape of Sierra Leone, granting amnesties to 
6 “In the Voucher Gate scandal,  officials in the financial departments of government ministries,  including the  
Treasury, prepared fake vouchers for payment to certain contractors for not doing any work which they could be  
paid for. The quantum of vouchers was so massive, that it was dubbed Voucher Gate by the press when unearthed 
by a government minister in the Ministry of Finance. In the case of the Million Gate scandal, millions of leones  
were embezzled from the Treasury by certain government officials. Similarly, huge amounts of money from the 
Treasury were squandered by certain government officials, which came  to be known as the Squander Gate 
scandal, but little attempt was made to punish these offenders” (Transparency International 2004, 26).
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corrupt members of past administrations and facilitating the return of Momoh to the country on a 
generous government pension.
The link between decades of corruption and the eventual collapse of the Sierra Leonean 
state was given an official endorsement with the publication in 2004 of the final report by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which found “endemic greed, corruption and nepotism” 
to be the central cause of the civil war, and which held all post-independence governments and 
political elites directly responsible for it (Government of Sierra Leone 2004, 30–32). Above all, 
by the end of the war corruption had become a defining feature of Sierra Leonean society:
The concept of “consideration,” “dash” or “appreciation” is so widespread that it is a way 
of life and there are no credible, voluntary alternatives to that situation. . . . Institutional 
weakness is a highly probable contributory factor, but even if checks and balances were 
put in place inefficient managers, who are appointed through nepotism and never sacked, 
would counter any ambition for proper controls (Government of Sierra Leone 2005d, 15).
Donor Aims and Agendas
Donor interest in anti-corruption state-building in post-conflict Sierra Leone emerged as 
the struggling government of Kabbah and his Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party were still contending 
with  the  erstwhile  alliance  between the  RUF and the  Armed Forces  Revolutionary Council. 
Already in 1997-98 the World Bank had been advising the nascent democratic government on the 
need for a policy and accountability organization at  the highest level.  But it  was the United 
Kingdom,  Sierra  Leone’s  main  donor,  which  provided part  of  the  impetus  and much of  the 
financial and technical support for a new Anti-Corruption Commission and a reformed Audit 
Service of Sierra Leone.  From the beginning there was a clear concern on the British side that 
any anti-corruption instrument could be used for political  purposes, much as it had been the 
195
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 5
tradition in the past  (691429 Bilateral donor official, London 2011). In order to counter these 
temptations, the United Kingdom became directly involved in the establishment of the necessary 
administrative organizations for public reporting (the Audit Service) and public sanctioning (the 
ACC),  through  a  direct  political  dialogue  involving  President  Kabbah,  the  British  High 
Commissioner in Freetown, and the Secretary for International Development Clare Short back in 
London. In February 2002 Short made a very symbolic visit to Sierra Leone, and in a key speech 
she restated the terms of British assistance: “I want to make clear today that the UK Government 
is committed to stand by Sierra Leone for the long-term provided that we have a strong mutual  
commitment  to  the  building  of  a  competent,  transparent  and  uncorrupt  modern  state” 
(Government  of  Sierra  Leone  2003a  Appendix  I). Though  she  acknowledged  the  “strong 
personal commitment” which Kabbah had made to the anti-corruption process, she warned that 
stronger enforcement of the law was needed.
The tacit link between success in anti-corruption and aid disbursement was formalized in 
the 2002  “Memorandum of Understanding” that Clare Short signed with President Kabbah in 
November of 2002. The agreement included corruption as one of the key elements of governance 
reform, and as a conditionality “bargain” it committed the UK to continue funding its multiple 
projects in the Sierra Leonean state in exchange for clear action on the part of the government in 
the enforcement of corruption legislation. Specifically, the MoU called for the development of a 
national anti-corruption strategy as per the 2000 Anti-Corruption Act, establishing clear roles and 
responsibilities for all public organizations involved, which should in turn be strengthened so as 
to ensure the success of the strategy (DfID and Government of Sierra Leone 2002). The MoU 
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both simplified and complicated DfID’s situation. On one hand, it made the task of monitoring 
easier, insofar as there were some clear, tangible benchmarks regarding the ACC and the national 
strategy against corruption. On the other hand, this made it extremely easy to assess whether the 
government  of Sierra  Leone exhibited the requisite  political  will  in  its  commitment  to  fight 
corruption. If it became evident that State House was blocking or stalling reform efforts, would 
Britain be ready to withhold the yearly tranche of conditional budget support that kept the Sierra 
Leonean state alive?
Given the absence of other donors to contend with, the case of foreign assistance to anti-
corruption  reform in  Sierra  Leone  embodies  closely  the  first  explanatory  type  presented  in 
chapter  2,  in  which  state-building  assistance  unfolds  according to  the  logic  of  tension.  The 
principal-agent  relationship  between  leading  donor  and  recipient  government  would  be  the 
crucial  strategic  dilemma in this  particular  process  of state-building.  Should DfID as an aid 
agency and the United Kingdom as a bilateral donor be willing to flex its conditionality muscles 
in  this  relationship,  they  would  have  an  unique  opportunity  to  fundamentally  transform the 
structure of incentives responsible for three decades of state capture and one of state collapse in 
Sierra Leone. Chapter 4 above demonstrated that the lack of donor enforcement in the area of 
civil service reform had facilitated a protracted and unimpressive process of limited institutional 
change. In the area of corruption, Britain was not beholden to the interests of other donors less 
inclined to engage in political dialogue. Perhaps this time things would unfold in a different way.
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5.3  Tracing the Process of Anti-Corruption Reform in Sierra 
Leone
Post-conflict Sierra Leone, rife as it was with corruption and state capture, sorely needed 
new institutions for administrative accountability. Corruption may have been a beast rooted in 
local cultural norms, but state reconstruction could not await a best-case scenario of custom and 
moral evolution which would take generations. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that the 
government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and his British backers soon agreed to establish a dedicated 
anti-corruption  agency after  the  Hong Kong model,  with  a  wide  policy  brief  encompassing 
sensitization, prevention, and investigation, even if the exact decision-making calculation that the 
President followed is unclear. On the one hand, he had reportedly received advice against the 
creation of an Anti-Corruption Commission from certain sectors within his administration: some 
public  officials  were  concerned  that  there  were  simply  “too  many  skeletons  in  the  closet” 
(“Sierra Leone’s War Against Corruption” 1999). On the other hand, donors were unsettled by 
the risks of granting massive amounts of foreign aid to a country which was unable to manage its 
own finances transparently. From this perspective, the ACC was established by the government 
of the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) in response to international accusations of corruption 
(970364 Senior ACC official,  Freetown 2010). Regardless, the idea at  the time was that the 
Commission  would  oversee  the  proper  employment  of  donor  funds,  reassuring  international 
partners  weary of  a  weak Sierra  Leonean state  by setting  up a  good watchdog organization 
(030798 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). A consultant with experience in Hong Kong was 
tasked with  outlining the  blueprint  and terms for  the  new organization and institutions,  and 
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studies were conducted on foreign models such as Hong Kong, Botswana, and Zambia, as well 
as on best practices espoused by Transparency International. “We cannot say that the ACC is 
home-grown,” an ACC official told me. “Foreign principles were replicated and adapted to Sierra 
Leone” (692610 ACC official, Freetown 2010).
In late 1999 an Anti-Corruption Act was drafted,7 and it was signed into law on January 
26th,  2000. The Act was to  be the basis  of a new Anti-Corruption Commission dedicated to 
sensitization, prevention, and prosecution of nine specific corruption offenses.8 By law, the ACC 
was  thus  imbued  with  both  reporting  and  sanctioning  responsibilities,  making  it  the  most 
powerful administrative body within the executive. The idea was to enlist public support in the 
fight against corruption, to promote and strengthen administrative systems and processes within 
ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs), and to investigate such reports as were filed on 
corrupt  practices.  Some  limits  to  this  expansive  brief  were  however  built  into  the  new 
institutions.  Article  53  of  the  Act  made  the  Commission  independent  of  “any  person  or 
authority,” and yet the appointment of the Commissioner and his deputy was the President’s 
prerogative  as  per  article  3.  The  decision  to  prosecute,  moreover,  would  not  rest  with  the 
Commission itself. As per the 1991 constitution, Article 37 of the Act vested that power in the 
Office of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, who was a political official and member 
of the cabinet. In addition, the ACC did not have the ability to threaten or impose compliance 
sanctions on MDAs which failed to implement its recommendations. The Commission was an 
7 According to a former anti-corruption official, the Act was written by “a bunch of idiots” in six weeks without 
any policy guidance (347420 Former ACC official, Freetown 2010).
8 The  corrupt  practices  included  in  the  Act  were:  corrupt  acquisition  of  wealth,  soliciting  or  accepting  an 
advantage, using influence for contracts, corrupting public officer, soliciting or accepting advantage for public  
officer,  misappropriation of public funds or property,  misappropriation of donor funds or property,  impeding 
foreign investment, and corrupt transaction with agents.
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unprecedented development in Sierra Leone, but as an administrative organization it was built 
weak. Its effectiveness would rely on the political will of the president. I will explore in greater  
detail  the tension that dominated the first  decade of the Commission’s  existence in the next 
section.
Besides its immediate administrative competences, the ACC was also envisioned from 
the beginning as a sector-oriented organization, with the Commissioner required to implement an 
anti-corruption strategy which would enable policy coherence and coordination across the public 
sector. In this task the ACC would have to work with other administrative organizations, like the 
Auditing Service, Parliament,  or the judiciary,  as well  as with State House and relevant line 
ministries within the executive. Getting all these players up to speed would be one of the major 
political  challenges  of  the  new Commission’s  work,  which  needed  assistance  from a  strong 
auditing organization able to supply its own reporting of public-sector malfeasance.
The office of the Auditor-General was a product of the 1991 constitution of Sierra Leone, 
promulgated by Momoh in his final dash to democratization before being deposed. Article 119 of 
the constitution had stipulated an independent public official, appointed by the president with 
parliamentary approval, who was to conduct external audits of all state organizations and other 
bodies established wholly or partly with public funds, and to compile these in a yearly report for 
Parliament to review. In 1998 the democratically-elected government adopted an Audit Service 
Act,  which removed the Auditor-General  from the public  service and provided him with an 
overseeing  board  and  a  service  composed  of  deputy  auditors  and  other  auditing  officials. 
Noncompliance with requests from the Audit Service, moreover, was elevated by the Act to the 
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category  of  punishable  offense,  with  up  to  5  million  leones  in  fines  and  two  years  of 
imprisonment. However, it would be six years before the Act was finally implemented, and with 
it  the  Audit  Service actually empowered as  an independent  administrative  institution.  In  the 
meantime, the office of the Auditor-General remained weak and functionally constrained by its 
reliance on the Public  Service Commission for its  personnel  (who themselves did not enjoy 
constitutional independence),  and on the Ministry of Finance for its  budget.  A Transparency 
International report published in 2004 reached a sobering conclusion: “Over the years, Audit 
Reports have not contributed to the fight against corruption” (Transparency International 2004, 
36). 
When the Audit  Service of Sierra  Leone (ASSL) was born in  2004 with the delayed 
application of the 1998 Act, DfID launched a project of support with two key organizational 
objectives: to increase the financial auditing standards, and to develop the capacity to conduct 
non-financial  audits.  An independent  review of  the  project,  conducted  in  April  2007,  found 
strong evidence that the ASSL’s technical capacity had been greatly increased in the intervening 
years, even if its independence remained compromised by financial reliance on the government, 
and cooperation by other public actors with its information requests was limited (DfID 2008c). 
While the Audit Service was providing, with British support, increasingly detailed reporting on 
corruption and financial malpractice in public organizations, the true Achilles’ heel of the system 
was  sanctioning,  which  by  law  was  the  prerogative  of  the  Public  Accounts  Committee  in 
Parliament.  As  audit  reports  became  more  frequent  and  increasingly  longer  and  more 
comprehensive, there remained a significant lag in their submission to Parliament, on average 
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over two years after the fiscal year under review.
DfID had included support for the committee and the demand-side of audits as two of the 
four outputs for its ASSL project, but the April 2007 review had found that “Audit reports are not 
published  when  submitted  to  Parliament,  and  the  PAC  [Public  Accounts  Committee] 
consideration  of  audit  reports  has  often  taken years  to  complete.”  Moreover,  there  was  “no 
formal response from the Government to PAC findings and no responsibility for ensuring that 
effective action is taken to recover losses reported by the PAC” (DfID 2008c). As of May 2005, 
the report  for 1996-1999 had just  been approved by Parliament;  those for fiscal years 2000, 
2001, and 2002 were being examined concurrently in an effort to catch up (Government of Sierra 
Leone 2005a, 1). While two years later the Public Accounts Committee had managed to process 
those reports, its recommendations for the 1996-1999 one had still not been fully implemented 
(Government  of Sierra  Leone 2007a, 2). The delay,  as  the Transparency International  report 
pointed out, minimized the significance of the audit reports, as by the time they were acted upon 
“those  that  might  have  misused  public  funds  would  have  died,  retired,  resigned,  or  been 
transferred to other departments”  (Transparency International 2004, 35). As a result, there was 
agreement  among  all  other  anti-corruption  actors  that  the  legislature  had  “not  been  able  to 
effectively exercise its ‘watchdog’ functions” (Government of Sierra Leone 2005b, 20). Besides 
its own inefficacy, Parliament was acting moreover as a choke point for the dissemination of the 
Audit Service’s findings, since by law audit reports could not be publicized upon submission to 
Parliament, which may or may not publish its own report on the report (DfID 2008c, 9). Given 
the patent “lack of commitment and leadership,” DfID decided to limit to a minimum any further  
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support to Parliament under phase II of its project (DfID 2008c, 12).
The anti-corruption reform process in Sierra Leone had been jump-started without any 
strategic planning: law had preceded policy, not the other way round. In June 2003 the national 
anti-corruption strategy was still on the Anti-Corruption Commission’s to-do list. It was only in 
February  of  2005,  after  a  year  of  work  by  a  small  team  advised  by  a  high-level  steering 
committee9, that the National Anti Corruption Strategy (NACS) was launched. It finally provided 
an analysis of the causes and extent of corruption in Sierra Leone, identifying priority areas and 
organizations of reform, and supplying a 32-page policy matrix of sectoral  recommendations 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2005b). Almost immediately, however, the shortcomings of the 
much delayed NACS became apparent, as there were no budgetary provisions for its activities, 
the “integrity officers” it designated in each public organization  found themselves “unable to 
influence policy decisions,” and the implementation process unfolded in a very slow and ad hoc 
manner  (Government of Sierra Leone 2008d, 8). Barely a year and a half after the NACS was 
endorsed by the President, a technical working group for its review was established, comprising 
civil society representatives, public actors, as well as donors.
A revised National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period 2008 to 2013 was adopted in 
May  2008,  which  broadened  its  predecessor’s  emphasis  on  education  and  prosecution  by 
adopting  a  “national  integrity  system”  approach  modeled  directly  after  the  prescriptions  of 
Transparency International. The new NACS located anti-corruption reform at the core of larger 
public  sector  reform,  and  provided  an  organization-by-organization  analysis  of  pillars  of 
9 Chaired by the Minister of Finance and comprising the ACC Commissioner as well as representatives of World  
Vision, SLANGO, World Bank, UNDP, DfID, and the European Union.
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integrity. From the perspective of institutional strengthening at the agency level, NACS 2008 
reiterated the call  for prosecutorial  autonomy of the ACC from the Attorney General,  which 
NACS 2005 had already singled out as a bottleneck; at the sector level, it acknowledged the lack 
of “structured coordination between the ACC and the various public sector institutions which 
constitute the implementation context”  (Government of Sierra Leone 2008d, 42). NACS 2008 
outdid its predecessor by including a 53-page-long “strategic action plan matrix” of tabulated 
policy recommendations. The feasibility of this action plan, however, was limited, as it relied on 
the financial  support  of  a cash-strapped government  and the willful  cooperation of  reluctant 
ministries and agencies, a weak Audit Service, and an uninterested Parliament.
In September 2008, with a new president in State House committed to a policy of “zero 
tolerance” on corruption, a DfID review of its country program painted a decidedly grim picture:
Corruption is rife at all levels of government and broader society, which, when combined 
with weak capacity and fragmented civil society, hampers the implementation of laws and 
the protection of human rights. Parliament and the judiciary are weak. An inefficient civil 
service due to years of mismanagement and neglect,  lack of training and low wages, 
means that Government is unable to deliver effectively even basic services to citizens. 
Lack of accountability allows, indeed encourages, poor levels of individual and corporate 
responsibility (DfID 2008a, 5).
As the lead donor, DfID had contributed to a more professionalized and capable Audit 
Service,  which had served to  clear  the  backlog of  audit  reports;  however,  effectiveness  was 
hampered by “the reality that the audited accounts are released only with significant delay after 
PAC review and that no corrective actions are taken by the government”  (DfID 2008a, 32). 
Support to Parliament, and particularly to the Public Accounts Committee, had been canceled 
“once  it  became  clear  that  there  was  insufficient  support  from  key  stakeholders  within 
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Parliament, across all party lines” (DfID 2008a, 34). As to the eight years of support for the Anti-
Corruption Commission, DfID’s flagship integrity project, they were deemed “a failure” (DfID 
2008a, 48).
In all these instances the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding had never been 
translated into an operational strategy, remaining instead mere political signals to the offices of 
the President and the Vice-President.  Despite  all  the evident political  roadblocks,  the United 
Kingdom was reluctant  to use whatever  aid conditionality it  had agreed to with the Kabbah 
administration. According to a former ACC official, the British were “possibly too willing to 
help,”  knowingly  overlooking  the  defects  and  shortcomings  of  the  anti-corruption  system 
(347420 Former ACC official, Freetown 2010). In the face of a “perceived lack of ownership and 
commitment” by the government, DfID had used whatever leverage it had to “buy reforms.” The 
MoU itself was little known by the public actors whose organizations it was supposed to reform. 
Everything pointed to the simple fact that “It is largely informal institutions and practices – not 
formal  rules  and  procedures  –  that  determine  hiring  and  promotions,  policy  formation  and 
implementation  and  delivery  of  goods  and  services”  (DfID  2008a,  37,  43).  The  constant 
challenge  of  private  institutions,  in  anti-corruption  and  other  areas  of  public  sector  reform, 
undermined the process of state-building. Beyond mere design and regulation, according to the 
reviewers, “Enforcement and implementation of new procedures is key” (DfID 2008a, 59). The 
report concluded with a sobering assessment of the potential use of aid as an inducement to  
reform: “Donor driven conditionality cannot buy reform. Genuine government ownership over 
the reform agenda is key to a realistic pace of reform” (DfID 2008a, 59). This conclusion was 
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challenged merely a year later when the Anti-Corruption Commission came to be celebrated in 
the international media and among donors as an institutional success. All it had taken was for the 
United Kingdom to finally decide to use its conditionality to remake the incentive structure.
5.4  Rise, Decline, and Rebirth of the Sierra Leone Anti-
Corruption Commission (2000-2011)
The  first  decade  of  existence  of  the  Sierra  Leone  Anti-Corruption  Commission  was 
shaped by the consequences of two strategic choices. First, the appointment of the Commissioner 
by the President, which would dictate the tenor of relations between the ACC and the rest of the 
public bureaucracy that it was intended to oversee. Second, the lengths to which Britain as the 
Commission’s chief foreign sponsor would go to ensure that the government was co-operating in 
the task of empowering and consolidating it as an administrative organization. The outcome of 
the  first  decision  would  emanate  from  the  political  incentive  structure  surrounding  the 
presidency, and the relative power of corrupt elements within the governing party. The second 
decision, in turn, would result from DfID’s own identity as a donor and its interactions with the 
Foreign Office and Number 10 at Downing Street.
The personality of the first Anti-Corruption Commissioner crucially defined the character 
of the ACC as an organization during its first five years of existence. The President’s first pick 
reportedly “ran away” during parliamentary confirmation when he was found to have avoided 
taxes in the past. In the ensuing tug of war between State House and London, after 6 months of 
paralysis a British-sponsored candidate who had not been on the initial shortlist emerged as the 
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unlikely nominee for the post: Valentine Collier, chief of the public service as secretary of the 
establishment in Kabbah’s administration. In a way it was a rational choice, considering that the 
administration  envisioned the  ACC’s  main  task  as  prevention  through  oversight  of  the  civil 
service  (650061 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). However, it was also an unpredictable 
appointment, and when Collier was brought in, nobody could predict that he would actually be 
determined to make the Commission work (030798 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010).
In his first annual report to Parliament, the new Commissioner invoked William Reno’s 
popular  notion  of  the  “shadow state”  as  an  explanation  for  corruption  in  Sierra  Leone,  and 
singled  out  “inadequate  incentives”  as  one  of  the  main  causes  of  corruption  in  developing 
countries. In his determination to confront corruption, Collier expected to rely on the assistance 
of “our most reliable partner,” the UK Department for International Development (Government 
of Sierra Leone 2002a, 3, 4). Britain’s foreign aid was in those early days mostly technical, 
seconding consultants and personnel to key positions within the ACC and providing the funding 
and equipment for carrying out its operations. A British consultant put together the conditions of 
service, code of conduct, standing orders, and competence-based training that would make the 
Commission into an effective administrative organization.  The process of recruitment sought 
young  men  straight  out  of  university,  and  was  contracted  out  to  private  firms  under  DfID 
monitoring. A new culture of integrity was instilled within the ACC through in-house training; 
that is why only young men were recruited (347420 Former ACC official, Freetown 2010). The 
Commission was officially launched on July 7th, 2001, and by the end of the year it had grown to 
61 staff, including 5 expatriate officials. Despite the paucity of experience and resources, the 
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ACC then secured the conviction of a magistrate,  Justice Taju-Deen, with a sentence of 12-
month imprisonment (although later the accused successfully appealed his conviction).
These novel administrative efforts did not particularly conform to the President’s agenda. 
Before Collier arrived in the Commission, Kabbah had appointed his own candidates to the key 
positions  of  Director  of  Investigations  and Director  of  Prevention,  but  the  resulting  lack  of 
progress had prompted DfID to force their removal. It was not the last time that DfID, especially 
through its entrepreneurial Secretary, Clare Short, found itself at odds with the President in their 
support for Collier  (347420 Former ACC official, Freetown 2010). The Deputy Commissioner 
himself was a Brit, and he spared no punches in his contribution to the Commission’s first annual 
report: “In spite of the introduction of the Act and Presidential determination to fight corruption,” 
he wrote, “many politicians, public officers, civil servants and their accomplices are still bent on 
betraying public trust and civic responsibility for personal gain”  (Government of Sierra Leone 
2002a, 8). Soon it would be clear whether Kabbah would live up to the commitment that he had 
voiced during the ACC’s launching ceremony not to “interfere, frustrate or obstruct the effort of 
the Commission” (Government of Sierra Leone 2002a, 21).
During a visit to Sierra Leone in February 2002, Clare Short received complaints from 
ACC officials regarding the failure of ministers and their subordinates to act upon the findings 
and recommendations relayed by the Commission, and they shared with her their suspicions of 
political interference (“Heading for the door” 2002). At the time, the Attorney General’s office 
was sitting on 35 investigations  submitted by the  ACC, and leaked documents  betrayed the 
President’s  desire  to  appoint  already  a  new  Commissioner  (“Kabbah’s  cabal”  2002). The 
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Commission’s second annual report  conveyed a mixed picture of acquiescence and hostility: 
support within the public bureaucracy “was in the mean characterized by open apathy and in a 
fair number of cases outright non-compliance.” Likewise, the report complained of “the rather 
lukewarm attitude of the judiciary,  which after  two years  has  yet  to  take a  single matter  of 
adjudication to a final conclusion.” Finally, there was “the level of disinterestedness over the past 
two and half years displayed by Parliament” (Government of Sierra Leone 2003a, 6, 7, 10). In 
other words, neither of the three branches of the Sierra Leonean government seemed willing to 
work with the Commission.
Prosecutions were by and large blocked at the office of the Attorney General except on 
those occasions when they served a political purpose for the administration. That was the case of 
Minister of Transport Momoh Pujeh, associated with the Kamajor militia, whose prosecution was 
personally encouraged by Kabbah in December 2001 as a signal to the restive militia; later, when 
the message had been clearly received, the President himself intervened personally to drop the 
prosecution  (International  Crisis  Group 2002b,  16–17). In  contrast,  further  investigations  of 
allegations  of  corruption  against  Okere  Adams,  Minister  of  Marine  Resources,  Energy  and 
Power, and Momodu Koroma, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were stopped short and the suspects 
were simply reprimanded by the administration  (International Crisis Group 2002b, 3). It was 
unclear whether Kabbah was unwilling or unable to prosecute corrupt officials. Some of them 
had helped him achieve power, and it might have been politically unfeasible to crack down on 
them (691429 Bilateral donor official, London 2011). By the end of 2002 over 40 cases had been 
submitted  to  the  office  of  the  Attorney  General  for  prosecution,  of  which  half  had  been 
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discarded.  The fact  that  there  was  no  obligation  for  him to  justify  such dismissals  made  it  
difficult  to ascertain to what degree they were based on legal grounds.  While some fears of 
political interference were dispelled when Attorney General Solomon Berewa moved on to a 
different post, the appointment in his stead of Eke Halloway, a political figure close to Berewa 
and Kabbah, did little to encourage optimism (International Crisis Group 2002b, 16). A political 
clique within State House, dubbed “The Untouchables,” accused the ACC in cabinet meetings of 
embarrassing the government through its accusations, and advocated for the appointment of a 
sympathetic lawyer to handle corruption prosecutions (International Crisis Group 2002b, 17). It 
was a covert confrontation between Collier and Kabbah, with Britain in the middle. A conflict 
that would soon escalate into open conflagration.
By the spring of 2005 official cooperation had all but ceased between President Kabbah 
and Commissioner Collier, who was refusing to shield cabinet ministers and had no less than six 
of  them under  investigation  (UNAMSIL 2005,  20). When the  ACC Director  of  Community 
Relations made a critique of the administration during a BBC radio interview, reportedly the 
President phoned the Commissioner and shouted at him “Since when is your office at war with  
my office!” before hanging up abruptly (030798 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). Collier’s 
misgivings with the President gradually escalated into an open confrontation with the governing 
Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party, which came to a turning point in April of 2005 after he made the 
following remarks at a public forum organized by civil society activists: “Parliamentarians were 
sick  men  in  crutches,”  he  said,  “handicap  [sic]  acting  hopelessly  with  disillusionment  in 
addressing state matters.” A few days after these words were reported in the Freetown press 
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(“Anti-Corruption  Boss  Condemns MPs” 2005,  “Don’t  Trust  Salone  Parliament” 2005),  two 
Members of Parliament motioned to summon Valentine Collier so that he could answer for his 
remarks and face a possible charge of contempt for Parliament.
On the May 31st meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Privileges, the Members’ 
reactions to the remarks were full of indignation and dismay: the Commissioner’s comments had 
been  “derogatory,”  an  “affront  the  dignity  and  prestige  of  Parliament.”  “Such  negative 
statements, the committee observed, are far-reaching and misleading, especially in the eyes of 
the International Community.” There was an unanimous view that there were grounds for charges 
of  contempt of Parliament  under article  95 of the 1991 Constitution.  Collier  was eventually 
summoned for June 13th, and then again for the 22nd. Here are some excerpts from the second of 
the two sessions:
Collier: “Parliament has not criticized what we are doing and has not provided 
guidance or direction to us in the conduct of our work.”
Chairman: “Mr. Collier, you have failed to take into due regard the constraints of 
Parliament. We legislate but don’t have the personnel to make these documents. All our 
legislations [sic] come from Government. In other countries, Parliaments have their legal 
teams which carry out their legislative drafting work but this facility is not available in 
Sierra Leone.”
Chairman:  “If  we  don’t  respect  our  Parliament  no  outsider  will....  The  ACC 
documents are going to donor countries and when Parliamentarians in other countries 
read about our Parliament including what was said by you at  that forum, it  could be 
devastating to this country” (Sierra Leone Parliament 2005).
With these words the Chairman of the Committee on Privileges, which was supposed to 
act as an administrative check on public officials, betrayed the growing sense of unease that the 
SLPP and the administration felt at the ACC’s meteoric rise in popular prominence. Even without 
the political autonomy necessary to secure convictions of corrupt officials, the dedicated work of 
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the Commission’s staff in collecting reports and publicizing them in the press was making a dent 
in the respectability of the Freetown elite. In a context of acute information scarcity, the ACC 
was providing citizens with the first honest appraisal of their leaders’ probity. That information 
was  slowly  shifting  popular  expectations,  and  contributing  to  a  growing  resentment  against 
President Kabbah and his SLPP allies. The aggrieved public officials did not sit idly by while the 
Commission exposed their abuses. By the time of the parliamentary inquiry the list of grievances 
that the administration had against Collier was already long and somewhat fantastic. In a memo 
sent to the British High Commissioner in late 2005, 
The government  accused Collier  and his  deputy,  Andy Felton (a British national  and 
DFID consultant),  of causing the death of Gloria Newman-Smart,  the former head of 
customs and immigration, whom the Commission accused of corruption; of discourtesy 
to the President and parliament (which Collier allegedly described as full of rogues); of 
“traveling in and out of the country without the permission of the government”; of paying 
journalists to “write negative articles against the government”; and of giving a French 
public  relations  firm  $50,000  “to  write  against  the  Sierra  Leone  Government” 
(International Crisis Group 2007, 9 note 61).
The position of the ACC’s first Commissioner became politically untenable. And so on 
November 8th, 2005, the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah decided not to renew Valentine 
Collier  as  Anti-Corruption  Commissioner,  invoking  as  a  justification  the  slim  chances  that 
Members of Parliament would confirm him after his public confrontation with them (“President 
Kabbah’s ‘Sack’ Letter to Anti Corruption Commissioner, Val Collier” 2005).
Around that time a DfID team was sent to Sierra Leone in order to conduct a fundamental 
review of its assistance to the ACC. Considering the degree of political interference, it was a 
perfect opportunity for a cessation of financial support. However, it was decided by both local 
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government  and  foreign  donor  to  give  the  anti-corruption  aid  relationship  yet  another  try 
(691429 Bilateral donor official, London 2011). The truce would not last long.
During  the  ACC’s  first  years,  President  Kabbah  had  come  to  rely  on  a  personal 
relationship with Clare Short, who had headed the creation of DfID as a paradigm-shattering and 
risk-taking  aid  agency.  In  2003,  however,  Short  had  been  replaced  by a  new Secretary for 
International Development, Hilary Benn, who had no personal stake in the success of the Sierra 
Leone intervention and was much less inclined to humor an evidently duplicitous government. 
By 2005 tension  had  been  mounting  for  months  between  Benn,  the  High Commissioner  in 
Freetown, and the Kabbah administration, with some confrontations taking place publicly in the 
newspapers, as well as through letter exchanges. Benn wrote a letter to Kabbah in March 2005 
complaining about the government’s failure to address the worsening corruption  (“A matter of 
graft” 2005); Kabbah replied with a 26-page letter complaining about DFID actions in Sierra 
Leone (691429 Bilateral donor official, London 2011). Popular perceptions were not lagging far 
behind  such  high-level  quarrels:  Sierra  Leoneans  were  increasingly  suspicious  that  their 
government had no political will to address the fundamental problem of corruption (UNAMSIL 
2005, para. 50).
One of the main sources of contention was Henry Joko-Smart, an elderly law professor 
and brother in law of President Kabbah, and the new ACC Commissioner once Collier had been 
let go. Sierra Leonean and donor officials who witnessed the transition agree on the fact that 
Joko-Smart’s appointment was the outcome of a political decision to stall the anti-corruption 
agenda,  or  at  least  the  ACC’s  targeting  of  cabinet  ministers  (030798  Senior  ACC official, 
213
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 5
Freetown 2010;  691429 Bilateral  donor official,  London 2011;  970364 Senior  ACC official, 
Freetown 2010). Joko-Smart himself had been penalized for corruption -unjustly, in his mind- 
during  an  inquiry  by  the  NPRC regime  in  the  early  1990s.  Much  like  Kabbah,  he  had  an 
instinctive disgust of investigations and prosecutions of high-level officials (International Crisis 
Group 2007, 9). The first order of business, according to him, was to clean the Anti-Corruption 
Commission itself. As a result there were no prosecutions for a 2-year period, a time remembered 
by one ACC official as “the dark ages”: “We were just idle... could not hold our head up high... 
people called us all sorts of things” (970364 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). Joko-Smart 
ignored his subordinates, accused them and DfID of being “thieves” and complained of British 
interference.  Investigations  ceased,  and civil  servants  working for  the Commission began to 
come to the office to do no work, some of them devoting themselves to distance learning instead. 
The ACC was put in a “deep slumber,” said an official working there at the time. “Nothing was 
happening” (030798 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010).
In late 2006 a team of DfID consultants was sent to Freetown in order to carry out the 
annual  review  of  British  support  for  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission  (DfID  2007a). The 
evaluators registered with dismay the impact that new leadership was having on the organization. 
Joko-Smart had stopped carrying out the fortnightly meetings between department heads which 
allowed for a coherent strategy and policy for the Commission. Instead, they had been replaced 
by monthly management meetings,  as well  as daily mini-management meetings dealing with 
minor administrative issues, for which no agendas or minutes were prepared (DfID 2007a, 14). 
There was a significant underspend of about 750,000 pounds, suggesting that costly tasks in 
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investigation, prevention, and community relations were not being carried out (DfID 2007a, 14). 
In their meeting with the consultants, Joko-Smart claimed to ignore the contents of the Project 
Memorandum governing DfID assistance (DfID 2007a, 14). He initially refused to let them meet 
department heads individually, and failed to provide them with documentation until the end of 
their visit.
The team found that  the Commission had fallen behind in  all  the components of the 
support framework: there was limited collaboration with MDAs and civil society on prevention, 
no impact assessment of community mobilization efforts, low numbers of -generally low-profile- 
prosecutions, and no new surveys on corruption. The Commission had voluntarily limited its 
organizational footprint in the country, and in so doing it had become unable to measure the 
results  of its  own work.  It  had become “inwardly focused,”  with no attempt being made to 
establish stronger ties with the office of the Auditor General or to pressure the Attorney General 
to process cases at a faster pace. Meetings between the Commissioner and the Attorney General 
had in fact ceased after DfID decided to stop attending them (DfID 2007a, 22). Informers from 
other state sectors reported the gradual disappearance of the ACC from the strategic policy level 
(DfID 2007a, 22). Press conferences had begun to focus more on why prosecutions were not 
initiated  than  on  the  merits  of  the  cases  (DfID  2007a,  21). And  the  Advisory  Committee 
mandated by law to oversee the Commission had lost  all  relevance.  The Commissioner was 
accountable to no one but the President himself (DfID 2007a, 25).
The conclusions of the review were simple enough:
the recent leadership and management of the organisation has undermined any progress 
that had been made with previous donor support. It is our view that during the period 
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under review, the necessary leadership in building and leading an effective ACC within 
an already difficult environment has largely been absent (DfID 2007a, 29).
 Considering the the future trajectory facing the ACC under the stewardship of Henry 
Joko-Smart, there was only one logical conclusion: “We recommend that DFID ends support to 
the ACC Sierra Leone” (DfID 2007a, 30).
The  fact  that  DfID’s  Sierra  Leone  office  was  willing  to  adopt  the  report’s  drastic 
prescription, and thereby to cut funds to the ACC altogether, did not do much to improve its 
already deteriorated relations with the Kabbah administration.  Unsurprisingly,  the aid agency 
found opposition to this option within the UK’s own Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where 
diplomats were much less inclined to send such a strong political signal. But eventually London 
managed to secure a middle way between suspension and acquiescence.  Official  funding for 
phase 2 of support was scheduled to end in March 2007, and it was determined that on that date 
the Commissioner would be notified of an offer of five additional months of limited assistance in 
order  to  implement  some  of  the  pending  recommendations  (DfID  2008a,  30). After  that, 
continued non-compliance would result in a freeze of British support for the ACC.
In April 2007 the DfID report found its way into the public eye, and the press presented it 
as an indictment of Joko-Smart’s work as Commissioner and -indirectly- on President Kabbah’s 
commitment  to  the  fight  against  corruption  (“Britain  Blacklists  Kabbah,  SLPP  Gov’t  for 
Corruption” 2007). For some within the ACC, the report was lopsided, placing no blame on the 
British consultants who had worked within the Commission;  for others,  however,  it  was the 
natural  outcome of  Joko-Smart’s  refusal  to  work with  donors  (647416 Senior  ACC official, 
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Freetown 2010; 650061 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). Later that year, DfID finally did 
what  it  had  not  dared  for  seven  years:  it  applied  its  conditionality,  although  not  due  to 
transgressions  of  the  ACC  assistance  framework.  Together  with  the  EU,  Britain  withheld 
disbursement of the conditional tranches of budget support to the government in response to its 
failure to release public account audits going as far back as 2002 (“The first-round fight” 2007). 
Even though perhaps not enough thought had been given to the political implications of such a 
symbolic gesture in an election year (691429 Bilateral donor official, London 2011), the freeze 
sent a powerful message to President Kabbah about donors’ new-found seriousness. Coupled 
with the ACC report, Britain’s willingness to suspend budget support signaled to the people and 
political opposition alike that the SLPP government -and by extension, the SLPP presidential 
candidacy  of  Vice-President  Solomon  Berewa-  did  not  have  the  political  will  to  address 
corruption at a fundamental level. 
The opportunity was not lost on Kabbah’s rivals, chief among them Ernest Bai Koroma, 
the insurance businessman who had rose to candidate for the presidency under the banner of 
Siaka  Stevens’s  old  party,  the  All  Peoples’ Congress  (APC).  Koroma  capitalized  on  public 
discontent and made the fight against corruption the central theme of his campaign: by promising 
“zero tolerance on corruption” he was sending a message, not just to the voters, but in particular 
to the donors (030798 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). The ACC had acquired a significant 
public  profile  since  its  creation,  and its  success  -or  lack  thereof-  had  become an  important 
component for the assessment of politicians  (647416 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). It 
was precisely its high profile that made Koroma focus on it during his campaign, in which he 
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made all sorts of pledges, like strengthening the ACC, drafting new legislation, or ensuring that 
there would be no sacred cows in his cabinet. The only way for the APC to separate itself from 
the previous administration, and to win the vote of Sierra Leoneans, was by committing itself to 
make the Commission effective (692610 ACC official, Freetown 2010).
Koroma  beat  Kabbah’s  Vice-President  Solomon  Berewa  in  the  second  round  of 
presidential elections in the fall of 2007. And while the losing SLPP blamed donors for its defeat, 
accusing  them  of  emboldening  the  opposition  and  withholding  budget  support  as  political 
punishment, Koroma in fact won due to a split within the ranks of the SLPP that had led Charles 
Margai,  son and nephew of the post-independence prime ministers, to form his own splinter 
party (the People’s Movement for Democracy and Change) and then strike an alliance with the 
APC  (Kandeh 2008).  As President-elect,  however,  Koroma could not  renege on its  electoral 
commitments.  He  once  again  pledged  that  he  would  prosecute  corrupt  officials,  investigate 
crimes of the past, and reinvigorate the ACC. Specifically, he aimed at giving the ACC its long-
sought  ability to  prosecute independently without  veto from the Attorney General  (“A clean 
sweep, maybe” 2007). The most powerful message that he could send was the removal of Henry 
Joko-Smart  from the Commissioner’s  office.  This  he did shortly after  his  election,  when he 
replaced the elderly law professor with a young human rights lawyer who would preside over an 
anti-corruption renaissance in post-conflict Sierra Leone.
In his first annual report as Commissioner, Abdul Tejan-Cole welcomed with relief the 
end  of  an  “annus  horribilis”  for  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission.  He  also  expressed  his 
aspiration to persuade DfID to restore its support, and reported the establishment of a committee 
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tasked with revising the Anti-Corruption Act 2000  (Government of Sierra Leone 2008b, 5–6). 
The latter task he carried out without external funding, calling in favors from friends in the legal 
community, and by late July 2008 a draft was ready for ministerial review and parliamentary 
approval (International Crisis Group 2008, 18). The government did not make any major changes 
to the proposal; because its public commitment it could not have (650061 Senior ACC official, 
Freetown 2010). Free from interference from State House, Tejan-Cole secured political pressure 
on MPs to pass the act by building an alliance with civil society groups  (647416 Senior ACC 
official, Freetown 2010). Caving in under popular demand, Members of Parliament adopted the 
Anti-Corruption Act 2008 without much attention to its contents—only later would they come to 
realize the administrative strength of the new law (970364 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010).
Most importantly, the revised act increased the number of punishable corrupt offenses 
from 9 to 27.10 Moreover, it granted prosecutorial autonomy to the Commission, as well as the 
power  to  enforce  compliance  sanctions  on  public  officials  who  refused  to  implement  its 
recommendations.  The ACC thus became, in many ways,  a veritable “state within the state” 
(347420 Former ACC official, Freetown 2010): an administrative organization independent from 
the civil service, with its own internal and external revenue streams, and the power to investigate 
and prosecute any public  official  within Sierra Leone. All  of this,  ostensibly,  with President 
10 Corrupt  acquisition  of  wealth,  Offering,  soliciting  or  accepting  advantage,  Using  influence  for  contracts,  
Corrupting public officer, Soliciting, accepting or obtaining advantage for public office, etc., Misappropriation of 
public  funds  or  property,   Misappropriation  of  donor  funds  or  property,  Impeding  investment,  Corrupt 
transactions with agents, Possession of unexplained wealth, Influencing a public officer, Peddling influence, Bid 
rigging, etc., Bribery of or by public officer to influence decision of public body, Deceiving principal, Accepting 
advantage to protect offender from legal proceedings, Abuse of office, Abuse of position, Public officer using his 
office  for  advantage,  Conflict  of  interests,  Treating of  public  officer,  Receiving gift  for  a  corrupt  purpose,  
Protection of public property and revenue, etc., Dealing with suspect property, Bribery in relation to auctions, 
Gifts, Transfer of proceeds of corruption, etc.
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Koroma’s backing (“Peace and the looming crisis” 2009). In the words of an ACC official: “The 
government has given us a free hand” (647416 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010). Tejan-Cole 
also  reorganized  the  Commission  internally  (with  assistance  from  DfID),  separating  its 
community relations and prevention offices into separate departments, and establishing a special 
unit overseeing implementation of the new National Anti-Corruption Strategy. He gave the staff 
a new impetus with the addition of intelligence and legal personnel, as well as an increase in 
salaries (114980 ACC official, Freetown 2010). The ACC moved ahead of other MDAs, not only 
in terms of remuneration, but also of equipment, work plans, strategy, reporting, and recruitment. 
A Strategic  Plan  was  provided to  donors,  containing  guidelines  and expectations,  and DfID 
provided additional benchmarks, for instance regarding the number of cases prosecuted, but also 
a high premium on preventive work, e.g. the number of reports on MDA systems and processes. 
Meeting the benchmarks would be necessary in order to secure further funding. As a result of all 
these  changes  since  the  arrival  of  Tejan-Cole,  there  had  grown  among  the  ACC  staff  an 
awareness  of  greater  responsibility  to  the  public:  “You  don’t  want  to  be  seen  as  a  non-
performer,”  one official  said.  “Because of clear benchmarks you cannot  afford not to  work” 
(030798 Senior ACC official, Freetown 2010).
The new Commissioner wasted no time in terms of investigations, arresting in April 2008 
the former ombudsman, Francis Gabbidon  (UNIOSIL 2008, para. 37). By February 2009 the 
ACC was investigating the sitting Minister of Energy and Power, Haja Afsatu Olayinka Kabba, 
for an energy contract that may have wasted up to $100 million (“Peace and the looming crisis” 
2009). The Commission had also indicted the Sierra Leone Road Transport Authority’s acting 
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head,  Sarah  Finda  Bendu  (“We  go  no  tire”  2009). In  September  2010  President  Koroma 
suspended the head of the National Revenue Authority after the ACC launched investigation into 
several  offenses.  And  on  November  4th the  Minister  of  Health,  Sheku  Tejan  Koroma,  was 
relieved of his office and charged with abuse of office and failure to comply with procurement 
regulations (UNIPSIL 2010, para. 61). Gabbidon, Koroma, and Kabba would all be convicted by 
late 2010.
The Anti-Corruption Commission had become one of the best-run state organizations in 
Sierra Leone. It had been unable to change prevalent cultural norms, and it still faced significant 
resistance within the state apparatus: “some institutions have embraced the fight whilst others 
have not. This has made our work very difficult” (Government of Sierra Leone 2010a, 7). But it 
was succeeding in transforming the basic incentive structure for public officials, in changing 
their risk calculations. “Culture can also be ambushed” (376956 ACC official, Freetown 2010). 
The key to this new dynamic was enforcement. And though its prevention department had failed 
to  use  compliance  sanctions  in  its  interactions  with  other  MDAs,  prosecution  of  high-level 
officials signaled to all public actors that the days of impunity were over. This drastic reversal of 
fortunes eventually secured the Commission a diversified stream of donor funding: besides DfID 
and GTZ (German technical cooperation), it started receiving support from IrishAid, the World 
Bank, the European Union, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and the Open Society Initiative for West 
Africa (Government of Sierra Leone 2010a, 7).
The United Kingdom, as Sierra Leone’s leading donor, had embraced the tension of its 
agency relationship with the government. For a time it seemed that a weakening of the ACC was 
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the inevitable  result  of  the interaction between a public-minded donor and a  private-minded 
government. But by altering the incentive structure through the political use of foreign aid, the 
UK was able  to shift  behavioral  patterns toward administrative reporting and sanctioning of 
corrupt practices.
5.5  The Structure of Incentives for Anti-Corruption Reform in 
Liberia
Liberia emerged from its 14-year-long conflict to find not a leading donor but a plethora 
of them willing to assist with reconstruction efforts. Ostensibly a good thing by the standards of 
the  humanitarian  and development  communities,  the presence of  multiple  aid  actors  did not 
necessarily bode well for institutional change in the collapsed state. But in fact external actors 
involved  in  anti-corruption  state-building  seemed  to  be  able  to  solve  their  collective  action 
problem,  and  in  the  process  they  launched  the  Governance  and  Economic  Management 
Assistance Program (GEMAP), one of the most ambitious aid coordination and conditionality 
mechanism  ever  seen  outside  of  international  transitional  administration.  Their  aims  were 
equally ambitious: increasing the transparency and accountability of economic governance on a 
sector-level scale. The road to revolution, however, was not a straightforward one. And neither 
were its results. As in the Sierra Leonean case, I will first discuss local and foreign actors and 
their incentives,  before exploring the general process of reform and delving into the specific 
dynamics of the establishment and evolution of the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission.
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Public Will and Private Legacies
Post-conflict anti-corruption efforts in Liberia can be split into two clearly differentiated 
political  periods.  Between  2003  and  2005  an  internationally-mandated  National  Transitional 
Government of Liberia (NTGL) was empowered to begin governance reforms under the terms of 
the  Accra  Comprehensive  Peace  Agreement.  The  Agreement  included  a  series  of  political 
provisions intended to guarantee transparency and accountability in the immediate period after 
the  end  of  the  second  civil  war  (Government  of  Liberia  2003). Article  XVI,  specifically, 
mandated  the  creation  of  a  Governance Reform Commission (with support  from the  United 
Nations  Development  Program),  which  among  other  tasks  would  “ensure  transparency  and 
accountability in governance in all government institutions and activities.” The NTGL, however, 
fell  short  in  these  obligations,  and  only  managed  to  establish  an  Executive  Task  Force  of 
Corruption towards the end of its mandate. By that time international actors had grown impatient 
enough to agree on GEMAP and force it on the transitional government. With the inauguration of 
Ellen  Johnson  Sirleaf  as  democratically-elected  President  in  early 2006,  international  actors 
gained an invaluable ally, ready to “accept” and “enforce” the terms of GEMAP and declaring 
corruption  “the  major  public  enemy”  (Government  of  Liberia  2006c). Johnson  Sirleaf  also 
directly requested the wholesale reform of the General Auditing Commission under European 
oversight,  formulated a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in December 2006, and eventually 
signed into law an Anti-Corruption Act in August 2008 establishing the Liberia Anti-Corruption 
Commission  (LACC).  It  seemed  that  where  the  NTGL had  been  an  anti-corruption  spoiler, 
President Johnson Sirleaf would prove to be a champion.
And  nothing  less  than  champion  was  required  to  challenge  entrenched  institutional 
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legacies. Towards the end of the second civil war (1999-2003), corruption had become endemic 
in all Liberian public organizations. Nepotism dominated staffing decisions in the civil service, 
and the judicial system was either unable or unwilling to act as a check of any kind. There were 
no administrative institutions for public accountability, and no incentive for public officials to 
refrain from capturing state resources. Crucial positions within government were considered first 
and foremost a stupendous source of personal enrichment (European Commission 2004, 7), and 
there was a widespread belief among the people that “if you don’t steal from the government 
you’re seen as stupid” (Government of Liberia 2009a, 296–297). The US Department of State’s 
annual  human  rights  report  on  Liberia  left  no  room  for  interpretation:  “Corruption  was 
widespread during the year. The absence of salaries for government employees exacerbated the 
situation. Corruption was present in all sectors of society including the judiciary. Those who 
publicly admitted to corruption were often not charged or tried” (US Department of State 2004).
The institutional path which had resulted in this kind of capture of public resources was 
rooted in Liberia’s early settler society, and had been reinforced after World War II by every 
successive administration despite each clique’s attempt to undo the patronage networks of its 
predecessors. Under William Tubman’s rule (1944-1971) the presidency had ceased to be the 
guarantor of settler patrimony, and instead became “the ultimate source of individual livelihood” 
in Liberia: “Whether derived as a gratuity from the briefcase carried by Tubman’s valet or from 
earnings from private agricultural estates or peasant farms, all incomes were perceived to be 
derived from President Tubman” (Sawyer 1992, 285). William Tolbert (1971-1980) perfected the 
presidential  abuse of  public  office,  and together  with his  family pursued a policy of blatant 
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capture of the state. His brother Frank was President of the Senate, his brother Steve Minister of 
Finance, his son A.B. a Member of the House of Representatives, his daughter Deputy Minister 
of Education, and two of his sons-in-law were, respectively, Minister of Defense and Deputy 
Immigration Chief (Government of Liberia 2009a, 130). Interestingly, Tolbert had in fact created 
in 1975 a “National Force for the Eradication of Corruption” directly reporting to the office of 
the president. However, the force had “no appreciable impact in tackling corruption,” and was 
discontinued under the military junta (Government of Liberia 2006d, 6).
President Samuel Doe (1980-1989), too, opened up state offices and resources to personal 
supporters and those from his Krahn ethnic group, while keeping to himself the rents from the 
lucrative  timber  sector  (Sawyer  2004,  444). The  institutional  status  quo  became  further 
entrenched: “Wealth was acquired not by any successful ingenuous enterprise but by outright 
corruption  and  patronage”  (Government  of  Liberia  2009a,  149).  Warlord-turned-president 
Charles  Taylor,  both  through  his  National  Patriotic  Front  of  Liberia  (NPFL)  and  from the 
Executive Mansion (1997-2003), amplified this historical pattern of state capture by seeking to 
exercise  absolute  control  over  Liberia’s  wealth.  Small  and  well-connected  Lebanese  and 
Americo-Liberian entrepreneurs came to control the extraction and export of gold and diamonds. 
Logging companies made payments to the tune of millions of dollars directly into Taylor’s bank 
accounts  in  exchange  for  a  lenient  tax  policy.  It  was  estimated  by  Liberia’s  Truth  and 
Reconciliation Commission that the forestry sector had been managed in a captured fashion for 
decades: between 1979 and 2003 “no single company had the legal right to log in Liberia,” and 
yet the successive governments had granted concessions equaling 2.5 times the total forested 
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area of the country (Government of Liberia 2009b, 28, 17, 12). The state and its prerogatives had 
been effectively privatized and sold to the highest bidder.
Donor Aims and Agendas
Donors were not oblivious to the strong legacies of capture which threatened the entire 
reconstruction enterprise. In late 2003 a Joint Needs Assessment prepared by the UN, World 
Bank, and IMF concluded that the truly challenging reform would not be the upgrading of the 
civil service, but “the alignment of state practices according to the norms of transparent and law-
abiding governance” (United Nations and World Bank 2004, 12). In order to secure the foreign 
resources to overhaul the public sector, the transitional government had to “reassure donors that 
if  they  contribute  to  the  transition,  their  resources  will  be  properly  managed  and  make  a 
difference.” A fundamental requirement for the general process would be  a mechanism which 
had “the authority to manage the transition process, enabling stakeholders to monitor progress, 
assess achievements, track the use of resources and obtain the information necessary to decide 
whether or not to release additional tranches of finance for specific purposes (United Nations and 
World  Bank  2004,  24).  Multilateral  donors  were  calling,  in  essence,  for  institutional 
conditionality. This was exactly the same concern that had animated the British to establish an 
Anti-Corruption Commission in Sierra Leone. But while the aims were similar in Liberia, the 
means  were  not.  Under  the  Results-Focused  Transitional  Framework  there  was  simply  no 
concrete and dedicated public transparency and accountability organization which could keep the 
NTGL honest. 
The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) agreement, 
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signed  by  the  transitional  government  and  donors  on  September  9th,  2005,  began  with  an 
acknowledgment of failure: Accra had assumed good faith on all parties to the NTGL, an uneasy 
alliance operating in a context of “weakened” and “dysfunctional” institutions. As a result, after a 
year and a half of foreign support, “widespread weak fiscal management” was hampering efforts 
to  curb  “systemic  corruption,”  and  thereby  endangering  implementation  of  the  RFTF  and 
negotiation  of  subsequent  foreign  assistance  (Government  of  Liberia  2005,  1–2).  While 
GEMAP’s immediate concern was public financial management, its ultimate aim was to help 
relieve aid and fiscal inflows from the pressure of private capture. To that end it was designed 
with a full armor of sticks for its carrots. Besides technical assistance -and surprisingly for a 
donor  initiative-  GEMAP seconded  international  experts  with  co-signatory  authority  to  the 
Central Bank of Liberia and a number of revenue-producing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
effectively establishing external veto over Liberia’s financial decision-making.
GEMAP was in many ways a truly revolutionary aid scheme, destined to become a model 
for  subsequent  post-conflict  state-building  assistance.  It  held  the  promise  for  donors  of 
addressing the Liberian government’s moral hazard. However, before the agent could ever be 
monitored and sanctioned for non-compliance, the multiple principals would have to agree on 
whether  and how to  do it.  The second strategic  dilemma of  state-building  assistance,  donor 
coordination, would make or break the GEMAP experiment, decisively shaping Liberia’s anti-
corruption experiment.
Donor Coordination
Born as a rare example of remarkable complicity between donors, the GEMAP agreement 
227
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 5
was designed to maintain strong coordination into the implementation phase, while adopting a 
much  less  confrontational  relationship  with  the  government.  An  infrastructure  of  donor 
coordination, monitoring, and joint oversight with the government of Liberia was set up, based 
on an Economic Governance Steering Committee. Chaired by the head of state of Liberia and “a 
representative  of  a  development  partner”  (the  American  ambassador)  as  his  deputy,  the 
Committee was meant to bring together all relevant ministries and agencies from the transitional 
government,  along  with  its  international  backers:  African  Union,  European  Commission, 
ECOWAS, Ghana, IMF, Nigeria, UN, United States, and World Bank. It would not only review 
GEMAP periodically “against benchmarks, results, and resource needs” during its intended 36-
month implementation period, but also ensure alignment with complementary capacity building 
efforts by donors, as well as broader coordination within the context of the RFTF (Government 
of  Liberia  2005,  6,  16). GEMAP was  engineered  to  behave  as  a  true  embodiment  of  the 
principles dominating aid doctrine at the time: coordination, alignment, ownership.
These aspirations were decidedly ambitious. Too ambitious, perhaps. Despite its name, 
GEMAP was not in fact a program, but a umbrella term for a plethora of separate donor projects: 
there was no shared programming cycle, no pooling of funds, and no integrated reporting lines.  
The question of  resource-sharing and joint  disbursement,  for  instance,  did not appear  in  the 
agreement, and had in fact never been a central point of discussion among donors. Instead, at the 
time  that  the  text  was  drafted  the  understanding  was  that  specific  GEMAP tasks  would  be 
divided between international actors, with funds for them diverted from preexisting and mutually 
disconnected aid streams (Dwan and Bailey 2006, 18). What donors had agreed to was a set of 
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common aims, as specified in the program document, as well as a formal information-sharing 
mechanism. From the standpoint of the principle of coordination, therefore, GEMAP was not so 
much a realization as a shared hope. Hence its motley shopping list of objectives, as I will detail 
below, reflecting executive, institutional,  and technical components drawn from each donor’s 
objectives and programming preferences.
GEMAP was a dream. An aspiration to overcome the collective action problem inherent 
in donor proliferation. As per the framework presented in chapter 2, ideally this case of foreign 
support for state-building should have unfolded as if there was a single donor and not many, a 
clear  logic  of  tension  which  would  have  allowed aid  actors  to  make  sure  that  the  Liberian 
government upheld the required standards of transparency and accountability. Instead, the lack of 
actual institutional mechanisms for collective action through selective participation incentives, as 
well  as  the  absence  of  a  leading  donor  which  could  allow  for  an  Olsonian  “exploitation” 
dynamic, all but ensured that international actors would be unable to coordinate the application 
of their  conditionality.  Thus the actual GEMAP process would be at  best  closer to the third 
explanatory type  of  state-building  assistance,  subversion,  and at  worst  result  in  the  kind  of 
contradictory  inducement  which  characterizes  the  fourth  type,  diversion.  In  any  event,  the 
prospects of administrative institutional change would have to rely on the political willingness of 
two fractured administrations.
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5.6  Tracing the Process of Anti-Corruption Reform in Liberia
In early 2004 the international community and the National Transitional Government of 
Liberia agreed to the Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF), a detailed reform and aid 
coordination strategy (National Transitional Government of Liberia 2004). The RFTF lacked a 
dedicated section on accountability and transparency, separating these reforms under different 
clusters and sectors: public official probity would be dealt with through civil service reform, 
whereas  auditing  and  procurement  transparency  were  included  under  public  financial 
management. As a result there was no overarching mechanism whereby donors could monitor or 
check the anti-corruption efforts of the NTGL. This was only too convenient for a fractured 
coalition of big men animated by a sense of entitlement and retribution, whose time horizons had 
been shortened by a CPA-mandated end to their tenure by January 2006. 
An  European  aid  strategy  drafted  at  the  time  lamented  the  fact  that  the  transitional 
assembly was “not a proactive political body,” but “more preoccupied with salaries and cars.” 
This “culture of bad governance” posed a threat to revenue collection, dampening the prospects 
that the NTGL could ever meet its stated objectives (European Commission 2004, 8, 14). In fact 
by 2005 the Speaker of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, his deputy the Chairman 
of the Ways and Means Committee, and the Chairman of the Rules and Order Committee, were 
all  suspended  for  fiscal  and  administrative  misconduct  (Ebo  2005,  25). The  Speaker  had 
allegedly taken home about $90,000, but he was not alone: the Director of National Welfare and 
the Managing Director of the Port Authority had both embezzled $600,000, while the head of the 
Bureau of Maritime Affairs had pocketed $3.5 million. Despite the widespread suspicions of 
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malfeasance -or rather because of them- in June of 2005 the NTGL established an “Executive 
Task Force of Corruption” comprising nine governmental and non-governmental commissioners. 
Its  mandate included civic  education,  investigation and recommendation for prosecution,  the 
elaboration of an anti-corruption law and strategy,  as well  as the drafting legislation for the 
establishment  of  an  anti-corruption  agency  (Government  of  Liberia  2006d,  7).  However,  no 
reports were published by the Task Force, and no public officials were ever prosecuted under the 
NTGL regime (Government of Liberia 2006d, 6). Instead of effectively hampering state capture, 
transitional  legislators  themselves  engaged  in  a  free-for-all  capture  of  public  resources:  in 
November 2005 they passed a law allowing them to take government vehicles for personal use at 
the end of their terms, and the following month “legislators leaving office stripped the capitol 
building of desks, computers, chairs, and carpeting”  (US Department of State 2006). By that 
point, however, donors were no longer idly witnessing the pilfering of their aid money.
In order to address the shortcomings of the initial phase of assistance, international actors 
designed in 2005 the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), 
envisioned  as  a  coordinated  external  intervention  along  six  lines  of  action:  (1)  financial 
management and accountability; (2) budgeting and expenditure management; (3) procurement 
and  granting  of  concessions;  (4)  processes  for  the  control  corruption;  (5)  key  governance 
institutions;  and (6) capacity building.  In terms of administrative organizations,  the GEMAP 
agreement mandated the NTGL to issue “within two weeks” an executive order establishing an 
“effective  and independent  non-political  Anti-Corruption  Commission  with  full  prosecutorial 
powers” and headed by both Liberian and expatriate commissioners  (Government of Liberia 
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2005, 13).  And it  committed the government to the adoption of a new law guaranteeing the 
independence of the General Auditing Office. Such was the kind of “immediate remedial action” 
which, according to the GEMAP agreement, all partners had agreed that the situation required. 
What the document failed to mention was that the emergence of such “agreement” had been far 
from uncontroversial.
In a twist of fate not deprived of a certain irony, the roots of what would become the 
intrusive GEMAP scheme lay in a series of audits of the Central Bank and certain state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) that in early 2004 were conducted by the European Commission after a direct 
request from NTGL Chairman Charles Gyude Bryant. At the time public financial management 
was a key prerequisite for European assistance,  but was also becoming a growing source of 
concern for the international financial institutions and the United States. Reports of widespread 
corruption and pilfering of state coffers were rattling the nerves of those external actors most 
involved in resurrecting the Liberian state and economy; once finished, the audits provided an 
empirical justification for such fears. Before going public, the Europeans shared the reports with 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States, and together they began 
to discuss the possibility of an international intervention of some sort to counter such levels of 
corruption. At a meeting in Washington the four donors decided to take the issue to ECOWAS 
and the UN at the next gathering of the RFTF in May 2004. According to a joint World Bank-UN 
report  on the origins  of  GEMAP, that  particular  meeting  turned out  to  be a  veritable  “grim 
occasion”:
Speaker  after  speaker  focused on corruption as the main reason for  Liberia’s lack of 
recovery, so much so that the leader of the NTGL delegation, Minister of Planning and 
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Economic Affairs Christian Herbert,  felt  obliged to intervene a second time to assure 
donors that the NTGL accepted the need for a more robust international role in public 
finance management. He characterized the problem as lack of capacity and asserted that 
there was no resistance to international experts coming in to work alongside counterparts 
in line ministries. Herbert called on the World Bank, the IMF and the US to provide this 
assistance (Dwan and Bailey 2006, 10).
With this admission of constraints, the Minister had provided a political justification for 
the intrusive aspirations of donors, who set out to design an economic governance assistance 
program (EGAP) which would go far beyond the usual kind of technical assistance. An initial 
draft  in  fact  granted  the  envisioned  program’s  steering  committee  veto  power  over  any 
government policy.  Naturally this aroused major resistance from the NTGL. “They wanted a 
take-over,”  recalled  a  Liberian  official  who  participated  in  the  negotiations  (718456  Senior 
elected official, Monrovia 2011). The transitional government at first “capitalized on tensions 
between partners,” hurling around accusations of international trusteeship.  Bryant secured an 
uncomfortable  ally  in  the  United  Nations  Mission  in  Liberia  (UNMIL),  which  found  itself 
trapped between its  reluctance to be overly political  and its  fear  that the NTGL would only 
accede to a watered-down program. In contrast, to the government’s continued obstructionism 
the other donors responded with increasingly drastic measures: at first they raised the possibility 
of  withdrawing  their  aid,  and  when  that  did  not  work  they  resorted  to  direct  pressure  on 
Chairman Bryant  himself.  Shortly thereafter  the US conveyed a more specific  and powerful 
threat, the withdrawal of its support to security sector reform, which prompted the NTGL to 
accede to the signature of GEMAP (Dwan and Bailey 2006, 13–14). Six years later, a former 
negotiator  on  behalf  of  the  government  rationalized  the  decision  by  arguing  that  foreign 
233
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 5
controllers were just meant to confirm what the NTGL was supposed to be doing anyway. “We 
knew our weaknesses,” he admitted. “We were prepared to play ball”  (718456 Senior elected 
official, Monrovia 2011).
The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program was an interesting mix 
of very different instruments, which were themselves expressions of different aid relationships 
with the government.  The shared authority over financial processes, for instance, was almost 
exclusively  an  American  intervention.  USAID’s  main  concern  with  regards  to  Liberia’s 
economic management was the leakage of public revenue, and what it foretold for the country’s 
eventual  graduation from foreign -and especially American- aid.  To that  end,  under the first 
GEMAP component,  in  early 2006 USAID deployed  expatriate  financial  controllers  to  four 
revenue-producing  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  -Liberian  Petroleum  Refining  Company, 
National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport, and Forestry Development Authority- as 
well as to the Bureau of the Budget, where they were supposed to contribute technical expertise 
as  well  as  “exercise  cosignature  authority  over  all  financial  commitments  and  payments  or 
allotments of their company or agency, including the use/replenishment of petty cash” (USAID 
2008,  6). The  only  other  donor  employing  executive  authority  in  this  fashion  was  the 
International  Monetary  Fund,  which  in  February  2006  seconded  its  own  expert  as  chief 
administrator of the Central Bank of Liberia. Institutional assistance, in contrast, was dominated 
by  multilateral  donors.  The  European  Commission,  in  particular,  provided  support  for  the 
Governance Reform Commission, the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission, and 
most importantly to the General Auditing Commission (GAC)  (European Commission 2008). 
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Finally, all donors engaged in various forms of public finance management technical assistance, 
deploying short- and long-term experts to state-owned enterprises, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry  of  Lands,  Mines,  and  Energy,  the  aforementioned  commissions,  and  other  public 
agencies throughout the Liberian executive. The result was a sprawling and somewhat undefined 
set of interventions aimed at improving financial management and curbing public corruption.
In all these efforts, donors were not so much coordinating as aligning their efforts. It was 
much less clear, however, whether they were also aligned with the Liberian government’s own 
plans. It must not be forgotten that GEMAP was born out of explicit political pressure from 
donors. Regardless of the diplomatic tone that permeated the agreement, the reform context was 
one of mutual suspicion, if not outright hostility. Fortunately for them, donors were relieved of 
an uncomfortable local agent when Liberia’s first post-conflict democratic elections were held in 
late 2005, ushering Ellen Johnson Sirleaf into the Executive Mansion shortly after GEMAP was 
signed and before the beginning of its implementation. Johnson Sirleaf publicly assumed the 
inherited GEMAP commitments as her own, and in so doing she gave donors the benefit of a 
retroactive  ownership  of  sorts.  Indeed it  seemed that  the  energetic  new President  -a  former 
multilateral donor official herself- was willing to own GEMAP’s aims to the bitter end. Pressure 
from the Executive Mansion on public officials, for instance, would be later identified in a mid-
term review as  one  of  the  main  sources  of  improvement  in  SOE performance and revenue 
generation (Government of Liberia 2008c, 16). Moreover, the President dismissed a number of 
high-level public officials suspected of corruption, like the comptroller of the Ministry of Public 
Works, the Deputy Minister for Health and Social Welfare, or the Director of the Civil Aviation 
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Authority  (US  Department  of  State  2007).  And  she  instilled  new  life  into  the  process  of 
developing central administrative organizations for corruption reporting and sanctioning, even if 
it is in these processes of institutional reform that we begin to see the government’s reluctance to 
embrace  and enforce  actual  change.  I  will  explore  the  case  of  the  Liberian  Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the investigation of public officials in greater detail below. But before that I 
will take a brief detour into the troubled history of the General Auditing Commission (GAC).
The  GAC,  like  all  supreme  audit  institutions,  had  the  potential  to  become  a  reform 
multiplier  in  Liberia’s  economic  management  and  anti-corruption  efforts.  As  the  Bureau  of 
Audits since 1956 and then General Auditing Office since 1972, the organization had historically 
been subordinated to the office of the president, both informally and legally, even after the 1986 
constitution defined it as an autonomous commission. Part of the GEMAP deal had been the 
establishment  of  a  truly  apolitical  Auditor  General  (AG),  and  in  June  2005  the  National 
Transitional Legislative Assembly complied by adopting the General Auditing Commission Act 
under which the GAC would enjoy greater independence and report directly to the legislature. In 
response  to  a  request  from President  Johnson  Sirleaf,  the  European  Commission  agreed  to 
organize and fund the recruitment process for a new Auditor General, and to provide financial 
support to his office for an initial contract of two years. The job eventually went to John S.  
Morlu, a young, American-trained Liberian auditor with experience in the financial consulting 
sector. The new AG immediately revealed himself to be an energetic leader for the GAC, drafting 
a 65-page-long organizational blueprint which was part strategic vision, part management plan, 
and part legal review of the Liberian public audit system (Government of Liberia 2007b). Morlu 
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also  succeeded  in  taking  the  Commission  out  of  the  civil  service  recruitment  system after 
confronting  and  winning  a  challenge  from legislators  at  the  supreme  court  (354978  Senior 
auditing officials, Monrovia 2011). The way he saw it, the GAC was “the first line of defense for 
promoting integrity, transparency and accountability throughout the public sector” (Government 
of Liberia 2007b, 5). The new Auditor General was not free from an almost messianic zeal to 
rattle the public sector, but like all Liberians he knew perfectly well what the challenge ahead 
would be:
At our first training, of 127 staff, I asked a simple question as I was asked to make an 
introductory remark. I asked the staff to name me a few wealthy Liberians who they 
believe or know obtained their wealth through the private sector, not Government. After a 
few minutes,  they came up with two individuals.  But soon, the debate started on the 
second individual because it was said he got his clients through his close contacts with 
the  President  then.  Essentially,  the  basic  reality  was  that  they  could  only  name  two 
Liberians they believe obtained their wealth outside of Government. I felt then I have got 
my work cut out for me (Morlu 2011).
Indeed, barely a year after it started receiving European support, the General Auditing 
Commission was already considered “one of the success stories of GEMAP.” 127 auditors had 
been trained, 11 audits completed, recommendations formulated for the new Public Finance Act 
and Financial Regulations, and development begun on an internal audit strategy for the Ministry 
of Finance (Government of Liberia 2008c, 18–19). In what was surely to be a politically-charged 
mission,  Morlu  could  rely  on  the  umbrella  of  support  from  the  European  Delegation  in 
Monrovia, which acted as de facto supervisor of the AG’s office under a “Special Dispensation” 
with the government (Government of Liberia 2007b, 65).
Besides the entrepreneurial new Auditor General, the second major factor in the GAC’s 
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early success was another individual: President Johnson Sirleaf herself.  As the foreword to a 
GAC Strategic Plan celebrated,
The  desire  by  the  President  to  forgo  her  Constitutional  right  to  appoint  an  Auditor 
General  but  instead  allow  the  development  partners  through  the  leadership  of  the 
European Union to competitively recruit and finance an independent Auditor General was 
a clear demonstration of commitment to “end the business as usual” and usher into place 
a new era of public sector transparency and accountability (Government of Liberia 2009c, 
2).
Nonetheless,  full  ownership  of  the  GAC’s mission,  and through it  of  GEMAP aims, 
required  sustained  political  support  beyond  the  foundational  moment.  And  no  matter  how 
revolutionary the President’s gesture may have been, the no less revolutionary Auditor General 
soon became a political thorn in the executive’s side. On June 13 th, 2007, Morlu criticized the 
omission  of  part  of  government  revenues  from  the  national  budget,  and  declared  that  the 
administration was “three times as corrupt as its predecessor” (European Commission 2008, 6). 
The AG shared his concern about “parallel budgets” with the House Speaker in a letter that was 
subsequently leaked to the press by a senator. In response, Johnson Sirleaf attacked him publicly 
for exceeding his legal responsibilities (“Rumours and plots: President Johnson-Sirleaf’s enemies 
have come out in the open with a raft of allegations and threats of military action” 2007). In 
April  2008  the  government  appointed  two  Deputy  Auditors  General,  but  it  did  so  without 
consultation  with  the  office  of  the  AG,  which  made  everyone  view  them  as  political 
appointments. It was assumed at the time that their hiring anticipated the eventual departure of 
European long-term technical assistance in 2008, and of the AG himself in 2009, but an official 
review found  “no  concrete  evidence”  to  support  that  interpretation  (Government  of  Liberia 
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2008c, 53–54). The greatest source of frustration for Morlu and his subordinates stemmed from 
the  fact  that  the  GAC only had  a  reporting  mandate,  with  no  power  to  enforce  any of  its  
recommendations with sanctions. The two main stakeholders in the auditing system offered little 
support. The legislature was considered by GAC officials “the weakest link in the process,” with 
legislators rarely acting upon recommendations, and sometimes being themselves named in the 
reports. As to the executive, it did not enforce the implementation of systems and procedures, 
even when the recommendations were explicit; at times it did not know what to do with the 
recommendations,  and  simply  passed  the  buck  to  the  Governance  Commission  for  policy 
suggestions  (402969 Governance official,  Monrovia 2011). Nor did it  pressure ministers and 
agency chiefs to ensure the independence of internal audit units, or even to have them produce 
any kind of report (354978 Senior auditing officials, Monrovia 2011). Frustrated and politically 
isolated,  the  GAC took to  using  its  findings  as  a  way to  spur  public  debate  on  corruption, 
publishing every audit and reporting on every controversy between the Auditor General and the 
executive on its website. 
By the time I arrived in Monrovia in early 2011, the open confrontation between Morlu 
and Johnson Sirleaf was the talk of the town. On the one hand, the Europeans had been reluctant 
to interfere in the clash between the President and her Auditor General, and did not seem ready 
for a political fight, much less in an election year (581120 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 
2011). On the other hand, the political salience of the Commission had sparked the curiosity of 
the  previously  uninterested  American  mission,  so  the  government  could  count  on  some 
additional support for its operations  (581120 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). Still, 
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key  donors  abstained  from voicing  their  concerns,  choosing  to  remain  “politically  correct” 
(895362 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). Having renewed Morlu’s contract in 2009, 
it was not clear whether the Executive Mansion would keep tolerating him or appoint a more 
friendly face in his stead. Senior GAC officials were concerned that a new AG “without vision 
and  political  aspirations”  would  undo  the  achievements  of  the  past  few  years;  continued 
independence,  they believed, was predicated on strong support from the Liberian people and 
from international partners (354978 Senior auditing officials, Monrovia 2011). For an expatriate 
adviser at the Commission, someone like Morlu would be required to be the engine behind GAC 
for the foreseeable future, a strong leader unafraid to publish reports; “an AG should not be a 
people  pleaser,”  he  said  (963735  Expatriate  auditing  adviser,  Monrovia  2011). Eventually 
Morlu’s term expired on April 27th, 2011, but not before a final spat of confrontation: an e-mail to 
President Johnson Sirleaf in which the still Auditor General asked her to “call off the dogs” and 
“take the darn job” (“Need to Review Auditor General’s Tenure” 2011). After a tenure filled -in 
the President’s words- with “needless controversies and distractions” that the country could “ill 
afford,” the search for a new AG began, this time managed by the Civil Service Agency with the 
assistance of Liberian civil society organizations, and with the European Delegation and USAID 
as observers  (“How New Auditor General, Deputy Were Selected, CSA Boss Explains” 2011). 
During  his  Senate  confirmation  hearing,  the  prospective  new  Auditor  General  accused  his 
predecessor of breaching professional auditing principles by using legal terms and politicizing 
his reports,  arguing that an auditor should be careful about releasing information,  much less 
before the legislature can review it, and that in fact the GAC should “protect its findings from the 
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public”  (“New AG Indicts John Morlu” 2011). As to the European Delegation, it  decided to 
maintain its capacity-building support for the General Auditing Commission, but warning that 
donor  support  was  “an  empty  shell”  when  political  commitment  from the  government  was 
lacking (“‘GAC Shell is Not Empty.’” 2011).
Those words could be applied to the entire GEMAP experience. As much as it was touted 
by its designers as an innovative -and even exemplar- approach to foreign assistance, the results 
of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program that oversaw Liberian public 
finances between 2005 and 2009 were mixed at best. For instance, performance and revenue 
generation  at  the  intervened  SOEs  increased  substantially  during  GEMAP,  but  international 
controllers were unable to fully enroll  their  Liberian counterparts for the purposes of proper 
monitoring and oversight, and the mindset of subordinate public officials seemed to change little 
beyond the offices of the finance departments where the expatriates sat. As a USAID mid-term 
review found: “In other departments that are in less frequent contact with the Controller, old 
habits  have  reportedly been  slow to  change”  (USAID 2008,  10). For  instance,  whereas  the 
finance  and  marketing  units  at  the  Liberian  Petroleum Refining  Company had  incorporated 
modern accounting standards, other departments persisted in producing false receipts, imbued 
with  a  culture  of  tolerance  for  the  continuing disregard  of  financial  and corruption  controls 
(USAID 2008, 16). Indeed, evaluators recurrently found that technical assistance was successful 
only whenever organizational leadership was aligned with GEMAP objectives  (USAID 2009, 
39). That  is,  the  program components  were  able  to  garner  support  from sympathetic  public 
officials, but they were largely incapable to swaying the stance of those who were not.
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Across  the  SOEs,  reform  efforts  were  making  progress  under  direct  supervision  of 
GEMAP  controllers,  but  no  further.  In  other  administrative  organizations  covered  by  the 
program,  the  results  were equally mixed.  Whereas  on  one  end of  the  spectrum the  General 
Auditing Commission was becoming so effective as to elicit political backlash, on the other end 
support for the General Services Agency, the centralized supplier of government goods, had been 
“irrelevant”  or  “scarcely  effective”  (USAID  2008,  19). Local  officials  offered  contrasting 
evaluations on GEMAP: whereas a legislator opined that the right systems had been put in place 
(718456 Senior  elected official,  Monrovia 2011),  some auditing officials  considered that  co-
signature  powers  did  not  entail  a  sustainable  change in  customary practices  (354978 Senior 
auditing officials, Monrovia 2011), and for a senior governance coordination official, if not a 
failure, GEMAP had not been as much of a success as its backers claimed, because it did not  
properly  train  local  officials  to  take  over  when  expatriate  controllers  left  (733895  Senior 
governance official,  Monrovia 2011). Another governance official  agreed with this  view: the 
concept was great, the aims laudable, but once it was completed the government had nothing in 
place, no checks and balances nor systems building. With such major gaps inherited from the 
design  phase,  the  program had  simply been  “a  waste  of  time,  a  waste  of  money”  (274889 
Governance official, Monrovia 2011).
Even more interesting is the fact that GEMAP is actually impossible to properly assess. 
First,  it  was  really  difficult  to  define  the  boundaries  of  GEMAP assistance.  The  imperfect 
aggregation of preexisting programs under the same label, as well as the presence of similar 
interventions  outside  the  formal  agreement,  made it  hard for  donors  themselves  to  isolate  a 
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coherent set of interventions for the purposes of monitoring (Government of Liberia 2008c, 18). 
According to a researcher who conducted interviews at the time, “none of the centrally placed 
persons had an overview of ‘basic facts’ concerning the size and scope of GEMAP activities.” 
For instance, whereas USAID claimed tax reform as a GEMAP success, those actually carrying 
out the reform -the IMF and Ministry of Finance- claimed the project was outside the program 
(Andersen 2010, 131). Second, even when one knew where to look, it was not clear what to look 
for.  Initially GEMAP had relied on a quarterly reporting system emphasizing narration over 
indicators, which had “proved relatively unsuccessful in providing stakeholders with consistent 
and meaningful information on program progress and impact”  (USAID 2009, 40). It was only 
after a retreat in August 2008 that a set of empirically verifiable benchmarks was agreed. Even 
then, indicators often related to outputs and deliverables instead of impact; annual targets and 
project targets were confused, with instances of multiple counting; and ultimately “all targets 
were so low that life of project goals were achieved every year”  (USAID 2010, 28). For the 
drafters of the final USAID review, the unfortunate implication was that “people who read the 
history and accomplishments  of  GEMAP will  not  have  the  proof  as  to  accomplishments  or 
impact, just number of people trained and offices assisted” (USAID 2010, 30).
A large majority of the people, in and out of government, interviewed by the assessment 
team, said that  the most  important  cross-cutting contribution to  improved governance 
under GEMAP was the public involvement of the President in espousing the program’s 
goals and supporting its implementation. . . . On a related issue, and perhaps in spite of 
the President’s very important support for GEMAP, there is a low-key, widespread ennui  
about  Liberia’s  government.  There  is  a  cynicism that  because  there  has  always  been 
corruption,  and  because  corruption  is  still  so  prevalent,  despite  the  important  and 
acknowledged progress made by GEMAP, the system may never attain the governance 
goals articulated by the President (USAID 2010, 24).
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The  truth  is  that  GEMAP was  never  a  fully  coordinated,  fully  owned  institutional 
assistance program: donors continued to act independently, and their alignment with the Liberian 
government was more symbolic than effective.11 It was “a child of the immediate post-conflict 
moment,”  beyond which every donor went  its  own way  (895362 Multilateral  donor official, 
Monrovia  2011). As  a  result,  its  ultimate  objectives  -improving  financial  accountability  and 
curbing  corruption-  remained  aspirational  goals  for  a  disparate  group  of  donors  more 
individually concerned with technical assistance than institutional enforcement. And on the odd 
occasion where politics did emerge from underneath layers upon layers of managerial timidity, as 
in the case of the Auditor General, international “backers” shied away from an overly and overtly 
confrontational relationship.  Therefore one might ask whether GEMAP was ever intended to 
address corruption and to put in place the kind of administrative institutions that hinder or punish 
the  privatization  of  public  organizations.  The  specific  case  of  the  Liberia  Anti-Corruption 
Commission will help answer this question.
5.7  Orphaned by All: The Troubled Infancy of the Liberia Anti-
Corruption Commission (2005-2011)
The idea of an independent anti-corruption agency following the Hong Kong model -or, 
for that matter, the Sierra Leone one- was nowhere to be found in the 2004 Results-Focused 
Transitional Framework (RFTF). Neither was it included in the Joint Needs Assessment which 
11 Andersen (2010) recounts a very illustrative anecdote regarding ownership. GEMAP’s Economic Governance 
Steering  Committee,  chaired  by  the  President,  was  supposed  to  publicize  the  program’s  activities.  Until  
November 2006 bulletins were released by the US embassy in Monrovia, but thereafter they were issued directly 
by the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism. Officially, at least. Because in fact the draft continued to be 
prepared by the US embassy, which also organized the agenda and materials for the Committee’s meetings.
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followed  it  shortly  thereafter.  Anti-corruption  was  not  a  specific  priority  for  the  immediate 
transition period, but a generalized concern that would be addressed in a piecemeal way through 
the  plethora  of  public  sector  and  justice  system  reforms  sponsored  by  donors.  The  2005 
Executive Task Force set up by the Transitional Government made it seem for an instant as if 
Liberia was ready to follow in its neighbor’s footsteps. The task force’s utter failure in all its 
objectives, however, evidenced the unwillingness or inability of the NTGL to confront the issue 
of  corruption  in  a  serious  fashion.  By the time GEMAP was signed in  September of  2005, 
changing donor sentiment had resulted in a new approach to the matter of anti-corruption, and 
this was reflected in the text of the agreement.
GEMAP included a dedicated component focused solely on the establishment “in the 
immediate  term”  of  an  “effective  and  independent”  Liberian  Anti-Corruption  Commission 
(LACC)  (Government  of  Liberia  2005,  4). Given the  Sierra  Leonean experiment  across  the 
border, this was not a surprising inclusion. What was remarkable was the expectation and detail 
with which this component was imbued in the Technical Annex to the agreement. LACC was to 
be established by the NTGL through executive order without a long-term lawmaking process at 
the Transitional Legislative Assembly, which would only follow up after an unspecified amount 
of time with “appropriate legislation.” In fact, the document established a concrete deadline of 
two weeks for the issuing of such executive order, which means that the donor drafters were 
expecting -or hoping for- the commission to be legally constituted by the end of September 2005 
(how they expected the NTGL to achieve in two weeks what they had been unwilling or unable 
to  do  in  two  years  is  anyone’s  guess).  The  LACC would  be  staffed  by  both  Liberian  and 
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international  commissioners,  and linked  to  an  “independent  prosecutor”  whose  office  would 
benefit  from technical  assistance  from the  international  community.  The GEMAP agreement 
went so far as to outline a basic mandate for the presumptive commission: “investigating any 
alleged  or  suspected  corruption  brought  to  its  attention  by  any  person  or  group  and 
recommending prosecution in cases of substantive corrupt practices.” Moreover, it would have 
“the authority to investigate cases brought to it by donor countries who believe that their funds 
were not properly utilized by the government” (Government of Liberia 2005, 13–14). Therefore 
the  LACC  would  work  both  as  an  internal  administrative  body  and  as  an  enforcement 
mechanism  for  donor  conditionality.  On  paper,  the  proposed  commission  was  the  ultimate 
expression of the concerns that  gave birth  to  GEMAP, namely ensuring that  the fragile  and 
unreliable Liberian government used aid inflows for their intended public aims.
There was a major flaw in the anti-corruption component of GEMAP: the fact that the 
establishment and development of the LACC was not assigned to any of the major donors. It 
must be recalled that GEMAP was not so much a new program as an aggregation of preexisting 
or  planned  institutional  assistance.  And  despite  its  prominence  in  the  agreement,  the  Anti-
Corruption Commission was an initiative of one of Liberia’s minor donors, the United Kingdom, 
only later supported -and to a lesser degree- by other aid actors. This meant that, compared to its 
sister  organizations  like  the  General  Auditing  Commission  or  the  Governance  Reform 
Commission,  LACC-to-be had a  very weak parent  on the donor side,  and so its  fate  would 
depend to a greater extent on the political will and capacity of the transitional government.
A January 2006 assessment conducted by UNDP painted a bleak picture of Liberia’s anti-
246
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 5
corruption system at the most essential level: the constitution did not actually provide for the 
independence of the judiciary or certain aspects of legislative oversight; it did not define the 
powers of the Attorney General or the Auditor General, which were specified in separate laws; 
and there had been no legislative elaboration of a constitutional provision on a code of conduct 
for public officials  (UNDP 2006, 22). At a practical level, the office of the Attorney General 
comprised only four prosecutors for the whole country, and the position was shared with those of 
Chief  Law Officer  and Minister  of  Justice,  which  entailed  the  administrative  oversight  of  a 
bloated set of legal, law enforcement, corrections, and public safety organizations, as well as the 
responsibility  to  prosecute  any offenses  reported  by  them  (UNDP 2006,  31–32). As  to  the 
specific task of anti-corruption prosecution, Liberia lacked an independent preventive body as 
required by the United Nations and African Union conventions (UNDP 2006, 39). The existing 
Penal Code Law criminalized a handful of corrupt offenses: bribery, unlawful reward of public 
servant,  trading  in  public  office  and  political  endorsement,  and  misapplication  of  entrusted 
property. In addition, it codified the crimes of larceny, defrauding and cheating, obtaining money 
under false pretense,  embezzlement, extortion,  blackmailing,  and receiving stolen goods. Not 
only did this codification fall short of international anti-corruption standards, but all these crimes 
were  moreover  considered  misdemeanors  or  felonies,  carrying  maximum  prison  terms  of 
between thirty days and five years. In other words, “the current laws dealing with anti-corruption 
issues  [could]  no longer  act  as  deterrence”  (UNDP 2006,  46). The development  of  an  anti-
corruption law was thus “imperative,” even if there was no single public organization with the 
competence to do so (UNDP 2006, 42, 45). Finally, the report echoed GEMAP in recommending 
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the creation of an independent and dedicated anti-corruption agency “as an expression of the 
political will to fight corruption and to address the culture of impunity which had gained ground 
in the system” (UNDP 2006, 46).
Predictably,  GEMAP’s  two-week  deadline  passed  without  an  Anti-Corruption 
Commission  being  created.  Indeed  it  would  take  two  years  for  the  LACC to  acquire  legal 
personality, and the road to such delayed inception was plagued with difficulties. To begin with, 
GEMAP was signed with an outgoing transitional  government,  its  implementation paralyzed 
until elections were held and a new president and legislature sworn into office in January of 
2006. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf had announced during her presidential  campaign that she would 
“wage war against corruption regardless of where it exists, or by whom it is practiced.” Her 
inaugural address conveyed a defiant reaffirmation of this pledge:
Corruption, under my Administration, will be the major public enemy. We will confront 
it. We will fight it. Any member of my Administration who sees this affirmation as mere 
posturing, or yet another attempt by yet another Liberian leader to play to the gallery on 
this grave issue should think twice. Anyone who desires to challenge us in this regard will 
do so at his or her personal disadvantage (Government of Liberia 2006c).
While  she  did  assume  the  GEMAP  obligations  inherited  from  the  transitional 
government, Johnson Sirleaf did not mention any anti-corruption agency in her speech. Instead, 
the two components of her stated anti-corruption drive were, first, a requirement for all cabinet 
members and agency heads to declare their financial assets, and second, the legislative adoption 
of a code of conduct for public officials. What is important to note about both initiatives is that, 
while ostensibly geared towards increasing accountability and curbing corruption, they entailed 
no administrative controls whatsoever,  relying instead of the political  clout  of the Executive 
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Mansion  for  enforcement.  Not  surprisingly,  few  major  public  officials  actually  released 
information  on  their  personal  finances  (US  Department  of  State  2007), and  although  the 
Governance Reform Commission managed to produce a draft Code of Conduct in June of 2006, 
its adoption was delayed for the time being due to its political implications. As it turned out, the 
will of the new President had a weaker effect on incentives than expected. 
Nonetheless, political will and ownership were on the march. The legislature ratified both 
the United Nations and the African Union conventions on corruption, and so it seemed that it 
would  not  be  long  before  national  legislation  was  brought  up  to  speed  with  Liberia’s  new 
international obligations. In fact, it took half a year for the EC- and UNDP-assisted Governance 
Reform Commission (GRC) to elaborate a National Anti-Corruption Policy paper with dedicated 
British technical  assistance.  A draft  was submitted to  cabinet  and donors  in  June 2006, and 
approved  by  President  Johnson  Sirleaf  two  months  later.  The  paper  outlined  a  “pillars  of 
integrity”  approach  to  anti-corruption,  as  well  as  the  next  steps  in  the  process:  first  the 
elaboration  of  a  national  anti-corruption  strategy,  and  only  then  the  drafting  of  legislation 
establishing the commission itself (Government of Liberia 2006b, 9). Falling short of an actual 
administrative reform, this plan did nonetheless generate some unrest. Resistance to the idea of 
an independent organization with complementary prosecutorial independence manifested itself 
most clearly within Johnson Sirleaf’s own government: the Minister of Justice argued that her 
office  was  the  legal  depository  of  all  prosecutorial  power  in  Liberia,  which  meant  that  an 
independent anti-corruption prosecutor could only be established through amendment or repeal 
of the legislation governing her Ministry (Global Integrity 2006).
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The  Governance  Reform Commission  released  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy 
(NACS) in December 2006. In the foreword, the President pledged her “personal commitment 
and  the  collective  resolve  of  the  Government  to  the  full  implementation”  of  the  strategy 
(Government  of  Liberia  2006d,  ii). The  “over-arching  objective”  of  NACS  was  “to  fight 
corruption in a holistic, systematic and sustainable manner” (Government of Liberia 2006d, 3). 
And yet the means at its disposal could hardly be expected to produce such end. The strategy’s 
roles  were  circumscribed  to  coordination,  monitoring,  and  promotion  of  participation;  what 
specifically it would coordinate and monitor, or ensure participation in, was not at all evident. 
The  strategy was  quick  to  identify institutional  weakness  and  the  absence  of  administrative 
checks as some of the central causes of corruption in Liberia, but did little more than prolong 
even further the already slow gestation of the anti-corruption agency that the NTGL and donors 
had called for a year and a half earlier. It nonetheless credited the “unprecedented prevailing 
political will to tackle corruption” with “much of the progress” made in the preceding months, a 
lackluster list which included treaty ratification without legislative reform, a code of conduct 
mired in legislative limbo, and a series of donor-led GEMAP activities (Government of Liberia 
2006d, 7–8).  What the National Anti-Corruption Strategy did do was reaffirm the need for the 
revision of outdated and incomplete anti-corruption legislation, and for the establishment of a 
Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission with a mandate to “investigate all cases of corruption and, 
in  coordination  with  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  effectively  prosecute  all  cases  of  corruption” 
(Government of Liberia 2006d, 13). On top of this the future commission was supposed to lead 
and coordinate the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy itself,  posing an 
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interesting conundrum that wiser philosophers may wish to tackle: Can an organization be tasked 
with ensuring the implementation of the very strategy that aims to create it?
In any event, the constrained but tenacious British technical assistance was finally getting 
somewhere.  By February of  2007, a  mere three months  after  the Strategy was released,  the 
Governance  Reform  Commission  had  prepared  a  draft  Anti-Corruption  Commission  Act 
(Government  of  Liberia  2007a). In  contrast  to  its  Sierra  Leonean  counterpart,  the  proposed 
Liberian bill was purely an organizational one, leaving the definition of corrupt offenses to the 
eventual review of the Penal Code Law. Also different from the Sierra Leonean example, the 
Liberian ACC as envisioned by the GRC was to be a collegiate body of five commissioners  
endowed with the organization’s powers and receiving technical and administrative support from 
a secretariat headed by an executive director. The proposed commission’s brief was expansive, 
and probably inspired by the observed shortcomings in its older counterpart across the border. In 
particular, according to Article 3.1 it could subpoena, arrest, freeze and seize, establish its own 
detention facilities, issue regulations with the force of law, and investigate and prosecute any act 
of corruption (however defined in a separate law). More importantly, according to Article 4.2.4 
prosecution could be carried out “alone or in coordination with the Ministry of Justice.” On 
paper, therefore, Liberia would have a strong ACC with the kind of prosecutorial initiative that 
the Sierra Leonean commission lacked, and which the transitional government, GEMAP donors, 
UNDP, and the elected administration itself had all called for at one point or another.
In the meantime the government pursued its anti-corruption drive, albeit in a rather  sui  
generis fashion. Some senior officials had been suspended for corrupt practices, but they mostly 
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hailed back to  the previous  government’s era.  The most  prominent  example was the former 
Chairman of  the  NTGL himself,  Charles  Gyude  Bryant,  who was  arrested  in  late  2006 for 
embezzling $1.4 million during his tenure. But as time went by some prominent cases continued 
to be pending judicial review, and other suspected corrupt public officials simply re-entered the 
administration  in  different  positions.  For  instance,  former  police  director  Chris  Massaquoi, 
suspended  in  2004  on  accusations  of  corruption,  was  appointed  by  Johnson  Sirleaf  as 
Commissioner  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization.  And  former  Commissioner  of  Customs 
Charles Bennie, also suspended under similar charges, was appointed Director of Price Analysis 
at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (US Department of State 2008).
Time went by, and the mid-term GEMAP review offered a succinct summary of progress 
so far: “assistance to the Anti-Corruption Commission has not yet taken off due to delays in the 
approval of legislation” (Government of Liberia 2008c, 19). It was on August 21st, 2008, after a 
troubled legislative process which limited the LACC to a mostly awareness-raising role, that the 
Anti-Corruption Act was finally signed into law by President Johnson Sirleaf. Four weeks later 
the five commissioners were sworn in, in a process that was not without controversy: on the 
donor  side,  the  US  reportedly  wanted  a  say  in  the  selection  of  the  Executive  Chairperson 
(402969 Governance official, Monrovia 2011); on the civil society side, the initial obligation of 
the President to consult them on the appointments was watered down to a mere option (Global 
Integrity 2009). Despite the quick appointments, the means-end dissonance which had dominated 
the LACC’s creation shortly become manifest, as the commissioners found themselves with a 
minimal budget and a whole secretariat to staff and equip (US Department of State 2009). The 
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government had made good on its pledge to literally establish the Commission, but absent a 
strong donor willing to build the organization, there was little the commissioners could hope to 
do in a funding-starved public sector where corruption may not actually represent the kind of 
budgetary priority that political rhetoric made it to be. Thus the long process of actually setting 
up the LACC began, with whatever scarce international assistance it could garner. Donors were 
initially hesitant  to  support  the Commission because of  the perceived political  nature of the 
commissioners, under whom the organization could become “just a tool of the establishment” 
(402969 Governance official, Monrovia 2011). There was a discussion among European donors 
to adopt an integrated approach to the General Auditing Commission and the Anti-Corruption 
Commission, but the idea was discarded due to the apparent weakness of the latter’s leadership, 
which  prompted  the  United  Kingdom  to  withdraw  its  support  after  stubbornly  willing  the 
Commission into existence (581120 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). In response to a 
request for technical assistance, USAID eventually fielded a consultant at LACC, who over the 
course of two weeks developed institution building and project priority ideas, drafted LACC’s 
first  brochure,  reviewed  internal  regulations,  and agreed  with  other  public  organizations  the 
creation of a NACS Steering Committee (USAID 2009, 36).
In July 2009 the Commission adopted its Standard Operational Procedures and By Laws. 
But  when  a  transparency  NGO  provided  the  first  public  evaluation  of  the  Liberian  Anti-
Corruption  Commission’s  work,  the  conclusions  were  not  encouraging:  the  agency was  not 
pursuing legislative change, manpower was low in the investigations  department  (six people 
without specialized training), reporting was irregular and following no clear guidelines, and there 
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was no publicly announced system for receiving complaints. According to this report the LACC 
could only investigate, turning over evidence to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution (Global 
Integrity 2009). But a contemporary US State Department report,  in contrast,  found “unclear 
whether the Commission or the Ministry had responsibility for prosecuting corruption cases” 
(US Department of State 2010). According to my interviews in 2011, the actual arrangement was 
indeed unusual: the LACC had to submit cases to the Minister of Justice, and only if he did not 
respond before 90 days  could it  move on with its  own prosecution  (172274 LACC official, 
Monrovia 2011). It was a moot point, in any event: by the end of 2009 LACC still had “minimal 
budget” and “insufficient staff,” and it had completed no investigations. Eleven corruption cases 
were pending by the end of the year: “To date, the government has been unsuccessful in every 
corruption case it has brought against present and former officials”  (US Department of State 
2010). Throughout  this  period  the  Commission  had  also  received  technical  assistance  from 
UNDP, as part of its work towards the establishment of a National Integrity Framework, yet 
another coordinating scheme without administrative enforcement capabilities. The March 2010 
evaluation  provided  a  rhetorically  optimistic  interpretation  of  the  3-year  long,  $350,000 
assistance program: “the stage has been set but there remains some significant work to ensure 
that processes and systems being institutionalized [sic] and the culture of integrity is deepened” 
(UNDP 2010a, 3).
When I visited Monrovia in early 2011 some public officials did not consider the LACC 
as  an  actual  watchdog  organization,  a  role  that  they  identified  with  Morlu’s  GAC.  The 
Commission was making some progress in its investigative and prosecutorial mandate: in 2010 it 
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had investigated eight cases, left  twenty-one pending, and reported four for prosecution  (US 
Department of State 2011). Whatever prosecutions prospered, however, were still considered in 
the light of outdated and lenient legislation: the Corrupt Offenses Act was still a draft, and the 
Code of Conduct that the President had proudly announced at  her inauguration in 2006 was 
nowhere near adoption into law, despite considerable donor pressure  (354978 Senior auditing 
officials, Monrovia 2011; 402969 Governance official,  Monrovia 2011). The fact that LACC 
Executive Chairperson Frances Johnson-Morris and Minister of Justice Christiana Tah were both 
perceived to be personally close to the President did not help improve Liberians’ and donors’ 
perceptions of the Commission’s effectiveness.12 As to the Executive Chairperson herself, she 
often voiced her frustration regarding the lack of prosecutorial power and enabling legislation, or 
the political connections that suspects usually had in government. The trouble was getting the 
external support to overcome all these hurdles. A senior multilateral donor official considered 
this a crucial paradox: funding came as a result of leadership and initiative, but the LACC had to  
be first empowered to act in that way. Still, his final assessment was grave: “If you don’t have a 
vision of where you want to go, it’s difficult for anyone to help you go there” (584620 Senior 
multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011).
Five years after its establishment, the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission remained the 
way it had been born: an orphan of both donor and government support. A Commission official 
wondered in our conversation why there was no more support.  He could come up with two 
explanations. First, there was an ownership problem: both the international community and the 
12 Reportedly Minister Tah had been appointed by President Johnson Sirleaf in 2009 after her dissatisfaction with 
the previous minister’s anti-corruption performance (Voice of America 2009).
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government were waiting to see their respective true intentions, and as a result there had been a 
stalemate. Second, there was a political problem: it would be difficult to empower the GAC and 
LACC at the same time, even through the latter more so than the former was “a brainchild of the 
international community”  (172274 LACC official,  Monrovia 2011). The comparison with the 
Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission could not be starker: whereas the latter had enjoyed 
the political support of a leading donor, the Liberian Commission had received lukewarm and 
piecemeal  assistance  from  successive  donors,  none  of  them  committed  enough  to  engage 
President Johnson Sirleaf in a serious conversation about reform.
5.8  Implications
Over two decades ago Robert Klitgaard (1988) warned of the high political and material 
costs involved in the establishment of successful independent anti-corruption agencies, and for 
that  matter  of  any serious  enforcement  of  anti-corruption institutions.  In  this  chapter  I  have 
illustrated how easily best-case administrative organizations can fail in the kind of worst-case 
states that need them most. Consistent with the analytical logic of capture, agency, and collective 
action,  the  cases  of  state-building  assistance  to  anti-corruption  reform in  Sierra  Leone  and 
Liberia validate the central policy implications of this dissertation: donors are more likely to 
promote institutional change when they are willing to use aid as an incentive mechanism, and 
this is a challenge best undertook by a single or leading donor than by a donor coordination 
arrangement.
As  long  as  the  United  Kingdom was  willing  to  acquiesce  with  non-compliance,  the 
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government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was able to interfere with the ACC’s functioning, 
shielding its ministers from prosecution by a zealous and independent Commissioner. Kabbah 
failed to anticipate, however, that there might be a limit to British patience, and the appointment 
of a political ally with the sole purpose of stalling the enforcement of anti-corruption institutions 
triggered the mechanism of conditionality which had long been neglected by the UK. Given the 
high profile of the ACC, the political opposition was able to capitalize on international pressures 
on Kabbah, and it reinvented itself through a commitment to end corruption. Such commitment 
could  not  be  easily  jettisoned  once  in  power,  and  therefore  the  new  President,  Ernest  Bai 
Koroma,  was forced  to  fulfill  his  promises  and strengthen the Anti-Corruption  Commission. 
Under Abdul Tejan-Cole the ACC achieved more than it ever did under Valentine Collier: new 
independence,  more  expansive  jurisdiction,  and  freedom  from  political  interference  in  the 
prosecution of high-level officials. It may not have changed Sierra Leonean culture; the time 
frame has simply been too short. But it significantly altered the incentive structure facing local 
public officials, and thus it may have laid the foundations for effective state-building. The lesson 
is clear: when actually enforced, aid conditionality can have momentous effects in state-building 
processes,  even  when  they  take  place  in  a  context  of  widespread  and  entrenched  private 
institutions.
The case of GEMAP in Liberia represents a much closer embodiment of the development 
policy community’s aspirations, as enshrined in current aid doctrine: coordination, alignment, 
ownership. It also illustrates what happens when best-case principles are pursued in worst-case 
scenarios.  Coordination becomes a  façade obscuring independent  and incompatible  reporting 
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lines,  programming  cycles,  and  agency  relationships.  Alignment  of  donor  and  government 
policies becomes a convenient fiction. And local ownership implies a continuation of patterns of 
state capture by public officials subject to a resilient structure of private incentives. GEMAP 
donors  rarely  strove  to  accurately  monitor  the  compliance  and  performance  of  recipient 
organizations, and when President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s cautious obstructionism became most 
evident,  as  in  the  case  of  Auditor  General  John  Morlu  or  the  Liberia  Anti-Corruption 
Commission, they adopted a policy that can only be characterized as “out of sight, out of mind.”
The implications of these two cases are clear, but that does not make them any more 
palatable or feasible. At the end of the day, anti-corruption, like all forms of state-building, is a 
political process, and necessitates a strong political donor able and willing to alter the structure 
of incentives. Only then will things stop changing solely to stay the same.
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6.  Building Security: The Politics of Aid and 
Security Sector Reform
“Is there a central archive or documentation center in the Ministry that I could access?” 
Hands hovering above the keyboard, the Major -who had been carefully typing my credentials- 
gave me a sidelong glance, and with the slightest of cynical smiles stood up and motioned me to 
follow him out of his office. He led me all the way to the end of that long third-floor corridor of  
the former Paramount Hotel, which had housed the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense since 
2002, and silently pointed to the last doorway on the right. I dutifully walked past him, into what 
turned out to be the male restroom. Right next to the urinals, opposite the sinks, there were 
several dilapidated filing cabinets, literally overflowing with documents: a fragment of the paper 
trail documenting the recent history of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, and of the 
Ministry tasked with managing and overseeing them. It took me some time, after many visits to 
post-conflict state organizations, to realize what powerful message this anecdote conveyed about 
the contradictions of state-building: here was a defense apparatus which formally complied with 
one of the most basic  tenets of a modern,  accountable,  and transparent  bureaucracy,  namely 
keeping a written record of all activity and personnel, but which in practice did not really know 
or care what to do with an ever-growing amount of documentation, other than to stuff it wherever 
there was room to spare. As it turned out, once I explored other ministries and agencies in Sierra 
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Leone and in neighboring Liberia, I actually developed a new-found respect for what I had seen 
that day at the Ministry of Defense: at least they were keeping a paper trail, even if it led all the  
way to the toilet.
Security sector reform (SSR) is one of the most recent incarnations of the state-building 
ethos that is channeling massive flows of foreign aid into post-conflict and transitional countries 
in search of institutional change. For a long time the purview of military and  security actors 
concerned with professionalism and operational performance, security sector reform today has 
become a burgeoning agenda comprising the establishment and transformation of the civilian 
structures  and  organizations  tasked with  commanding,  managing,  overseeing,  financing,  and 
supplying security and intelligence forces, in a wide spectrum of tasks that ranges in scale from 
the  training  in  office  software  of  individual  defense  auditors,  to  the  legislative  overhaul  of 
national security architectures. Going beyond the contours of conventional military assistance 
(often called “mil-to-mil” cooperation),  SSR has come to embody the basic  tenets of public 
sector reform and other good governance agendas and, inasmuch as it is linked to the promotion 
of  sustainable  development,  to  qualify  as  official  development  assistance  (ODA),  thereby 
involving the aid actors who disburse it. Like all other kinds of state-building assistance, it is a 
profoundly political process: for Western governments uncertain of the trade-offs of mixing aid 
harmonization and strategic  concerns;  for  donor bureaucracies  unaccustomed to inter-agency 
cooperation beyond the most abstract of shared objectives; and particularly for collapsed- and 
weak-state elites, who often rely on the security sector as a reasonably safe source of patronage 
and clientelistic redistribution.
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I begin the chapter by locating SSR within the conceptual field of civil-military relations 
and subsuming it under the analytical framework developed in chapter 2. Then I move on to the 
cases of foreign support for security sector reform in post-conflict  Sierra Leone and Liberia, 
discussing in turn the legacy of bloated, undisciplined, and corrupt security sectors; the aims and 
agendas of donors involved; and finally the process of assisted reform that unfolded in each 
country. After discussing the general dynamics of each case, I present detailed case narratives of 
a decade of transformations of the armed forces under the aegis of the international community. 
In the final section of the chapter, I conclude by venturing some policy implications.
6.1  Administrative Institutions for the Civilian Control of the 
Security Sector
The transformation of the security sector implies an ambitious transition from private to 
public institutional compliance across many state organizations, creating a great many “losers” 
who immediately become potential spoilers. As reflected in a 2004 survey of SSR initiatives by 
OECD donors, early foreign interventions often came across several key obstacles: politically, 
buy-in was generally limited to development actors themselves; operationally, most interventions 
were short-term and of an ad hoc nature, and coordination was absent both between departments 
and between donors  (OECD 2004,  6–12). The results  of the regional  survey in sub-Saharan 
Africa,  if  anything,  painted  an  even  grimmer  picture.  Reforms  had  tended  to  focus  on 
practitioner needs (e.g. professional training) rather than institutional oversight priorities, on the 
military over the police and intelligence services, on formal actors over informal actors, and on 
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short-term  interventions  without  adequate  attention  to  longer-term  implications  (e.g. 
demobilization without follow-up on reintegration)  (OECD 2004, 25). SSR interventions had 
been  generally  led  by  donors  themselves  and  by  the  executive,  with  a  marginal  role  for 
legislatures in terms of defense management and oversight (OECD 2004, 26). Finally, and most 
damning  of  all,  state-building  assistance  to  the  security  sector  was  doing  little  to  alter  the 
fundamental balance of power between civilians and security actors; in the analytical terms of 
this dissertation, what the survey found was that window-dressing public institutional change 
masked the persistent -and perhaps reinvigorated- private institutions of military dominance:
In particular, little has been put in place to enhance the capacity of civilians to make an 
input into strategic planning or oversight processes. Moreover, the intent behind some 
approaches to SSR seems, consistent with the term “reform”, to be a re-engineering of 
often decrepit and discredited institutions and a re-centering of the state in the security 
system,  rather  than  a  fundamental  rethinking  of  security,  strategic  concepts  and 
frameworks, and governance institutions. The donor SSR literature is often suffused with 
technocratic  and  apolitical  conceptions,  often  derived  from  previous,  and  often 
unsuccessful,  exercises  in  public  sector  reform.  The  central  priority  in  most  African 
countries,  however,  is  to  alter  the  relations  of  power  within  the  security  system and 
society at large (OECD 2004, 30).
A State-Building Problematique
The political challenges of SSR are familiar ones.  “The civil-military problematique,” 
wrote Peter Feaver,  “is a simple paradox: because we fear others we create an institution of  
violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection”  (Feaver 
1996, 151). Post-conflict states have all become painfully familiar with this basic tension. As I 
describe below, Sierra Leone and Liberia in particular have had to endure a lengthy process of 
increasing politicization and capure of security forces, which in some cases became enemies and 
predators of the same citizens and governments that they were supposed to protect. The “civil-
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military problematique” is thus acutely pertinent after conflict and collapse, and it is the policy 
and political problem that security sector reform aims to remedy, or at least ameliorate. This 
could mean that the politics of SSR might be better studied through the analytical lens of civil-
military relations. But in this chapter I adopt a different interpretation: the dilemmas of security 
sector reform in fact remind us that military organizations are a constitutive part of the state, and 
therefore that civil-military relations are but a specific subset of administrative relations between 
public actors. SSR politics is not military politics: it is state-building politics.
Classical formulations of the civil-military problematique were strongly shaped by the 
analytical  and  practical  problem  of  military  neutrality  in  industrialized  democracies. 
Foundational works by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz were devoted to the study of the 
military  as  a  corps  and  ethos,  as  a  professional  class  within  the  modern  nation-state  that 
commanded the authority of expertise and expected the deference of governments. Whether one 
thought  of  the  military as  a  distinct  social  sphere,  or  as  one  overlapping and melding with 
civilian  politics,  the  basic  question  remained  the  same:  what  factors  ensured  the  continued 
political neutrality of the uniformed class. Huntington saw the possibility of political neutrality 
predicated on operational autonomy, and called this approach “objective civilian control” (as 
opposed to total “subjective control” by civilians) (Huntington 1957). Janowitz, in turn, was less 
inclined to see military and civilian spheres as mutually excluding social arenas, and advocated 
compulsory  military  service  as  a  way to  create  citizen-soldiers  who  would  uphold  and  not 
undermine  democracy  (Janowitz  1960). Regardless  of  the  approach,  the  logic  was  similar: 
professionalism was the central concept in democratic civil-military relations, which meant that 
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civilian control of the military was forced to rely, ultimately, on a corporate commitment to self-
restraint on the part of the armed class.
More recent scholarship of civil-military relations has moved past the founders’ focus on 
internal checks, and into the study of mechanisms for civilian control and the multiple actors 
-domestic and international- that shape such mechanisms  (Burk 2002). The central concept of 
this  approach  is  not  professionalism,  but  subordination.  Thus  the  question  has  been  what 
techniques  of  control  affect  the  military’s  ability  to  subvert  as  well  as  its  disposition  to 
insubordinate (Feaver 1999). Recent studies working within this institutional approach to civil-
military relations have documented the kinds of legacies that hinder reform (Gots and Putnam 
2004), analyzed  the  impact  of  external  incentives  for  institutional  change  (Bruneau  and 
Trinkunas 2006; Duman and Tsarouhas 2006), studied the role of armed forces in transitions to 
democracy  (Barany  1997;  Emizet  2000;  Ojo  2006),  and  expanded  the  basic  theoretical 
framework  to  analyze  “civilian  supremacy”  (Fravel  2002), the  normative  underpinnings  of 
shared civil-military responsibility (Bland 1999, 2001), “informal” civil-military relations (Pion-
Berlin 2009), and the “second generation problematique” of effective governance of the defense 
sector (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002). Perhaps the most interesting theoretical contribution 
in recent civil-military relations, however, has been the re-imagining of the problematique as a 
principal-agent problem, with information asymmetries corrected through oversight mechanisms 
(such as control over budget, doctrine control, or force structure), and incentive-compatibility 
enforced through inducements and punishments (like audits, discharge, or courts martial) (Feaver 
2003). It  is an incentive- and interaction-based approach that in fact brings the civil-military 
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problematique remarkably close to the analytical framework for state-building that I presented in 
chapter 2.
Public Institutions and Private Coercion
The struggle to secure the subordination of military agents to civilian principals is at its 
core an institutional problem: Will the armed forces abide by public institutions? Will civilian 
leaders  be able  to  enforce  administrative  controls  to  ensure  that  the  informal  institutions  of 
subversion and praetorianism do not prevail? Security sector reform in particular represents a 
dedicated  attempt  to  displace competing  private  institutions  by new public  institutions.  As I 
argued in chapter  two,  it  is  specifically administrative public  institutions  that  matter  for  the 
process of state-building, in so far as they seek to ensure that public actors behave according to 
public rules. In this chapter, I focus on two types of civil-military administrative institutions, 
which I subsume under the terms “command” and “accountability.”
Command  institutions establish  the  primacy  of  civilian  authority  over  security 
organizations,  in  terms  of  the  definition  of  policy  aims  and  of  the  design  of  the  chain  of 
command. At the highest level of aggregation, civilian command is defined by constitutional 
provisions about political neutrality, operational authority, veto power over budgetary allocations 
and high-level  appointments,  or  legislative initiative.  At the level  of the sector  itself,  of the 
agencies  and  whatever  overarching  bodies  coordinating  them,  civilian  command  entails 
questions of policy formulation authority, policy coordination and intelligence sharing structures, 
distribution of labor among agencies, or conditions for action under emergency situations. At the 
lowest level of ministries and departments, finally, civilian command is manifest in planning and 
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budgeting processes, recruitment practices, or policy and operational autonomy. The politics of 
command therefore involve the institutions that determine the aims, means, and conditions of 
security-sector performance. The  flip  side  of  command  is  embodied  in  accountability 
institutions, which involve monitoring and sanctioning of security sector behavior by civilian 
authorities. In its most basic expression, civilian accountability of the security sector entails the 
legislative power to summon and investigate actors within executive agencies and departments. 
At the sector level,  individual agencies are  accountable to central  planning and coordination 
bodies, and are subject to various reporting requirements and external audits of their activities. At 
the lowest level of aggregation,  accountability entails  detailed and consistent documentation, 
justification  of  all  expenses,  compliance  with  internal  audit  units,  and  subordination  to 
monitoring and sanctioning by the civilian leadership.13 The struggle between military subversion 
and  praetorianism and  civilian  command  and  accountability  is  at  the  heart  of  post-conflict 
security sectors, and thereby of SSR politics.
Theoretical Introduction to the Cases
By the start of their civil wars in 1989-1991, the security sectors of Sierra Leone and 
Liberia were in disarray,  almost unrecognizable as public bureaucracies due to the degree of 
capture that they had been subject to. From an institutional perspective, they were asphyxiated by 
private  institutions:  personal  loyalty  and  blood  ties  determined  recruitment  and  promotion, 
13 One could propose performance as a third key principle of SSR, in the sense that security actors are to behave 
according to public  sector management  standards of  transparency;  this is  related to the ideal  of operational  
effectiveness in the civil-military relations literature (Feaver 1999). However, I find it more interesting to focus 
on how such performance is determined for a security sector by civilian command institutions, and enforced in  
turn by accountability institutions. From this institutional  perspective,  therefore,  performance is a subsidiary 
dimension.
266
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 6
corruption  and  unfettered  extortion  defined  the  interactions  of  security  forces  with  average 
citizens,  and  there  was  no  political  -let  alone  democratic-  authority  that  could  manage  and 
coordinate the many security agencies and units in a transparent and effective manner. Command 
and accountability, understood as civil-military administrative institutions, had never been fully 
developed to begin with, and with each political turnover, in State House in Freetown as in the 
Executive  Mansion  in  Monrovia,  the  prospects  of  change  grew  progressively  dimmer. 
Considering the legacy of decades of capture of public security organizations and consolidation 
of  political  adventurism and predation,  it  is  fair  to  say that,  by the end of  the Mano River 
conflicts between 2000 and 2003, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean security sectors were at best 
profoundly failed, at worst utterly collapsed. 
In the rest of the chapter, I explore the institutional politics of security sector reform in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 2000s. At the inter-organizational (sector) level, I 
focus on the institutional effects of assistance by a leading donor -the UK- in Sierra Leone, and 
by a multiplicity of poorly coordinated donors in Liberia. At the intra-organizational (agency) 
level, I compare the results of reform interventions in the military and ministries of defense by 
leading donors in both countries, with the difference that where the UK deployed in Sierra Leone 
a long-term monitoring presence,  the US in Liberia focused on short-term technical support. 
Under  ideal  circumstances,  British  assistance  in  Sierra  Leone  had  the  potential  to  unfold 
according to the first explanatory type presented in chapter 2, tension: absent the complications 
inherent  in  donor  coordination,  a  clear  agency relationship  could  emerge  with  the  recipient 
public actors. Should the United Kingdom fail to use its conditionality as an inducement for 
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enforcement, however, the administrative command and accountability of security actors would 
have  to  rely on  their  own willingness  to  assume such  constraints,  and  assistance  would  be 
defined by the logic of concession. In Liberia, in turn, multiple-donor support for security sector 
reform should unfold in a pattern reminiscent of the fourth type, diversion, in which all hinges on 
the  inability  of  external  actors  to  harmonize  their  contradictory  inducements.  The  detailed 
narrative of armed forces restructuring in Liberia is of particular interest because it can further 
illuminate  whether  the  strategic  outcome at  the  sector  level  could have been avoided if  the 
United States had been the leading donor.
6.2  The Structure of Incentives for Security Sector Reform in 
Sierra Leone
After  a  decade of  violence and uncertainty,  Sierra  Leone embarked in  a lengthy and 
comprehensive  process  of  security  sector  reform in  1999 under  the  close  stewardship  of  its 
former colonial power, the United Kingdom. The British intervention, encompassing assistance 
to institutional and organizational transformations in the armed forces, police, intelligence, and 
national security architecture, was the first field test of the new concept of SSR that DfID had 
developed. Perhaps because the challenges were still to fully comprehended, this was also the 
most ambitious SSR undertaking by a single donor in the early 21st century, outside of the United 
States’ occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. It was the absolute protagonism of a leading -and 
often lone- donor that defined the Sierra Leonean post-conflict SSR experience. And while it did 
not  manage  to  secure  full  local  ownership  of  reforms,  nor  seamless  inter-organizational 
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coordination, nor full administrative accountability, the United Kingdom did take control of a 
disjointed and disaffected coterie of security actors and turned it into a moderately coherent and 
reliable public sector, able to guarantee national security and reluctant to become involved in 
politics, and without a doubt the strongest pillar of the Sierra Leonean state after a decade of 
foreign assistance.
Public Will and Private Incentives
SSR in Sierra Leone began in 1996 with a request by the newly elected government of 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah for British assistance in the restructuring of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). 
The ensuing coup d’état of March 1997 painfully reminded Kabbah that the armed forces could 
not simply be ignored or wished into irrelevance: soldiers had been involved in Sierra Leone’s 
power politics for far too long, and they were unlikely to overcome their appetite for primacy 
and financial autonomy overnight, much less at the hands of a civilian government headed by a 
technocrat who had spent decades outside of the country.  On September 25th, 1998 the Sierra 
Leonean  Minister  for  Presidential  Affairs  wrote  to  Her  Majesty’s  Government:  Kabbah’s 
administration was asking the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) to carry 
out a comprehensive review of the structures for civilian management of its military, comprising 
the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Headquarters. This request would mark the beginning 
of  the  most  ambitious  security  sector  reform effort  by an  aid  donor,  which  would  face  the 
daunting challenge of establishing administrative controls on a coercive state apparatus which 
over the course of decades had become accustomed to establishing its own control over civilians.
When he succeeded his brother in State House,  Prime Minister Albert  Margai (1964-
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1967) had turned to the “Africanization” of the Sierra Leonean civil service and military as a 
way to install co-ethnics and cronies from his Sierra Leone’s Peoples Party (SLPP) in positions 
of power. In particular, he carefully groomed the first African officer of the Royal Sierra Leone 
Military Force (RSLMF), David Lansana,  by inserting him via marriage into the “Moyamba 
group” that dominated Freetown’s Mende elite. On the 1st of January,  1965 Lansana became 
Force Commander, and at the helm of an ineffective Forces Council he set out to ensure the 
recruitment  of  government  loyalists.  The newly tribalized  and politically connected  RSLMF 
became directly involved in internal security for the first time during the March 1967 elections, 
when soldiers were deployed to protect leading SLPP candidates and civil servants who favored 
Albert’s reelection against Siaka Stevens’s opposition All  Peoples’ Congress (APC); in those 
days Lansana went so far as to switch his operational headquarters from Murraytown Barracks to 
his  personal residence  (Cox 1976,  107–108). Shortly after Stevens was declared winner and 
sworn in by the Governor General, Lansana arrested the new Prime Minister and took over the 
country as “custodian of state security”  (Cox 1976, 146). He established a military junta, the 
National Reformation Council, which lasted barely a year before it was deposed in a coup by the 
disaffected non-commissioned officers of the Anti Corruption Revolutionary Movement. In April 
1968 Siaka Stevens was again sworn in as Prime Minister.
Stevens first ensured control of the -since 1971- Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force 
by weeding out officers loyal to the Margai and Lansana regime, and by increasing military 
expenditures  in  order  to  keep  the  soldiery  content  (Cox  1976,  200).  At  the  same  time,  he 
neutralized the army physically by capping its ranks at about 2,000 troops and refusing to supply 
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them with ammunition, and politically by recruiting and promoting individuals who were either 
close to the APC party or belonged to his Limba ethnic group (Ero 2000, 18). The Sierra Leone 
Police (SLP) was similarly undermined through political interference and promotion of Limba 
officers.  Both the chief  of police and the chief of the army became designated Members of 
Parliament under the APC regime, and it was routine for politicians to secure appointment of 
their clients in the RSLMF and SLP (Gbla 2006).14 An additional strategy that Siaka Stevens 
pursued  was  to  counterbalance  the  official  state  military  by  establishing  new  paramilitary 
organizations directly loyal to him which acted as de facto private armies for the APC. Thus, 
with the help of Cuban and Chinese trainers and advisers, he created the Internal Security Unit in 
1972 and the Special Service Division in 1977, both of which had distinctive uniforms and acted 
as largely internal military forces outside the constitution; Sierra Leoneans eventually took to 
reading their acronyms as “I Shoot You” and “Special Stevens Dogs” (Ero 2000, 19).
“By the time the RUF launched its assault, the AFRSL [Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Sierra Leone] was unprepared to mount an effective counter-attack. It was ill-equipped, poorly 
trained, highly politicised, and, crucially comprised around 3,000 soldiers—364 of whom were 
in Liberia as part of the ECOMOG intervention mission” (Ero 2000, 19). After the onset of the 
RUF rebellion in 1991, the armed forces were swollen to around 15,000 (the exact number was 
never clear due to the prevalence of “ghost” soldiers);  for the most part  these troops lacked 
experience, discipline, operational capacity, and loyalty to the government. They were “sobels”: 
14 As Albrecht explains, “Politicisation of the SLP had resulted in potential recruits and serving officers of all tribal 
backgrounds approaching politicians to try to influence the IGP and were – for a fee – given a politician’s 
‘calling card’ (a similar system existed in the army). On the  reverse side of these cards there was an instruction  
that the officer was to be appointed to such  and such a position or that he or she was to be recruited into the 
SLP” (Albrecht 2010, 44).
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soldiers by day, rebel by night. By 1999 the AFRSL were in fact an uneasy alliance of three kinds 
of soldiers. First of all, there was a minority of  troops recruited during to the days of Siaka 
Stevens’s successor, Joseph Momoh (1985-1991); they were in general status quo troops who 
had stayed loyal through the military regimes in the early phase of the war, and who did not  
support Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma’s coup against the Kabbah government in 1997. Then there 
were the new soldiers brought in towards the end of the war, about 1,000 recruits with no past 
affiliation with any fighting group, and who were supposed to be trained by British and other  
foreign  advisers  into  a  new  army.  Finally,  the  last  group  consisted  of  Armed  Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) soldiers, a motley crew of formerly disloyal officers, disgruntled 
RUF  troops,  and  other  “tainted”  soldiers;  they  exhibited  wildly  different  degrees  military 
experience, but were united in their dissatisfaction about how much less than the rebels they had 
received from the July 1999 Lomé Accord (“Moving the mandate” 2000). As to the Sierra Leone 
Police, by 1999 it was “a spent force.” “Its methods of policing were very unprofessional and 
displayed blatant disregard for human rights; corruption was the order of the day”  (Fakondo 
2008, 2). It was precisely the ostensible lack of capacity and loyalty of official security forces 
that at first led the Kabbah government to rely for its security on the irregular militias of the Civil 
Defense Forces and on Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers: the fragile democratic regime simply 
could not afford to trust official state security actors.
Donor Aims and Agendas
The intervention of the United Kingdom in the Sierra Leonean security sector followed 
directly from requests by the government of President Kabbah. The first assistance project was a 
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Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) which arrived in Freetown in July 
1998.  The  mission,  fully  funded  by  the  UK  despite  its  misleading  title,  had  a  mandate  to 
“develop an efficient, effective and accountable police service in order to maintain a politically 
stable, peaceful and relatively crime-free environment conducive to economic development.” In 
terms of the restructuring of the armed forces, the UK responded to the Sierra Leonean plea with 
an inter-departmental  intervention,  comprising the Department  for International  Development 
but also the UK’s Ministry of Defense (UK-MOD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO). DfID’s role would be “ring-fenced” to advisory and implementation assistance within the 
Sierra  Leonean  Ministry  of  Defense,  and  the  other  departments  would  supply  the  military 
training and more political support  (Albrecht and P. Jackson 2009, 27). In December 1998 a 
framework for assistance was agreed with local stakeholders: the Sierra Leone Security Sector 
Program (SILSEP), a governance program focusing on administrative and civil service reforms 
aimed at making the armed forces a strong and accountable, civilian-led organization. Between 
SILSEP and an International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT), the UK set out to 
fundamentally transform the Sierra Leonean military in order to ensure that, for a change, it 
would  work  for  the  democratically  elected  government  and  not  against  it.  Finally,  while 
Kabbah’s request for assistance in 1998 had focused on the armed forces and defense apparatus, 
the various assessment missions which culminated in the SILSEP project framework had realized 
that adequate civilian control of the military could not stop at the Ministry. That is why SILSEP 
would also assist the fledgling National Security Council (created in 1997), and in particular the 
office of the National Security Advisor, in formulating and overseeing a national defense policy 
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(DfID 1999a).
In principle, bilateral assistance from the United Kingdom to Sierra Leone was covered 
by the ten-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Kabbah and Clare Short on 
behalf of their respective governments on November 13th, 2002 (DfID and Government of Sierra 
Leone 2002). As a “soft conditionality” mechanism, the MoU was intended to govern bilateral 
assistance during a 10-year period, during which the UK would disburse each year about £40m, 
including  £5m  of  conditional  budget  support  tied  to  compliance  with  specific  agreed-upon 
benchmarks. In terms of SSR, London committed itself to continue supporting the Sierra Leone 
Police, armed forces, and Office of National Security in exchange for Sierra Leonean delivery of 
certain benchmarks: military accountability to Parliament;  coordination of the sector under a 
national security policy defined and implemented by the National Security Council; respect for 
the apolitical character of the various security organizations; and operational strengthening of the 
police, ONS, and central intelligence unit. In practice, however, MoU conditionality was never 
actually deployed (M. White 2008, 3). Its effectiveness was undoubtedly hampered by London’s 
inability  to  coordinate  its  own multi-agency interventions.  Most  British  SSR assistance  was 
funded  though  the  Africa  Conflict  Prevention  Pool,  a  whole-of-government  funding  stream 
which brought together the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Ministry of Defense, and 
Department  for  International  Development.  But  once in  Freetown there was no inter-agency 
management authority  (Albrecht 2009, 4), and the High Commissioner’s role was limited to 
providing informal coordination (Ashington-Pickett 2008, 8).
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Agency was the key strategic dilemma in the British effort to promote security-sector 
state-building in Sierra Leone, which would be conditioned by an underlying concern for the 
sustainability of peace and stability in the country. The United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) had proved to be a weak enforcer of the peace in its first months of 
deployment, forcing the UK to deploy its own military forces after the infamous kidnappings of 
peacekeepers in May of 2000. British assistance to security sector reform could be understood as 
an attempt to ensure that such an intervention would not be needed again. There was a dual 
motive for assistance, therefore: the idealistic aspiration of administrative control of the security 
forces was tempered by the more mundane and pressing concern to ensure stability. Whether the 
process of assisted SSR unfolded according to the first explanatory type presented in chapter 2, 
tension, or the second type, concession, would depend on a central strategic question for the 
British: How far would they be willing to go to challenge the customs of a notoriously corrupt 
military class without angering them into becoming a threat to peace?
6.3  Tracing the Process of Security Sector Reform in Sierra 
Leone
In light of the military’s prior involvement in coups and juntas, and its -at best- uneasy 
commitment to democracy, it was only logical for the fledgling civilian administration of Ahmad 
Tejan Kabbah and his DfID partners to focus initially on the Sierra Leone Police as the main 
providers  of  internal  security.  Project  appraisals  had  begun  as  early  as  1997,  but  had  been 
disrupted  by  the  Armed  Forces  Revolutionary  Council  coup.  Eventually  a  five-officer 
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Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) managed to deploy in July 1998. Due 
to mission delays and the January 1999 invasion of Freetown by the combined forces of the 
RUF/AFRC, the task force was extended beyond its initial completion date, and in October 1999 
it was strengthened by Kabbah’s appointment of a former British senior police officer, Keith 
Biddle, as Sierra Leone’s Inspector General of Police (IGP). Funded by DfID, the new IGP and 
his team conducted a needs assessment exercise, as a result of which the provisional Task Force 
was transformed into  a  longer-term Commonwealth  Community Safety and Security  Project 
(CCSSP), which in October 2000 became the main avenue for police reform in the country with 
support from the UN Civilian Police department  (Albrecht 2010, 21–22).15 As part of his wide 
operational and institutional mandate, in which he enjoyed direct access to President Kabbah,16 
Biddle  flattened  the  rank  structure,  established  an  Executive  Management  Board  of  senior 
officers for collegiate management of the traditionally personalistic police service, reformed the 
infamous  Operational  Support  Division  (the  armed  wing  of  the  SLP),  and  created  new 
departments  such  as  the  Complaints,  Discipline  and  Internal  Investigations  Department,  an 
internal organization for administrative enforcement  (Fakondo 2008).
Despite resistance from within the ranks (both high and low), the administrative reforms 
launched  by the  Commonwealth  project  had  a  strong  impact.  Between  2000  and  2001  the 
internal  investigation  unit  registered  410  complaints  from  the  public,  of  which  239  were 
15 Meanwhile, UNAMSIL supplied for the embryonic SLP a “cocoon within which they could develop their own 
level of competence” (M. White 2008, 4).
16 At the time the High Commissioner was under the impression that the IGP was an advisory position, which is  
why he agreed to fund Biddle’s appointment despite DfID complaints. As a precondition for assuming his post,  
Biddle requested and was granted direct  access  to Kabbah,  deeming intermediary organizations as potential 
political roadblocks to reform. The combination of external funding and political autonomy made the retired 
British  policeman  the  most  powerful  individual  in  the  Sierra  Leone  Police  during  his  tenure  (1999-2003) 
(Albrecht 2010, 25).
276
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 6
followed by disciplinary action, including several prosecutions. A new set of Police Discipline 
Regulations was adopted in June 2001 as a professional code of conduct. And a staff review of 
the tribal make-up of the SLP ensured that the perceived primacy of Limbas (the ethnic group of 
Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh) was not reflected in recruitment and promotion practices; 
reportedly the custom of political recruitment was severely undermined after Biddle had several 
politicians escorted out the SLP headquarters by armed officers  (Albrecht 2010, 39–40). The 
transition from the notorious Brit to a Sierra Leonean Inspector General in 2003 coincided with a 
management gap in CCSSP, which led to a deterioration of coordination between DfID and the 
SLP  (Albrecht  and P.  Jackson 2009, 92–94; also Howlett-Bolton 2008).  Despite the difficult 
transition, most of the Commonwealth-funded reforms seemed to have had a lasting effect on the 
SLP, which under local management successfully provided security for the 2007 elections and 
later sent officers to UN missions in Sudan and Haiti,  even if  the specter of corruption and 
violence still marred its day to day activities (Fakondo 2008).
The  case  of  military  restructuring  under  the  Sierra  Leone  Security  Sector  Program 
(SILSEP) and the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) is the subject of a 
more detailed narrative in the next section. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that through these 
projects the United Kingdom managed to turn the Ministry of Defense from “four or five guys 
sitting  around  a  mailbox”  into  a  semi-rational  defense  bureaucracy.  From  a  sector-wide 
perspective,  however,  what  stands  out  the  most  about  defense  restructuring  is  the  fact  that, 
despite its origins as a DfID initiative, over time it came to be dominated by IMATT, which had a 
focus on professionalism and operational effectiveness not entirely shared by the aid agency. 
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That said, despite its gradual loss of relevance in the defense sector, DfID did manage to fully 
imbue SILSEP with its SSR policy ambitions via its second major aim: the reform of the national 
security and intelligence architecture.
Support  to  sector-wide  policy  oversight  and  coordination  began  in  1999  with  the 
deployment of the SILSEP head adviser to State House, where he began to assist the National  
Security Advisor in developing a new national security act and policy. In 2000 DfID decided to 
further balance its support to the Ministry of Defense and police by establishing a dedicated 
Intelligence  and  Security  Services  component,  and  in  January  2001  a  full-time  civilian 
Intelligence and Security Advisor was seconded to State House.  Over the next few years he 
“shepherded” the development of the National Security and Intelligence Act (Ashington-Pickett 
2008, 2), assisted in establishing a new Office of National Security (ONS) as a technical policy 
analysis body, and contributed to the strengthening of a Central Intelligence and Security Unit 
that  existed  purely  on  paper.  The  latter  task  was  particularly  relevant  in  a  country  where 
intelligence coordination had only ever  been practiced within the military  (Conteh 2008, 4). 
Regarding the Office of National Security, at the time there were concerns inside DfID about 
funding a strong and independent security agency, which could be subject to misuse in a country 
deprived  of  adequate  civilian  oversight  mechanisms.  But  the  prospect  of  a  “new  start” 
organization which DfID could staff and monitor according to modern standards, free from the 
politicization of the Sierra Leonean security sector, tipped the donor agency into assuming the 
risk (DfID 2002, 21). Eventually, and after much political resistance17, the new national security 
17 According to the Intelligence and Security Advisor at the time, Robert Ashington-Pickett, “because of perceived 
threats to vested interests, there was considerable opposition to many aspects of SSR, including national security 
legislation. As often happens, many stakeholders were supportive of SSR in principle, but opposed many of its 
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architecture was legally formalized in the National Security and Intelligence Act of 2002, under 
which a new National Security Coordinator would head the ONS and enjoy primacy -subject to 
the National Security Council- on matters of intelligence collection and analysis, inter-agency 
security coordination, and emergency and disaster management  (Government of Sierra Leone 
2002c).
The Office of National Security, child of SILSEP as it was, became very early on the 
program’s success story, and eventually as much a source of pride for its expatriate backers as of 
annoyance for its Sierra Leonean interlocutors. In a 2005 DfID review of SILSEP, it was found 
that  the  “ONS  functions  much  more  effectively  compared  to  almost  all  other  Government 
departments in Sierra Leone.” Its relative success was in fact precipitating it into overstretch as it 
took on responsibilities which no other government agency was either able or willing to assume 
(Albrecht  2009,  3). Headed  by a  retired  armed  forces  Brigadier  General  with  a  significant 
political  presence,  in  2003 the  ambitious  ONS launched a  comprehensive  National  Security 
Sector Review (NSSR). The framework document, endorsed by the National Security Council in 
August 2003, was the first systematic attempt at a technical threat assessment in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone, and it formed the basis for a lengthy process of consultation and discussion that 
resulted in  the publication in  March 2007 of  a  NSSR Report  (Government  of  Sierra  Leone 
2005d). It is a testament to the intellectual honesty and public ethos of the DfID-funded local 
drafters  that  they  actually  found  the  greatest  threats  to  Sierra  Leone’s  SSR  process  in  the 
country’s own leaders and indeed in its own people. The report decried the prevalence of private 
details.” Thus the delays in the parliamentary adoption of the new Act, which ranged “from the sophisticated to 
the banal.  These included repeated delays both in finding space on the parliamentary agenda and obtaining 
executive sign-off. One of the final obstacles was the apparent lack of the right sort of paper on which to print it”  
(Ashington-Pickett 2008, 7).
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institutions in both the state and society, the fact that “public officials cannot distinguish between 
public and private interest,” and that “public office is but a means of self-enrichment.” Not only 
were there material and normative incentives for the private capture of public office, but the 
administrative institutions that could conceivably curb them were also undermined from within 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2005d, 15). Ultimately the report blamed these self-reinforcing 
patterns on a generalized lack of political will, at both the elite and popular levels.18 With most 
complaints emerging from the consultation process being of a developmental nature, the ONS 
produced a report which not only connected security and development, but that in fact attempted 
to integrate them, recommending institutional and organizational changes well beyond its remit, 
especially regarding the fight against public corruption.
The National Security Sector Review Report was launched by President Kabbah in 2005 
as part of the First Pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, but there were three basic  
problems with this ambitious SSR program. First, there was strong resistance among donors and 
government agencies to this merging of security and development, as it was generally understood 
that SSR was a distinct task from poverty reduction, and that in any case it had already been 
prioritized by the leading donor (M. White 2008, 6–8). Second, the PRSP security sector reform 
component as drafted was simply unaffordable:  the total  cost amounted to  $93.1m, equal  to 
55.6% of the total bill for Pillar One, and to 24.7% of the PRSP as a whole (M. White 2008, 9). 
And third, Kabbah and his entourage felt that SSR had already been achieved once the war was 
18 “Factors that contribute to this threat include a fundamental fear of change, and indifference, indecisiveness, self-
interest and a lack of accountability over failures. Also of concern were poor confidence, ineptitude and a lack of  
energy. . . . a lack of political awareness and apathy on the part of the population, which in turn fails to stimulate 
political parties, to be responsive, accountable and capable of representation of needs across tribal/ethnic lines”  
(Government of Sierra Leone 2005d, 15–16).
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over. According to then-National Security Coordinator Kellie Conteh, “by 2003 there was some 
attention, in 2004 less, in 2005 they were so comfortable that they didn’t listen at all” (Albrecht 
and P. Jackson 2009, 128). After receiving a meager £1 million for its Implementation Plan from 
DfID19, the National Security Sector Review remained an unfulfilled but impressive testament to 
the ONS’s success. Too much of a good thing, perhaps, as its adoption of DfID’s radical SSR 
agenda put it at odds with a range of state organizations accustomed to business as usual. For 
instance, despite attempts to use the NSSR process to establish a sector-wide budgetary ceiling 
and forum for financial prioritization, the inability to agree on priorities made each agency revert 
to the old habit of dealing bilaterally with the Ministry of Finance (Middlebrook and S. M. Miller 
2006, 19). As of 2009, DfID funds for the NSSR Implementation Plan ran out and the project 
was not renewed.20
The tension between local and external demands continuously dominated the British SSR 
undertaking in Sierra Leone. The International Military Assistance Training Team was unable to 
coordinate productively or agree on monitoring and evaluation standards with DfID, which in 
turn had the “financial muscle” to resist political leadership from the High Commission. As a 
result all three British missions reported to London separately (Albrecht 2010, 24). The very fact 
that individual officials like Clare Short in London and Keith Biddle in Freetown enjoyed strong 
personal relationships with President Kabbah and direct political access to State House could 
easily undermine the nominal primacy of the High Commissioner. And so more than a whole-of-
19 According to the DfID program manager in Freetown at the time, this contribution was intended to prevent a 
negative and potentially destabilizing reaction by the security sector (M. White 2008, 11).
20 However, the government was able to gain access to the UN Peacebuilding Fund to the tune of $35m, out of  
which $15m were budgeted for SSR (979094 Senior ONS official, Freetown 2010).
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government  approach,  the  UK’s  intervention  resembled  an  uneasy  partnership  between 
autonomous  actors,  which  only  hindered  the  chances  of  exercising  financial  and  political 
leverage in Freetown towards the common aim of reform. Coordination on the part of the Sierra 
Leonean government itself fared only marginally better, even if the 2007 elections seemed to 
ratify the operational success of SSR. The early phase of the process had been marred by certain 
“hiccups,” such as the inability to coordinate civilian and military officials, coupled with the 
problem that the Sierra Leone Police was a financially self-reporting agency which refused to 
cede oversight of its resources to outside civilians. The fact that major security responsibilities 
were split between a British Inspector General of Police, a Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff, and 
the UNAMSIL Force Commander did not make the situation any easier  (979094 Senior ONS 
official, Freetown 2010).
Despite the NSSR fiasco,  the National Security Coordinator was able to energize the 
National Security Council, which provided some substantial policy orientation to the sector. The 
2005 Standard Response Guidelines (Government of Sierra Leone 2005e), for instance, clarified 
the new national security architecture, confirming the National Security Council Coordinating 
Group as the main day-to-day security management body in the country.21 They also established 
a clear decision-making hierarchy with strategic, operation, and regional levels, as well as a state 
security classification level. A Draft National Security Policy was developed in 2006 with British 
assistance (Government of Sierra Leone 2006d), explicitly relating a national threat assessment 
to the multiple policy instruments available to the government; however,  as of late 2010 the 
21 Chaired by the NSCoord, the NSCCG brought together the Inspector General of Police, Chief of Defense Staff, 
Assistant IG for Operations, Joint Force Commander, Head of SSG, and the Director Joint Assessment Team 
(secretary).
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Policy had yet to be adopted  (979094 Senior ONS official, Freetown 2010). Finally, and most 
importantly, the National Security Council adopted a policy on Military Assistance to the Civil 
Power which clearly defined the specific tasks for which the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed 
Forces could be deployed internally, always under a mandate from the NSC and safeguarding the 
primacy of the Sierra Leone Police (Government of Sierra Leone 2006b).22 After the departure of 
UNAMSIL in 2005, the military assistance policy and the National Security Council architecture 
were  first  and  successfully  put  to  the  test  during  the  2007  presidential  and  parliamentary 
elections, when the SLP and RSLAF coordinated effectively to provide security throughout the 
electoral  process,  and  the  security  sector  “spoke  with  one  voice  to  the  public  and  showed 
common resolve” (Conteh 2008, 6; Albrecht and P. Jackson 2009, 151–153). National Security 
Coordinator Kellie Conteh later wrote that in the run-up to the election he was meeting with the 
IGP and Chief  of  Defense Staff,  and head of  the  National  Electoral  Commission  “every 48 
hours”  (Conteh 2008, 6). Despite the reported pressures from Kabbah’s government, the SLP 
managed  to  remain  politically  neutral  largely  due  to  this  support  from  the  other  security 
principals (672429 Expatriate SSR official, Freetown 2010).
At the level of administrative enforcement, however, the United Kingdom had been much 
less successful as a donor. Even a decade after the beginning of SILSEP and its determination to 
improve  legislative  accountability,  the  security  sector  remained  firmly  in  the  hands  of  the 
President, with no more checks than occasional expressions of consent -or, even less frequently, 
22 The  five  Standing  MACP  Tasks  were:  Support  to  SLP  Border  Control  Patrols,  Maritime  Control  and 
Surveillance Operations, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal, Point Security 
(to protect key facilities), and FISU and H Troop (support to intelligence activities as defined by the NSC Joint  
Intelligence Committee). Other Emergency MACP Tasks included Counter Terrorism, Counter Crime, Public 
Order (supposedly confined to specialist/engineer support to the SLP), and Military Armed Action.
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of concern- by other public organizations. Consider the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MIA), which was mandated to oversee the Sierra Leone Police. As a 2007 management and 
functional review found, “in essence the MIA appears to all intents and purposes to be defunct 
and  unable  to  provide  a  fully  comprehensive  oversight  mechanism”  (Government  of  Sierra 
Leone 2007b,  4).23 Instead,  the  only functioning administrative  accountability  body was  the 
Police  Council,  a  vestige  of  the  1991  pre-war  constitution  chaired  by  the  Vice-President. 
According to  a  1999 Commonwealth  Task Force  report,  with  its  representation  of  divergent 
political and financial interests (political officials like the Vice-President, Minister of Internal 
Affairs, and two presidential appointees; operational officials like the IGP and his deputy; the 
head of the civil service, and a representative from the Bar Association) the Police Council “itself 
stands firmly in the way of effective police governance” (quoted in Albrecht 2010, 63). Kabbah 
had been unwilling to cede power to ministries he could not control, thus his retention of the 
defense  portfolio  as  well  as  the  ostracism to which  he  subjected  MIA to  the  benefit  of  the 
Inspector General of Police. Combined with a centralized control of intelligence in State House 
via  the  National  Security Coordinator,  the  President  held  personal  command over  the entire 
security sector.24 
As to Parliament, the committees on Presidential Affairs and Defense and on Internal 
Affairs  and Local Government  had neither the capacity nor the willingness to exercise their 
23 The Ministry, with a manpower of 22 (including only 4 professional staff), was supposed to oversee not only the  
SLP, but the Prisons Department, Immigration, the National Fire Force, and the National Registration Secretariat. 
When  the  Koroma administration  came into  office  its  responsibilities  were  further  diluted  when  the  Local  
Government brief was merged into it. MIA had been one of the political intermediaries the avoidance of which  
Keith Biddle made a precondition for his appointment as IGP.
24 After his election in 2007, Ernest Bai Koroma surrendered the defense portfolio to a dedicated minister. As I  
discuss below, this decision actually allowed for more direct relations between the MoD/RSLAF and Cabinet.
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constitutionally based oversight powers (Gbla 2008).25 In late 2010 there was no documentation 
whatsoever to be found in the parliamentary library about the respective committees’ work on 
security sector issues: no registry of their composition through the years, no minutes of meetings, 
no reports from investigations, not even proof that they had actually convened. Like the rest of 
the Sierra Leone Parliament, the committee on Presidential Affairs and Defense suffered from an 
acute lack of capacity, with only one administrative secretary that it had to share with another 
committee. But it had also fallen prey to attempts to redress this limitations: in particular, it had 
become the norm since the end of the war to appoint Members of Parliament with security sector 
experience to  serve on the committee,  in  order  to  facilitate  relations  with the MoD and the 
military (006803 Parliament administrative official, Freetown 2010).26 This custom made sense 
in a context of novice MPs with no technical support, but it also meant that the elected officials 
tasked with overseeing the sector were more likely to sympathize with aspirations of autonomy, 
and in fact resulted in scant oversight. As one MP put it, the law may require security sector 
officials to report, but if they were doing good, why make them do so? Especially after, as he 
said, the international community had given a positive review of their actions  (841259 Senior 
elected official, Freetown 2010).27
On May 31st, 2008 SILSEP was finally terminated, with some of its elements (including 
25 The Sierra Leone Parliament was one of the few blind spots of DfID’s SSR projects. In fact, a Sierra Leone 
Parliamentary Development Support Project had been launched in 1998. But the inability or unwillingness of 
MPs to promote reform of their own collegiate institutions made DfID give up on any attempt to strengthen the 
legislature (672429 Expatriate SSR official, Freetown 2010).
26 The three senior  MPs in the committee  were all  former military men,  and  they usually sat  together  at  the  
“Defense Table” in the cafeteria.
27 As he told me, the selection of units or issues to investigate was based on cursory readings of the general press,  
and their main objective was always to ensure that the military and police had what they needed and that they  
were “cared for.”
285
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 6
MoD advisers) turned over to a joint interdepartmental program. The Completion Report stated 
two reasons for termination: the apt performance of the security forces during the 2007 elections, 
and a less-than-expected funding allocation to the country office  (DfID 2008b). Interestingly, 
SILSEP’s termination actually came as a surprise to some advisers on the ground, especially 
those working for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defense, who felt 
that DfID had acted unilaterally (Albrecht 2009, 12). It was but one last illustration of how the 
sector-wide SSR process launched by the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, while free from the 
confusion of donor collective action, was marred by multiplicity within the leading donor itself, 
which  had  severely  hindered  its  ability  (or  willingness)  to  deploy  conditionality  as  an 
inducement against recalcitrant practices. In terms of civilian control of the security sector, the 
British  achieved  a  remarkable  degree  of  administrative  command.  Too  much,  perhaps,  as 
centralization  around  the  ONS  and  State  House  in  general  moved  the  focus  away  from 
administrative accountability: some civilians did enjoy firm control of the security sector, and 
were able to deploy it in a coordinated and effective fashion. But there were preciously few 
administrative checks on potential misuse, other than an Office of National Security tasked with 
making sense of a panoply of public actors jealous of their organizational autonomy. Moreover, 
the dwindling of British funding had not been met with greater budgetary commitments by the 
government  of  Sierra  Leone  (which  covered  by  2010  about  30%  of  the  financial  needs), 
betraying a general lack of political concern for SSR as the war receded into memory (979094 
Senior ONS official, Freetown 2010).
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6.4  SILSEP and IMATT: Building a Ministry of Defense for Sierra 
Leone (1998-2011)
In 1998, after two decades of politicization and one of political adventurism, the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone were a clear security liability for Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s 
embattled government. The cabinet had decided to launch a defense restructuring process, but it 
had  also  agreed  to  avoid  the  “Costa  Rica”  option  of  complete  military  demobilization  and 
reliance on the Sierra Leone Police.28 Nigerian Brig. Gen. Maxwell Khobe, by then appointed 
Chief of Defense Staff by Kabbah, was one of the voices of caution, arguing that it was better to 
keep soldiers “fed and trained” within the armed forces than at large as a potential source of new 
rebels  (Albrecht and P. Jackson 2009, 23).29 Hence the letter of request for assistance to the 
government of the United Kingdom in which Kabbah asked the Department for International 
Development  (DfID)  to  carry  out  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  structures  for  civilian 
management of his military. After two assessment missions, in December 1998 the two sides 
agreed  on  the  outline  and  aims  of  the  Sierra  Leone  Security  Sector  Program (SILSEP):  a 
governance program concerned with administrative and civil service reforms of the kind that fell 
well within the purview of DfID,30 and assisted by the UK-MoD’s “Defense Diplomacy” as well 
28 Demilitarization made perfect sense: widely discredited among the population, the military was unprofessional, 
ill-equipped, undisciplined, averse to change, and bloated with political recruits (Nelson-Williams 2008, 3), and 
since the beginning of the RUF rebellion its  most significant contribution had come in the form of further  
instability through military coups. As a result of these deliberations, in 1999 the AFRSL were in fact disbanded 
for a short period of time, and a plan was put forward to build a brand new 6,000-strong army with 5,000 new  
recruits  and  1,000 troops  re-recruited  from the  AFRSL  (Gbla  2006,  83). This  decision  was  met  with  only 
“grudging and partial acceptance” by the military, and it was in fact reversed at a critical cabinet meeting after  
the realization that releasing into the general population over 10,000 disgruntled military men, many of them still  
loyal to Maj. Koroma, could potentially destabilize the country. 
29 “The phrase ‘better to be inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in’ was often used to describe  
this process” (M. White 2008, 4).
30 Conventional “development” activities under SILSEP included: building civilian controls over the military and 
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as by the FCO’s “in-service training” program.
The major component of the project would be “institutional capacity building” within the 
Sierra Leone Ministry of Defense, which in fact amounted to building it from scratch, as at the 
time it  consisted of “four people sitting in a hut acting as a post box (and being almost totally 
ignored)”  (113629 Expatriate  SSR official,  online  2011) Overseeing this  ambitious  program 
would be a Military Adviser (a British officer of Lt. Col. rank or higher) and a Civilian Adviser 
(an Uk-MoD civil  servant)  seconded to the Ministry and working closely with the Chief  of 
Defense Staff and Defense Headquarters. Together, this MoD Advisory Team (MODAT) would 
render expert advice to the new SL-MoD, as well as assist in the wholesale institutional and 
organizational  transformation of the defense apparatus.31 MODAT was officially deployed in 
June  1999,  and  by  October  it  had  conducted  a  “mini-Strategic  Defense  Review”  with 
recommendations  including  an  outline  Defense  Policy,  new  defense  structures,  and  a  new 
organizational  blueprint  for  the  SL-MoD.  To  help  them  implement  this  wholesale  reform 
MODAT requested the deployment of a British Military Advisory Training Team for a period no 
longer than three years (in order to avoid dependency) as a logical extension of SILSEP.32 Work 
over military expenditure, contribution to the costs of demobilization and resettlement of ex-combatants, legal 
and constitutional advice, assistance in the establishment of civilian control of intelligence services, and civic 
and state-society training for the armed forces. These elements were now encompassed in DfID’s brief under a  
new “Poverty and the Security Sector” policy paper. In 2000 the role of security in development was further  
consolidated by the UK Government’s  2000 White Paper on International  Development,  Eliminating World  
Poverty (Albrecht and P. Jackson 2009, 29).
31 Inter alia:  subordinating the AFRSL to a new Ministry able to develop a defense program, bid for its funding, 
oversee all stages of the budget process, and discuss defense policy not just internally but also with Parliament  
and the people; providing an updated legal framework that enshrined civilian protections and subordinated the 
AFRSL to  civilian  authority;  developing  fair  and  transparent  terms  and  conditions  for  the  armed  forces 
workforce;  drafting  a  national  defense  policy  enjoying  broad  consensus;  and  creating  a  civilian-military 
establishment that conformed to the needs of Sierra Leone (DfID 1999b).
32 At the time MODAT was aware of reluctance back in London to longer-term commitments, and was advised by 
UK-MoD and FCO to limit its proposal to 3 years to avoid “flutters” in London (Albrecht and P. Jackson 2009, 
46–47). As an interesting anecdote,  it was discussed but then discarded to appoint a British officer as Chief of 
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began with a proposed institutional design borrowed from a simplified British MoD template, 
with  little  opportunity  for  consultation,  validation,  or  review  due  to  operational  constraints 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2003d, 16). In March 2000 President Kabbah formally adopted the 
proposals to restructure the SL-MoD headquarters and the armed forces, and the head of the civil 
service was asked to post “suitable civilian candidates” to senior administrative and management 
positions. By May 2000 the total number of MoD civilian staff had risen to 35 civilians and 14 
military officers: a Director General,  two Deputy Secretaries, six Directors, and four Deputy 
Directors, assisted by 22 ancillary and support staff; they were joined by the Chief of Defense 
Staff and his team of 13 officers (Government of Sierra Leone 2003b). Together, these 49 people 
were supposed to run the 18 specialized directorates and 8 defense committees that composed the 
new Ministry’s executive and oversight architecture.
In December 2001 a “Management Plan” was produced with buy-in from senior officials 
which encapsulated the structure of the new Ministry  (Government of Sierra Leone 2001b, i). 
This document was in fact the first attempt to hold the SL-MoD to modern public administration 
standards, and as of my visit in late 2010 it reportedly remained the main reference for internal 
organization and regulation of the Ministry, especially in terms of objectives and performance 
monitoring  (482060 MoD civilian official,  Freetown 2010). Two outside bodies, the Defense 
Council and National Security Council, would help define defense policy, while expenditures 
and general management issues could be reviewed by the Parliamentary Committee on Defense 
and Presidential Affairs. The Minister of Defense himself and the Director General, as principal 
Defense Staff; tellingly, the idea had came from within the President’s environment, fueled by his mistrust of the 
military.
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accounting officer,  would be the main conduits  of accountability to Parliament.  Internally,  a 
“robust and effective financial and managerial audit” unit was to be established, and a Defense 
Management  Board  was  supposed  to  oversee  the  Ministry’s  functioning.  The  ambitious 
Management Plan was, in every sense, a child of SILSEP’s early days, when the promises of 
reform seemed greater  than  its  challenges.  On the  surface,  the  political  leadership  of  Sierra 
Leone  seemed  very  much  invested  in  defense  restructuring  through  administrative 
transformations. On January 21st, 2002 the new Ministry of Defense was formally inaugurated at 
its new HQ in the former Paramount Hotel in Tower Hill, a multiple-floor, Y-shaped building 
located 100 yards up the street from State House. The war was declared officially over, and the 
Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone were christened by President Kabbah as the new 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF).
As part  of  the preparations  for  the eventual  formulation of  a  comprehensive  defense 
review, and despite the absence of a national security policy, the Ministry launched consultations 
towards the drafting of a Defense White Paper.  The Paper would clearly explain,  not just  to 
Sierra Leonean citizens but also RSLAF troops themselves  (Kondeh 2008, 2), the reforms that 
were sweeping the new MoD and armed forces; it would also provide clear definitions of roles 
and responsibilities in the new civilian-military bureaucracy. Despite reservations by DfID and 
IMATT about  the  pertinence  and  accuracy  of  its  findings,  in  July  2003  President  Kabbah 
presented the Defense White Paper in front of paramount chiefs and other national authorities, 
calling for “Armed Forces that function and operate within the law, that are loyal, accountable 
and  subject  to  the  control  and  oversight  of  the  democratically  elected  and  appointed 
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Government”  (Government of Sierra Leone 2003b foreword). The Paper publicized the MoD 
organizational chart based on the MODAT blueprint, by then populated by 165 staff, as well as 
the recent restructuring of the RSLAF. From a defense policy perspective, it included a cursory 
assessment of threats (small arms, ex-combatants, corruption) and security priorities. Absent a 
national security or defense policy, it provided some strategic guidance in the form of Defense 
Missions and their subordinate Military Tasks. Above all, it signaled -both to the population and 
to donors- a fundamental thing: ownership, a commitment to continue down the difficult but 
necessary path of reform towards more effective and accountable armed forces. Administrative 
civil-military institutions were ostensibly on the march.
It  was not  at  all  clear,  however,  that  the leading donor would  be  able  to  ensure the 
enforcement,  and not  just  the  design,  of  such  novel  constraints.  A mere  year  after  the  first 
SILSEP advisers set foot in Freetown, the UK had found itself more militarily involved in Sierra 
Leone than it had expected, after deploying in May 2000 a reinforced paratrooper battalion to 
evacuate foreign nationals and provide support to the embattled UN peacekeepers. Within a few 
months,  after  the sudden repatriation of SILSEP’s Civilian Adviser due to illness, the Sierra 
Leone Ministry of Defense and armed forces were left in the hands of a British-led International 
Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT), which by early 2001 had placed some of its 65 
foreign officers  at  different  rungs of  the military hierarchy.  IMATT was supposed to  pursue 
reform of the SL-MoD according to the MODAT blueprint, but its interference with the formal 
chain of command actually served to undermine SILSEP’s aims (DfID 2002, 9). By the time the 
second MODAT Civilian Adviser arrived in Freetown in July 2001 as part of SILSEP phase two, 
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a civilian-led MoD reform effort had morphed into a military-led troop training and restructuring 
program under IMATT. This led some MoD civil servants to lament a return to the old ways of 
the 1980s and 1990s, when the military had recurrently prevailed over their civilian overseers 
(Albrecht and P. Jackson 2009, 60).
Despite  very  visible  displays  of  political  commitment  on  Kabbah’s  part,  a  SILSEP 
progress  report  written  in  mid-2002  was  dominated  by  a  decidedly  somber  tone:  political 
commitment  to  reform  seemed  “fragile”;  there  was  a  sense  within  civil  society  that  ex-
combatants had somehow been rewarded for their atrocities; the Government of Sierra Leone 
was  unable  to  financially  support  security  sector  reform  efforts  without  generous  British 
assistance;  and  program  management  from  a  distance  had  demonstrated  inability  to  fully 
apprehend local complexities and respond to changing conditions (DfID 2002, 2–3). Most MoD 
personnel were “unaware of the nature and scope of the SILSEP Programme and none were 
involved in its day to day management and co-ordination”  (DfID 2002, 5). Complicating this 
picture, there was a widespread perception among the armed forces that civil servants had “taken 
their jobs from them,” despite lacking the kind of military and security experience that would be 
necessary to oversee and mange them. Some officers were still being promoted for reasons of 
political expediency, while others continued to reject the idea of civilian control  (International 
Crisis Group 2003b, 6–7). As to the civilians themselves, they saw the top military as barriers to 
reform  (Kondeh 2008, 6). In the meantime, IMATT officers had become the source of some 
friction with local staff, owing mainly to different managerial cultures, impatience with corrupt 
practices, and a tendency to bypass the chain of command. There was a perception among local 
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civilian and military personnel that IMATT was exercising too much political power (DfID 2002, 
10–12). Finally, at the political level things did not look any brighter. There was no reform of the 
armed forces act in sight, and Parliament had yet to examine the MoD, placing a large question 
mark on the effectiveness of legislative oversight. President Kabbah held the post of Minister of 
Defense and thus had complete authority over the new and ostensibly apolitical RSLAF.33 All 
these factors combined added to the troubling realization that, three years in, SILSEP was not 
delivering all that it had hoped to.
The first complete snapshot of the progress of reforms came in late 2003 when, as part of  
a systematic effort to diagnose the status and needs of ministries, departments, and agencies, the 
DfID-funded Governance Reform Secretariat conducted a management and functional review 
(MFR)  of  the  Ministry  of  Defense,  which  found  an  organization  seriously  afflicted  by 
institutional  dysfunction  (Government  of Sierra Leone 2003d).  Ministry personnel conducted 
their affairs with vague or simply nonexistent job descriptions, and grading and salary scales 
presented anomalies, such as military officers reporting to civilians of inferior grade or enjoying 
significantly higher salaries (as much as 400%) than civilian counterparts of the same grade. The 
directorate structure borrowed from the British template  was in  place,  after  a fashion, but it 
worked in a fairly inconsistent and incoherent manner. Directorate plans were often too vague to 
be of any use in actual management and monitoring, and those that were detailed -mainly on the 
military side- were not being properly followed due to personnel limitations and shortages (some 
directorates had a grand total of one or two staff). Individual directorates did not have a separate 
33 This also meant that  there was no additional representative at cabinet or National Security Council meetings, 
leaving the Ministry cut off from top decision-making and senior MoD administrators without clear political and 
strategic guidance.
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budget line, and the Director General’s approval was required for every expenditure; in fact, the 
MFR team found that it had become customary to seek authorization from the Deputy Minister 
himself  for  every  expense.  On  the  military  side,  official  lines  of  reporting  had  often  been 
bypassed,  with  commanders  dealing  directly  with  the  Ministry  on  administrative  matters. 
Information sharing was also deficient, with most directorates keeping their own separate file 
systems and a central registry utterly unable to manage records and documentation. There was no 
effective ministry-wide coordination and monitoring mechanism. As to what senior management 
were doing with their time instead of directing policy and monitoring its implementation, it was 
found that they spent most of their time in committee meetings.
Prevailing  deficiencies  in  the  enforcement  of  the  newly-designed  administrative 
institutions had in fact not been met with much resistance from the United Kingdom as a donor. 
If  anything,  the  combination  of  IMATT’s  presence  and  the  lagging  pace  of  institutional 
development within the MoD had led to a shift of focus in the defense restructuring process: a 
program born out of a desire to subordinate a restive military to civilian authority and modern 
public management practices was gradually morphing into a technical effort for the right-sizing 
and training of the RSLAF.34 With IMATT at the helm of the restructuring process, the Ministry’s 
main function had been reduced to ensuring some semblance of financial survival for itself and 
for the troops.
An April  2007 review found that  UK advisers  were still  working,  eight  years on,  to 
develop basic systems and processes within the Ministry of Defense, and in general many of the 
34 The 14,500-strong RSLAF of 2002 would eventually be reduced, after much lobbying from IMATT, to a target  
size of 8,500 troops by 2010. IMATT’s “Plan 2010” was also to contribute to the eventual drawdown of the 
mission, which was committed until 2012.
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MFR recommendations were yet to be implemented (DfID 2007b). Key civilian staff had been 
transferred to other ministries and agencies, taking with them their much needed institutional 
memory. The MoD/RSLAF lacked an overall strategy, with an engaged deputy minister who 
wielded no political authority and a cabinet with political authority but no engagement (Le Grys 
2008; Albrecht and P. Jackson 2009, 144). Their own lack of progress did not deter local staff 
from developing a “clear and well-coordinated” line of criticism towards British advisers for lack 
of audits, poor communication, and failure to learn. In a display of unwarranted optimism, the 
review drafters saw such criticisms, while unjustified, as a manifestation of local ownership of 
the principles of democratic control, accountability, and sound management  (DfID 2007b, 12). 
The 2008 SILSEP Completion Report celebrated that “While there are a number of areas in 
which the MOD could improve, particularly in the area of civilian and military interaction, it is  
recognised as one of the best developed Government Ministries in Sierra Leone” (DfID 2008b, 
4). Such an assessment clearly understated the lack of institutional enforcement at the MoD, 
though probably not the even worse situation of the rest of the public sector. But the impact of a 
state-building agenda cannot be measured by a counter-factual: there had been clear aims from 
the beginning, clear conditions for assistance, and readily identifiable problems. A closer look 
revealed a pattern of prevailing subversion underneath the veneer of modern bureaucracy.
By the end of the 2000s several things had changed in the defense apparatus of Sierra 
Leone.  In  terms  of  civilian  command,  a  dedicated  Minister  of  Defense  was  appointed  by 
President Ernest Bai Koroma. In terms of civilian accountability, the internal audit unit actually 
started to do its job, producing the first comprehensive systems review of the MoD. But while, in 
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principle,  the  appointment  of  a  proper  minister  could  mean  greater  strategic  and  policy 
leadership for civilian and military directorates, in practice what the audit documents reveal is a 
public organization that had all the trappings of modern bureaucracy but little of its content.
For a ministry that was celebrated as a triumph of new civil-military relations, these had 
remained the major point of contention. According to a civilian official, although relations were 
“cordial,”  the  aim  of  subordinating  military  structures  to  civilian  oversight  had  not  been 
welcomed by the military, and there was still  some resistance  (482060 MoD civilian official, 
Freetown 2010). Friction was manifest in procurement and budgeting decisions, with uniformed 
personnel prone to interpret cuts to their proposals as personal attacks, and accusing civilians of 
not  caring for the military  (169417 Senior MoD civilian official,  Freetown 2010). A foreign 
adviser characterized this cleavage within the MoD in both material and ideational terms:
The RSLAF (with some justification) view the civil servants as lazy, greedy and corrupt 
and overrule/ignore them constantly. They resent the vesting of the financial power with 
the DG and the Minister and wish a system more akin to that enjoyed by the police – who 
control their own budget and have no strong links with the Ministry of Interior. . . .
The  civil  servants  feel  intellectually  superior  and  view the  RSLAF as  poorly 
educated thugs. They find it hard to stand up to their military colleagues and never talk up 
during meetings, even to defend themselves. The civil servants have no knowledge of 
how the military works and are disinclined to learn. They don’t understand the military 
ethos (113629 Expatriate SSR official, online 2011).
Trained and competent staff were sorely needed in many of the Ministry directorates, 
there were no job descriptions, no documents outlining the duties of departments, and no system 
for  transferring  knowledge  to  their  successors:  there  was  simply  no  institutional  memory 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2010d, 15). By late 2010 senior civilian staff consisted of two 
deputy secretaries,  two senior assistant  secretaries,  and two assistant  secretaries,  all  of them 
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overseeing the directorates for finance and budget, staff and administration, procurement, and 
policy  (482060 MoD civilian official,  Freetown 2010). Private gain was the main motivation 
within the civilian side of the Ministry. As a foreign adviser put it: “the civil servants appear only 
to be interested in activities that incur mas mas (their share of the profits of corruption) – they 
concentrate solely on procurement,  pay,  manpower and finance – all  of which are lucrative” 
(113629 Expatriate SSR official, online 2011). Auditors regularly found that expenditure tracking 
forms got stuck in key offices, with too many signatories for the approval of purchases and 
officials continuously bypassing the control measures. When transactions were actually recorded, 
it  was  done  only  in  a  very  vague  fashion;  in  a  particularly  comedic  example,  the  auditor 
wondered whether all RSLAF soldiers had the same foot size, seeing as there were no details on 
a purchase order which simply read “boots” (Government of Sierra Leone 2008c, 3).
With  financially  succulent  directorates  concentrating  civilian  attention,  the  MoD had 
been left without the capacity to determine its own policy. According to a foreign adviser, there 
was “an almost universal inability to plan ahead for more than a few weeks at a time” (113629 
Expatriate SSR official, online 2011).  In fact there was no one in charge of the directorate of 
policy, which had become “very ineffective for an extended period” and for all practical purposes 
was by late 2010 non-existent (Government of Sierra Leone 2010d, 15). The previous Director of 
Policy had been moved to procurement after the incumbent had been caught on video soliciting 
bribes and charged by the Anti-Corruption Commission. Despite outside efforts to re-establish 
the policy directorate, the Director General resisted all efforts to do so (113629 Expatriate SSR 
official, online 2011). In the meantime, the 2003 Defense White Paper remained the main policy 
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guideline, and the 2001 Management Plan the principal administrative reference (482060 MoD 
civilian official, Freetown 2010). Whenever IMATT stood back to function as facilitator instead 
of driver, strategic efforts amounted to little more than “facsimiles of the current state, with no 
view of the future shape and direction of the RSLAF” (113629 Expatriate SSR official, online 
2011). There was a Defense Policy Committee, gradually becoming more effective in terms of 
adopting policies, but without a policy directorate there was never a chance of implementation. 
“The concept of a defense strategy implies accountability,” said an adviser, “and they would 
rather work to a woolly concept -against which they cannot be held accountable- than against a 
strategy”  (113629  Expatriate  SSR  official,  online  2011). The  absence  of  a  defense  policy, 
combined  with  military  officials’  reluctance  to  bring  these  concerns  up  to  their  political 
principals,  resulted  in  a  disjuncture  between  the  threat  environment  and  an  imperfectly-
implemented restructuring process (882175 Senior MoD military official, Freetown 2010). The 
Defense Policy Assumptions had become the main guidance for the RSLAF, even when their 
considerations reflected a greater concern with financial expediency than strategic imperatives.35
Administrative institutions were in place at the Ministry, but not the will to enforce them. 
Internally,  the  performance  agreement  signed  by  Minister  of  Defense  Paolo  Conteh  with 
President  Koroma  (as  part  of  the  latter’s  agenda  of  running  Sierra  Leone  like  a  “business 
concern”)  was  never  fully  monitored  within  the  MoD,  with  the  Defense  Policy  Committee 
reluctant  to  include  the  topic  on  its  agenda.  Even  when  the  Minister  himself  was  the  one 
35 The DPA 2011-2013,  for  instance,  suggested  couching  requests  for  aircraft  and  vessels  in  the  language of 
stopping transnational  organized  crime in  order  to  attract  donor  funding;  they also  painted  the  benefits  of  
participating in UN peacekeeping missions in terms of the income they generated through the reimbursement  
process (Government of Sierra Leone 2010b).
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requesting procurement and expenditure information, these were seldom forthcoming. When an 
accountant had attempted to establish more transparent processes he was reportedly moved away 
at  the  insistence  of  the  Director  General  (113629  Expatriate  SSR  official,  online  2011). 
Cooperation with the audit unit was a constant source of concern: there was reportedly greater 
reluctance to share information with internal auditors than with external ones, and in general a 
“control mentality” was lacking  (121912 MoD civilian officials, Freetown 2010). Perhaps this 
was partly the fault  of auditors,  who tended to focus on monitoring store deliveries as they 
presented  the  most  lucrative  opportunity  to  exact  bribes  from  contractors  in  exchange  for 
signature of receipts (113629 Expatriate SSR official, online 2011). When submitted to the audit 
committee, its very composition worked to undermine the reports: the very directorate chiefs 
who may have had conflicts of interests were in charge of endorsing the recommendations, and 
the Civil  Adviser and legal  director  had by late 2010 only recently been added as members 
(121912 MoD civilian officials, Freetown 2010). When some “proper” audits were done at the 
behest of the Ministry of Finance, either the Director General or the Minister himself sat on the 
report, and their findings were not implemented (113629 Expatriate SSR official, online 2011).
Externally,  the parliamentary committee tasked with overseeing the MoD and RSLAF 
worked based on cursory readings of the general press, and its main objective was always to 
ensure that the military had what they needed and that they were “cared for.” The reason why 
there was no new defense act was that issues of well-being (housing, healthcare, infrastructure) 
took priority. Regardless, as an MP sitting in the committee told me, democratic ideals could not 
be preached in the military: one could not bring the army to its knees just to satisfy civil society 
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(841259 Senior elected official, Freetown 2010).36 In light of the inability and unwillingness of 
Parliament to exercise oversight, the Office of National Security and National Security Council 
Coordinating Group had become the de facto civilian overseers of the security sector, but their 
effectiveness was heavily affected by the personality of the individual occupying the office of 
National  Security  Adviser  (113629  Expatriate  SSR  official,  online  2011). Ultimately,  the 
executive had been left with all but absolute control of the security sector, unencumbered by 
neither comprehensive legislation nor institutional administrative checks of the sort that SILSEP 
was hoping to establish back in 1999. The British intervention had thus succeeded in securing 
civilian  command of  a  historically  subversive  military,  but  the  administrative  institutions  of 
civilian accountability existed in paper only.
6.5  The Structure of Incentives for Security Sector Reform in 
Liberia
In contrast to Sierra Leone, security sector reform in Liberia did not enjoy the dedicated 
attention  of  a  major  bilateral  partner.  The  combination  of  a  reluctant  leading  donor,  an 
uncoordinated array of  UN missions,  and a  plethora of  bilateral  donors,  resulted in  an SSR 
process that failed to deliver on all key aid principles. Local ownership was segmented at best, 
and  reliant  until  late  in  the  process  on  foreign  planning  and  institutional  design.  Donor 
interventions were piecemeal and ad hoc, with no external actor adopting a whole-of-government 
approach, and all but the UN unwilling to state the kind of long-term commitment required for 
36 Here is another example of the interviewee’s understanding of civil-military relations: “One cannot say that you 
cannot do a coup—you can if you have a purpose that is supported by the nation; if you don’t have a purpose you 
should stay in the barracks.”
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successful SSR. Finally,  donor coordination was defective from the beginning, and was only 
coalescing around informal consultations six or seven years after the end of the conflict.
Public Will and Private Incentives
The restructuring of the Liberian security sector had been on the political agenda since 
the very beginning of the civil war. Already in 1991 the Interim Government of National Unity 
presided by Amos Sawyer had tasked a cabinet committee with recommending modalities for 
military restructuring, such as demobilizing only the personnel that had been irregularly recruited 
outside of the normal vetting process. After assuming power in 1997, Taylor had also constituted 
a committee with a similar mandate, whose recommendations for restructuring and the creation 
of  a  new  officer  corps  he  simply  ignored  (Samukai  2004).  On  August  18th,  2003  the 
Comprehensive  Peace  Agreement  became  the  supreme  source  of  SSR  policy  in  Liberia. 
However,  it  would not be until  the summer of 2005 that the Minister of Justice convened a 
national  dialogue,  in  which  delegates  agreed  that  SSR  should  have  proceeded  from  a 
comprehensive national security and defense review which had yet to be carried out  (DCAF 
2005). In 2007 the new President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, mandated the Governance Commission 
to provide intellectual leadership for the SSR process, and it seemed that finally the Liberian 
government would seize control of the transformation of its own security apparatus. A National 
Security Statement was adopted in February 2007, followed by a National Security Strategy in 
January 2008. The 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, under its first pillar devoted to Peace 
and Security, soon became the main clearinghouse for implementation of the National Security 
Strategy and Matrix together with the specific individual agency strategies, as well as for donor-
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stakeholder discussion of issues affecting security reform. It is hard to say whether the challenges 
of implementing these new institutional frameworks were any greater than in Sierra Leone. They 
were certainly no smaller.
With  the  assassination  of  President  William  Tolbert  on  April  12th,  1980  and  the 
establishment of the People’s Redemption Council, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) achieved 
a gigantic leap from obscurity and derision into political control of the country. As President of 
Liberia, Samuel Doe increased substantially the size of the AFL, complementing a 6,000-strong 
brigade with a new National Coast Guard. He assured the political affinity of the armed forces by 
shifting the demographic make-up of the AFL away from Americo-Liberians (a vestige of the 
Tubman and Tolbert regimes) and swelling the officer corps with natives of the South Eastern 
regions of Liberia, mostly belonging to his Krahn ethnic group. The Liberian National Police 
followed a similar path, and the constant instrumentalization of the Liberian security sector in 
support of regime interests became a major source of dysfunctionality,  which would become 
apparent  during  the  conflict  and  post-conflict  years  (Ebo  2005,  14).  When  warlord  Prince 
Johnson and his fighters killed Samuel Doe in August 1990, the AFL all but collapsed, to the 
extent that in 1992 the president of the interim government, Amos Sawyer, had to rely on a  
parallel 1,000-strong paramilitary group for his protection (International Crisis Group 2009, 4).
By the time he was democratically elected President in 1997, Charles Taylor was faced 
with a weakened but still deeply hostile, Krahn-dominated armed forces who held him personally 
responsible  for Doe’s death.  Rather than attempt to  restructure the army across ethnic lines, 
however, Taylor set out to disband part of the AFL and neglect the rest into near dissolution. In 
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November 1997 he retired 2,400 soldiers, most of them Krahns, and by late 2001 two additional 
rounds  of  retirement,  totaling  4,000  men,  led  to  the  virtual  disappearance  of  the  AFL 
(International Crisis Group 2002a, 13). Taylor then merged part of his National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) into the army, although the Deputy Defense Minister at the time said that these 
troops were “on the orders but not the payroll of the government” (“Taylorland under siege: The 
victorious warlord hasn’t made the transition to civilian politics” 1999).
While he starved the AFL troops, whose salaries were often many months in arrears, 
Taylor rewarded handsomely certain elite units closer to him. These infamous groups included 
his personal protection force, the 300- to 800-strong Special Security Service; the elite Anti-
Terrorist Unit led by Taylor’s son Chuckie, numbering up to 6,000 fighters, 2,500 of whom were 
in  Monrovia;  and a  215-strong paramilitary Special  Operations  Divisions  within  the  Liberia 
National Police (LNP). The police itself was heavily politicized, with most of the 4,000 officers 
recruited from the NPFL; like other groups, “the police were never used in the defense of the 
public but as personal instruments to secure Charles Taylor’s political  agenda” (International 
Crisis Group 2004, 19). Other NPFL-related forces included the 1,500 “Jungle Lions” militia in 
Monrovia, as well as a Special Strike Force in the provinces (International Crisis Group 2003b, 
7–8). Though dedicated to basically the same tasks, all these units were organizationally distinct 
and mutually independent, answerable to Taylor alone; it was his way of preventing the kind of 
cooperation that may lead to a coup. By the time the conflict ended in 2003, the security sector 
was bloated, corrupt, and populated by “ad hoc” creations with overlapping functions  (DCAF 
2005; Government of Liberia 2006a; Gompert et al. 2007). It had become “the dumping ground 
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for political cronies and loyalists, many of whom were highly incompetent”  (Government of 
Liberia 2006a, 12). Civilian command and accountability were absent. 
Donor Aims and Agendas
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement embodied the first set  of international aims for 
security sector reform in Liberia.  Article VII mandated that the Armed Forces of Liberia be 
disbanded and restructured  with assistance  from ECOWAS, the  United  Nations,  the  African 
Union, and the International Contact group for Liberia. More specifically, the parties requested 
“that the United States of America play a lead role in organizing this restructuring program.” 
Article VIII, in turn, requested the United Nations Civilian Police to “assist in the development 
and implementation of training programs for the LNP [Liberia National Police].” A division of 
labor was thus established whereby the Americans would lead SSR for the military, while the 
United Nations mission would take charge of SSR for the police.  And that was it.  The first 
comprehensive review of this distribution of labor and its effects was not actually carried out 
until late 2006, when a report by the RAND Corporation provided a cursory threat assessment, a 
set of guiding principles and criteria, as well as a security concept and core functions from which 
it proposed a governance architecture and several force structure scenarios (Gompert et al. 2007). 
The agenda of foreign support for SSR in Liberia was simple: there was no agenda.
Much as the United States could have played the role of leading donor given its close 
historical links to Liberia, by all accounts Washington had been extremely reluctant to become 
engaged in the troubles of its long-time African client. By the time the second civil war ended 
with the ouster of Charles Taylor, in 2003, the United States was already engaged in Afghanistan 
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and Iraq, and the tribulations of a small West African country, regardless of past connections, 
seemed an unnecessary distraction. Even the crucial American role in creating the remarkably 
strong United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was interpreted at the time as an attempt to 
facilitate  quick disengagement  for  the limited United States presence under cover  of  a  solid 
multilateral  mission  (International  Crisis  Group  2003a,  13).  In  any  event,  during  the  CPA 
negotiations the United States had demonstrated a willingness to carry out the restructuring of 
the  Armed  Forces  of  Liberia,  which  were  modeled  after  the  American  military  and  had 
traditionally relied on the expertise of Americo-Liberian officers with experience there. Hence 
the “lead role” in military restructuring as mandated by Article VII of the Accra Agreement. The 
US pledged $35 million after signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the NTGL (Malan 
2008,  28),  and  it  hired  for  the  task  two private  security  contractors,  Pacific  Architects  and 
Engineers  (PAE)  and  DynCorp.  Throughout  the  entire  process  of  military  restructuring  the 
United States would exhibit as a donor a clear preference for administrative design and little real 
concern for the politics of enforcement.
Donor Coordination
With  no  clear  shared  agenda  and  the  leading  role  divided  between  the  notoriously 
byzantine United Nations and the politically uninterested United States, SSR in Liberia remained 
a  disjointed  and  haphazard  effort.  Beyond  the  defense  restructuring  process,  which  was  an 
American  fiefdom,  the  security  sector  was  the  subject  of  a  myriad  assistance  and  training 
projects that not always related to each other in a meaningful way. The US was not providing any 
leadership beyond the restructuring of the army, while the cautiously apolitical UNMIL felt that 
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its Security Council mandate should have made it the natural leader of the SSR process (Malan 
2008,  24),  a  perspective  that  wasn’t  shared  by  bilateral  donors.  Coordination  through  the 
Security Pillar of the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee overseeing the PRSP 
was generally limited to information sharing. This led Sweden to launch a parallel Security and 
Justice Donor Coordination Group, and to create the first inventory ever of donor support for 
justice  and  security  sectors  reform.  A March  24th,  2011  draft  of  the  document  included  45 
separate  projects,  of  which 20 targeted  the Liberia  National  Police  (US Embassy,  Monrovia 
2011). The United Nations Police division, tasked with training and supporting the LNP, was 
itself composed in the spring of 2011 of officers from 39 nationalities; a frequent complaint 
heard around the security community in Monrovia was that recruits did not even know what 
hand to salute with anymore.
Security sector reform in Liberia closely follows the fourth explanatory type outlined in 
chapter 2, diversion, a clear case of “too many cooks” in which contradictory donor objectives 
left  the  entire  administrative  process  of  SSR in  the  hands  of  the  very agencies  that  it  was 
supposed to reform. Given the powerful legacies of private capture resulting from decades of 
politicization, it would be extremely difficult for even the most committed government to secure 
the  adoption,  let  alone  implementation  of  the  new  -and  much  needed-  command  and 
accountability institutions.
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6.6  Tracing the Process of Security Sector Reform in Liberia
 There was a fundamental problem with the way in which the 2003 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement  had  approached  security  sector  reform,  an  “original  sin”  which  reverberated 
throughout  the  following  decade.  Even  though  Article  VIII  of  the  Agreement  was  entitled 
“Restructuring  of  the  Liberian  National  Police  (LNP)  and  Other  Security  Services”  (my 
emphasis), with the arrangement that emerged at the CPA thirteen of the fifteen security agencies 
that the NTGL had inherited in fact remained “orphans” of SSR assistance.37 The basic political 
and conceptual challenge for the transitional and -from 2006 onwards- elected governments of 
Liberia would be how to simplify and re-arrange a bloated and corrupt security sector in order to 
ensure civilian control and financial sustainability, while enjoying only piecemeal and disjointed 
support from about a dozen bilateral donors and a multifaceted UN system.
Discussions of SSR in the Accra peace negotiations had focused on technical aspects, 
such as training, restructuring, and professionalization of the security forces. Therefore at the 
beginning of the process there had been no road map for the administrative transformations that 
should  accompany technical  reforms.  The transitional  government  simply inherited  the  CPA 
framework and, for the first few years of reform, strategy constantly followed a few steps behind 
action.  The political  track of SSR planning began with the involvement of foreign non-state 
actors: the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the African Security 
Sector Network, and the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King’s College, London. 
37 National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Drug Enforcement Agency, Special 
Security Service,  Customs – Financial Security Division, Ministry of National Security,  Forest  Development 
Authority  Police,  National  Security  Agency,  Liberia  Petroleum Refining  Company Security  Force,  Liberia  
Seaport  Police,  Liberia  Telecommunications Corporation Plant  Protection Force,  Monrovia  City Police,  and 
Roberts International Airport Base Safety (Gompert et al. 2007, 41ff).
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In July 2004 they began researching Liberia’s fledgling SSR process, and in their consultations 
they found that UNMIL was acting in isolation from the American intervention in the armed 
forces,  and  that  key  agencies  like  the  National  Security  Agency,  the  National  Bureau  of 
Investigation, or the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization were being completely neglected. 
There was no wider governance framework for SSR, and the general consensus among Liberians 
was  that  they  did  not  fully  own  the  process  (Ebo  2005,  53–55). Absent  a  coherent  SSR 
framework “each component of the security system is undergoing changes in the expectation 
(assumption?)  that  pieces  of  the  puzzle  would  all  fit  together  once  reform  had  been 
accomplished” (Ebo 2005, 19).
The  Governance  Reform  Commission  (GRC),  established  in  April  2004  through 
executive order of the NTGL Chairman as the main domestic policy planning agency, had yet to 
become involved. After the RAND report had been conducted, but before it was published, the 
GRC had actually taken the first step towards proper Liberian ownership by commissioning a 
local  SSR  expert  to  conduct  an  assessment  of  the  security  sector.  The  exercise  found  a 
conflicting legal framework dominated by the 1986 constitution, the 2003 CPA, and the 2003 
UN Security  Council  Resolution  1509,  which  had  enabled  the  continued  supremacy  of  the 
president over the legislature. It analyzed the overlapping functions of every security agency and 
recommended the  abolition  of  four  of  them which  had redundant  investigative  and policing 
mandates (Government of Liberia 2006a). But by that time the RAND report had become the de 
facto national SSR strategy, and its main recommendations -reinvigorating the National Security 
Council  and supplementing the police with a small  quick-response unit  capable of low-scale 
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combat- were added to the existing plans for training the police and overhauling the armed forces 
(Malan 2008, 25). There was a feeling at the time within the Governance Reform Commission 
that the American SSR team was “muscling out everybody else” (Malan 2008, 23).
When in 2007 the new President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, transformed the GRC into a new 
Governance Commission (GC) and mandated it to provide intellectual leadership for the SSR 
process, its consultations were criticized by the US security assistance team and by Liberian 
“securocrats” who felt that an open process would be too time consuming and could compromise 
national security  (Jaye 2008, 8). According to the GC Chairman, former Interim President of 
Liberia Amos Sawyer, the Minister of Defense, Inspector General of Police, American SSR team, 
and National  Security Advisor  all  shared  a  certain  preference  for  secrecy and “opaqueness” 
(Malan 2008, 34). Disagreements notwithstanding, a National Security Statement was signed in 
February  2007  as  a  result  of  the  Governance  Commission-led  process,  calling  for  a 
“comprehensive, integrated and coordinated” SSR strategy in order to streamline and rationalize 
a  more  accountable  and  professional  security  sector  (Government  of  Liberia  2007d). The 
Statement also called for a reform of the relevant national security and defense acts, as well as 
for the participative drafting of a National Security Strategy, which was launched soon thereafter. 
The new Strategy was adopted by the National Security Council in January 2008, after what one 
key participant describes as a “very long and very heated” process of consultations (739520 SSR 
expert, Monrovia 2011).
It  was the  impending completion  of  Liberia’s  Poverty Reduction  Strategy Paper  that 
pushed all actors to finalize the Strategy (Government of Liberia 2008d; Jaye 2008, 8). In fact, 
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the Strategy did not contain a policy plan for security sector reform as such, but a historical 
overview of security challenges, a detailed assessment of external and internal threats, a series of 
overarching  security  objectives,  and  a  blueprint  for  a  more  coherent  national  security 
architecture. An Implementation Matrix was appended to it in order to integrate the Strategy in 
the PRSP framework, but it ultimately relied on the development of individual plans for each 
agency. In terms of legislation, discussion began on the need to rewrite the National Defense Act 
(which  I  discuss  in  the  next  section)  and  to  draft  a  comprehensive  National  Security  and 
Intelligence Act which could address some of the duplication and overlap that the GRC report 
had  found.  The  adoption  of  the  PRSP  also  brought  with  it  a  new  centralized  forum  for 
coordinating SSR efforts between donors and Liberian authorities through the regular meetings 
of the Liberian Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC), a deliberative body tasked 
with coordinating the national reconstruction agenda of Liberia. In addition, a new position of 
SSR Coordinator was created with DfID assistance inside the office of the National Security 
Advisor (334277 Senior SSR official, Monrovia 2011).
 However,  as a Liberian SSR expert  told me, there simply was no synergy of effort: 
donors  were  not  coordinated  among  themselves,  and Liberians  weren’t  either  (739520  SSR 
expert,  Monrovia  2011). All  ministries  and  agencies  were  underfunded,  so  that  agreeing  on 
strategic  priorities  was  nearly  impossible;  with  every  security  agency  focused  on  its  own 
survival,  “everything  [was]  a  shopping  list  of  priorities”  (160802  Bilateral  donor  official, 
Monrovia 2011). The presence of many small donors was a blessing in disguise, as according to 
a bilateral SSR official the LNP “will ask money from anyone who’s willing to give,” but was 
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not capable of coordinating itself the support it was receiving. Moreover, despite informal efforts 
(like the inventory compiled by the Swedish mission) to develop an increasingly coordinated 
donor voice, it  was not clear how strong the resulting message could ever be, given that the 
Minister of Justice and the President knew “what everyone is ready to pay and not pay” and 
would be ready to circumvent official fora and call directly upon the US Secretary of State or the 
Special  Representative  for  the  Secretary General  (231865 Bilateral  donor  official,  Monrovia 
2011). There is an even more fundamental question: Did all these separate interventions succeed 
in promoting strong command and accountability institutions?
In terms of civilian command, the achievements were more formal than substantial. For 
instance, it had been envisaged in the National Security Policy Statement to conduct subsequent 
reforms of the National Security Strategy. However, at the time of my visit in early 2011 not only 
had it not been reviewed since 2008, it had not really been implemented; and it was unclear 
whether  the  young SSR Coordinator  had  the  political  gravitas  necessary for  influencing the 
National Security Advisor (739520 SSR expert, Monrovia 2011). Following the Implementation 
Matrix, specific agency strategies had been developed for the Liberian National Police, Bureau 
of Immigration and Naturalization, National Fire Service, and the corrections department; but the 
Drug Enforcement Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, and Ministry of National Security, 
all of which the Governance Commission had marked for dissolution, were held in stasis pending 
legislative reform through a new National Security Reform and Intelligence Act (334277 Senior 
SSR official, Monrovia 2011). The draft Act had been stuck in the Senate for years, facing strong 
resistance from the security bureaucrats whose livelihoods were threatened by it (Government of 
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Liberia  2011;  160802 Bilateral  donor  official,  Monrovia  2011;  334277  Senior  SSR official, 
Monrovia 2011). Which meant that at least the legislature was playing some role in defining 
security sector legislation, after being marginalized from the SSR process since the beginning 
(Ebo  2005;  Government  of  Liberia  2006a;  Jaye  2008).  Still,  according  to  a  central  SSR 
participant,  the  overlapping  responsibilities  between  legislative  committees  had  caused  a 
“competition for primacy, undermining the emergence of an effective parliament”; he had found 
“no  evidence  to  suggest  that  they  have  been  involved  in  other  important  decision-making 
processed concerning the shape of Liberia’s SSR programme”  (Jaye 2008, 19). As a bilateral 
donor official  remarked,  it  is  difficult  to foster accountability when the legislature is  “just  a 
popularity contest”  (160802 Bilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). Liberia, after all, had a 
very presidential government -“Ellen Johnson Sirleaf with her star pupils as ministers”- which 
was not particularly keen on legislative reform; and such was the government that donors were 
forced to deal with. On top of that, donors themselves had tended to neglect oversight with their 
focus on technical changes and material capacity (467906 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 
2011). Accountability institutions, therefore, were also weak.
By  mid-2011,  eight  years  to  the  signing  of  the  CPA,  it  was  unclear  whether  the 
institutional reforms to the Liberian security sector would be sustainable at all. Was there true 
local commitment to change? Donor officials in Monrovia were generally pessimistic. “You can’t 
own something you can’t control, and you can’t  control anything if  you don’t  pay for it,” a 
multilateral official told me. “Proper local ownership would mean no external proposals. But this 
is a problem when all that is requested is equipment, vehicles, or salaries, with no rationale” 
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(467906 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). For instance, the United States had created 
a Professional Standards Division within the LNP, but this had not really had an impact in actual 
behavior:  “Because they didn’t  invent  it,  they do not believe in  it”  (231865 Bilateral  donor 
official, Monrovia 2011). Or, as a senior UNPOL officer complained, “There is an LNP Strategic 
Plan, but whose plan is it?” (632098 Senior UNPOL officer, Monrovia 2011) New systems had 
been put in place, but it all still depended too much on personalities, not on institutions (160802 
Bilateral donor official,  Monrovia 2011). The top eight people within the LNP were political 
appointees, all of them accountable to a ninth political appointee, the Minister of Justice. These 
individuals,  more than any regulation,  defined the LNP, and they were prone to challenging 
foreign imposition. “‘You are importing ideas,’ they will say. ‘You don’t understand our country, 
our culture, where we come from,’ even if some local officials are not even sure what crimes are 
codified under Liberian law, while foreign officials study it and refer to it constantly”  (632098 
Senior UNPOL officer, Monrovia 2011). A 2011 study of the LNP found an incapable police 
force in which “corruption and petty bribe seeking [was] still pervasive”  (Search for Common 
Ground/SIPRI  2011). And  yet  according  to  an  International  Crisis  Group  report,  the  most 
troubling issue was the widespread suspicion in Monrovia that the upper hierarchy of the LNP 
was unwilling to deal with such problems, and that the higher levels of government were not 
inclined  to  demanding  a  change  of  behavior  (International  Crisis  Group  2009,  19). As  one 
bilateral donor official said, the only reason that the government of Liberia had great strategic 
plans for the AFL, LNP, etc., was because donors themselves had to have strategies. But the only 
way to have local officials implement these strategies was to work side by side with them, and to 
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have penalties for noncompliance. In the end, she believed, the limitations of the SSR process 
were caused as much by Liberian politics as usual as by donor acquiescence with it: “Shame on 
us,” she ruefully said (231865 Bilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011).
There was one aspect of security sector reform, however, which was not afflicted by the 
confusion  of  multiple  donor voices.  The Armed Forces  of  Liberia  had  been assigned to  the 
United States under the CPA and the surrounding tacit agreements among international actors. 
Could the US achieve meaningful administrative change when free from the competing agendas 
and standards of other donors?
6.7  The United States, DynCorp, and the Restructuring of the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (2003-2011)
In 2003 the solution to the problem of what to do with the splintered and demoralized 
AFL once Charles Taylor was gone was anybody’s guess. After arriving in Liberia, the head of 
UNMIL,  Special  Representative  for  the  Security  General  (SRSG)  Jacques  Paul  Klein,  had 
questioned the need to retain the AFL altogether, claiming that soldiers “only play cards and plot 
coups” (International Crisis Group 2004, 18). The idea of a demilitarization of Liberia, relying 
instead on a stronger police and a border security force, seemed attractive at the time, especially 
after the CPA had left the disarmed AFL and Ministry of National Defense (MoND) in the hands 
of Taylor’s former Defense Minister (International Crisis Group 2003a, 7). A Military Advisory 
Committee comprising the chiefs of staff of AFL and rebel groups LURD and MODEL, as well 
as representatives from Ghana, Nigeria, US, and ECOWAS, was set up with UNMIL assistance 
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to  ponder  the various  alternative approaches.  After  reviewing the  1998 restructuring  plan,  it 
proposed in March 2004 the creation from scratch of a 6,500-strong Liberian National Defense 
Force (Ebo 2005, 17–18). However, the Committee was later dissolved “on the reasoning that it 
was an interim arrangement” (Ikpe 2007, 19), and by that time the US government was already 
pursuing its own approach to fulfilling its CPA commitment.
In January 2004 the US Department of State dispatched an assessment team to Liberia, 
which was followed in May by a joint “subject matter expert assessment” by personnel from the 
Department of Defense and two private security companies, DynCorp International and Pacific 
Architects  and  Engineers  (PA&E).  These  early  missions  were  guided  by a  purely  technical 
mentality, and their plans included no mention of institutional capacity at the Ministry and AFL 
(McFate 2008, 652). Despite the expectations of Marine units deployed in Chad and Niger with 
the Pan-Sahel Initiative that they would be responsible for training the new AFL (International 
Crisis Group 2009, 9), the Department of Defense concluded that it did not have the capacity to 
carry out SSR itself. Instead, it requested bids from DynCorp and PA&E, with which it had a  
preexisting  Indefinite  Delivery/Indefinite  Quantity  contract  for  security  support  in  Africa.  A 
division of labor was reached: DynCorp would demobilize the Armed Forces and Liberia and the 
Ministry, and organize the recruitment and training of the new personnel, whereas PA&E would 
provide organizational and mentoring support for the new units  (McFate 2008, 646). With no 
specific guidelines in the CPA as to “how” to restructure the AFL, the US had contracted the task 
out  to  two  private  firms  without  consultation  with  local  stakeholders  (334277  Senior  SSR 
official,  Monrovia 2011). The resulting strategy would fully demobilize and rebuild the army 
315
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 6
from the ground up, to the dismay of some AFL members, who expressed their frustration in a 
letter to the Minister which decried the new plan as a violation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (Jaye 2008, 6).
DynCorp submitted its proposal for the initial Force Structure and Table of Organization 
and Equipment to the Department of State in July 2005, calling for a completely new AFL with 
about 2,000 troops.38 How this specific number was reached was the subject of much speculation 
in Monrovia at the time. The official explanation was financial: 2,000 soldiers was all that the 
Liberian government could afford to pay. An International Crisis Group report questioned this 
reasoning, through, estimating that 500 regular salaries was all that the current budget would 
allow; it even wondered whether it was the Americans themselves who perhaps were unwilling 
to pay for anything beyond 2,000 troops (International Crisis Group 2006, 6). The obscurity of 
the whole process led to some creative speculation: “The (possibly apocryphal) story circulates 
in Monrovia that in 2005 U.S. Ambassor John Blaney, at lunch with the Transitional Government 
Chairman Gyude Bryant,  came up with  the  number  of  soldiers  Liberia  could  afford  to  pay 
regularly by making a quick calculation on a napkin” (International Crisis Group 2009, 5). In any 
case, there were no doubts that 2,000 was a number defined by monetary considerations and not 
by any kind of serious threat assessment  (Ikpe 2007, 16), and it was acknowledged by the US 
that it would not be a large enough army in case of another rebellion (McFate 2008, 647). It is 
not surprising, thus, that the decision to contract DynCorp became a strong source of resentment 
38 The actual number was 1,928, including “a brigade headquarters company (103 personnel), two light infantry 
battalions  (663  personnel  each),  an  engineer  company  (162  personnel),  a  military  police  company  (114 
personnel), a training company (180 personnel), a military band (40 personnel), and three military personnel at 
the  Ministry  of  Defense,  which  was  overwhelmingly  civilian  in  composition.  Although  this  blueprint  has 
changed over time, the original concept for the AFL remains consistent” (McFate 2008, 647).
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among Liberian security actors, especially the legislative committees on defense and security, 
which felt marginalized from the process (Government of Liberia 2006a, 13). Some even argued 
that the use of a private company was a strategy for “plausible deniability” on the part of the US 
government should the process fail  (DCAF 2005). More importantly, the complaint was raised 
that the American plan had a very narrow focus on technical military restructuring, with little 
attention to civilian management (Ebo 2005, 53). This was cause for concern in a country where 
the Ministry of National Defense had historically enjoyed little authority and the armed forces 
had been controlled by the president without any legislative check (Gompert et al. 2007, 47). 
According  to  Sean  McFate,  who  was  Program  Manager  for  DynCorp  and  led  the 
restructuring  program in  Liberia,  the  reform of  the  AFL consisted  of  five  phases:  political 
consultation  with  key  stakeholders,  safe  demobilization  of  the  legacy  force,  recruiting  and 
vetting, equipping and training, and finally fielding of the new force. Virtually every element of 
this program was “sui generis,” as there were “no textbooks on comprehensive SSR” (McFate 
2008, 647–648). Although DynCorp’s contract had been awarded by the Department of State in 
the summer of 2004, it was not officially initiated and funded until May 2005, when NTGL 
Chairman Bryant approved, after months of consultations, the demobilization plan. Between July 
and January a total of 13,770 legacy soldiers were discharged with severance packages ranging 
from $285 to $4,300  (Malan 2008, 29). In October 2005 a two-year recruitment and vetting 
process  began that  processed more than 12,000 applications  for the new AFL, while  on the 
civilian side restructuring of the Ministry of National Defense began in April  2006 with the 
retirement of some 400 civilian personnel. A month later the new Defense Minister, Brownie 
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Samukai,  flew to  the  US in  order  to  participate  in  the  joint  drafting  of  a  National  Defense 
Strategy for Liberia, the adoption of which was later hindered by the ongoing political wrangling 
around the National Security Strategy. The first class of AFL recruits graduated in November of 
that year, and in March 2007 they were followed by 119 civilian MoND personnel who had 
undergone a 17-week training course (McFate 2008, 649–650).
The US SSR Program was funding every aspect of the restructuring, except for salaries 
themselves, which were covered by the government of Liberia. But the restructuring was not “a 
US closed shop,” as the Governance Reform Commission had criticized: there was a Defense 
Support Group for Liberia composed of donors contributing equipment or training to the AFL, 
such as the United Kingdom, Ghana,  Nigeria,  China,  or  Sierra  Leone  (433809 Senior  MoD 
civilian officials,  Monrovia 2011). Still,  as the main donor the United States had a  defining 
impact on the restructuring of the AFL, and when its funding fell short, as it often did, it slowed 
down DynCorp’s program and thereby the whole process of reform. These kinds of delay only 
increased the overall costs of the SSR effort, as DynCorp operated under a “cost plus overhead” 
basis that charged the US government for the every hour its employees (82 expatriates and 239 
Liberians in late 2007) were deployed on the ground, even if they were sitting idle (Malan 2008, 
42; McFate 2008, 651).39 Funding shortages had a clear impact on training, too, like in the case 
of the elimination of the human rights, humanitarian law, and civics modules after DynCorp was 
forced to shorten the basic training period for recruits (McFate 2008, 653).
Oversight remained a problem throughout the whole process. The US military official 
monitoring DynCorp’s contract, a seaman with no experience in military restructuring or contract 
39 In the first half of 2007 the combined costs of DynCorp and PA&E totaled $18 million (Malan 2008, 42).
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oversight, was forced to rely on the private company for virtually every policy decision, even 
when these were suppose to emanate from the US government. The American Embassy staff 
-overstretched  and  overburdened  as  it  was-  often  relied  for  its  coordination  with  local 
stakeholders on DynCorp, which itself had no vote in the consultation process but wielded de 
facto agenda-setting power. McFate actually saw more benefits than drawbacks in this informal 
arrangement,  as  a  “dispassionate”  actor  like  DynCorp was  able  to  promote  ideas  and attain 
consensus without falling hostage to political imperatives in Monrovia or Washington (McFate 
2008,  651–652). This  optimistic  assessment  was  not  shared  by  some  of  his  Liberian 
interlocutors. For the Governance Commission Chairman, the prospect of an apolitical, short-
term commitment from the United States was a cause for concern, given the role that the US-
trained AFL had played in Liberia’s recent history. According to him, “The image of DynCorp 
creating an armed elite [was] disconcerting to many Liberians”  (Malan 2008, 46). The main 
problem was that, from the very beginning, the American involvement had tended to neglect the 
accountability dimension of  security sector  reform. For  instance,  the initial  assessments  that 
Pentagon officials conducted in 2004 contained no mention of the need to establish institutional 
capacity within the Ministry of National Defense (McFate 2008, 652). The demobilization plan 
itself was adopted with some support from the NTGL and the Ministry,  but the process had 
completely sidelined the transitional legislative assembly; since the legislature was the only body 
with the constitutional power to disband the army, some elected officials would later argue that 
the dissolution had no legal basis (Ikpe 2007, 19).
When the time came to reform the legislation governing the AFL, which dated back to 
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1956, the United States yet again mishandled the political side of reform, both in terms of the 
drafting process and of the bill itself. The initial bill proposed by President Johnson Sirleaf was 
controversial to the point of being later withdrawn by her government. The reviewed draft was 
written by MoND staff and the American SSR Team, with guidance from the Minister of Defense 
and a counselor from the Ministry of Justice, in a closed process that was criticized from within 
the American team itself (Malan 2008, 82). Unsurprisingly, the revised National Defense Act of 
2008 largely neglected the legislature;  it  focused too narrowly on the army instead of civil-
military relations  (739520 SSR expert, Monrovia 2011; Government of Liberia 2008a). While 
the Senate’s consent was necessary for the Chief of Staff’s appointment by the President (Section 
3.2.b) and the legislature had to approve any military deployment outside Liberia (Section 3.6.a), 
the  Act  only  required  the  President  to  “expeditiously”  communicate  to  the  legislature  the 
operational deployment of the AFL inside the country (Section 3.5), and the President retained 
autonomous authority over the appointment of all officers over the rank of lieutenant (Section 
7.10). There was a provision for legislative oversight of accountability and auditing (Section 
9.7), but it somewhat cryptically called on the Legislature to “remain cognizant of the national 
security  interest  of  the  country.”  Besides  occasional  consent  on  appointments  and  the 
constitutional clause on auditing, then, the legislature was left by the Act outside of the defense 
planning, budgeting, and review process, relegating it to the familiar role of rubber-stamping the 
president’s decisions.  In terms of intra-organizational administrative institutions,  the National 
Defense Act of 2008 reaffirmed the civilian control of the military (Section 3.1), and stipulated a 
joint  military-civilian  strategic  planning process  between the  Chief  of  Staff  and Minister  of 
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National  Defense  (Section  3.2.e).  Accountability  requirements  were  reflected  in  specific 
provisions for the acquisition and accounting of equipment,  property,  and funds,  including a 
mention  of  a  “recognized  and  credible  system of  auditing  and  accountability  for  all  public 
property” that was to be established within the Ministry (Section 9.5).
Despite  the  efforts  of  the  American  SSR  Team,  however,  by  mid-2011  the  NDA 
provisions regarding the Ministry and AFL were essentially moot, due to the simple fact that the 
army was yet to become operational. A Nigerian still occupied the office of Chief of Staff, a 
lasting ramification of the decision to disband the whole officer corps and thus dispel whatever 
institutional memory remained in the AFL; without a link to the past, some cautioned, a future 
administration may very well claim that the AFL was “an Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf army” (739520 
SSR expert, Monrovia 2011). The Liberian government, for its part, remained unable to assume 
the cost of the armed forces, and it was understood that unless the US continued to provide 
much-needed financial and technical support, the AFL would not be operational any time soon 
(334277 Senior SSR official, Monrovia 2011). At the time of my visit it was reportedly an army 
without weapons, as it was said that they were kept under lock at  the American embassy in 
Monrovia (467906 Multilateral donor official, Monrovia 2011). As a result, UNMIL was still de 
facto Liberia’s military. DynCorp’s contract had ended in 2009, and a handful of foreign advisers 
had been seconded to the MoND for continued training. In 2010 the US Marine Force Africa 
began mentoring and advising the AFL, seven years later than expected. In a survey of Liberian 
perceptions of American support to SSR conducted by the US Africa Command, AFL soldiers 
complained that they had “not been adequately prepared to function as a competent army.” As 
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one private first class put it, “The Americans should not teach us things halfway” (AFRICOM 
2010,  16). A prevalent  fear  was  that  if  the  Americans  did  not  stay to  enforce  the  reforms,  
everything would collapse. “Someone must be here to monitor our system because it is spoiled,” 
an AFL officer commented.
We built a system based on corruption, and it cannot change overnight. We need time to 
develop the rule of law, and we need a mindset change... If the system that the Americans 
have built is not maintained, I will retire from the army. I pray that people will help us 
maintain the system (AFRICOM 2010, 17).
A complaint frequently heard around Monrovia’s policy and diplomatic circles was that 
Liberia would have benefited greatly from the kind of strong support that the United Kingdom 
had been providing for neighboring Sierra Leone.
6.8  Implications
The fact that UNAMSIL withdrew in 2005, whereas by 2012 UNMIL remained fully 
deployed and with no solid timetable for withdrawal, is a direct consequence of the differential 
success of security sector reforms in Sierra Leone and Liberia during the first decade of the 21 st 
century. It is also a powerful reminder that a donor’s best ideas by themselves are powerless to  
secure institutional change in a setting as adverse as a post-conflict state dominated by private 
norms  and  incentives.  Ideas  require  enforcement,  and  enforcement  entails  a  political 
commitment which not all donors can be relied upon to supply.
Despite its many shortcomings and continued reliance on external financial support, the 
Republic  of  Sierra  Leone Armed Forces  and Sierra  Leone Police  had become under  British 
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guidance  moderately effective  security organizations,  able  to  coordinate  under  a  functioning 
national  security  architecture,  subordinated  to  civilian  command,  and  increasingly  -if 
painstakingly-  accustomed to civilian  accountability.  The Sierra  Leone Parliament  may have 
remained a weak link in the security sector, but still the basic administrative institutions of a 
modern security sector were taking root in Sierra Leone a decade after collapse. A major factor 
behind these transformations had been a long-term commitment by a leading donor willing to 
adopt a whole-of-government approach -however imperfect- in search of institutional reform. 
And while Britain had fallen short of enforcing conditionality out of a fear of destabilization, its 
continued presence on the ground and attention to administrative institutions was responsible for 
a fledgling system of civilian command and, to a lesser extent, accountability.
Across  the  border,  meanwhile,  Liberia’s  donors  had sought  in  superficial  and flawed 
coordination attempts what the patent lack of local ownership could not generate by itself: a 
coherent strategy of reform. The unwillingness by both the United States and the United Nations 
mission to exercise political leadership of the process enabled local private institutions to subsist 
underneath a  plethora of  ad hoc,  window-dressing institutional  changes,  leaving the security 
sector open to control by a network of affiliates of the President who continued to sideline an 
ineffective legislature. Instead of “boots of the ground” the US had relied on private contractors, 
as if the challenges before the Armed Forces of Liberia after five decades of mismanagement and 
corruption  were  simply  technical.  It  took  seven  years  since  the  end  of  the  conflict  for  the 
Pentagon to  begin  to  assume direct  responsibility over  what  had historically  been a  willing 
American client  state.  As a  result  civilian command in Liberia was best defined,  instead,  as 
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presidential command, whereas civilian accountability had yet to make the leap from the pages 
of a forgotten National Security Strategy and a couple of flawed legislative acts into the political 
reality of a corrupt and opaque security sector.
These case narratives generate three clear and straightforward policy implications. First, 
given the political nature of security sector reform and the likelihood that security forces and 
agencies will be captured by private institutions in situations of state collapse, donors should 
devote greater attention to the challenge of securing compliance with institutional reforms by 
emphasizing administrative command and accountability mechanisms. Second, given a situation 
of donor proliferation in security sector reform efforts, attaining effective coordination without 
“donor shopping” and free-riding may be simply too difficult.  Instead,  and assuming shared 
interests, donors may be better off by fully delegating SSR program assistance and enforcement 
to a leading donor able and willing to engage with the recipient government in what is, at heart, a 
fundamentally political  dialogue.  And third,  the restructuring of entire  security organizations 
according to modern administrative principles is better carried out by public actors whose own 
personal  and  professional  approaches  have  been  shaped  by  those  same  institutions.  The 
delegation of certain SSR tasks to private contractors of the sort that the United States hired in 
Liberia  can  only  aspire  to  promote  technical  alterations  over  political  transformation,  and 
institutional design over administrative change. Privatized state-building assistance might turn 
out to be as good as no state-building assistance.
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7.  Analytical Principles for State-Building 
Assistance
It is the tragedy of modern post-conflict Africa that compared to the wasteful decades 
since independence the tragic days of foreign domination can come to be seen as a desirable 
alternative. This is not an uncommon sentiment in Sierra Leone, where the old still remember a 
time when streetlights were lit all night, buses ran on time, and schools and hospitals basically 
functioned. In what is perhaps the most extreme instance of “grass-is-greener” bias, my usual 
Freetown driver once said to me that he wished that “white people” (by which he meant the 
British) would once again take over his country. However outrageous such an idea might be in 
Western academic circles, and however troubling it actually is from an ethical standpoint, he was 
just tired of corrupt politicians incapable of delivering safety, certainty, and welfare for him and 
his family. How can a foreign state-builder reply to this unexpected plea in light of the obvious 
political causes of persistent underdevelopment?
The quick answer is that it is not that easy to make things better when they have gotten so 
bad. Even “white people” have spent most of their history killing and stealing from each other. 
“The history of the modern state,” wrote Robert Jackson, “is in no small part a history of rulers  
who are illegitimate, governments that are disorganized or incompetent, and subjects who are 
indifferent, isolated, alienated, cowed, or in rebellion” (R. H. Jackson 1990, 21–22). Beyond the 
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commonly held image of an anarchic and brutish cauldron in which warring states eventually 
congealed and moved on to absorb other political units, the lesson to take from Jackson is that 
early modern and modern Western history (and for that purpose, history since the first states 
were created in Antiquity) is basically a long sequence of failed and collapsed states: in the 
longue durée failure may not be the exception but the norm. That being said, in this concluding 
chapter I argue that the reasonable expectation of failure should not deter from supporting state-
building efforts in post-conflict environments around the world. Although most recent policy 
discourse has tended to alternate between the extreme prescriptions of complete immersion and 
complete abandonment, the fact is that there is a middle way, an aid-based approach, which can 
contribute to the reconstruction of failed and collapsed states. However, some of the principles 
espoused by current aid doctrine may hinder more than help the pursuit of this challenging task, 
and  some  of  them  need  to  be  rethought  analytically  in  order  to  ensure  that  state-building 
assistance can lay down the foundations of sustainable institutional change.
7.1  Charting the Middle Ground between Abandonment and 
Occupation
Many states around the world are barely worthy of that definition: their effective reach 
rarely  goes  beyond  the  capital,  and  they  often  have  to  rely  on  the  perpetuation  of  private 
institutions and patrimonial deals in order to maintain a semblance of authority. However, these 
same states  are  granted  full  diplomatic  rights,  seats  in  every international  organization,  and 
formal  sovereign  control  over  people  and  resources.  They  are  artifacts  of  the  politically 
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convenient but analytically misleading identification between empirical and juridical statehood. 
According to Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, the empirical state consists of “a centralized 
government with the capacity to exercise control over a state’s territory and the people residing 
in it,” by which they mean “the ability to pronounce, implement, and enforce commands, laws,  
policies, and regulations”; the juridical state, in contrast, is a legal construct, “both a creature and 
a  component of the international  society of states,  and its  properties can only be defined in 
international terms” (R. H. Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 6, 12). Jackson and Rosberg argued that 
juridical statehood, as upheld particularly by the Organization for African Unity, was responsible 
for the persistence of weak empirical states in Africa,  what Jackson would later call  “quasi-
states,” in which the “juridical cart” was placed before the “empirical horse”  (R. H. Jackson 
1990, 23). The history of a shared interest in immunizing African political units in fact can be 
traced all the way back to the era of colonization (Herbst 2000). In effect this artificial protection 
from external pressures meant that African states were rarely subject to any external incentives to 
develop  their  empirical  statehood.  Hence  the  endemic  weakness  and  eventual  collapse  of  a 
number of states. Given this historical pattern, one may wonder whether donors and other foreign 
actors can do anything to alter this pattern. More importantly: Should they?
“The question is no longer whether to bring the state back in,” wrote Afghanistan state-
builders Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, “but how to do so” (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 28). 
The issue of different modalities of intervention seems indeed to be a central issue of contention 
among practitioners and analysts, even if the spectrum of the how belongs to the even broader 
spectrum of the whether. On the one end, there are those who think that state-building is an 
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eminently  internal  process,  for  whom  intervention  serves  above  all  to  perpetuate  the 
dysfunctional  features  of  the  collapsed  state.  On  the  other  end,  some  scholars  question  the 
viability of collapsed states as political units in the first place, and advocate for the revision of 
their  sovereign  privileges  coupled  with  an  intrusive  involvement  by external  actors.  Finally, 
somewhere in  the middle we find the approach embodying the bulk of  actual  state-building 
initiatives  by the  international  community,  in  which  foreign  aid  serves  as  the  main  channel 
between external and internal factors. These ideal types are important insofar as the different 
assumptions  about  state  formation  that  they  embody  lead  to  conflicting  diagnoses  and 
prescriptions for reconstruction.
Let Them Fail!
The persistence of weak states due to the sovereign immunity accorded to them by the 
international community has led some scholars to formulate a radical notion. I call this approach 
“Let Them Fail.” From this perspective the problem is not so much one of how to build effective 
states from the ones we have, but how to let new ones rise from the ashes of the old ones. “By  
enforcing juridical  statehood,” wrote Jackson and Rosberg,  “international  society is  in  some 
cases also sustaining and perpetuating incompetent and corrupt governments” (R. H. Jackson and 
Rosberg 1982, 22). Under the guise of neutrality, “international recognition may no longer serve 
as a protective umbrella for weak regimes, but may become a potential stumbling block to fresh 
starts  and rejuvenation  by insisting  on  holding  on to  old  territorial  boundaries  and political 
entities” (Doornbos 2003, 57). But what would an alternative policy actually look like? Jeffrey 
Herbst has two prescriptions for dealing with the empirical-juridical mismatch. The first one is to 
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“decertify” old states: “to formally recognize that some states are simply not exercising physical 
control over parts of their country and should no longer be considered sovereign” (Herbst 2000, 
264, 2004, 312). The second is to allow the formation of new states, “provid[ing] international 
recognition  to  the  governmental  units  that  are  actually  providing  order  to  their  citizens  as 
opposed to relying on the fictions of the past” (Herbst 2000, 268, 2004, 314). In essence, Herbst 
and  others  are  arguing  against  an  international  legal  order  which  has  artificially  frozen  the 
process of state formation, hindering any further attempts at the development of feasible political 
units. 
Donors’ fixation with transplanting external institutional models onto recognized borders, 
according to this strand of thought, is part of a larger “outsider bias” which “tends to neglect 
local agency and indigenous capacities for institution building” (Englebert and Tull 2008, 134–
135).  The autonomous Somali  regions  of  Somaliland and Puntland,  or  Uganda after  Yoweri 
Museveni’s takeover, are some of the cases invoked by scholars arguing for unhindered internal 
state-building  (Englebert and Tull 2008; Ottaway 2003; Weinstein 2005). The problem is that 
there are few “blueprints” for this approach, due to the fact that “military men and politicians  
more prone to act than to write, and scholars have devoted little attention to the issue” (Ottaway 
2003, 256). However, there are at least some theoretical foundations within the “Let Them Fail!” 
approach on which to erect a model of internal state-building. Building on the work of Jackson 
and Rosberg, Herbst, and especially Charles Tilly, Jeremy Weinstein argues for “autonomous 
recovery”: “a process through which countries achieve a lasting peace, a systematic reduction in 
violence,  and  postwar  political  and  economic  development  in  the  absence  of  international 
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intervention”  (Weinstein 2005, 9). State reconstruction, from this perspective, is an eminently 
internal process that develops domestic sources of legitimacy and capacity. An eminently violent 
one, too, insofar as “force is what made state reconstruction from the inside possible” in such 
cases as Uganda, Eritrea, or Ethiopia  (Ottaway 2003, 257). In a way, this internal process can 
only be assisted from the outside when it is already in motion, but not artificially manufactured. 
To do so would just perpetuate the dynamics of failure that brought about collapse in the first 
place.
The problem with this approach is that the international community may not be ready to 
tolerate  decades  of  chaos  and  killing  before  strongmen  decide  to  become  state-builders. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  entirely  clear,  as  I  argue  in  chapter  2,  that  the  material  and  ideational 
incentives  of  state  failure  and  collapse  can  by  themselves  evolve  into  administrative  state-
building. For all intended purposes we could say that Charles Taylor won his war for Liberia in 
1997, and yet such victory did not translate into a consolidation of state authority and legitimacy. 
If anything, it further eroded them, sparkling a renewed insurgency against the official victor of 
the  first  civil  war.  Therefore,  letting  them  fight  seems  to  be  a  genuinely  interesting  and 
provocative prescription when uttered within the comfortable halls of academia, but not so much 
outside of it.
Let’s Build Them!
The disjunction between empirical and judirical statehood has also inspired a radically 
different agenda to state-building policy. Scholars within this approach demonstrate a concern for 
the repercussions of collapsed states in international security, and maintain that they can only be 
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truly reconstructed from the outside, even if that requires temporarily stripping them of their 
“sacred” juridical statehood. “Left to their own devices, collapsed and badly governed states will 
not fix themselves because they have limited administrative capacity, not least with regard to 
maintaining  internal  security”  (Krasner  2004,  86).  Beginning  from  the  seemingly  evident 
assumption that a collapsed state cannot rebuild itself, Stephen Krasner advocates intervention as 
a means towards “shared sovereignty,” which involves “the engagement of external actors in 
some of the domestic authority structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time.” 
These partnerships can only be effective by instituting “self-enforcing equilibria involving either 
domestic players alone or some combination of domestic and international actors. Political elites 
in the target state would have to believe that they would be worse off if the shared sovereignty 
arrangement  were  violated”  (Krasner  2004,  108).  A similar  approach  is  proposed  by James 
Fearon and David Laitin, whose prescription for overcoming the vicious circle of collapse is 
formulated  in  much  less  politically  correct  terms  than  Krasner’s:  “neotrusteeship”  or 
“postmodern imperialism,” which is similar to classical imperialism in that it would entail “a 
remarkable degree of control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions,” 
but different from it in that domination would be exercised by “a complex hodgepodge of foreign 
powers,  international  and nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs),  and domestic  institutions” 
(Fearon and Laitin 2004, 4). Thus for Fearon and Laitin as for Krasner, the way to deal with the 
negative incentives of collapse is to -forcibly- impose a new set of incentives such that it will be 
in the interest of local actors to build an effective state. 
Simon Chesterman studies precisely that kind of intrusive intervention, as exemplified by 
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episodes  of  “transitional  administration”  by  the  United  Nations  in  Kosovo  or  East  Timor 
(Chesterman 2004). By definition, this mission type is geared towards “state-building,” that is, 
towards “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens 
with physical and economic security,” an umbrella objective encompassing “electoral assistance, 
human rights and rule of law technical assistance, security sector reform, and certain forms of 
development assistance” (Chesterman 2004, 5). The core issue at stake is whether the UN -or any 
external actor, for that matter- can actually build the institutions of an effective state, and what it 
takes to do so. But there is a further practical and ethical dilemma inherent to transitional foreign 
administration: “Is it possible to establish the conditions for legitimate and sustainable national 
governance through a period of benevolent foreign autocracy?” Chesterman believes that there is 
a fundamental flaw in transitional administration—the fact that its highly idealistic ends can only 
be achieved through profoundly anti-idealistic means. This creates a paradoxical combination: on 
the one hand, “the idealist project that a people can be saved from themselves through education, 
economic incentives, and the space to develop mature political institutions”; on the other hand, 
“the realist basis for that project in what is ultimately military occupation” (Chesterman 2004, 1). 
At the end of the day, the outcome of idealism guiding action is the same outsider bias that  
Englebert and Tull, Ottaway, and others speak of. “Political structures created for foreign control 
(benevolent or not) tend to be unsuited to local rule.  The reason for this, in part,  is that the 
‘limited  goals’ of  foreign  control  (benevolent  or  not)  are  generally  determined  with  limited 
regard to local circumstances” (Chesterman 2004, 237).
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Let’s Assist Them!
In this dissertation I have explored the use of foreign aid as an inducement for state-
building in contexts of prevalent informal institutions like patrimonial administration, abuse of 
public office for private gain, and military autonomy from civilian control. The central analytical 
approach to each of these areas of reforms has been that of incentives. This is not a new idea, and 
in fact it represents the middle ground between the extremes of abandonment and occupation 
which some theorists and commentators remain fixated on. The same middle ground that the 
transnational aid community has been working on for a while. “Ultimately, change comes when 
the incentives to throw out the old policies and old institutional arrangements become stronger 
than the incentives to keep them” (World Bank 1997, 13). This does not mean that incentives can 
alter institutional paths overnight.  But the use of aid as an inducement can plant the seeds for 
behavioral adaptation and the eventual emergence of new norms, new habits, and new cultures, 
which are the true buttresses of state strength. In designing programs of state-building assistance 
in weak or collapsed states, donors should be mindful of one key analytical challenge: how to 
create longer time horizons for local public actors.
Robert Jackson characterizes state-building as a process “occurring over a long period of 
time”  (R.  H.  Jackson 1990,  10).  A “well-functioning state  is  difficult  to  construct,”  concurs 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, because of the fact that modern administration depends on “complex 
social  norms  and  values  that  involve  much  more  than  the  specific  legal  regulations  of  a 
bureaucracy.” State-building, therefore, is not just about putting the right institutions in place, but 
about  a  “restructuring  of  the  actors’  interests”  (Rueschemeyer  2005,  146–147).  This  is 
intrinsically a slow process, which can only gain momentum “once the major underlying factors 
333
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 7
of  an  old  order  have  vanished  or  been  severely  weakened,  while  those  supportive  of  new 
developments have come to predominate” (Rueschemeyer 2005, 156). Historical precedent casts 
a long shadow that we forget at our own peril, like many seem to have done at the dawn of the 
post-colonial era: “In retrospect, the vision that the new states were to build legitimate nations, 
provide wealth, and guarantee security within the span of a few decades of achieving formal 
independence was, to be kind, somewhat naïve” (Milliken and Krause 2003, 10). A commitment 
to  promoting  institutional  change from the  outside  entails  altering  the  expectations  of  those 
choosing to enforce or ignore administrative institutions, which is not a transformation that can 
be achieved within a year or two. “A more capable state can be built,” the World Development 
Report  1997  reads,  “but  the  process  will  be  slow  and  will  require  immense  political 
commitment” (World Bank 1997, 13). In light of the experience of state-building assistance in 
Liberia  and Sierra  Leone, however,  it  is  worth asking whether current development  doctrine 
allows for this sort of “political commitment.”
7.2  The Political Paradoxes of Current Aid Doctrine
Aid actors are acutely aware of the challenges of state-building and have been working 
for some time now on strategies guiding how best to promote it from the outside. The World 
Development Report 1997, titled “The State in a Changing World,” represented a crucial turning 
point in development thinking, a true achievement in the struggle by policy-makers and analysts 
to “bring the state back in.” It highlighted the need to “raise state capability by reinvigorating 
public institutions,” which entailed “designing effective rules and restraints, to check arbitrary 
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state actions and combat entrenched corruption,” and ultimately “providing incentives for public 
officials to perform better while keeping arbitrary action in check”  (World Bank 1997, 3, 7). 
Counting Douglass North among the “distinguished experts” who assisted the drafting team, the 
report drew from the same institutionalist assumptions and models that I have in this dissertation. 
However, the drafters were far more skeptic about the ability of foreign assistance to promote 
reform. International agencies could indeed “encourage and help sustain reform” by supplying 
technical  advice  and  expertise,  by  providing  financial  assistance  to  ameliorate  the  pains  of 
adjustment,  and  by  providing  leaders  of  recalcitrant  societies  a  mechanism  for  external 
commitment.  None  of  these  forms  of  assistance  would  be  any  good,  however,  given  the 
prevailing lesson from the history of foreign aid, which teaches us that “external support can 
achieve little where the domestic will to reform is lacking” (World Bank 1997, 14–15).
Later  strategic  formulations  have  sought  to  problematize  the  issue  of  political  will. 
Expanding on the 1997 World Development Report,  a World Bank strategy on public sector 
reform acknowledged that “To be effective, we need to work with our partners to understand and 
address the broad range of incentives and pressures – both inside and outside of government – 
that affect public sector performance” (World Bank 2000, para. 11). A policy guideline on state-
building  developed a  decade  later  by the  OECD illustrates  the  degree  of  sophistication  that 
development actors have reached in their policy analysis. It begins with premises not dissimilar 
form the ones in this dissertation: state-building “needs to be understood in the context of state-
society relations” insofar as it “is a deeply political process”  (OECD 2011c, 11). Despite the 
continuous  improvement  of  the  concepts  and  prescriptions  guiding  institutional  assistance, 
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however, donors are still handicapped by their own aid doctrine, which forces them to somehow 
promote state-building by working through failed state organizations.
Donors Will Always Have Paris 
The most prominent set of strategic principles guiding current aid policy is without a 
doubt the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005). Born out of a concern with aid 
effectiveness, the Paris Declaration was an laudable effort to define guidelines for the improved 
design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of official development assistance. It was 
organized around five principles (see box 7.1 below). The first one, ownership, translates into an 
exercise  of  “leadership”  by  the  aid  recipient  (“partner  country”)  on  the  formulation  of 
development strategies and programs as well as on aid coordination at all levels. The second one, 
alignment, calls on aid providers to base their strategies and programs on the ones developed by 
the recipient, and to use recipient country systems for such tasks as public finance management, 
accounting  and  auditing,  procurement,  or  monitoring.  The  third  principle,  harmonization, 
invokes  “common  arrangements  at  country  level”  for  every  stage  of  the  aid  process,  from 
planning through disbursement and all the way to evaluating and reporting, emphasizing the need 
for improved complementarity of donor efforts. The fourth one, managing for results, suggests a 
better use of measurable indicators for results-oriented evaluation and performance management 
by  both  aid  recipients  and  providers.  The  final  principle,  mutual  accountability,  calls  on 
recipients to increase the oversight role of parliament and participatory schemes, and on donors 
to supply their partners with more transparent and timely information on their aid flows; through 
these policies mutual accountability is supposed to strengthen the predictability and accuracy of 
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the recipient’s budget process as well as to increase the popular legitimacy of aid programs.
Box 7.1: Current Aid and State-Building Doctrine
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005) Principles for Good International Engagement in  
Fragile States and Situations (OECD 2007)
(1) Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective 
leadership over their development policies and 
strategies, and coordinate development actions.
(2) Alignment: Donors base their overall support on 
partner countries’ national development strategies, 
institutions, and procedures.
(3) Harmonization: Donors’ actions are more 
harmonized, transparent, and collectively effective.
(4) Managing for Results: Managing resources and 
improving decision-making for results.
(5) Mutual Accountability: Donors and partners are 
accountable for development results.
(1) Take context as the starting point.
(2) Do no harm.
(3) Focus on state-building as the central objective
(4) Prioritize prevention.
(5) Recognize the links between political, security, 
and development objectives.
(6) Promote non-discrimination as a basis for 
inclusive and stable societies.
(7) Align with local priorities in different ways in 
different contexts.
(8) Agree on practical coordination mechanisms 
between international actors.
(9) Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give 
success a chance.
(10) Avoid pockets of exclusion.
The moment one looks at the Paris Declaration as a set of institutional templates instead 
of policy aspirations, it becomes evident how much of it relies on the problematic assumption of 
identity of interests between donor and recipient, as is generally the case in modern aid discourse 
(Englebert and Tull 2008). In fact, the principles map rather clearly onto the strategic dilemmas 
of state-building assistance that I outlined in chapter 2. Harmonization will only be realized if the 
problem  of  donor  collective  action  (the  second  dilemma)  is  somehow  solved.  Alignment, 
management  for results,  and mutual  accountability,  are  all  dimensions of  the principal-agent 
relationship governing foreign aid (the first dilemma), ans as such they are all subject to the 
incentive-compatibility constraint of dissimilar principal and agent utilities. Finally, ownership is 
bound to be shaped by the interaction between public and private institutions in the everyday 
dynamics of local state-building (the conceptual premise). The Paris Declaration assumes that the 
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problem of aid effectiveness is one of transaction costs, which can be reduced to a marginal level 
through the development of a shared normative commitment to its principles. The problem with 
this agenda for action is that it actually embodies a destination more than a journey. And the 
countries that need foreign aid the most, which usually have the weakest states, are the furthest 
from said destination, and consequently face a much more difficult journey. This brings to the 
fore the practical and ethical problems of alignment, conditionality, and ownership in contexts of 
acute institutional subversion.
The Paradox of Alignment and Institutional Weakness
Under the Paris Declaration donors are supposed to disburse their aid through the very 
country systems that are most prone to capture or subversion by patrimonial elites: budgeting, 
procurement,  accounting,  and auditing.  That is,  foreign aid is to be channeled through weak 
administrative mechanisms which in the process of channeling it will somehow become more 
capable, mainly due to the use of “diagnostic reviews,” “performance assessment frameworks,” 
and  “an  associated  set  of  reform  measures”  (OECD  2005,  para.  18).  In  all  fairness,  the 
Declaration suggests that state-building is a core component of alignment. But in this process 
donors are told to play a “supporting role” to the leadership of the recipient government, and to 
measure  such  leadership  by  a  set  of  mutually  agreed  standards  guiding  the  design, 
implementation,  and  monitoring  of  reforms.  The  principle  of  alignment,  in  practical  terms, 
subsumes aid effectiveness under the politics of ownership.
What about those recipients whose country systems are simply too weak to channel aid 
effectively?  In  general  terms,  Paris  permits  donors  to  “establish  additional  safeguards  and 
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measures”  for  such cases,  but  only “in  ways  that  strengthen  rather  than  undermine  country 
systems and procedures” (OECD 2005, para. 21). More specifically, the Declaration includes a 
set of prescriptions for aid towards fragile states, where state-building becomes the paramount 
task in “environments of weak ownership and capacity.” However, the actual prescriptions for 
donors  in  such  cases  are  simply  heightened  versions  of  the  overarching  principles  for  aid 
effectiveness. On the one hand, harmonization is imbued with an added sense of urgency “in the 
absence of strong government leadership.” On the other hand, alignment has to be pursued “to 
the  maximum  extent  possible,”  avoiding  the  kinds  of  “activities  that  undermine  national 
institution building” such as bypassing country systems (OECD 2005, para. 39).
The Paris Declaration’s consideration of recipients with weak institutions was expanded 
through the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations 
(OECD 2007). In many ways the Principles represent the best practices and lessons of decades of 
state-building  interventions,  and  they  generate  politically  nuanced  and  analytically  sound 
prescriptions. For instance, the first principle asks donors to “Take context as the starting point,” 
which involves recognizing “the different constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy” 
(OECD 2007, para. 1). And the Principles do emphasize the need for longer aid engagement in 
weak  states  “given  low  capacity  and  the  extent  of  the  challenges,”  envisioning  that  the 
development of “core institutions” will take “at least ten years” (OECD 2007, para. 9). But above 
all the Principles outline a bare-bones strategy for state-building assistance, and it that respect 
they simply restate some of the ideas enunciated in Paris: coordination and alignment. Regarding 
the latter, whenever political will or state structures are just too weak the Principles suggests that 
339
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 7
donors stay away from it and instead “consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner 
country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level”  (OECD 
2007, para. 7). This is what has been later called “shadow alignment” (OECD 2011c, 82). In any 
event, the foundational prescription against confrontation is pervasive across the Principles, and 
is in fact explicitly stated at the very beginning of the document: “A durable exit from poverty 
and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership 
and people” (OECD 2007, preamble).
Ultimately, the Paris Declaration and the Principles expect donors to perform a delicate 
balancing  act:  building  local  institutions  and  organizations  by  using  them  as  long  as  they 
“provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes” (OECD 2005, para. 17). But what 
happens when such assurances are not feasible? What should donors do when local leaders are 
manifestly stalling or sabotaging the reform of country systems? Should they simply ignore state 
organizations and focus instead on regional and non-state actors, as the Principles say?
The Paradox of Ownership and State Failure
The Paris Declaration did not really condemn aid conditionality, but it did subsume it 
under the principle of alignment of donor strategies and programs with recipient ones. The text 
of the Declaration calls  on donors to “Draw conditions,  whenever possible,  from a partner’s 
national development strategy or its annual review of progress in implementing this strategy.” 
Likewise, it suggests that aid actors “Link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a 
manageable set of indicators derived from the national development strategy.” The following 
sentence  in  the  Declaration  was  surely  aimed  at  appeasing  some  of  the  more  idiosyncratic 
340
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 7
donors, as it told them that “This does not mean that all donors have identical conditions, but that 
each donor’s conditions should be derived from a common streamlined framework aimed at 
achieving  lasting  results.”  Finally,  Paris  allowed  for  exceptional  circumstances  in  which 
conditions not included in the recipient’s strategies and programs could be legitimate, but only 
“when  a  sound  justification  exists  and  would  be  undertaken  transparently  and  in  close 
consultation  with  other  donors  and  stake  holders”  (OECD 2005,  para.  16).  In  other  words, 
conditionality under the Paris terms is for the most part a mechanism for foreign aid donors to 
hold a recipient accountable to whatever reforms and policies it has “owned.”
Ownership is as popular a buzzword as it is a difficult idea to observe and measure, much 
less  implement  in  practice  (Chesterman  2007).  The  entire  post-Paris  zeitgeist  of  the  aid 
community has turned ownership into the keystone of “good” international assistance, including 
support for state-building. The 2000 World Bank strategy on public sector reform, for instance, 
began with  the  basic  premise  that  “Reform will  proceed only when a  country’s  leaders  are 
committed  and  in  the  driver’s  seat”  (World  Bank  2000,  11).  And  yet  when  the  seemingly 
commonsensical aspiration is picked apart into its conceptual components, it becomes evident 
that  by itself  it  is  less  of  a  miracle  cure  and more  of  a  recipe  for  disaster.  After  all,  “The  
effectiveness  of  governance  assistance  will  always  be  limited,”  as  Stephen  Krasner  writes. 
“Some leaders will find the exploitation of their own population more advantageous than the 
introduction  of  reforms”  (Krasner  2004,  98).  This  is  just  a  restatement  of  the  lesson  that 
“conventional technical assistance is rarely effective in settings where even minimal rules and 
restraints on arbitrary action are lacking” (World Bank 1997, 158–159). So what does ownership 
341
The Anatomy of State-Building Assistance Chapter 7
really mean as a guiding principle when recipient elites have no incentive to promote change?
First  of  all,  we  need  to  distinguish  ownership  of  aims  from  ownership  of  means. 
Everyone but the most obtuse actors in a failed or collapsed state would happily agree to the idea 
of a German-like state providing bountiful services efficiently, effectively, and in an accountable 
manner. Not everyone, however, would agree to cease collecting the rents of public office while 
everyone else seems to keep doing so. As chapter 2 has argued and chapters 4 through 6 have 
illustrated,  being a  reformer in  a  weak state  is  a  sorry proposition,  the  source of  ideational 
isolation and material vulnerability. Aims are not the problem in state-building; means are. Thus 
a government can display 100% ownership of long-term strategy without really sharing the same 
desire for the short-term sacrifices inherent to the pursuit of said strategy. That is why a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper is an unreliable guide to a recipient government’s ownership of reform. 
Besides the fact that it is often written with the assistance of foreign experts, it merely reflects 
local endorsement of a series of strategic aims, which are nothing without the assumption of the 
costly means that they require.
We can further disaggregate ownership of means into design and enforcement. Like all 
institutions,  those  that  enable  state-building  have  to  be  devised  before  they  are  actually 
implemented. And even a government unwilling to sacrifice patrimonial recruitment may agree 
in principle to the idea of a rationalized human resource policy. It may even go so far as to enact  
such policy as law. And still that does not guarantee that it will actually be ready to incur the 
political costs of enforcing the kind of administrative changes which threaten entire clientelistic 
networks. It would be political suicide. And so in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia one 
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finds multiple instances in which legislation is adopted with standards that even OECD countries 
would  envy,  only  to  remain  unenforced  and  unenforceable,  mere  paper  testimonials  to  the 
willingness of an aid-starved government to agree on a certain institutional design, but with no 
true concern for the challenges of enforcing it.
An aid-based approach to state-building has to begin with the recognition that ownership 
will almost always be contested. As I have repeated time and again throughout this dissertation, 
state-building is a political process, and as such it demands political approaches and strategies. 
Securing ownership of aims should not be too hard. Even ownership of design will be feasible, 
considering the reliance of weak governments on foreign templates and expertise for legal and 
administrative reform. However, donors should prepare for contested ownership of enforcement, 
and formulate their interventions accordingly. In other words, prepare for a fight.
7.3  Analytical Prescriptions for State-Building Assistance
In the chapters above I have shown the political struggles for state-building between local 
actors in donors in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia. The entire analytical framework for 
studying these  narratives  of  continuity and change is  built  atop  a  very simple  but  powerful 
notion: the self-restraining state. Understood as a set of organizations tasked with enforcing rules 
on citizens but also on themselves, the state becomes an arena for the competition between the 
public  institutions  of  administrative  control  and  the  private  institutions  of  capture  and 
subversion.  The balance  of  power between these two sets  of  institutions  at  any given point 
configures the macro-structure of incentives within which local public actors operate, and which 
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they themselves help sustain with everyday decisions to uphold or violate the administrative 
rules of public office. This is the core of state-building as an institutional process, as it has been 
throughout history. Everything else is auxiliary. A benign international system may allow a state 
to survive without an army. A plentiful source of natural wealth may release it from the need to 
extract taxes from its population. And the vagaries of cultural and political history may endow it 
with as many or as few regulatory functions as its citizens or leaders feel necessary.  But no 
matter what a modern state ultimately does, it is supposed to do it in accordance with the law. 
Everything else, as Weber put it, is dilettantism.
Box 7.2: Analytical Prescriptions for State-Building Assistance
(1) Focus on administrative organizations as state-building multipliers
(2) Promote administrative enforcement before regulatory reform
(3) Commit to longer and open-ended programs of assistance
(4) Design an incremental and flexible schedule of priorities and disbursements
(5) Attach clear, credible, and substantial aid conditionality to disbursement phases
(6) Share monitoring and evaluation information with citizens
(7) Pursue donor harmonization before engagement with the recipient government
(8) Disburse funds through a donor leader capable of political confrontation
Met with a situation of self-enforcing state failure or collapse, external actors face an 
almost  endless  list  of  reforms  which  their  foreign  assistance  could  target.  But  if  they  are 
interested in any outcome which relies on the honesty and professionalism of public actors, then 
administrative change becomes an evident priority. It can be matched with palliative assistance 
of the kind that ensures hospitals, schools, and even the security forces are up and running from 
the beginning. But the seeds of sustainable public good provision can only be planted via state-
building, which entails ensuring the enforcement of administrative institutions. And this requires 
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us to begin thinking about the analytical prescriptions which should guide an aid program of this 
particular nature. I outline below eight such prescriptions, derived from each of the strategic 
dilemmas that articulate the theoretical framework of the dissertation: the conflict between public 
and private institutions (prescriptions 1 and 2), the agency relationship between recipient and 
donor (prescriptions 3, 4, 5, and 6), and the collective action problem between multiple donors 
(prescriptions  7 and 8).  Some of  these ideas  I  have already touched upon in discussing the 
implications of the empirical cases, but I reformulate them here as general principles.
(1) Focus on administrative organizations as state-building multipliers
The  first  evident  prescription  of  state-building  assistance  is  focusing  on  those 
organizations whose job it is to make sure that public officials comply with administrative rules 
and regulations. These are the public bodies tasked with overseeing, auditing, and sanctioning. 
Often these organizations will  be small  and have their  jurisdiction circumscribed to a  single 
ministry or department. The internal audit unit at the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense is a 
great example. It only began to conduct audits in 2008, and its reports did not come close to 
international standards until  2010, eleven years after  the security sector reform program was 
launched by the United Kingdom. If the unit had been a priority already in 1999 or 2000, in a 
few years there could have been an established internal mechanism for performance assessment 
within the Ministry, providing DfID and the government with a steady flow of information on the 
pace of reform. Had comprehensive reports been produced at that early stage, they would have 
served as the basis for a different dynamic between DfID, IMATT, the Ministry, and the RSLAF, 
built  atop  tangible  problem  analysis  and  observable  benchmarks.  At  the  level  of  sectoral 
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administrative organizations this  potential  was realized,  albeit  with varying success, with the 
Anti-Corruption Commission in Sierra Leone and the General Auditing Commission in Liberia. 
By producing highly detailed information on the misuse and abuse of public office, these two 
organizations  generated  public  outcry  at  the  illicit  behavior  of  senior  politicians  and  civil 
servants, and provided donors with reliable indicators of compliance and noncompliance with 
their  conditions  and  recommendations.  There  is  an  even  higher  administrative  organization 
which was neglected to a large extent both in Liberia and Sierra Leone, however: the legislature. 
The prioritization by democracy-promotion programs of constituency service, then lawmaking, 
and only then oversight resulted in legislative committees unable or unwilling to exercise their 
administrative duties. As a result, the executive was virtually unchecked in both countries during 
the first decade after the end of war.
It is crucial to realize the full potential of administrative organizations as state-building 
multipliers. It follows from the concept of the state that I have used throughout this dissertation 
that the true measure of statehood or state strength is not the number of areas of social life that 
public actors regulate, but whether they comply with administrative law and norms. In a context 
of private subversion of public institutions, an enlargement of the state’s regulation of society 
will not lead to greater institutional effectiveness, but to broader incentives for private capture. If, 
on  the  other  hand,  administrative  organizations  are  strengthened  to  the  point  of  effectively 
monitoring and sanctioning the compliance of public actors with the law, then state strength 
increases across the board, insofar as all public actors under scrutiny, no matter what function 
they perform, will have a greater incentive to behave according to the template of professional 
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bureaucracy, to uphold the key principles of formalism, impersonality, and documentation in the 
discharge of their obligations as public officials.
(2) Promote administrative enforcement before regulatory reform
The second prescription follows logically from the first one: focus on enforcing whatever 
rules there are before introducing new ones. The fundamental problem of failed states is not that 
they do too little, but that they do too little according to the law. There is an understandable urge 
to promote new legislation and regulations for public organizations which do not work properly. 
And in some instances of glaring legal lacunae, improved rules are in fact very much needed. But 
this  should  not  distract  state-builders  from the  more  fundamental  problem of  administrative 
noncompliance.  Consider  the  “dark  ages”  of  the  Sierra  Leone  Anti-Corruption  Commission 
under Henry Joko-Smart in 2005-2007: the same law was in force as when Valentine Collier was 
promoting the prosecution of sitting ministers, and yet the ACC had come to a virtual halt in its  
administrative actions. Or consider the organizational blueprint that the first British MODAT 
team imported for the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense, which utterly failed to reformulate 
civil-military  relations  or  to  ensure  mutual  accountability  between  different  units  and 
departments.  At  the  most  basic  level,  the  legislatures  of  both  countries  rarely fulfilled  their 
constitutional mandates to control the executive’s behavior.
The Weberian state is an agnostic concept when it comes to the specifics of regulative 
and even administrative orders: the only necessary condition is that both are upheld by public 
actors, whether out of instrumental rationality, value rationality, or mere habit.  Western state-
builders,  in  contrast,  are  enamored  of  “best  practices”  and  other  ideal-typical  institutional 
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templates which are seldom based on any actual public organization on Earth, but are more often 
amalgams of abstract rules and blueprints. It is tempting to conclude that the major obstacle to 
state-building in places like Liberia and Sierra Leone is  the lack of proper institutions. This 
approach stems from an intrinsically optimistic view of people, which assumes that “bad” public 
officials are the result of “bad” public institutions and organizations. In this dissertation I have 
shown that the truth is often more complicated than that: “bad” public officials are the result of 
private  institutions  overpowering  public  ones.  And  those  private  institutions  are  unlikely  to 
vanish solely by adopting new public laws and regulations. A failed state with few and outdated 
laws is therefore likely to remain failed no matter how many up-to-date bills are formally signed 
into  law.  Institutional  design  can  never  be  a  reliable  indicator  of  state-building  success; 
institutional enforcement can be.
(3) Commit to longer and open-ended programs of assistance
Institutional  transformations  affecting  the  political  economy of  the  state  can  only be 
sustainable when they alter the structure of incentives faced by public officials, and as such they 
are likely to take a long time. Usually, however, donors are either politically unwilling or legally 
unable to devise projects and programs projecting further than three to five years into the future. 
This was one of the several Achilles’ heels of GEMAP in Liberia: designed by mandate to last 36 
months (even if it was latter expanded to four years), the agreement could not have possibly been 
construed as a signal that its changes would be permanent. It was evident to all corrupt public 
officials at the time that they would simply have to “wait it out” and appear to comply with 
foreign controllers and conditions for a few years. Three or five years are nothing compared to 
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four  or  five  decades  of  state  capture  and failure.  In  contrast,  the  ten-year  Memorandum of 
Understanding which Secretary for International Development Clare Short signed with President 
Kabbah sent a much clearer signal of British commitment to institutional change in Sierra Leone. 
Even  if  the  conditionality  built  into  it  was  never  fully  utilized,  the  agreement  generated  a 
widespread popular and elite expectation that the United Kingdom would be a central player in 
Sierra Leonean reconstruction. In this particular regard the Paris Declaration and the Principles 
for Engagement in Fragile States are absolutely right.
State failure and collapse generate considerable insecurity and uncertainty, and as such 
they drastically shorten the time horizons of local elites. When tomorrow can bring renewed 
violence  or  political  upheavals,  it  is  imperative  to  make the  most  of  today.  And the  choice 
between the diffuse and delayed benefits of public goods and the concrete and immediate rents of 
private  capture is  not  really a  choice.  It  is  only when the possibility of  misuse  or  abuse is  
curtailed,  and when it  will  be  so  in  the  foreseeable  future,  that  public  goods  become more 
attractive. Absent radical transformations coming from within the local political economy, it is 
up to donors to lengthen the time horizons of public actors by throwing the wrench of foreign aid 
into the gears of the structure of incentives for state capture. The shadow of the future has to 
loom large  over  the  present  in  state-building,  imbuing every administrative  reform with  the 
specter of permanence and even inevitability. This can only be ensured by providing long-term 
external support to the lonely and besieged local reformers who would otherwise fail to promote 
the public rationality of uncertain administrative enforcement.
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(4) Design an incremental and flexible schedule of priorities and  
disbursements
A long-term aid commitment has to be articulated through small, observable interventions 
that allow for a sustained political dialogue. This is nothing new, as most donors attach detailed 
logframes and implementation schedules to their projects. The difference is that narrow reform 
benchmarks need to be more incremental, and broad program triggers more flexible, than they 
both usually are. One of the failures of the 2002 United Kingdom-Sierra Leone MoU was its 
coarseness. For instance, the government was required to develop and publish within a certain 
time frame a defense white paper, or a national anti-corruption strategy. But these two program 
objectives were neither reliable indicators of reform enforcement at such an early phase, nor 
justified benchmarks for the suspension of British assistance, insofar as their development could 
be afflicted by a bevy of technical complications and delays. Now consider this hypothetical 
program of  escalated  reform:  first,  professional  auditors  are  recruited;  second,  the  auditors 
request information from ministries and agencies; third, ministries and agencies comply with the 
request; fourth, auditing reports are produced; fifth, the reports are submitted to the legislature 
for  consideration;  sixth,  the  legislature  forwards  recommendations;  seventh,  ministries  and 
agencies apply the recommendations; eight,  auditors request information on compliance with 
recommendations;  ninth,  compliance  reports  are  produced;  tenth,  the  legislature  responds  to 
compliance reports. Every one of the ten steps of this series is likely to require foreign assistance 
for  its  implementation,  but  each  of  them also  entails  a  conflict  between  private  and  public 
institutions, and thus an observable political choice. By fusing the two together, an aid program 
can  be  designed  which  retains  an  open-ended  commitment  while  disbursing  according  to 
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concrete achievements. 
Post-conflict state-building assistance needs to start reasonably small and be reasonably 
nimble. While commitment has to project far into the mists of the future, disbursements have to 
deal concretely with the fog of the present. Incremental program design would rely on gradually 
more  significant  reforms  and  indicators,  while  allowing  for  delays  in  their  attainment  and 
implementation. In that way delayed or imperfect compliance with the terms of assistance need 
not lead to a withdrawal or suspension of the donor program, which would negate my third 
prescription concerning long-term commitments. By focusing on observable political choices as 
disbursement benchmarks, which serve as screening devices for compliant and noncompliant 
public officials, such a program would reduce the uncertainty of imperfect information inherent 
to  state-building.  An  incremental  approach  would  also  allow  for  the  establishment  and 
consolidation  early  on  of  organizational  and  personal  relationships  between  donors  and 
individual public officials and departments with core administrative responsibilities.
(5) Attach clear, credible, and substantial aid conditionality to  
disbursement phases
Conditionality  is  intrinsic  to  an  incremental  and  flexible  approach  to  state-building 
assistance. But I am thinking here of conditionality which is clearly delineated, highly credible, 
and substantial enough to have an impact in the survival of public organizations and officials. 
Most aid conditionality for institutional reform, in contrast, usually falls short on all three counts. 
Of all the case narratives included in this dissertation, assistance to civil service reform in both 
countries proceeded without any predetermined conditions, as did support to security sector and 
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anti-corruption reform in Liberia. In Sierra Leone the MoU did attach some benchmarks to the 
latter  areas  of  reform,  but  these  were  generally  ignored  by civil  servants  involved  in  their 
attainment, and time after time London made the political choice not to suspend the £5 million 
yearly tranche of conditional assistance. The only case of effective conditionality that I have 
analyzed  is  the  freeze  of  budget  support  by the  UK and  the  European  Commission  to  the 
government of Sierra Leone in early 2007, following the failure to disclose audit reports on the 
use of foreign aid. However, this was at the time an unpredictable choice subject to the politics 
and personalities of the time. In any event, the structure of conditionality established by Britain 
in its long-term agreement with the government sent at best a mixed signal: even if the Kabbah 
administration defaulted on its commitments all the time, it would still receive £35 million a year 
in unconditional assistance. In contrast, following the model of open-ended commitment with 
incremental  and  discrete  benchmarks  outlined  above,  conditional  disbursements  would  be 
ubiquitous and -at least until mid-way through the program- potentially more substantial than the 
already disbursed aid.
This approach would directly contradict the Paris call for more predictable aid, and it 
could indeed have deleterious consequences for budgeting and planning, but above all it has the 
potential  to  generate  a  powerful  incentive  for  incremental  reform,  and  so  to  act  as  a 
counterweight to private institutions of official abuse and capture. This approach to conditional 
aid  disbursement  would  also  strengthen  the  incentive-shattering  potential  of  an  open-ended 
commitment, as noncompliance with even the most minor administrative reforms would freeze 
the  continued access  to  a  significant  source  of  present  and prospective aid  inflows.  Current 
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doctrine does  not  allow for  this  type  of  assistance,  insofar  as  it  considers  that  stagnation  is 
partially caused by the vices and externalities of aid dependence, which the Paris Declaration 
seeks to correct. However, aid dependence can instead be seen as leverage in the challenging 
political task of supporting administrative state-building: without aid to the public sector, it is 
local elites who really suffer. For donors who are reluctant to suspend assistance targeting basic 
public services, conditionality can simply entail a shift in aid modalities and recipients, away 
from the state and toward decentralized non-state providers, who can continue tending to the 
population  with  foreign  resources  while  political  leaders  and  their  clients  are  starved  of 
budgetary support.  Incremental conditionality would drastically change the dynamic of assisted 
state-building. Perhaps it would not do away altogether with the “ritual dances of reform,” but it 
would certainly change the tune.
(6) Share monitoring and evaluation information with citizens
One of  the  remarkable  yet  often overlooked features  of  weak states  -post-conflict  or 
otherwise- is the acute scarcity of information on government performance. With only fledgling 
or highly partisan newspapers with small  circulation,  a state-owned TV channel or two, and 
many small  and politicized radio stations,  rumor and prejudice roam free.  For the most part 
citizens lack any objective assessments of what politicians do and say, as even the most capable 
public organizations rarely have the human and technical capacity to produce and print reports or 
newsletters, much less maintain working websites. Into this information-starved social context 
enter  donors,  who  not  only  release  much  information  of  their  own,  but  can  also  assist 
administrative organizations in sharing their findings with the public. This dynamic is evident in 
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the cases of anti-corruption reform in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where zealous public officials 
like Valentine Collier and John Morlu managed to generate public outcry towards their respective 
governments  by  fearlessly  (or  tactlessly,  depending  on  whom one  speaks  to)  disseminating 
information collected by their organizations. Donors themselves can very easily use information 
to generate political pressure, as did the biting review of support for the ACC in 2007 when it  
somehow made it to an internet forum in Sierra Leone and subsequently to the press. Without 
Collier, and without the DfID report, it  is unlikely that Sierra Leoneans would have had any 
reliable  information  on  which  to  substantiate  their  suspicions  of  corruption  in  the  Kabbah 
administration, and consequently there would not have been enough public outrage for Ernerst 
Bai Koroma to seize -and to commit himself to- as a presidential candidate.
State-building  donors  should  be  constantly  aware  of  their  leverage  on  a  recalcitrant 
government  due  to  this  informational  asymmetry.  Public  institutional  change  is  a  political 
process which for the most part takes place behind closed doors inside official buildings. Even in 
advanced industrialized democracies  citizens  are  seldom aware  of  every bit  of  regulation  or 
legislation which their representatives enact and their civil servants are supposed to uphold. But 
everyone  understands  corruption.  In  a  political  struggle  of  the  scale  of  post-conflict  state-
building, donors should not be afraid to turn state capture against itself by disseminating reports 
of  dishonest  behavior  and  noncompliance  with  administrative  principles.  That  way  even  if 
external  actors  do  not  have  the  necessary political  weight  to  impose  their  conditionality  on 
reluctant elites, they can give citizens the chance to hold their public officials to account. For 
state-building assistance, information is power.
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(7) Pursue donor harmonization before engagement with the recipient  
government
In  this  dissertation  I  have  repeatedly  invoked  the  analytical  expectation  that  the 
promotion of administrative enforcement is likely to be more effective under a leading donor 
than under a donor coordination mechanism. All the case narratives that I have presented confirm 
this  expectation  empirically.  The  presence  of  a  main  foreign  interlocutor  is  not  a  sufficient 
condition for effective reform, but it does seem to be necessary. When they relied on coordinated 
donor support, both Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil service reforms were easily stalled and 
subverted  at  the  hand  of  powerful  private  incentives.  Security  sector  reform under  multiple 
donors in Liberia, likewise, was an unmitigated disaster. And even GEMAP, that much-touted 
triumph of donor coordination, failed once it became evident that it was nothing of the kind, but 
instead a disjointed collection of vaguely aligned programs. That said, there was real genius in 
the way GEMAP was born. Before they even engaged the transitional government, the European 
Commission, United States, and international financial institutions met separately and agreed on 
the terms of the potential program. When they finally took the idea to the government and other 
donors, they were able to present a united front against Chairman Bryant’s attempts to turn them 
on each other. It was this combined action, this combined pressure, which ultimately cajoled a 
transitional  government  of  warlords  and  thieves  into  signing  one  of  the  most  intrusive  aid 
interventions ever.
The Paris Declaration is entirely correct in its demand of greater harmonization between 
donors, but only as long as it takes place before alignment with the recipient government. Local 
elites in aid-dependent states are perfectly aware of the idiosyncratic features that pull donors 
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apart, and have adroitly exploited such fault lines for decades in their attempt to exact greater aid 
commitments without complying with politically suicidal conditions. An effective program of 
coordinated  state-building  assistance,  therefore,  cannot  be  designed  without  a  prior  political 
strategy. And success depends on all or most donors agreeing on a common strategy before they 
negotiate it with the government. The only way to preempt the collective action problem inherent 
in multiple-donor support for state-building is to reach a consensus before any aid is committed. 
Donor harmonization is not a technical prescription for aid effectiveness, but a political strategy 
for effective aid conditionality. Coordination between major external actors has to be resolved 
before the government comes to the negotiating table, not afterward.
(8) Disburse funds through a donor leader capable of political  
confrontation
Finally, harmonization of donor strategies is useless without the effective disbursement of 
foreign  aid  along the  lines  of  incremental  administrative  conditionality  outlined  above.  This 
requires a donor leader able and willing to establish a persistent and honest political dialogue 
with local elites about compliance and noncompliance. The United Kingdom played such a role 
-after a fashion- in anti-corruption reform in Sierra Leone, but it was not capable of doing so in 
civil service reform due to the presence of other donors, and it was not ready to do so in security 
sector reform due to the imperative of ensuring sustainable peace. In Liberia, the United States 
failed to act as a leader entirely, circumscribing its assistance to discrete and largely apolitical 
programs which were unlikely to give rise to political confrontations. Even the deployment of 
USAID  financial  controllers  in  state-owned  enterprises  under  the  terms  of  GEMAP  was 
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understood  as  a  peculiar  form of  technical  assistance,  and  expatriate  controllers  who  made 
political waves were simply moved or replaced. One lesson emerges clearly from all the cases: 
not all donors are created equal, and while bilateral donors may not always be willing to act 
politically, multilateral donors are almost surely unable to do so.
Endangered  patrimonial  elites  are  quick  to  accuse  politically  engaged  donors  of 
neocolonialism or Western imperialism. It is logical that they do so: their political and economic 
sustenance depends on a certain perception of privatized reciprocity and fair redistribution of the 
spoils of state capture. But patrimonial elites should not be the true local stakeholders of foreign 
assistance. Citizens should. And citizens in weak states crave public goods of the sorts that can 
only  be  provided  effectively  by  public  organizations  functioning  in  accordance  with 
administrative  institutions.  When local  incentives  prevent  the enforcement  of  such rules  and 
regulations, it  is up to donors to make sure that they use aid as a clear political inducement 
against state capture by unfettered public officials. Given the strategic dilemmas introduced in 
chapter 2 and illustrated in chapters 4 through 6, it is only natural to prescribe a donor leader and 
not donor coordination as the best possible agent for such political confrontation.
7.4  Conclusion
Most of the prescriptions in this chapter fly directly in the face of current development 
discourse: they are impolitic, adversarial, distrusting, political. But taken as a whole they are also 
the logical implication of six detailed narratives of post-conflict state-building assistance and of a 
solid  analytical  framework based on fundamental  social  scientific  ideas.  In  many ways  this 
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dissertation could be characterized as a theory of failure. From that perspective one could further 
claim that among my cases there is only a single instance of successful state-building assistance 
in these pages, the one targeting the Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission.  But it  is by 
explaining the logic behind failed interventions that we can begin to imagine alternative uses of 
foreign aid as an catalyst for institutional change. Therefore I consider all six cases to be positive 
ones  in  a  purposeful  sense:  they  all  illustrate  the  strategic  logic  inherent  to  state-building 
assistance, the powerful underlying incentives which can undermine even the best laid plans. It is 
not gratuitously that I have chosen the term “tension” to describe the kind of confrontational 
dynamic which that “success story” embodies: effective state-building assistance in weak states 
is bound to be a source of enormous political tension. But “tension” is far more desirable than 
“concession,”  and  it  would  appear  to  me  that  it  is  certainly  better  than  “subversion”  and 
“diversion.”
Armed solely with two simple strategic dilemmas and one conceptual premise, I have 
attempted to chart the anatomy of state-building assistance: the complex set of interactions and 
processes  linking  administrative  organizations  and  aid  donors  in  a  dynamic  of  institutional 
continuity  and  change.  In  so  doing  my  aim  has  to  reclaim  the  conceptual  relevance  of 
bureaucratic politics for the political economy of development, but also to provide the analytical 
foundations for a revitalized and more hopeful praxis of state-building assistance: better concepts 
for better policy. Aid is not dead; it is merely broken, shackled by the very principles and ideals  
that sought to liberate it from unrelenting criticism and endless self-examination. Simply put, 
foreign aid has become too timid for its own good. And if this dissertation proves anything, it is 
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that the agents of state weakness and failure are extremely adept at defeating timid opponents. 
Donors have to realize that fulfilling their aid promises necessitates coming to terms with their 
own politics; they have to recognize that the future of external support for institutional change 
lies not in caution but in boldness. All I have provided here are some analytical foundations for 
such boldness. It is up to them to turn them into effective state-building assistance.
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